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The goal of this dissertation is to determine the extent of the
pre-revolutionary Russian army's influence on the creation and
development of the body of Soviet military thought known as opera-
tional art. This theory, which deals with the preparation and
conduct of military operations at the army and front (army group)
level, had its practical and theoretical origins in the pre-1917 army
and was subsequently expanded upon by the successor Red Army. The
conclusions reached are based upon an examination of the major
military and military-theoretical developments which took place
between 1904 and 1937. Pertinent political and economic events,
relevant to the narrative, are highlighted as well.
The dissertation is divided into four chapters, each corre-
spending to an identifiable period in Russian-Soviet military histo-
ry. These include the first chapter, covering the pre-revolutionary
period from 1904 to 1917, which focuses on the military operations of
the Russo-Japanese and First World wars, as well as interwar theoret-
ical studies. The second chapter deals with military operations in
the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920, and the war with Poland, as well as
the role of the former tsarist officers in staffing the early Red
Army. Chapter three covers the decade of the 1920s and examines the
period's doctrinal and strategic controversies, including the initial
formulation of the theory of operational art, and the theory of
consecutive operations. The fourth chapter highlights the Red Army's
technical transformation from 1930 to 1937, and its effect on strate-
gy and tactics, and the development of the theory of the deep opera-
tion. This is followed by a brief epilogue detailing the effects of
the military purge on the Red Army's command and theoretical cadres,
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8INTRODUCTION
The goal of this dissertation to determine to what degree the
Soviet theory of operational art up to 1937 owes its existence to the
practical and intellectual inheritance of the pre-revolutionary
Russian army and, conversely, to what extent may the Red Army's
operational thought be ascribed to circumstances peculiar to the
Soviet regime. In the course of describing the overall development
of operational thought and practice during the pre-revolutionary
(1904-17) and post-revolutionary (1918-37) eras, I plan to reach
certain conclusions regarding the relative weight of the contribution
made by the imperial army to the formulation of operational art as it
stood by the latter half of the 1930s.
The choice of the 1904-37 period as a subject of study is
significant, and encompasses the time from the appearance of the
first modern operations during the Russo-Japanese War to the begin-
ning of Joseph Stalin's military purge. Such a broad scope of
investigation will enable the reader to examine at length the imperi-
al army's early attempts to understand the new operational level of
war, both on the battlefield and in an academic setting, as well as
similar efforts by the follow-on Red Army. The dissertation natural-
ly concludes with the physical destruction of a large part of the
tsarist-era and later military cadres and the emergence of a qualita-
tively new Red Army.
The dissertation's centrepiece, operational art, is the theory
and practice of waging war at the operational level, which, unfortu-
nately, has heretofore been almost completely unknown in the West,
even among the professional military. Moreover, even those authors
who have been aware of operational art's existence have often either
dismissed it outright, failed to understand it, or concerned them-
9selves only with individual aspects of the theory. 1
 For the sake of
clarity and consistency, I will be guided throughout by the defini-
tion given in a 1958 Soviet work, which defines operational art
(Russian, operativnoe iskusstvo) as
a component part of military art, concerned with the elabo-
ration of the theory and practice of preparing and conducting
front and army operations of the different services of the
armed forces. Operational art is the connecting link between
strategy and tactics. Proceeding from the demands of strategy,
operational art determines the methods of preparing and con-
ducting operations for the achievement of strategic goals and
serves as the point of departure for tactics, which organises
the preparation and conduct of the combined arms battle in
accordance with the operation's goals and tasks.2
Many of the theorists whose writings contributed to the devel-
opment of operational art served in both the imperial and Red armies,
thus making their role especially significant to the thesis. More to
the point, any study of the role played by tsarist-era writers in
this field must inevitably focus on the influence wielded by the so-
called 'military specialists'. Thesse were the former imperial off i-
cers who willingly or unwillingly joined the Red forces during the
Russian Civil War and who continued to serve the Soviet regime in the
postwar years as well. As the living embodiment of the imperial
military-theoretical tradition, their role is critical to any attempt
to determine the degree of theoretical continuity, or lack thereof,
between the two regimes. Particular attention will thus be paid to
the military specialists' theoretical and practical work in both the
pre-1917 and post-revolutionary periods and how their ideas were
received by the political-military authorities.
Among the thousands of military specialists who joined the Red
See W.D. Jacobs, 'The Art of Operations', Army, XII (1961), no. 4, pp.
60-64; E.N. Luttwak, 'The Operational Level of War', International Security,
V (1980-81), no. 3, pp. 61-79; J.J. Schneider, 'Theoretical Implications of
Operational Art', Military Review, LXX (1990), no. 9, pp. 17-27; L.D. Holder,
'Training for the Operational Level', Parameters, XVI (1986), no. 1, pp. 7-13.
2 B.N. Morozov, ed., Xratkii Slovar' Operativno-Takticheskikh i
Obshchevoiskovykh Slov (Terminov) (A Short Dictionary of Operational-Tactical
and Combined-Arms Words (Terms)] (Moscow, 1958), p. 188.
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Army, of particular interest are the careers of those graduates of
the imperial General Staff Academy who later came to occupy important
command, teaching and administrative posts. Since these graduates
may reasonably be considered to be the old army's intellectual elite,
their subsequent Soviet-era careers and theoretical writings merit
especially close study.
However, among the many factors to be considered are those
which inevitably distinguish the Red Army from its imperial predeces-
sor. These include the Bolsheviks' imposition of a radical political
ideology upon the army, in contrast to the relatively apolitical
outlook of the Russian officer corps before the revolution. Another
is the forced and massive industrialisation of the Soviet economy,
beginning in 1929, which also had no counterpart in the pre-revolu-
tionary years. In short, the utterly new political-economic situa-
tion which obtained following the Bolshevik coup influenced the Red
Army's technical and theoretical development in ways not dreamed of
by the old regime's officers, and was in many ways fundamentally at
odds with the military legacy of imperial Russia. It is the tension
inherent in the coexistence of these two currents that the answers to
the dissertation's central thesis are to be found.
A number of other, lesser, factors will also be examined.
Chief among these are organisational-administrative questions, such
as the persistence of the front (army group) instance of command, and
the enduring system of Stavka (supreme command)-front-army subordina-
tion in wartime. On the other hand, organisational incongruities,
such as the post-1929 creation of large air and mechanised forma-
tions, which had no counterpart in the pre-revolutionary era, will
also be examined.
The dissertation consists of four chapters, each corresponding
to an identifiable and self-contained period in Russian-Soviet
military history. Chapter I deals with the rise of the operation as
a distinct form of military endeavor prior to 1904, as the result of
socio-economic and technical changes in warfare. The chapter exam-
ines the operationally-significant features of the Russo-Japanese and
11
First World wars, and includes an extensive survey and analysis of
the interwar (1906-14) literature dealing with operations. Chapter
II is devoted to the operational events on the main fronts of the
Russian Civil War and the war with Poland, and examines salient
features of the Red Army's conduct of operations. The chapter also
examines the role the military specialists played in the Red Army's
victory. Chapter III deals with the first interwar decade (1921-29)
and the theoretical works of the former military specialists and the
'red commanders', as the more politically-attuned non-professional
soldiers who achieved prominence during the Civil War were known.
Also investigated is the role of both groups in the formulation of a
specifically Soviet military doctrine and the development of the
theory of 'consecutive operations'. Chapter IV covers the period
from the onset of massive industrialisation to the eve of Stalin's
military purge (1930-37), and encompasses the Red Army's technical
transformation from a predominantly infantry-cavalry force to a
modern mechanised army. This chapter deals primarily with the
effects of this change on the fields of strategy and tactics and the
elaboration of the theory of the 'deep operation'.
Each chapter, with the exception of the first, also includes a
brief introductory section, in which the salient political, economic,
technical and military-administrative developments of the period are
highlighted. Where useful, short biographical sketches of the more
important theorists are included in the narrative. The dissertation
concludes with a brief description of the purge's effect on the armed
forces, and an extensive explanation of the conclusions reached
regarding the main thesis.
The conclusions will be based primarily on the original, open-
source works of those theorists who participated in the development
of operational art during the period in question, as well as a number
of internal documents on the subject gleaned from the Russian mili-
12
tary archives. 3
 Other valuable sources are the collected works of
some of the major theorists and anthologies of other writings of the
period in question. 4 The dissertation will also make use of the
extensive memoir literature covering the period, which not only
provides useful factual information, but also vividly portrays the
tenor of the times. 5 Also of great value are a number of official
publications, particularly those of the Soviet period. 6
 Finally, a
number of journals contain a great deal of original literature on the
subject, written by the major participants.7
Unfortunately, a good deal of the English language secondary
source material relevant to the thesis tends to be rather superf i-
cial. This is no doubt due in part to the linguistic and archival
inaccessibility of much of the material, as well as the West's
longstanding ignorance of operational art. The great mass of these
A.A. Neznamov, Sovrernennaia Voina. Deistviia Polevoi Armii [Modern
War. The Activities of a Field Army] (St. Petersburg, 1911); N.N. Movchin,
Posledovatel'nye Operatsii P0 Opytu Marny i Visly [Consecutive Operations
According to the Experience of the Marne and the Vistula] (Moscow and
Leningrad, 1928); V.K. Triandafillov, Kharakter O peratsii Sovremennvkh Armii
(The Character of Operations of Modern Armies] (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929);
A.I. Egorov, Tezisy Doklada 'Taktika i Operativnoe Iskusstvo RKKA na Novom
Etape' [Theses of the Report 'The RKKA's Tactics and Operational Art at a New
Stage], July 1932. TsGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18; N.E. Varfolomeev,
Udarnaia Armiia (The Shock Army] (Moscow, 1933).
M.V. Frunze, Izbrannve Proizvedeniia (Selected Works] (Moscow, 1957);
M.N. Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve Proizvedeniia (Selected Works] (Moscow, 1964);
S.S. Kamenev, Zapiski o Grazhdanskoi Voine i Voennom Stroitel'stve. Izbrannye
Stat'i (Notes on the Civil War and Military Construction. Selected Articles]
(Moscow, 1963); A.B. Kadishev, ed., Vo prosy Strateaii i Operativnogo Iskusstva
v Sovetskikh Voennykh Trudakh (1917-1940 qp.) (Problems of Strategy and
Operational Art in Soviet Military Works (1917-1940)] (Moscow, 1965).
A.M. Vagilevskii, Delo Vsei Zhizni [The Cause of a Lifetime] (Moscow,
1974); L.M. Sandalov, Perezhitoe [My Past] (Moscow, 1961); B.M. Shaposhnikov,
Vospominaniia. Voenno-Nauchnvi Trudy [Memoirs. Military-Scientific Works]
(Moscow, 1974); N.N. Voronov, Na Sluzhbe Voennoi (On Military Service]
(Moscow, 1963).
6 Narodnyi Komissariat p0 Voennym i Morskixn Delam, Polevoi Ustav RKKA
(RKKA Field Manual] (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929); Narodnyi Komissariat
Oborony, Vremennvi Polevoi Ustav RKKA 1936 [1936 RKKA Provisional Field
Manual] (Moscow, 1937).
N.E. Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia v Akademicheskoi Postanovke' [Strategy
in an Academic Setting], (1928), no. 11, pp. 78-98; V.K. Triandafillov,
'Vozmozhnaia Chislennost' Budushchikh Armii' (The Possible Size of Future
Armies],	 (1927), no. 3, pp. 14-43; A. Fedotov, 'Ispol'zovanie Sredstv
Podavleniia v Proryve' (Employing Suppression Means in a Breakthrough], 3
(1932), no. 8-9, pp. 44-63.
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books overlooks the operational level of war entirely and mentions
only in passing the role of the former tsarist officers in the
formulation of Soviet thinking in this area. 8 Such works are all
too often mere recapitulations of previous studies and rarely rise
above the level of popular history. Many rely heavily on unsupported
anecdotes and lack a solid documentary base, while most tend to
stress the Red Army's technological development and give short shrift
to the theoretical side. Other works by British and American authors
are considerably higher in quality, although they too do not address
the dissertation's central thesis and tend to focus on the technolog-
ical-administrative development of the Red Army at the expense of
theory. 9 Neither do they dwell at any length on the position of the
military specialists within the Red Army; nor do they attempt to link
their activities with the development of post-Civil War operational
thinking.
More pertinent to the thesis is a handful of older, as well as
more recent, works dealing with the Red Army, which examine in laud-
able detail either the role of the military specialists or the theory
of operational art.'° These are excellent and well-documented stud-
ies which contain a great deal of valuable information on both topics
in isolation. However, in none of these works do the authors make an
explicit attempt to examine the military specialist-operational art
nexus. Moreover, nowhere do they concern themselves with pre-revolu-
tionary operational theory or the part played by the future special-
ists in its formulation.
Before proceeding to an examination of the Soviet secondary-
8 E. Wollenberg, The Red Army, trans. C.W. Sykes (London, 1938); M.
Garder, A History of the Soviet Army (London, 1966); E. O'Ballance, The Red
Army (London, 1964); B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Soviet Arm y (London, 1956).
H.F. Scott and W.F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder,
Cob., 1979); M. Mackintosh, Juc gernaut. A History of the Soviet Armed Forces
(New York, 1967).
10 D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton, 1944); F.
Benvenuti, The Bolsheviks and the Red Army, trans. C. Woodall (Cambridge,
1988); D.M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art. In Pursuit of Dee p Battle
(London, 1991); J. Erickson, The Soviet Hih Command. A Military-Political
History. 1918-1941 (London, 1962).
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source literature, a few words must be said regarding the veracity of
the materials in question. AB one historian aptly noted, the study
of Soviet military history 'resembles an exercise in forensic patho-
logy'.	 The difficulty inherent in such research stems from the
longstanding Russian-Soviet tradition of state interference in
scholarly matters, with predictably deleterious consequences for the
latter. This has often resulted in a situation in which history, in
particular, has been employed as much to obfuscate as to illuminate.
While this policy was by no means confined to the Soviet regime, the
late system's far-reaching ideological pretensions exacerbated the
situation immeasurably. The effects are particularly evident in much
of the secondary-source literature since the end of the 1920s and
have varied since then in accordance with the transient needs of the
particular leadership group. Depending upon the period in question,
political considerations have led to the glorification of the mili-
tary roles of some (Lenin, Stalin, Voroshilov) and the denigration or
historical 'disappearance' of others (Trotskii, Tukhachevskii, Sve-
chin). Even the brief period of openness at the end of the 1950s and
first part of the 1960s was motivated in part by N.S. Khrushchev's
campaign to denigrate the late Joseph Stalin's role in Soviet histo-
ry. The latest period of revelations, begun under M.S. Gorbachev,
while highly uneven and sometimes given to sensationalism, has been
far more objective and promises to be more long-lasting in its
effects. Easily the most important development of the post-1985
period for the foreign researcher has been the greatly-increased,
relatively speaking, access to the hitherto-forbidden Russian mili-
tary archives.
As one might expect, the volume of literature in Russian
devoted to the problem of the country's pre-revolutionary military
legacy and operational art is much greater than in the West. Howev-
er, many of these works suffer from the same shortcomings as regards
the dissertation's central thesis, as explained above, although for
J.D. Hartgrove, 'Chronicling Soviet Military History: The Major Works
of John Erickson', Russian History/Histoire Russe, Spring (1985), p. 96.
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different reasons. Whereas in the West much has been written out of
ignorance, in the former Soviet Union, at least until quite recently,
political constraints frequently hindered an objective examination of
the country's military past.
Unfortunately, those Soviet works dealing with the former
tsarist officers' practical and theoretical contribution to the Red
Army are almost exclusively concerned with the period encompassing
the Russian Civil War, 1918-22. This fixation, while somewhat
understandable, necessarily fails to address the officers' role
during the remaining years covered by the dissertation and consti-
tutes a serious oversight in Soviet historical research. Among these
works are several official histories of the Civil War. 12
 However,
their worth is often diminished by a politically-motivated tendency
to dismiss or ignore the role of the former tsarist officers and a
predilection for empty sloganeering. A much more valuable source for
understanding the problem, and the Civil War in general, is the
three-volume history of the conflict published at the end of the
1920s. 13 This is a deeply military history of the war and is by far
the best and most objective account from the Soviet side, and it
contains numerous facts and interpretationB which were omitted from
later official histories.
Among other useful publications dealing with the Civil War are
two collections of orders issued by the Soviet high command and the
various front commands during these years. 14 Both works are primar-
ily documentary and refreshingly free of the usual political cliches.
12 M.Gor'kii and others, eds., Istoriia Grazhdanskoi Voiny v SSSR (The
History of the Civil War in the USSR] (Moscow, 1935-60); G.A. Belov and
others, eds., Iz Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voin y v SSSR (From the History of the
Civil War in the USSR] (Moscow, 1960-61); N.N. Azovtsev, ed. Grazhdanskaia
Voina v SSSR (The Civil War in the USSR] (Moscow, 1980-86).
13 A.S. Bubnov, S.S. Kamenev and R.P. Eideman, eds., Grazhdanskaia
Voina. 1918-1921 [The Civil War, 1918-1921] (Moscow, 1928-30).
14 G.A. Belov and others, eds., Direktivy Glavno go Komandovaniia Krasnoi
Armii (19l7-1920 [Directives of the Red Army High Command (1917-1920)]
(Moscow, 1969); N.N. Azovtsev and others, eds., Direktivv Komandovaniia
Frontov Krasnoi Armii (1917-1922 [Directives of the Red Army's Front Commands
(1917-1922)] (Moscow, 1971-78).
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Together they convey an unintended but profound impression of the
former tsarist officers' degree of involvement in day-to-day military
affairs at the operational-strategic level.
There also exists a large number of more general works which
touch upon the role played by the military specialists during these
years. These generally focus on the Communist Party's efforts to
recruit the former officers into the Red Army and to establish
effective control over them. Others fleetingly treat the problem of
the military specialists as part of the Soviet regime's larger effort
to enlist the 'bourgeois intelligentsia' to its cause. Several of
these works contain valuable details regarding the employment of the
former tsarist officers and the controversy which this policy engen-
dered in both the party and the army.15
Easily the most important work on the subject of the military
specialists is A.G. Kavtaradze's study of their role in the Red Army
during the Civil War. 16 The author uses a wealth of archival and
secondary literature to construct a detailed picture of the special-
ists' life in the army, including data on their social origins,
methods of recruitment, their command and staff roles, and the
problems and prejudices which they encountered in their work.
Kavtaradze also provides a useful listing of those former officers
who served in the Red Army's general staff apparatus or commanded ar-
mies. The book is also refreshingly free of much of the ideological
boilerplate which mars so many Soviet histories of the period. On
the other hand, the work is necessarily limited, from the point of
view of the dissertation's thesis, due to its narrow focus on the
15 S.A. Fediukin, 'Ob Ispol'zovanii Voennykh Spetsialistov v Krasnoi
Armii' (On the Employment of Military Specialists in the Red Army], V-IZh
(1962), no. 6, pp. 33-44; V. Domnikov, 'Velikii Oktiabr' i Sozdanie Sovetskikh
Voennykh Kadrov' (Great October and the Creation of Soviet Military Cadres],
V-IZh (1967), no. ii, pp. 14-25; N.F. Kuz'min, 'Voennyi Vopros na VIII S"ezde
Partii' [The Military Question at the VIII Party Congress], Vo prosy Istorii
KPSS (Questions of CPSU History] (1958), no. 6, pp. 174-88; S.A. Fediukin,
Velikii Oktiabr' i Intelliaentsiia (Great October and the Intelligentsia]
(Moscow, 1972).
16 A.G. Xavtaradze, Voennye Spetsialisty na Sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov,
1917-1920 g . [Military Specialists on Service to the Soviet Republic, 1917-
1920] (Moscow, 1988).
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Civil War and its failure to examine problems of military theory.
The large body of Soviet literature devoted to the development
of the operation and operational art is equally impressive, although
the quantity of the work often exceeds its quality. The Soviets were
among the most prolific publishers of military-historical and mili-
tary-theoretical books and articles, and operational art was no
exception. This is hardly surprising, as Soviet historians always
made much of the Red Army's contribution to the development of
operational theory. Since Stalin's death, a number of valuable works
have appeared addressing these topics. Among these are several
histories of military art, as well as more specific studies.17
Others deal with individual operations and operational developments
of the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, with a minimum of politi-
cal commentary.18
The Soviets have also produced a large body of work on the
military operations of the Civil War. 19 Unfortunately, while a
number of works are highly detailed and offer a great many facts, the
value of many others has been reduced by an overtly propagandistic
17 • Marievskii, 'Stanovienie i Razvitie Teorii Operativnogo Iskusstva'
[The Birth and Development of the Theory of Operational Art], V-IZh (1962),
no. 3, pp. 26-40; V.A. Semenov, Kratkii Ocherk Razvitiia Sovetskogo
Operativnogo Iskusstva (A Short Essay on the Development of Soviet Operational
Art] (Moscow, 1960); P.A. Rotmistrov, ed., Istoriia Voenno go Iskusstva [A
History of MilitaryArt] (Moscow, 1963); R. Savushkin, 'KVoprosuoVozniknov-
enii i Razvitii Operatsii' (On the Question of the Origin and Development of
the Operation], V-IZh (1979), no. 5, pp. 78-82.
18 N.A. Levitskii, Russko-Iaponskaia Voina 1904-1905 pg. [The Russo-
Japanese War, 1904-1905], 3rded. (Moscow, 1938); 1.1. Rostunov, ed., Istoriia
Russko-Iaonskoi Voiny , 1904-1905 pg. [A History of the Russo-Japanese War,
1904-1905] (Moscow, 1977); P.V. Cherkasov, ed., Mirovaia Voina, 1914-1918.
'Lutskii Prorvv'. Trudy i Materialy k Operatsii lugo-Zapadnogo Fronta v Mae-
liurie 1916 Goda (The World War, 1914-1918. 'The Lutsk Breakthrough'. Works and
Materials on the Southwestern Front's Operation in May-June 1916) (Moscow,
1924); A.S. Beloi, Galitsiiskaia Bitva (The Battle of Galicia] (Moscow and
Leningrad, 1929).
19 Kravchenko, 'Kharakternye Cherty Nastupatel'nykh Operatsii
Krasrioi Armii v Grazhdanskoi Voine' [Characteristic Features of the Red Army's
Offensive Operations in the Civil War], V-IZh (1976), no. 3, pp. 96-102; L.M.
Spirin, Razgrom Armii Koichaka (The Rout of Koichak's Army] (Moscow, 1957);
K.V. Agureev, Razgrom Belogvardeiskikh Voisk Denikina [The Rout of Denikin's
White Guard Troops] (Moscow, 1961); N.E. Kakurin and V.A. Melikov, Voina s
Belopoliakami [The War with the White Poles] (Moscow, 1925).
18
tone and read more like didactic novels than history. 20
 This is
also the period most affected by the Stalin cult, when the Civil
War's history was distorted almost beyond recognition.21
More impressive is the amount and quality of work after 1953
covering the theoretical and technical developments of the interwar
(1921-41) period. On the whole, much of the superior work is fairly
free of ideological bluster and provides valuable insights into this
extremely rich period.
However, in spite of all the impressive work that has been done
in this area, only two recent works come even close to addressing the
dissertation's thesis: l.A. Korotkov's A Histor y of Soviet Military
Thought, and P.A. Zhilin's The Birth and Develo pment of Soviet
Military Historiography, 1917-1941. The two works are unique in
their efforts to more or less objectively discuss the role of the
former tsarist officers in elaborating a specifically Soviet theory
of war and operational art, although the latter subject's treatment
is not as complete as one would like. Neither are the authors wholly
free of a number of standard formulations and a somewhat condescend-
ing attitude towards the military specialists. On the other hand,
Korotkov's discussion of the specialists' contribution to the doc-
trinal and strategic debates of the 1920s is generally fair, and
20 Tiulenev, Sovet gkaia Kavaleriia v Boiakh za Rodinu [Soviet
Cavalry in Battles for the Motherland] (Moscow, 1957); S.M. Budennyi,
Proidennvi Put' [The Road Travelled) (Moscow, 1958-73.
21 V.A. Melikov, Geroicheskaia Oborona Tsarits yna (1918 p.) [The Heroic
Defense of Tsaritsyn (1918)) (Moscow, 1938); V.A. Melikov, 'Lenin i Stalin-
Organizatory Pobed Grazhdanskoi Voiny' [Lenin and Stalin-Organizers of the
Civil War's Victories), V-IZh (1939), no. 5, pp. 6-47.
A. Golubev, 'Obrashchena li Byla v Proshloe Nasha Voennaia Teoriia
v 20-e Gody?' (Was our Military Theory Focused on the Past in the '20s?), 3
IZh (1965), no. 10, pp. 35-47; R.A. Savushkin, RazvitieSovetskikhVooruzhenn-
vkh Sil i Voennopo Iskusstva V Mezhvoennyi Period (1921-1941 pg.) (The
Development of the Soviet Armed Forces and Military Art During the Interwar
Period (1921-1941)) (Moscow, 1989); F. Danilov and I. Kravchenko, 'U Ietokov
Sovetskoi Teorii Operativnogo Iskusstva (1921-1930 gg.)' (The Origin of the
Soviet Theory of Operational Art (1921-1930)), V-IZh (1973), no. 11, pp. 38-
45; S.A. Tiushkevich, ed., SovetskieVooruzhennyeSily . IstoriiaStroitel'stva
(The Soviet Armed Forces. A History of Construction) (Moscow, 1978);
R.Savushkin, 'K Voprosu o Zarozhdenii Teorii Posledovatel'nykh Operatsii
(1921-1929 gg.)' [On the Problem of the Conception of the Theory of
Consecutive Offensive Operations (1921-1929)), V-IZh (1983), no. 5, pp. 77-83.
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Zhilin's section on the specialists' pre-revolutionary writings is
particularly good. 	 It is indeed unfortunate that the limited size
of the two works and their broad scope of inquiry do not allow the
authors to examine these questions to any great depth.
The dissertation will also make use of a small number of
Becondary emigre sources in both English and Russian. 24
 The value
of these sources, however, is primarily limited to the pre-revolu-
tionary and Civil War periods, and their usefulness declines sharply
in discussing the post-1920 period. Also, while helpful, the worth
of these sources, like that of their communist counterparts, is often
impaired by their stridently polemical tone and a desire to settle
old scores with their adversaries.
In short, in none of the studies cited above is the part played
by the former tsarist officers in the development of Soviet opera-
tional art examined with anything approaching the necessary depth or
thoroughness, and in the overwhelming majority of cases the attempt
is not made at all. Only in the two Russian-language works previous-
ly mentioned is the subject even broached, and there insufficiently.
In almost every case the role of the military specialists, when noted
at all, is viewed almost exclusively in the context of their practi-
cal activity as Red Army commanders and administrators during the
Civil War, while their pre-revolutionary (1904-17) and post-Civil War
(1921-37) theoretical work in the field of operations is essentially
ignored. Likewise, those works dealing with the theoretical develop-
ment of operational art--almost all of them Soviet publications--only
mention in passing the contribution of a few well-known former
23 l.A. Korotkov, Istoriia Sovetskoi Voennoi Mysli [A History of Soviet
Military Thought] (Moscow, 1980); P.A. Zhilin, ed., Zarozhdenie i Razvitie
Sovetskoi Voennoi Istoriograf ii. 1917-1941 (The Birth and Development of
Soviet Military Historiography, 1917-1941] (Moscow, 1985).
24 A.A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia Russkoi Armii [A History of the Russian
Army] (Belgrade, 1933-38); A. Zaitsov, 1918 God. Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi
Grazhdanskoi Voinv [1918. Essays on the History of the Russian Civil War]
(Paris, 1934); V. Rapoport and Yu. Alexeev, Hi gh Treason. Essays on the
History of the Red Army. 1918-1938, ed. V. Treml, trans. B. Adams (Durham,
North Carolina, 1985); A.I. Denikin, Ocherki Russkoi Smuty (Essays on the
Russian Troubles] (Paris, 1921-22, Berlin, 1924-26).
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officers, and even then often fail to identify them as such, as if
reluctant to acknowledge the Red Army's debt to its imperial prede-
cessor. Nowhere is a systematic attempt made to explore the connec-
tion between the two problems and to determine their proper relation-
ship to one another. For these reasons, I believe, the dissertation




OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONAL THEORY OF THE LATE-IMPERIAL
ERA, 1904-1917
A. Introduction
Modern operational art is directly linked to the rise of the
operation as an independent sphere of military activity during the
nineteenth century and it8 continued evolution into the twentieth.
However, in order to understand the present state of affairs, it is
necessary to go back to a time when there were neither operations nor
operational art.
Strategy and tactics have existed since the beginning of
organised conflict itself, with strategy determining the overall plan
for prosecuting the war and delivering the armies and fleets to the
battlefield, and tactics executing the plan by actually engaging the
enemy. In the past, some of these tactical actions have led to the
defeat of one side's forces in a single climactic battle. At other
times, the tactical-strategic link has been less immediate, and it
often took years of seasonal campaigning to bring about a final
result. For much the greater part of military history, this two-tier
arrangement sufficed. However, as in so many other areas, the
Industrial Revolution ushered in enormous changes in the way men made
war; changes which rendered the old formula increasingly obsolete.
The most startling of these was the vastly increased ability of
the developed countries' economies to feed the material demands of
war. The large-scale introduction of the factory system ensured that
late nineteenth-century armies could be supplied with heretofore
undreamed-of amounts and varieties of military equipment. The
growing power and flexibility of this system made it possible not
only to remake a nation's arsenal within a few years, but also to
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increase output dramatically to meet the omnivorous demands of the
large national armies which were beginning to appear. The crucial
importance of these factors became apparent as early as the American
Civil War of 1861-65, in which the North's substantially larger
military-industrial base finally overwhelmed the Confederacy's
primitive war economy, despite the advantage in traditional military
virtues which the latter enjoyed. As any study of the conflict
reveals, individual valor, while still important, had begun to yield
pride of place to the cold, quantitative indices of national military
production.
The Industrial Revolution also brought about important changes
in the existing means of war, while producing a number of radical
innovations as well. The most far-reaching of these were the enor-
mous qualitative improvements in firearms and artillery. The large-
scale introduction of rifled firearms after 1850 increased both their
range and accuracy to deadly effect. This was followed by the
introduction of breech-loading weapons, magazine rifles, and smoke-
less gunpowder, all of which dramatically increased the individual
soldier's rate of fire and personal safety in holding defensive
positions. Similar developments were also taking place in the
artillery arm, where advances in fire control and range finding soon
made the indirect laying of fire possible against enemy artillery and
infantry positions. By the turn of the century, artillery ranges
were being computed in the thousands of yards, considerably increas-
ing the 'killing zone' through which an attacker would have to
advance. These changes were highly advantageous to a defender who,
fighting from trenches and fortified positions, could now engage an
attacker from a greater distance and with a greater amount of fire
and degree of accuracy than had ever been known before. Under these
conditions an attacker was likely to be repulsed with horrendous
losses, as happened to Union troops at Cold Harbor in 1864 and the
Prussians at St. Privat in 1870.
The growing primacy of the defensive gradually forced the
attacker to adapt his methods to the new reality. As advancing in
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close column formation became increasingly suicidal, the less compact
extended order caine into being as the attacker Bought to moderate the
murderous effects of the new technology. As the likelihood of a
successful frontal attack decreased, the commanders resorted more and
more to trying to outflank the defender in order to turn his posi-
tion. The efficacy of this maneuver was dramatically illustrated
during the Franco-Prussian War during the fighting at Metz and Sedan,
where two French armies were surrounded and forced to capitulate.
The victorious German army came to make the turning movement the
centrepiece of its military art after 1870, and by 1914 its scope had
grown from the tactical to the strategic sphere, as embodied in the
famous Schlieffen plan.
Technological breakthroughs in the means of communication
during this period also played a major part in revolutionising the
art of war among the industrialised states. The most prominent of
these were the invention of the telegraph, telephone and wireless
telegraph. These innovations greatly increased the control which a
commander could exercise over the battle, even from a great distance.
Now he could more effectively maneuver his scattered forces from a
single location, as von Moltke had done. It also meant that a single
commander could now control the actions not only of several corps,
but of a number of armies as well, thus setting the stage for the
appearance of the front, or army group, level of command. This
impetus to centralized control also added greatly to the power and
authority of the young general staff system.
The invention of the railroad was yet another factor which
profoundly affected the conduct of war. With the spread of a rail
net over much of Western Europe and the United States after 1850,
military planners were quick to discover that large numbers of men
and supplies could be swiftly transported over great distances in a
fraction of the time required to cover the same ground on foot or by
horse. As with the telegraph, the railroad's influence was first
felt at the strategic level, in the American Civil War, where large-
Bcale movements from one theatre of war to another were common. The
24
Prussians owed much of their success in their several wars of German
unification (1864-71) to their mastery of the railroad and its
possibilities for strategic deployment. The war plans of the major
European powers after 1870 came to be built increasingly around
precise mobilisation tables based upon the carrying capacity of the
railroads.
Along with these myriad economic-technological changes came
equally significant social ones, by far the most important of which
was the appearance of the mass national army. Until the end of the
18th century most European armies were staffed by professional
soldiers. These armies were relatively small, expensive to recruit
and maintain, and even more expensive to lose. The caution and
indecisiveness often displayed in European conflicts from 1648 to
1789 may be traced in part to the fear of losing such a large invest-
ment in a risky battle.
The French Revolution brutally swept this pleasant system
aside. The modern national army was born in 1793 with the proclama-
tion of the levee en masse, as France mobilized its adult male
population to defend the republic against the invading armies of
monarchist Europe. Although these drafts were often unwieldy on the
battlefield and lacked the discipline of the old armies, Napoleon's
military genius forged this explosion of nationalist enthusiasm into
a formidable military weapon. Alone among the members of the anti-
Napoleon coalition, Prussia adopted universal military service in
1813, and maintained it up to and beyond the unification of Germany
in 1871. The success of this policy was so complete as to compel
most of the major European powers to adopt some form of conscription
soon after: Austria-Hungary in 1868, France in 1872, and Russia in
1874. Such measures ensured that by the turn of the century not only
could most industrialised nations field a large army immediately upon
the outbreak of war, but that the call-up of trained reservists and
new recruits would raise the strength of the armies to several
million men within a few weeks. What is more, these armies were now
equipped and supported by the fabulously productive energies un-
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leashed by the Industrial Revolution. And while modern armies
demanded infinitely more in terms of materiel supply, the industrial
capacity of post-1870 Western Europe allowed the belligerents a great
deal of latitude in the allocation of human and productive resources.
It is therefore one of the ironies of history that despite the
tremendous growth in the destructive power of modern armies, by the
end of the nineteenth century the leading industrialised nations had
actually become more resistant to a single 'knockout' blow by the
enemy. The vastly increased human and productive resources at the
disposal of the modern state had the cumulative effect of increasing
its defensive 'depth' and making it nearly impervious to the kind of
climactic warfare practiced by Napoleon. Now a state could suffer
even a number of heavy reverses and, by drawing upon its vast inter-
nal resources, put together new armies to continue the struggle, as
France succeeded in doing for a time following the disasters of Z4etz
and Sedan. After 1870 the fact of the modern state's war potential
was implicitly recognised in the growing emphasis placed upon the
factor of time and the necessity for rapid mobilisation and attack in
order to preempt the enemy's preparations.
In view of the augmented 'staying power' of the modern state
and its military consequences, the European art of war was in serious
need of revision by 1900. Prior to this time the strategic art of
maneuvering one's forces to the decisive point for the grand battle
of annihilation was deemed the pinnacle of generalship in the manner
of Napoleon, and was the object towards which all commanders strived.
Von Clausewitz, Napoleon's great interpreter, stated this succinctly
in his On War: 'The major battle is therefore to be regarded as
concentrated war, as the centre of gravity of the entire conflict or
campaign'. 1 And while the commanders persisted in their search for
the Napoleonic ideal, the passage of time rendered this approach
increasingly at odds with reality.
Now the generals were discovering that heightened enemy resil-
C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), p. 258.
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ience had made an Austerlitz or Marengo all but impossible. Follow-
ing a defeat, the enemy could slip away to regroup and replenish his
forces, while the victor could rarely pursue effectively, given the
effects of his own losses and the heightened defensive powers of
modern weapons. Instead of a single battle deciding the war, one
battle now served merely to set the stage for the next one, which
might quickly follow on the heels of the previous one. This tendency
for formerly separate battles to fuse together in time became appar-
ent as early as the Wilderness fighting in Virginia in 1864. As one
Union participant in these battles later remarked:
Usually in military operations, the opposing armies come
together, fight a battle and separate again, the strain lasting
only a few days.... But with these two armies it was differ-
ent. From the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th of April, 1865,
they were in constant contact with rare intervals of brief
comparative repose
This phenomenon was repeated in the fighting around Metz during
the early stages of the Franco-Prussian War. Here, in the space of
five days (14-18 August, 1870), the German armies fought the battles
of Colombey and Nouilly, Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte and
St. Privat. At these times, when the fighting was most intense,
spreading out over several days, it became increasingly difficult to
distinguish when one battle ended and another began. Often two or
more major battles would rage simultaneously, as the single battle-
field of old was gradually absorbed into the continuous melee of
modern war.
Just as the formerly separate battles were merging in time, so
were they also joining together in terms of space. This was due in
part to the growing size of modern armies, which now had to spread
out over great distances in order to deploy effectively and turn the
enemy's flank, as well as to ward off similar attempts on the enemy's
part. The battle was also growing in depth, as the increasing range
2 A.A. Huinphreys, The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65. In The Army
in the Civil War, subscription ed. (New York, 1885), XII. 118.
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of modern weapons ensured that the fighting would begin at ever
greater distances from the actual front line, as even the formerly
inviolate rear areas became part of the battle zone. The spatial
growth of the modern battlefield can be shown by comparing two
important 19th-century battles. In 1812 the French and Russian
armies met at Borodino along a front of six to eight kilometers,
while in 1870 the Germans and the French fought the simultaneous
battles of Gravelotte-St. Privat along a continuous front of some 20
kilometers in breadth.
However, even given the presence of modern communications
technology, the enormous spatial growth of modern war after 1870 made
it increasingly difficult for a single commander-in-chief to control
all of his armies, which in the Russian case might be spread out
along a front stretching hundreds of kilometers in length. The
Russian high command sought to alleviate this problem by creating the
front, or group of armies, to serve as an intermediate command link
between the commander-in-chief and the individual army commanders.
The front first appeared in the 1900 Russian war plan, which called
for the creation of two fronts, directed at Germany and Austria-
Hungary, respectively.
The single battle thus lost its former significance and spatial
'separateness' and became increasingly subsumed under what came to be
known as the 'operation' (Russian, operatsiia), which later Soviet
theoreticians have defined as the 'totality of various combat ac-
tiOnB, conducted according to a single plan by operational major
field forces on one or several services of the armed forces for
achieving the assigned strategic or operational goal'. 3
 While
ranking above the purely tactical battle in terms of goals and forces
engaged, the operation remains subordinate to strategy, due to its
inability to bring about a strategic decision through its own re-
sources, which are only a portion of the state's entire armed forces.
It this very intermediacy which defines the modern operation and sets
Morozov, p. 189.
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the stage for the elaboration of a theory of operational art.
Thus as opposed to the colorful spectacle of the past, war by
1904 had acquired a distinctly modern countenance. The necessary
economic, technological and social requirements were now in place and
had developed to such an extent that it lacked only a major war to
illustrate just how far the operation had come.
B. The Russo-Japanese War
In northeast Asia the conflicting colonial ambitions of Russia
and Japan finally came to a head in February 1904 with the surprise
Japanese attack on the Russian Pacific Squadron anchored at Port
Arthur. Although Admiral Togo's ships did not succeed in destroying
the squadron as planned, they were able to bottle up the Russian
vessels within the harbor for the remainder of the war. At one
stroke, the Japanese were able to seize command of the sea, which was
an absolute prerequisite for the next, continental phase of their
strategy. They quickly followed up their success with a series of
amphibious landings in Korea and southern Manchuria over the next few
months. By May the Japanese had driven the small Russian covering
force back and cut off the garrison at Port Arthur from the main
Russian forces based on Mukden.
Japanese strategy in the war was driven by the need to score a
quick and decisive victory over the small Russian contingent in
Manchuria, before it could be reinforced from Europe. The Japanese
armed forces, despite their impressive growth over the preceding 30
years, were still highly dependent upon foreign military imports,
particularly naval, and the country's economic situation was such
that it could ill afford to wage a lengthy war with its potentially
far stronger adversary. The Japanese instead relied on surprise,
speed and Russia's well-known internal weaknesses to bring them a
quick and cheap victory.
The Russian problem was just the opposite. At the beginning of
the war, the Russians had only about 98,000 troops in the Far East,
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left over from their 1900 occupation of Manchuria during the Boxer
Rebellion. 4
 This force depended almost entirely for its reinforce-
ments and supply upon a single unfinished rail line stretching
thousands of kilometers back to European Russia. Russian strategy,
thus hampered by nearly insuperable logistical difficulties, was
necessarily defensive during the war's early months and sought to
avoid large encounters with the stronger Japanese forces until
sufficient reinforcements arrived to enable them to take the of fen-
sive. While this strategy was undoubtedly correct for the first six
months, the Russian effort was hobbled throughout by the senior
generals' inability or unwillingness to adopt a more aggressive
attitude, even after they had achieved a numerical superiority over
the enemy. This stood in poor contrast to the Japanese approach,
which invariably sought to carry the battle to the Russians, even in
the face of superior numbers.
However, in spite of aggressive Japanese efforts to score a
quick victory, the land war dragged on inconclusively throughout the
spring and summer of 1904. Following the investment of Port Arthur,
the Japanese, under the overall command of Marshal I. Oyama, moved
north to meet Gen. A.N. Kuropatkin's Manchurian Army, guarding the
approaches to Mukden. The first major clash occurred at Liao-Yang
(24 August-3 September), during which the Japanese managed to dis-
lodge the Russians from their positions through a skillful combina-
tion of frontal assault and flank attacks. The battle accomplished
little except to cause casualties estimated at 15,890 Russians and
17,539 Japanese. It was otherwise indecisive, except for the nega-
tive impression it left in the minds of the Russian command, as well
as the common soldier. 5 The Japanese did not follow up very smartly
upon their victory, and the Russians were able to withdraw unmolested
to the north. During the next four weeks the two armies eyed each
Levitskii, p. 65
V.A. Apushkin, Russko-Iaponskaia Voina, 1904-1905 (The Russo-Japanese
War, 1904-1905] (Moscow, 1910), p. 133.
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other warily across a 40-kilometer no-man's land and gathered their
forces for the next battle.
Kuropatkin, under pressure from St. Petersburg to relieve Port
Arthur, resolved to attack the Japanese before they could recover
fully from the Liao-Yang fighting. The moment was certainly favour-
able, as the Russians had recently been reinforced and now numbered
some 210,000 men and 758 guns against a Japanese force of only
170,000 and 648 guns, along a 60-kilometer front. 6
 The Russian
commander, to facilitate control of this large force, divided his
army into several detachments, each of which was the equivalent of a
small army. This made Kuropatkin, in effect, the first front com-
mander in everything but name.
Kuropatkin's plan called for the 'Eastern Detachment' (two
infantry corps and a cavalry division) to move south across the Sha-
ho River in order to turn the weakly-held Japanese right flank and
force Oyama back upon Liao-Yang. At the opposite end of the Russian
front, a 'Western Detachment' (two infantry corps and a cavalry
division) would attack due south to pin down the Japanese forces and
prevent them from switching troops against the main effort. A force
of two infantry corps occupied the interval between the detachments,
echeloned slightly to the rear, while another two corps formed the
army reserve, with one corps behind each wing.
The Russian plan contained a number of faults, the most serious
of which was the even distribution of force along the front, which
effectively precluded a decisive attack on any one sector. Kuropat-
kin exacerbated these faulty initial dispositions by tying the pace
of the general advance to that of the left flank, thus making the
entire attack hostage to the ostensible main effort, which was so
understrength as to be doomed from the start. This egregious die-
persal of force coincided exactly with the plan's lack of a clear and
decisive objective, and foresaw nothing more ambitious than the
gaining of ground on the Japanese right, a move which neither threat-
6 Levitskii, pp. 167, 169.
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ened the enemy nor held out any promise of relief to Port Arthur.
Also, whereas an attack on the Japanese left would have taken the
Russians across relatively level ground, by attacking the enemy
right, the Eastern Detachment would be forced to advance over moun-
tainous terrain in which large-scale movement would be limited to a
few narrow and easily-defended passes. In retrospect, it is obvious
that a determined and well-supported attack against the Japanese left
would have been far more effective, forcing the Japanese to fight
where they stood or fall back.
The Russian offensive began on 4 October on the left flank,
followed a day later by the Western Detachment on the right. Given
the distance between the two armies, the Russians encountered little
initial resistance, although they advanced none the less slowly for
that. The Russians reached the Sha-ho on 6 October and immediately
and inexplicably dug in upon encountering the brigade-sized Japanese
screen, although the enemy's main body was still some distance away.
Here the superior Russian forces began to lap around the Japanese
position, although the Eastern Detachment's commander, Gen.-Lt. G.K.
Shtakel'berg, did not venture to attack, even when a serious assault
would have easily routed the defenders. The Russian general even
gave his troops a day's rest on the 7th, and was no more aggressive
the next day, which enabled the Japanese to withdraw southwest to a
stronger and less-exposed position. The Russians followed slowly and
finally closed to the Japanese line along the upper Tai-tzu, but the
element of surprise which their unexpected offensive had afforded
them was now lost. The Western Detachment, its movements dictated by
the progress of the 'main attack', advanced in an equally dilatory
manner, and the Russians' progress slowed to a crawl. And although
they would continue to attack fitfully, the overall initiative at
this point passed to the Japanese.
Gen. Kuroki, commanding the Japanese First Army on the right,
reacted swiftly to Shtakel'berg's threat and dispatched a division to
the threatened sector to shore up his position along the mountain
passes. However, the Japanese were not content to merely blunt the
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Russian attack, and instead of allowing his actions to be dictated by
the enemy, Oyama made the prompt and soldierly decision on 9 October
to carry the battle to the enemy. The Japanese commander's plan
called for his Second and Fourth armies, and Kuroki's left wing, to
close to the Russian positions along the Shi-li-ho and pin the enemy
along this line, while at the same time trying to turn the Russian
right on the western bank of the Sha-ho. In fact, the first frontal
collisions had taken place that very day south of the Shi-li-ho.
The Japanese attacks continued throughout the morning and
afternoon of the 10th and the Russians slowly began to give ground,
although they retired in good order. Kuropatkin made no attempt to
alleviate the pressure on his right by reinforcing the Western
Detachment, or by prodding the Eastern Detachment into action. The
latter group limited itself to ineffectual cavalry probing and a
number of unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Japanese from the
mountain passes. However, these were unsuccessful and Shtakel'berg
began to withdraw his forces to the north and construct defensive
positions. Thus ended the heralded Russian offensive, which had been
brought down by a combination of bad planning and the lethargy and
timidity of the command echelon.
The Japanese offensive was resumed with vigor on the morning of
the 11th. Oyama had decided to give up his attempt to turn the
Russian flank, due to a shortage of forces, and the Japanese shifted
their attacks to the centre of the line, where repeated assaults
gradually wore the defenders down. The pressure here and further
east finally compelled the Russians to pull back their forces in the
centre towards the Sha-ho, a move which exposed the flank of the
Western Detachment, forcing it to fall back as well. Unfortunately
for the Russians, Kuropatkin's notion of command and his disjointed
view of the battlefield meant that there was no attempt to relieve
the pressure on this wing in spite of the Russians' overall numerical
superiority.
The fighting began to die down over the next few days, as the
Japanese, by now exhausted, were content to let the Russians with-
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draw. Only in the centre were the attacks launched with any energy,
causing the Russians here to fall back behind the Sha-ho, where they
had already begun fortifying the northern bank. Kuropatkin attempted
a half-hearted counterattack west of the Sha-ho on the 14th with an
infantry corps, which had up until now been idle. However, this
attempt quickly faltered as a result of the Russians' usual inability
to coordinate their efforts, and the fighting gradually began to
peter out due to mutual exhaustion. There followed a final, brief
burst of fighting along the Russian bridgehead south of the Sha-ho,
which the defenders managed to hold in the face of furious Japanese
infantry assaults. Both armies then settled down into a prolonged
period of positional warfare known as the 'Sha-ho sitting', which
lasted, with minor breaks, for four months. Thus the operation's end
found the Russians back at their starting point, although consider-
ably the worse for wear in terms of casualties, and especially in
morale. According to one source, the Russians lost 46,330 men,
compared to Japanese casualties of 15,879, although the latter figure
is probably too low by a good deal.7
To the military historian, the battle is further evidence of
the operation's spatial and temporal evolution and the further
development of the art of conducting operations. For it is to the
October fighting that the distinction of having produced the first
modern operation belongs. For two weeks, forces totalling nearly
400,000 men were engaged in nearly- continuous fighting along a more
or less solid front some 90 kilometers in breadth and 20 in depth.
The unprecedented appearance of these indices in a single battle
caused a later Soviet-era theoretician to remark on the 'amazing
imprint of modernity' which 'lies upon the operation along the Sha-ho
River' 8
By February 1905 both sides had sufficiently recovered from the
V.A. Cheremisov, Russko-Iaponskaia Voina, 1904-1905 Goda (The Russo-
Japanese War, 1904-1905], 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 163.
8 A.A. Svechin, Evoliutsiia Voennogo Iskusstva [The Evolution of
Military Art] (Moscow and Leningrad, 1928), II. 508.
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October fighting to contemplate renewed offensive activity. The
Japanese, numbering 270,000 men and 926 guns, were spread along a
110-kilometer front, while the Russians, who lived in deadly fear of
the enemy's turning movements, were even more extended, occupying a
150-kilometer front with 315,000 men and 1,219 guns, which effective-
ly negated their numerical superiority. 9
 The Russian position was
further echeloned to a depth of 85 kilometers, and consisted of three
defensive positions, of which only the first was occupied. Kuropat-
kin, despite his failure of the previous autumn, remained in overall
command of a force now divided into three armies. At the same time,
he was also commander-in-chief of all Russian forces in the Far East,
which included both land and naval forces. This was an organisation-
al expedient to which the Soviets would resort to in 1945, with
considerably more success.
The tsar had been pressing Kuropatkin to launch a decisive
offensive against the Japanese, so as to extricate Russia from a war
which was becoming increasingly unpopular at home. The latter
dutifully responded with a plan, which even by the standards of late-
imperial thinking, was striking in its lack of imagination. The
plan's most glaring fault was that Kuropatkin once again utterly
failed to pursue a decisive goal, either by means of battle, or by
maneuvering against the Japanese communications in anything approach-
ing a forceful manner. Instead, Kuropatkin planned to make his main
attack with Gen. A.V. Kaulbars' g Second Army between the Hun-ho and
the Sha-ho, with the vague notion of threatening the enemy's left
flank and forcing him back on Liao-Yang. If this effort was success-
ful, Gen.-Lt. A.A. Bil'derling's Third and Gen. N.P. Linevich's First
armies would support the attack by moving south against the Japanese
centre and right.
Kuropatkin's latest plan was again flawed in its very concep-
tion by its failure to employ the Russians' numerical superiority to
any end other than the geographical objective of reaching the Tai-tzu
Levitskii, pp. 238-40.
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River, in what was little more than a massive frontal attack. If
Kuroptakin at least planned this time to attack across the more
favorable terrain west of the Sha-ho, he still had not learned the
wisdom of concentrating his forces for a decisive blow. Only a
fraction of his force was assigned to take part in the main of f en-
Bive, with the rest slated for supporting roles or held in the army's
more than ample reserve. Kuropatkin further reduced his chanceB by
clinging to his practice of tying the supporting units' advance to
the succesB, or lack thereof, of the main effort, thereby rendering
the entire offensive dependent upon the enemy's defensive prowess
along a particular sector, and in practice relegating the greater
part of his army to the role of passive bystander. Finally, given
his heavy investment in the above-named defensive positions, there is
reason to doubt Kuropatkin's commitment to any offensive action. In
any event, he saw no reason to hurry his preparations, and scheduled
the offensive to begin on 25 February.
The Japanese were also making offensive plans, but of an
entirely different kind from the half-hearted Russian efforts.
MarBhal Oyama's plan called for nothing less than the destruction of
the entire Russian force in a single operation. He particularly
sought to take advantage of the Russians' extended deployment, in
which most of their forces were spread out in a single line, which
made mutual support difficult and encouraged turning movements by an
attacker. According to Oyama's plan, Gen. Kawaxnura's Fifth Army was
to attack the Russian outposts in the mountainous area north of the
Tai-tzu and move northwest in conjunction with Kuroki's army to hit
the Russian First Army's left flank. This attack, aside from having
the objective of turning the Russian left, was also given the task of
drawing away Russian reserves from the Japanese left wing, where
Oyama planned to deliver his main attack. Here, Gen. Nogi's Third
Army, recently arrived from the successful siege of Port Arthur, was
to swing around the Russians, right to turn their flank west of the
Hun-ho and to cut Kuropatkin's communications north of Mukden, and
link up with Kawamura to encircle the defenders. The attack would be
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supported by the Japanese Second and Fourth armies, which would
launch simultaneous frontal attacks against the Russian positions
along and to the west of the Sha-ho, to prevent Kuropatkin from
switching forces to either flank.
The contrast between the two plans could hardly be more strik-
ing. Whereas Kuropatkin, with an overall superiority in men and
materiel, frittered away this advantage by allocating his forces
evenly along the front, Oyaxna consolidated his smaller force into two
strike groups and a ready reserve. Moreover, Oyama would be attack-
ing with all his forces simultaneously, in pursuit of a single,
clearly-defined goal, while the Russian efforts would be fitful and
uncoordinated, aiming at amorphous geographical goals instead of the
enemy army. If there was a flaw in the Japanese plan, it was that it
was probably too ambitious for the forces at Oyama's disposal. One
can easily detect in the Japanese commander's design his personal
experience at Sedan in 1870 and the strong influence of German
military ideas in Japan at this time.1°
The Japanese were first off the mark with a night attack by
units of Kawamura's army against the Russian left on 18 February.
The attack made little initial progress due to stout resistance and
the hilly terrain, which restricted the attackers' room for maneuver.
Gradually, however, the weight of numbers began to tell and the
Russians fell back in the face of a Japanese turning movement on
either side of their position. Kuroki's right wing applied addition-
al pressure, beginning on 24 February, by moving against Linevich
along the upper Sha-ho. But the Russians retreated skillfully, and
although the Japanese persisted in their efforts to turn their flank,
they could make little headway. However, they were quite successful
in achieving their other goal of drawing the defenders' attention
from the decisive front. The Japanese attacks so alarmed Kuropatkin
that he ordered Second Army's reserve and his own general reserve of
two infantry corps, eastward to counter the threat. Kaulbars there-
10 Ibid, p. 240; M.Carver, Twentieth Century Warriors (London, 1987),
pp. 333, 336-38.
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upon decided to cancel Second Army's 'main effort', a move to which
Kuropatkin readily acceded. The ruse had worked perfectly and the
Russian command was not only fooled into weakening its forces in the
area of the forthcoming main attack, but had completely surrendered
the initiative to the enemy as well.
On 27 February Nogi began his move around the Russian right.
His 3 1/2 divisions quickly wheeled to the northwest, screened by a
cavalry brigade on the Ta-liao River's west bank. That same day,
Second Army began its attack to divert the Russians' attention from
the envelopment being prepared against them. The Japanese turning
movement caught the Russians completely by surprise, even though they
had long been aware of Nogi's presence. In fact, so ineffective was
the Russian cavalry west of the Hun-ho that Kaulbars was not even
made aware of the enemy's move until the next day, by which time the
Japanese were well around the Russian flank.
Kuropatkin's response to this developing threat was to dispatch
a brigade to cover his communications north of Mukden; the first in a
series of half-measures which came to exemplify his conduct of
operations. At this point the commander-in-chief still saw the main
danger on his left wing, where the Japanese had resumed their attacks
on 1 March. Had an energetic counterattack been made at this point,
using all available forces, the Japanese might well have been thrown
back against the Tai-tzu and Nogi's attack disrupted altogether.
However, such decisive actions were foreign to Kuropatkin's nature,
and he proceeded to compound his previous error by ordering one of
his infantry corps back to Mukden, where it would be of no immediate
use to either wing. Kuropatkin's perverse refusal to seize his
opportunities and his desire to be secure everywhere ended the best
hope the Russians had of defeating the Japanese offensive.
In contrast to the confused Russian response, Nogi pressed on
with his turning movement, meeting as yet only sporadic opposition.
Kaulbars remained only dimly aware of the threat to his right,
although the situation was growing more serious by the hour. Second
and Fourth Japanese armies, meanwhile, persisted in their unsuccess-
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ful efforts further to the east. Kuropatkins response to this
concerted effort was to hurriedly reinforce and extend hi right
flank by creating small scratch unite of strictly tactical signifi-
cance, in order to keep pace with Nogi's left wing and deflect it
from the rail artery at Mukden. As the battle developed, this
'syBtem' of reinforcing the Russian right wing gradually bled Third
and First armies of men and equipment, while Second Army never
received the decisive infusion of strength which would have enabled
it to turn on the Japanese in strength.
The Russians seemed to recover somewhat during the first few
days of March and began striking back in several places along their
lengthening right flank. However, these attacks were poorly coordi-
nated and usually not pressed very hard. The Japanese were only
slightly inconvenienced by these moves and continued to press the
enemy all along the front. Oyama continued to reinforce Nogi from
his general reserve, and the latter castled his divisions northward
as the line gradually snaked beyond Mukden. Elsewhere, Second Army
maintained the pressure on the Russians still south of the Hun-ho,
while First and Fifth armies continued to harry Linevich. However,
as before, the Japanese could make little headway here, although
their attacks continued to pin down large numbers of enemy troops.
Both sides traded attacks throughout the 5th, 6th and 7th,
although the Japanese generally got the better of the fighting. The
Russians kept searching for the Japanese left flank, but failed to
find it, and as a consequence, most of their attacks became costly
frontal assaults which did little to deter the Japanese from their
objective. Nogi was now closing in on the railway north of Mukden,
and Japanese cavalry was even able to raid the outposts defending
this artery and destroy sections of the line. Kuropatkin, by scrap-
ing together his last reserves, was able to organise one last block-
ing group west of the railroad. However, although this latest
scratch group was temporarily able to stave off the threat to the
Russian communications, it was far from being a force capable of
pushing back the Japanese. The bankruptcy of Kuropatkin's policy was
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now revealed. By failing to use First and Third armies for anything
more than a general reserve for his right wing, the Russian commander
surrendered the initiative along his centre and left to the enemy.
The Japanese, in turn, ceaselessly pressed the Russians south of the
Hun-ho, threatening a breakthrough and preventing Kuropatkin from
shifting more forces to his right. By the end of the first week in
March, Kuropatkin could no longer maintain this balancing act, while
the Japanese, with fewer troops, continued to attack everywhere.
The Russian commander was thus faced with the necessity of
shortening his front south of the Hun-ho by pulling back First and
Third armies behind the river in order to build up a sufficient
blocking force west of Mukden. An order to this effect went out on
the 7th, and the two armies began to pull back later that evening.
The Japanese followed none too aggressively, and by the morning of
the 8th the Russians were ensconced in their new positions along the
north bank of the Hun-ho. On that day Gen. Oku's Second Army moved
its last division north of the river, so that the full weight of two
Japanese armies was now brought to bear against the beleaguered
Russian right. With the closing of the Fourth, First and Fifth
armies to the Hun-ho, the Russian front caine to form a very narrow
and dangerous corridor with its apex southwest of Mukden and the
Japanese nibbling at its flanks. The Russian position was plainly
untenable, although when disaster struck it was from a wholly unex-
pected quarter.
Due to poor staff work and the confusion caused by the hurried
retreat, the troops who fell back behind the Hun-ho sometimes occu-
pied their unfinished positions in a haphazard fashion. Kuroki's
forces struck one of these weak points and the Japanese flowed into
the breach and into the Russian rear, hardly hindered by the demoral-
ized defenders, who, in the absence of centralized control, could
offer little in the way of resistance. By nightfall Kuroki's army
had wheeled to the northwest and was within a few hours of the
Mandarin Road north of Mukden. The Russian army now faced the very
real threat of encirclement.
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Fortunately for the Russians, Kuropatkin had by this time
already admitted defeat and had decided to pull the entire army back
to Tieh-ling before he was even aware of the magnitude of the Japa-
nese breakthrough. The Russians began their retreat on the evening
of 9 March through the 11-kilometer corridor along the railroad
leading out of Mukden. The most difficult task fell to the lOt of
Third Army, which had the greatest distance to travel, over roads
clogged with men and supply wagons, and periodically shelled from
both flanks. In these desperate hours a number of Russian units
performed heroically and managed to keep the Japanese at bay just
long enough for the main body to get away. By the evening of the
10th the greater part of the Third Army had escaped, followed closely
by Second Army. First Army, which was effectively cut of f from its
neighbors, took a more easterly route and also managed to elude its
pursuers. On the morning of 11 March units of the Japanese Third and
First armies finally linked up north of Mukden, although the greater
part of the Russian army had escaped.
The Russians did not linger long at their Tieh-ling positions,
but continued their retreat northward only haif-heartedly pursued by
the Japanese, who were in any case in no condition to engage the
enemy after two weeks of continuous fighting. By 30 March the
Russians had reached their final defensive position at Ssu-ping-
chieh. Linevich replaced Kuropatkin and the Russian army was rein-
forced to a strength of 446,500 men to 337,500 Japanese, but the
dispirited Russians undertook no more offensive operations. 11
 The
Japanese, for their part, had reached the limits of their resources
and were content merely to observe their foes and allow the revolu-
tionary situation in Russia to take its course. The latter's final
defeat came at the naval disaster at Tsushima (27-28 May, 1905), and
peace negotiations began soon afterwards. The Treaty of Portsmouth
ended the war on 5 September, 1905.
The Battle of Mukden was the war's largest land battle and the
11 Levitskii, p. 292.
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greatest single clash of arms before 1914. In it the Russians lost
some 89,000 men, of whom 30,000 were prisoners, against Japanese
losses of approximately 70,000. 12
 In operational terms the fighting
here and along the Sha-ho represents a continuation and significant
expansion of the trends already mentioned, particularly as to the
increase in the size of the armies engaged and the spatial growth of
the battlefield. There is every reason to believe that had the two
sides elected to fight along the Ssu-p'ing-chieh position these
figures would have grown even further. The operation had come a long
way since its infant beginnings during the previous century, and in
Manchuria the ghastly contours of 1914-18 were already visible.
C. Reform and Recovery
'We did not know modern war', was one observer's verdict on the
Russian army's failure in the Far East. 13
 Indeed, of the major
European powers, the Russians had probably been the least successful
in adapting to the late-nineteenth century revolution in military
affairs. However, a defeat may also have the positive effect of
forcing a nation's political-military establishment to reexamine its
fundamental beliefs in order to avoid a repetition of the mistakes
which led to disaster. This was partly the case with Russia, whose
humiliation in the war with Japan had led not only to domestic unrest
and far-reaching political changes, but had resulted in a measure of
reform within the chastened army as well. The intense soul-searching
occasioned by the army's poor showing against the despised Japanese
prompted several gifted thinkers to ponder the implications of recent
military developments and attempt to draw lessons for the future.
These studies, carried out in the decade preceding the outbreak of
war in 1914, resulted in a number of interesting and influential
conclusions as to the nature of modern war and, in particular, the
12 Ibid, p. 286.
13 Neznamov, V.
42
nascent field of operations.
Needless to say, the term 'operational art' was not in use at
this time and would only gain widespread currency under the successor
Red Army some 20 years hence. 14
 Nor would it be correct to assume
that the rich vein of operational thought which emerged between 1905
and 1914 is entirely original to these years. In fact, many of the
ideas which agitated Russian military thinkers during this time had
their genesis in the decades preceding the turn of the century. By
far the most outstanding thinker during the pre-1904 period was the
military theorist and philosopher Genrikh Antonovich Leer (1829-
1904). Leer was the author of several detailed works on strategy and
other subjects, and from 1889 until 1898 was the chief of the
General Staff Academy, from which advantageous position he was able
to shape the thinking of many of the country's best officers. In
Leer we find one of the earliest Russian attempts at the systematic
study of operations and an effort to incorporate this phenomenon into
the existing fields of strategy and tactics. Appropriately enough,
his major work on the subject was entitled Strate qy (The Tactics of
the Theatre of Military
 Activities), which first appeared in 1869 and
which was reissued regularly over the next 30 years.
As the title suggests, there was as yet no place for an inde-
pendent field of operations in Leer's system; nor did the author put
forth a working definition of the operation, although considerations
of this sort occupy a prominent place in the book. Rather, the
operation was subsumed under the rubric of strategy, which Leer
divided into two parts, the ideal and the practical. The first, or
strategy in the 'broad sense', deals with what he called the 'philos-
ophy of military affairs', and constitutes a holistic understanding
of the phenomenon of war. The second, or 'strategy in the narrow
sense', is more concrete and corresponds closely to the spatial
parameters of modern operational art. Leer termed this sphere the
'tactics of the theatre of military activities', which he identified
14 A.A. Samoilo, Dye Zhizni [Two Lives] (Moscow, 1958), p. 58.
43
with the 'higher tactics' of Napoleon. This, in turn, was distin-
guished from what Leer called the 'tactics of the battlefield', which
is similar to the modern understanding of tactics, which is also
geographically much more limited in scope and restricted to the
immediate task of engaging the enemy.15
Of equal importance with the delineation of these separate
spheres of activity was their hierarchical relationship to one
another in theory. Thus the operation is subordinate to Leer's
notion of applied strategy by virtue of the former's physical identi-
fication with the theatre of military activities (the tactics of the
theater of military activities), while it is by inference superior to
the 'tactics of the battlefield', and is in fact made up of 'a series
of local actions, maneuvers and local battleB'. '6
 In practice,
strategy devises the operational plan, deploys, supplies, maneuvers
and provides for the security of the army in the given theatre of
military activities, while the issue is ultimately decided by a
series of purely tactical actions, i.e., battles.17
In spite of what is by current standards a confusing termino-
logical overlap, it is clear that Leer had recognized the operation
as a separate entity, in much the same way as battles and engagements
were seen as subdivisions of the larger phenomenon of war. As a
separate theory, however, the sphere of operations was as yet far
from achieving full independence from the more established fields of
strategy and tactics. Rather, they--in particular, strategy--tended
to encroach upon operations and to lend their terminology to the
latter almost to the point of masking its distinctive features.
Nevertheless, the distinctions which Leer did make indicate that the
art of conducting operations was beginning to separate itself from
its elder brothers. The seeds of future operational autonomy had
15 G.A. Leer, Strategiia (Taktika Teatra Voennykh Deistvii) (Strategy
(The Tactics of the Theater of Military Activities)], 4th ed. (St. Petersburg,
1885-87), 1.1.
16 Ibid, I. 10.
17 Ibid, pp. 6-10.
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been planted, although it would be left to another army to complete
the process.
Of particular significance for the future development of
operational art were Leer's thoughts on the nature of the theatre of
military activities (teatr voennykh deistvii) and the organisation of
the masses of men and materiel which would occupy it. The author, in
the 1898 edition of Strateqy, defined for the first time the theatre
of military activities as 'the space in which one or two armies
operate, having one and the same objective'. The theatre of war
(teatr voiny), on the other hand, is 'the entire space in which the
war is waged', and may consist of several theatres of military
activities. 18
 More than ten years earlier, Leer had speculated that
a theatre of military activities might contain as many as five
armies, numbering up to a million men. Depending upon a variety of
geographical and political factors, these units might be further
organised into what Leer called 'groups of separate armies' (gruppy
chastnykh arinii), each of which would be responsible for a separate
theatre of military activities.19
This huge and unwieldy mass would inevitably present enormous
control problems which could no longer be resolved using previous
methods of direct field command, even given the remarkable advances
in communications means during the previous half-century. Leer's
solution was the post of commander-in-chief (glavnokomanduiushchii),
each of which would be responsible for a group of armies. 2° Howev-
er, the name belies the weak powers actually accorded the position,
as Leer preferred a distinctly 'hands off' approach to command at
this level more reminiscent of the elder Moltke's practice in 1870.
According to Leer, the commander-in-chief would be strictly limited
in his ability to interfere in the activities of his individual army
18 G.A. Leer, Strateqiia (Taktika Teatra Voennykh Deistvii (Strategy
(The Tactics of the Theater of Military Activities)], 6th ed. (St.
Petersburg, 1898), I. 4.
19 Leer, Strateqiia, 4th ed., II. 13-14.
20 Ibid, p. 21.
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commanders, and would be restricted to informing the latter of the
operation's 'general idea' and the overall situation in the theatre
of military activities.21
Leer's ruminations on the need to combine the heretofore
independent armies into larger groups of armies, operating towards a
common goal in a single theatre of military activities was, in retro-
spect, a seminal event in the development of Russian operational
thought. Here, in a rudimentary form, was the theoretical justifica-
tion for organising what would later become known as the front,an
operational-level command instance lying midway between the supreme
command and the individual field armies. Leer's recommendations
became a reality in 1900, with the division of the western theatre of
war into two theaters of military activities, each manned by a single
front, directed, respectively, against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The imperial army, in the years remaining to it, would further
develop Leer's ideas on this score, and the notion of the front would
quickly become one of the major tenets of the Red Army's operational
heritage after 1917.
While Leer's work was certainly incomplete by current stan-
dards, his efforts were nevertheless advanced for his time and would
continue to serve as a valuable reference point for succeeding
theorists. Long regarded as the army's leading theoretician, Leer's
influence was felt particularly at the General Staff Academy, even
after his departure in 1898. To judge from later sources, a number
of Leer's ideas had already been introduced into the students' course
of study at the end of the century, notably the author's notions of
the theatre of military activities and the necessity for creating
groups of armies.
Among the later theorists were the academy graduates A.V. Gerua
and E.E. Messner, who are credited with coining the term 'operatics'
21 Ibid, p. 21.
P.1. Izmest'ev and E.E. Messner, comps., Kons pekt Strateaji (A
Strategic Abstract] (St. Petersburg, 1899), pp. 12, 53-54.
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(operatika). One observer of the period's theoretical controversies
later wrote that, according to this scheme, strategy is the waging of
war in its entirety, while operatics is the conduct of the battle at
the army level, and tactics is the waging of combat from the corps
level down.	 This early division of military art into strategy,
operatics and tactics is of decisive importance to the development of
later operational thought, helping to further the liberation of the
realm of operations from the two older disciplines. This theoretical
(the hierarchical arrangement of the three fields) and organisational
(the division of tasks according to the type of units engaged)
division is one of the earliest pieces of evidence pointing to a link
between pre-revolutionary and Soviet operational thought. From this
formula it was but a short step to the later Soviet division of
military art into strategy, operational art and tactics.
This is not to suggest that there existed anything like unanim-
ity on this and other matters in the army in the wake of the Manchu-
nan debacle. On the contrary, the Russian army during the interwar
period was continually riven by any number of theoretical, practical
and personal controversies. One chronicler of the time saw the army
as being divided into three antagonistic camps. The first group,
according to this view, consisted of those senior officers who
completely failed to understand the lessons of the recent war and the
need for reform within the army. The leading members of this clique
included war minister V.A. Sukhomlinov (1909-15), and chief of staff
Ia.G. Zhilinskii (1911-14), among others. 24
 As a group, these men
represented most clearly the official views of the court and the
military bureaucracy. And while they were not wholly indifferent to
the idea of reform, their innate conservatism and lack of resolve in
implementing even the most inoffensive changes certainly retarded the
army's development into a truly modern force.
23 A.A. Kersnovskii, Filosofiia Voiny
 [The Philosophy of War] (Belgrade,
1939), pp. 31-32.
24 Kersnovskii, Istoriia, III. 608.
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By far the most interesting of these groups was the so-called
'Young Turks', whose writings and educational efforts did so much to
revitalize Russian military thinking during these years. Intellectu-
ally, this group stood head and shoulders above its stultified
opponents in the war ministry, although its academic virtues did not
save it from defeat by the obscurantists' bureaucratic intrigues.
These intelligent proponents of reform included D.G. Shcherbachev,
chief of the General Staff Academy from 1907 to 1912, and the mili-
tary intellectuals N.N. Golovin and A.A. Svechin. 25
 The latter
would eventually become one of the Red Army's leading and most
controversial military theorists in the 1920g.
Finally, a third and much less influential camp consisted of
those who tended towards a romanticized view of Russian military
history. Headed by A.Z. Myshlaevskii and A.K. Baiov, this group's
practical recommendations were few, and its existence was due more to
a deep-seated reaction against western influences and a vague search
for a native military method. 26
 In spite of its weak theoretical
base, this faction's strongly nationalistic appeal made it potential-
ly the most powerful of the contending groups. Ironically, the
nationalist school was to enjoy its greatest success under the
ostensibly 'internationalist' Soviet regime, particularly following
World War II, which assiduously promoted the idea of a distinctly
Russian-Soviet military tradition.
Much of the intellectual ferment during the interwar decade
took place in the General Staff Academy, which served briefly as the
reformers' base for disseminating their ideas within the army through
successive classes of young, would-be staff off icers. The reformers
managed to get the upper hand during the period of recrimination
which followed the Russo-Japanese War, when the army establishment
and its methods stood in temporary disgrace. The academy itself was
certainly in need of reformation and had been heavily criticized for
25 Ibid, p. 608.
26 Ibid, p. 609.
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failing to prepare its students to meet the demands of modern war-
fare. Indeed, the quality and relevance of the instruction in many
areas left much to be desired, even under the reformist administra-
tion. For example, a preoccupation with abstractions at the expense
of practical knowledge was a chronic problem in the academy's program
for several years. 27
 One student who would later enjoy a brilliant
career in the Red Army, B.M. Shaposhnikov, later complained of his
student years that despite the outward signs of reform, the academy
still 'prepared more of a theoretician than a practitioner for
service on troop staff s'.28
Whatever its shortcomings, the interwar academy did attempt to
impart to its students some idea of modern war, and offered what one
former officer called a 'well-founded knowledge' in tactics, opera-
tics and strategy.	 However, the academy's approach to the field
of operations was often hobbled by the same terminological muddle
which had characterized Leer's writings on the subject and which
would continue to plague his successors. For example, the academy's
leading authority on operations, Col. A.A. Neznamov, was during these
years a professor of strategy, ample proof of the operation's contin-
uing absorption by the latter discipline. This duality was reflected
in the colonel's lectures, in which his teaching of operations was
'not exactly grand tactics as defined by Napoleon, and not exactly
the strategy of the theatre of military activities according to
Leer'. 3° Likewise, one instructor referred to his teaching duties
in the realm of operations as lecturing on the 'higher tactics' of
large combined-armed arms format ions •31
27 Samoilo, p. 61; A.I. Denikin, Put' Russkogo Ofitsera (The Journey of
a Russian Officer] (New York, 1953), pp. 87-89.
28 Shaposhnikov, p. 135.
29 E.E. Messner and others, Rossiiskie Of itser y (Russian Officers)
(Buenos Aires, 1959), p. 38
30 Shaposhnikov, p. 143.
31 B.V. Gerua, Vospominaniia o Moei Zhizni (Memoirs of My Life] (Paris,
1969), I. 252.
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Despite these continuing problems, there can be little doubt
that the reformists' academic efforts during these years did much to
raise the quality of the interwar graduates' understanding of opera-
tions. Unfortunately, however, such victories proved fleeting, as
the reactionary clique within the army regained its strength and
confidence. The struggle between the competing factions ended in
1913 with the complete victory of the Sukhomlinov faction and the
dismissal of many of the 'Young Turks' to other posts.
Much of the significant writing on operations during this
period, both inside the academy and without, dealt with a range of
questions which were central to developing a coherent theory of
operations. Some of these had already been raised in basic form by
Leer and would continue to animate military thinkers through what
remained of the imperial era and well into the Soviet regime. These
issues may be reduced to four basic questions. The first concerned
the place operations were to occupy in relation to the fields of
strategy and tactics. This was more than just a problem of seman-
tics, and its resolution would have decisive consequences for the
theoretical independence of operations and for creating the basis for
elaborating a broader theory of operational art. The second question
concerned the operation itself and dealt with the different catego-
ries of operations, as well as their preparation and conduct. The
third dealt with the notion of the front/group of armies in the
theatre of military activities, its mission, composition and system
of command. Finally, the fourth question concerned the early theo-
retical speculation into what in the 1920s came to be called 'consec-
utive operations', or the conduct of uninterrupted offensive opera-
tions along a single axis to final victory.
Easily the most outstanding figure to explore these and other
problems during this period was the aforementioned Aleksandr Aleksan-
drovich Neznaxnov, whose highly productive academic career spanned
both the tearist and communist regimes. Neznamov was born into a
peasant family in 1872 and finished military-engineering school in





doubtlessly imbibed many of the reigning ideas on the place and
conduct of operations according to Leer. Following service in the
Manchurian theatre, Neznamov returned to the academy as an instruc-
tor, and was appointed professor of strategy three years later, while
at the same time serving as a member of the army's commission to
write a new field manual. Neznamov held a variety of command and
staff posts during the Great War and was promoted to the rank of
general-major in 1915. He joined the Red Army in early 1918 and
taught briefly at the new RKKA General Staff Academy, before moving
to the Military-Engineering Academy, where he worked as a professor
until 1925. Neznamov continued to produce scholarly works under the
Soviet regime and served on a number of administrative and historical
commissions until his death in 1928.32
Neznamov's interwar writings reveal him to be the sort of
clear-headed analyst which the army so desperately needed. As
opposed to Leer's lengthy discourses on the immutable principles of
war, Neznamov was a convinced materialist who believed in the primacy
of technical and economic factors in determining the development of
military art. This shift away from the fuzzy and idealistic concept-
ions of the past helped pave the way for a more realistic study of
modern war within the Russian army.
Neznamov's views on the subject of operations were most cogent-
ly expressed in his 1911 work, Modern War. The Activities of a Field
Army, which was reissued a number of times under the Soviet regime.
Even a cursory reading of the book reveals the extent of the author's
debt to Leer, although he was able to improve upon the latter's ideas
in a number of areas. Most importantly, Neznamov was able to advance
somewhat the terminological independence of the operation from
strategy and tactics. This distinction was most clearly expressed in
a passage, which stated that
just as the entire war is broken up into an entire series
32 A. Ageev, 'Voenno-Teoreticheskoe Nasledie A.A. Neznaxnova' [A.A.
Neznamov's Military-Theoretical Heritage], V-IZh (1983), no. 11, pp. 84-89.
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of operations, so each operation is broken up into an entire
series of local immediate objectives, ... and they are all
together united by the operation's common goal, just exactly as
all the operations are linked among themselves by ... the war's
fundamental guiding idea according to objective and direc-
tion.33
Neznamov's formula reaffirmed the primacy of strategy over
operations and further delineated their relationship in an emerging
three-way division of labour. Thus strategy determines the overall
military goal and attempts to achieve this through the grouping of
various operations. The connection between the two is obvious even
before the outbreak of war, during which time strategy determines the
relative importance of the various theatres of war and the forces
accordingly assigned to them, which in practical terms involves
drawing up a plan for the strategic deployment of the country's armed
forces. This plan, in turn, determines the armies' placement and
objectives at the beginning of the war and constitutes, in effect,
the first operational plan. 	 As the war progresses, strategy will
continue to regulate operations by orienting the armies' axes of
advance and allocating reinforcements, and by otherwise reacting to
changes in the overall situation.
At the operational-tactical nexus the operation is clearly
dominant over the innumerable tactical actions which comprise it. In
practice, the operational plan establishes the number, type (of fen-
sive or defensive) and objective of these tactical actions, according
to the forces allocated to them, in order to achieve the more long-
range goals previously established by the strategic instance.
Neznamov fleshed out his notion of the operation with a battle-
field definition, which served as a useful counterpoint to the more
theoretical exegesis cited above. According to this view, a future
war was likely to unfold in a series of forward movements by the
attacker and corresponding withdrawals by the defender. These
Neznamov, p. 14.
3' Ibid, p. 15.
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periods of activity would, in turn, be punctuated by periods of
relative inactivity, during which both sides would seek to improve
their respective positions by bringing up reinforcements and other-
wise refitting in preparation for the next round of fighting. It was
to these self-contained periods of preparation and fighting that
Neznamov gave the name operations, thereby continuing Leer's practice
of subsuming the various preliminary measures under the rubric of
operations .
Taken together, these examples offer a definition of the place
occupied by operations in military affairs which later Soviet theo-
rists would find it difficult to improve upon. One sees, in fact, in
these passages the outline of what would eventually become the
standard definition of operational art from the mid-1920s. And while
Neznamov did not set himself the task of creating a new discipline,
his work in further separating the sphere of operations from that of
strategy and tactics certainly helped to further the movement towards
the operation's ultimate theoretical independence.
Neznamov was less successful in his discussion of phenomena at
or near the operational level of war. This confusion chiefly re-
volved around his use of the term srazhenie (engagement, battle) and
a number of concepts derived from it. By itself the engagement is a
pure abstraction, which Neznamov defined as 'that towards which every
operation tends', and which serves as the latter's 'logical end'.
Of somewhat greater substance were the 'army engagement' (armeiskoe
Brazheuie), which has much in common with what later became known as
the army operation, and the 'general engagement' (general'noe srazhe-
nie). The latter was a looser term which involved the collision of
the greater part of the belligerents' armed forces in a single
climactic battle, as was common during the wars of antiquity and
Napoleon. 37 By way of historical example, one may consider the
Ibid, p. 13; Leer, StratecTiia, 4th ed., I. 23.
Neznamov, p. 136.
Ibid, pp. 155, 137.
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Battle of Mans and the destruction of Gen. Samsonov's army in East
Prussia as modern examples of the army engagement, while the battles
of Galicia and the Marne correspond more closely to the author's
notion of the general engagement.
However, these terms obscure as much as they elucidate, partic-
ularly as to the role of the operation via a via the army or general
engagement. As defined by Neznaxnov, it is difficult to determine
whether the different engagements are an integral and culminating
part of the operation, or something separate for which the preceding
operation functionB merely as the maneuver prelude to the actual
fighting. Moreover, by seeming to separate the general engagement
from the operation, Neznamov inadvertently struck at the heart of the
modern understanding of the operation, which holds that it is actual-
ly the general engagement which has been absorbed by the operation.
Neznamov was more fortunate in his examination of the various
kinds of operations, which he divided into three types: offensive,
defensive, and the meeting operation. As opposed to previous ef-
forts, the author's functional delineation of the operation was more
in tune with modern demands and would persist well into the Soviet
period. Of the three, Neznamov considered the offensive operation
the most important and devoted by far the most space to its study.
In this regard he was not unlike many of his colleagues in the West
before 1914, who looked forward to an offensive war of maneuver,
despite the ominous hints of 1904-05. In the case of Russia, this
more pugnacious approach also represented a healthy reaction to the
army's chronic passivity during the Russo-Japanese War, in which the
numerically inferior Japanese won repeated victories by seizing the
initiative from the languid Russian command.
As to the various offensive forms available to the commander,
Neznamov spoke approvingly of what he called the 'strategic break-
through' (strategicheskii proryv), followed by a subsequent attack
against one of the separated wings of the enemy front. Such an
option, he claimed, had become more attractive of late due to the
extreme elongation of the armies' fronts, which would impede any
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defensive countermeasures. 	 This is a surprising assertion, in
light of Neznamov's experience in Manchuria, which saw not a single
instance of an operational breakthrough. Moreover, the approaching
World War would clearly show that the prospects for such a break-
through had been reduced dramatically, even under the more favorable
conditions of the Eastern Front.
Neznamov's real preference was for the envelopment maneuver
against the enemy's communications, carried out by an army acting
semi-independently in the theatre of military activities. The chief
exponents of this method were the chief of the German General Staff,
von Schlieffen, and his predecessor, the elder von Moltke, whose
encircling operations at Metz and Sedan continued to mesmerize
European military thinkers forty years after the event. 39
 Neznamov,
however, had certain reservations and was quick to point out that the
fortuitous circumstances of the Franco-Prussian War were unlikely to
be repeated, given the increasing tendency of the battlefield to
coalesce into a single front, with the corresponding loss of room for
maneuver. To this list of factors he added modern communications and
intelligence means, which had rendered the old-style turning movement
(obkhod) all but impossible, although he did not entirely rule out
its use in the operations of a group of armies.1'°
As an alternative, Neznamov proposed the less ambitious f lank-
ing maneuver (okhvat), which he felt to be the most acceptable
expedient under modern conditions. However, the inherent limitations
of this maneuver were that the smaller forces involved and the
movement's shallow scope were of tactical significance only, and
could not lead to a decisive operational result. According to this
scheme, the main flank attack would be accompanied by a secondary
attack elsewhere along the defender's front. This would not only
Ibid, pp. 21-22.
Neznamov was known at the academy as a devotee of the German school
of operations. See Shaposhnikov, p. 144.
Ibid, pp. 21, 198-99.
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divert the defender's attention from the main blow, but would also
draw the latter's reserve into the battle against the secondary
attack, leaving it vulnerable to a flanking movement by the main
ef fort. 41
 This was a prescription for a maneuver as old as military
art itself, and one which would be greatly expanded upon, both in
theory and practice, under the Soviet regime.
The 'waiting operation' (vyzhidatel'naia operatsiia) was
Neznamov's term for what otherwise was a defensive operation.
However, as the name implies, the defender's mission was not limited
to merely repelling the enemy's attacks, but was also to actively
prepare for future offensive operations. Here, perhaps more than in
any other area was felt the searing experience of the Russo-Japanese
War and the widely-held belief that the war had been lost in large
part due to the commanders' lack of offensive spirit. One can even
detect here traces of the French cult of the offensive, which was all
too willing to turn any defensive posture into the basis for an
attack. Thus even when attacked by superior forces, the defender is
to begin preparing a decisive counterattack, preferably against the
enemy's flanks. This would involve stripping as many men as possible
from the passive sectors in order to form a reserve capable of taking
the attacker in flank and disrupting or halting his attack, prepatory
to a counteroffensive.'
Neznamov's preference for viewing the defensive as a forced
measure, dictated by temporarily adverse conditions, was an approach
which enjoyed great support among a later generation of Soviet
theorists, as did his desire to promptly transform any defensive
action into a counteroffensive. A serious shortcoming in his analy-
sis, however, was his narrow focus on the army offensive operation,
which necessarily confined his prescriptions to the operational-
tactical sphere. Unfortunately for posterity, Neznamov chose not to
address the idea of waging defensive operations at the front level or
41 Ibid, p. 178.
'	 Ibid, p. 184.
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theatre of military activities. This omission would be repeated,
with tragic consequences, by later Soviet theorists prior to 1941.
Neznamov's final category was the meeting operation' (vstrech-
naia operatsiia), which occurs when both sides are in motion. This
was a comparatively recent phenomenon, brought about by the enormous
growth of late nineteenth-century armies and their resulting tendency
to form a continuous front. This was even more likely to be the case
when both sides pursue an offensive strategy, as actually occurred in
1914. Neznainov thought it likely that given the limited space
available for maneuver at the beginning of a European war, the first
operations would inevitably unfold as frontal collisions, only after
which would the future course of action become clear. 43
 It is un-
fortunate, given the likelihood of the next war beginning as a series
of meeting operations, that Neznamov did not devote more attention to
this phenomenon.
Neznamov, like other theorists of his time, felt the need to
address the problem of operational-strategic troop control; and in
this area, as in others, his views are an interesting blend of
foreign and domestic influences. For example, Neznamov's preferred
army numbered approximately 200,000 men, a figure which can be traced
directly to Leer.M However, a future European war might well in-
volve the mobilisation of millions of men and their deployment into
many such armies, thus vastly increasing the problem of command and
control from the centre. As the coordination of this unwieldy mass
would be beyond the powers of even the most brilliant commander-in-
chief, Neznamov proposed combining these armies into two or four
groups of armies for greater ease of control.45
There was also a number of other reasons which prompted Nezna-
mov to advocate the creation of groups of armies. He thus approving-
ly quotes the German von Schlichting's criteria for forming groups of
Ibid, pp. 24, 62.
Ibid, p. 194; Leer, Strate giia, 4th ed., II. 13
Neznamov, p. 194.
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armies, of which the most important is that the armies in question
pursue the same goal and attack along the same strategic axis.1'6
This condition, as we have seen, corresponds closely to Leer's
definition of the theatre of military activities, which was later
given flesh in the Russian 1900 war plan, which posited the formation
of two fronts: one moving westward against Germany, and the other
southwest against Austria-Hungary.
A 'group commander' (komanduiushchii gruppoi) would command
each of these bodies and would answer directly to the commander-in-
chief at the centre. However, as had Leer, Neznamov preferred a weak
group commander and proposed to severely restrict his powers over the
armies in the field. He believed that the commander-in-chief should
orient the group commander only as to the larger goals being pursued,
while the latter 'will regulate only the moveaent of the areies',
thus leaving the individual army commanders a great deal of lati-
tude. 47
 Neznamov's penchant for decentralized control in this in-
stance may have been a reaction to Kuropatkin's petty interference at
Mukden, or admiration for the elder von Moltke's practice of giving
his army commanders broad operational freedom. But however laudable
these ideas may have been in theory, Neznamov's recommendations
tended to undermine the group commander's authority and reduce him to
a mere transmitter of instructions from the centre to the field
armies, thus rendering the entire group/front command level superflu-
ous. This also placed a premium on selecting army commanders who
would not only display initiative, but who would also be able and
willing to work together--a rare combination in any army.
Neznamov was probably at his most prescient when analyzing the
inconclusive nature of modern operations. As we have seen, the
increased viability of modern armies from the mid-nineteenth century
had made their destruction in a single general engagement increasing-
ly unlikely, although he continued to hail the latter as the 'ideal'
46 Ibid, p. 196.
Ibid, p. 197.
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of military art. 1' This lesson had been driven home repeatedly
during the Russo-Japanese War. There the Russians had abandoned the
field at Liao-Yang, been fought to a standstill along the Sha-ho, and
barely escaped disaster at Mukden. However, in spite of these
victories, the Japanese army had never achieved anything approaching
a strategic success, and the land war eventually ended in a position-
al stalemate.
In these and other cases the losing side had avoided a decisive
defeat by breaking contact with the enemy and slipping away to
regroup and fight again. Furthermore, the fighting in Manchuria
revealed that the victor, instead of immediately following up on his
success and finishing off his weakened opponent, is often as hurt and
exhausted as the latter and must make good his losses before resuming
the advance, lest he be defeated in turn by the defender, who has
been able to replenish his forces more easily by falling back on his
sources of material supply, while the further the attacker advances
the more materiel he expends and the further he moves from his own
base. Thus the victor is forced to halt his pursuit, lest he risk a
counterattack and possible defeat at the hands of a revived foe.
This materiel regrouping would necessarily entail a pause in the
fighting until the army or front were brought back up to strength and
able to resume the advance. This novel situation caused Neznanov to
note that modern wars have come to unfold 'in the form of separate
leaps of the attacker forward and the defender back', punctuated by
periods of relative quiet as the opponents prepare for the next phase
of fighting. 49 In this characterization of modern operations was an
insight into a pattern of war which would become all too familiar
within a few short years.
Here, in an admittedly rudimentary and incomplete form was the
germ of what, under the Soviets, came to be known as the theory of




result through the uninterrupted conduct of successive offensive
operations. This area was to become one of the Red Army's most
interesting and productive fields of theoretical endeavor during the
1920s, when armed with the rich operational experience of World War I
and the Russian Civil War, a number of outstanding thinkers would
build upon Neznaxnov's original notions to fashion a unique theory of
conducting military operations.
For all of his foresight, however, Neznamov was not without his
faults as a military thinker. Perhaps the most glaring of these from
the modern point of view was his stubborn belief in the continuing
utility of the Napoleonic decisive engagement, when recent history
clearly indicated that the general engagement had been absorbed by
the the operation, and was now, at best, merely the battlefield
culmination of the latter's efforts. Neznamov's sometimes confusing
and contradictory approach to the place of operations in military art
also dogged his thinking and prevented him from making a truly
imaginative leap forward. However, his shortcomings were those of
his time and they should not blind us to his importance as a transi-
tional figure, who, while serving both the tsarist and Soviet re-
gimes, made a profound contribution to the development of his coun-
try's military theory. As his student, Shaposhnikov, later recalled,
'it is doubtful that anyone ... so revealed the character of modern
operations like Neznamov'.5°
Among the other writers on operations during these years were
two officers whose subsequent careers mirror the tragedy of the
Russian officer corps after 1917. The more noteworthy of these was
Gen. Nikolai Petrovich Mikhnevich, who was born in 1849. Following
service in the Russo-Turkish War, Mikhnevich was graduated from the
General Staff Academy in 1882, and from 1892 taught there as a
professor of Russian military art. He also served briefly (1904-07)
as the academy's chief as it was beginning to recover from the shock
of the !4anchurian defeat. Mikhnevich wrote widely on questions of
50 Shaposhnikov, p. 145.
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military strategy, areas of which would later be considered the
proper sphere of operations. HiB most famous works in this area were
Strategy (1911) and Fundamentals of Strate gy
 (1913), in which he
examined the changing nature of modern war and the place of opera-
tions in it. Mikhnevich, upon leaving the academy, served as a
division and corps commander, and from 1911 to 1917 was chief of the
army's Main Staff. He joined the Red Army in 1918, but due to his
advanced age he took no part in the fighting. However, Mikhnevich
did resume his teaching duties under the new regime and served as an
instructor in the Artillery Academy until two years before hiB death
in 1927.
The other was Col. Andrei Grigor'evich Elchaninov, who was born
in 1868. Elchaninov entered the army in 1888 and was graduated from
the General Staff Academy six years later, and from 1908 was a
professor of strategy at the same institution. His enthusiastic
lectures on the exploits of the great Russian commanders and his
belief in the applicability of their principles to modern conditions
mark him as an adherent of the 'nativist' school of military art.
These and other views were most forcefully presented in his
Waging of Modern War and Battle (1909), and Strate gy (1912). Elchan-
inov died in 1918 in southern Russia, where the anti-Bolshevik armies
were beginning to coalesce.
Mikhnevich's views as to the place of operations in military
art reflect the consensus on the subject that had emerged in the
army. This he expressed in the following formula:
Each war consists of one or several campaigns; each
campaign--of one or several operations, representing a certain
complete period from the army's strategic deployment at the
operation's starting point, to the resolution of 9ie latter
through a victorious combat on the battlefield.... 1
As this passage indicates, the operation continued, in Mikhnev-
ich's mind, to occupy a sort of theoretical no-man's land between
51 N.P. Mikhnevich, Strategiia [Strategy), 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg,
1911), I. 152.
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strategy and tactics. As did Neznamov, the author evidently believed
that the end result of a number of operations and/or campaigns would
be the general engagement,--the culmination of all previous opera-
tional activity-- which would, in turn, lead to a final strategic
result. Again, this formula left precious little to the operation
except to maneuver the armies in preparation for the climactic
battle, which remained theoretically and spatially Beparate from the
preceding operations. On the other hand, Z4ikhnevich did correctly
subordinate the operation to the campaign, which is nothing more than
a seasonal or geographical subset of strategy.
Mikhnevich divided operations into two types, according to
goal, a delineation which was at once more precise than Leer's
abstractions and less concrete than Neznamov's functional approach.
Thus the 'main operation' (glavnaia operatsiia) has a decisive effect
on the course of the war, while the 'secondary operation' (vtorostep-
ennaia operatsiia), as its name implies, is of local significance
only. 52
 Presumably either of these may be of an offensive or defen-
sive nature, although the reigning offensive mentality within the
army almost assured that the former would predominate. And although
Mikhnevich did not elaborate on this point, it could be inferred that
the main operation would be conducted in the chief theatres of
military activities, while the secondary operations would be confined
to less important theatres, or would be launched in support of major
efforts in the more important theatres.
Mikhnevich also divided operations into two types, according to
scale: simple and complex. The first would likely involve a spatial-
ly-restricted operation by limited forces, pursuing a single object-
ive. The complex operation, on the other hand, would involve larger
forces operating over a wider area, pursuing multiple objectives
simultaneously. 53
 This, in crude form, was the theoretical basis
52 N.P. Mikhnevich, Osnovy Strate gii [Fundamentals of Strategy) (St.
Petersburg, 1913), p. 127.
Mikhnevich, Stratepiia, I. 178, 180.
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for distinguishing between simple (army) and complex (front) opera-
tions. Unfortunately, Mikhnevich failed to develop this interesting
notion further, but the ideas and terminology he employed would
resurface as the basis for later Soviet work in the 1920s in the area
of army and front operations.
As to the latter, Z4ikhnevich recommended organising the na-
tion's forces into groups of armies, each one numbering as many as 1-
1 1/2 million men. These groups of armies might have a permanent or
temporary organisation and would control those armies acting along a
single 'operational line' (operatsionnaia liniia). 54 The latter
corresponded closely to Leer's and Neznamov's notions of organising
similar groups on the basis of their ultimate objectives within the
theatre of military activities. However, unlike the others, Mikhne-
vich favored a looser form of control from the centre, in which the
commander-in-chief would regulate the groups' and armies' actions in
the only the most general fashion, thus according the groups command-
ers and their subordinate army commanders great freedom of action.55
Unfortunately, the ticklish problem of relations between the latter
two command levels was not examined at all.
The spatial growth of the formerly restricted battlefield into
the theatre of military activities and the corresponding need for new
forms of troop control was a topic which attracted Elchaninov's
attention as well. Elchaninov, as did others, supported the creation
of the front level of command, which would serve as an intermediary
between the commander-in-chief and the armies in the field. However,
the author belonged to that group of thinkers which sought to re-
strict the front commander's powers to indicating his subordinate
armies' 'overall objective of activities', with the individual army
commanders free to pursue their goals within these guidelines.56
'. Mikhnevich, Osnovy , p. 73.
Ibid, p. 246.
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Finally, of particular interest for the future are Elchaninov's
thoughts on the periodisation of a war into a number of operational
episodes. Thus instead of a conflict crowned by a decisive general
engagement, wars would henceforth take the form of what he called an
'unbroken series of local decisions', or local operations. These
would unfold in a succession of operational efforts, which would
yield a final result only after a prolonged ef fort. 57 Here again,
in rudimentary form, was the outline of what became known in the
1920s as the theory of consecutive operations.
The most common theme amongst the more progressive theorists
during these years was the broad agreement as to the necessity of
establishing the front/group of armies command instance in order to
control the various armies in a given theatre of military activities.
As we have seen, Leer's early thoughts on the subject eventually
found more concrete expression in the Russian army's 1900 war plan,
which called for the creation of two separate fronts to coordinate
operations against Germany and Austria-Hungary. And although this
plan was periodically revised during the following years, the notion
of two fronts operating along diverging axex in the western theatre
of war remained unchanged.
The notion of a separate front level of command was one of
Russia's more original contributions to military art, preceding by a
number of years the creation of similar bodies in the West. The
ideas associated with the front were ultimately codified in the
ReQulations on the Field Control of Troo ps in Wartime, issued on the
eve of war in 1914. The Re qulations stated that the prime require-
ment for creating a front is that several armies must be acting in
concert in pursuit of a single strategic goal in a specific territo-
ry, or theatre of military activities. 58 This was simply a rehash
of what had been stated by a number of theorists, from Leer onward.
Ibid, p. 309.
58 General'nyi Shtab, Polozhenie o Polevom U pravlenii Voisk v Voennoe
Vremia (Regulations on the Field Control of Troops in Wartime] (Petrograd,
1914), p. 1.
64
These criteria served as the basis for forming the first wartime
fronts in 1914, as well as others during the course of the war. They
were later adopted by the successor Red Army and served, with little
change, as the justification for the creation of similar bodies
during the Civil War and World War II.
More at variance with past theory, however, were the Re qula-
tions' views on the role of the front commander. As we have seen,
writers such as Leer, Neznamov and Mikhnevich tended to exalt the
role of the individual army commanders at the front commander's
expense, whereby the latter became little more than a figurehead,
charged with relaying orders from the commander-in-chief to the army
commanders. The Reaulations stood this formula on its head, declar-
ing that 'The commander-in-chief of the front's armies is the chief
of the armies, fortresses and fleet designated for joint activities
with the armies of a given front'. 59 This article represented a
significant expansion, at least in theory, of the front commander's
powers, and has much in common with Kuropatkin's wide-ranging author-
ity in the Far Eastern theatre of war during the Russo-Japanese War,
and with a similar and more successful experiment adopted by the Red
Army in the same theatre in 1945.
As before, the front commander was subordinated to the command-
er-in-chief and charged with carrying out the latter's instructions
by directing his subordinate armies towards the objective. However,
the Requlations, in contrast to many of the views expressed earlier,
unequivocally stated that the army commanders would be 'subordinate
in all respects to the front commander-in-chief', and are given only
the latitude necessary to carry out the latter's instructions.
This 'tilt' in favor of a strong front commander would yield the
imperial army only variable success in the few years remaining to it.
The follow-on Red Army, with its systemic tendency towards a high
degree of centralisation, would later develop this idea even further.
Ibid, p. 11.
60 Ibid, p. 54.
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The evolution of Russian views on the operation during this
period presents a complex and often contradictory picture, with many
progressive steps often matched by a retrograde one. To cite only
the most egregious example, the consolidation of the art of opera-
tions into a self-contained discipline was still hampered by the
reigning confusion as to the relationship of the operation to strate-
gy and tactics, despite commendable progress in this area. Likewise,
the otherwise progressive invention of the front/group of armies was
still hobbled by the refusal of several theorists to endow the front
commander with powers worthy of the name. However, progress had been
made towards a functional delineation of operations into offensive,
defensive and meeting types. Finally, the era's tentative investiga-
tion into the nature of successive operations gave great promise for
the future.
Russian history is replete with efforts at reform, which have
begun in a period of hope, only to be defeated by the conservative
nature of the regime. At best, these endeavors have survived in a
truncated form to serve as the inspiration for the next cycle of
flux. This was the military reformers' fate during the period 1905-
14, and they left behind a rich operational legacy which would serve
at the basis for much of what was to come. The task of completing
this work, however, would fall to a more vigorous regime, which by
suffusing many of these ideas with its own peculiar energy, would
take the next important steps in the development of operational art.
D. Operations in the First World War
During World War I the modern operation truly came into its
own. Compared to the modest scope of earlier operations, those of
the 1914-18 period were gigantic struggles, fought along extended
fronts stretching hundreds of kilometers in breadth and depth. And,
whereas earlier operations had been relatively short-lived and
involved, at most, a few armies, the Great War's operations often
lasted weeks, or even months, and embraced entire groups of armies.
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Unfortunately, however impressive the increased scope of operations
during the war, it waB not matched by a similar growth in the skill
with which they were conducted. As the war passed from its initial
maneuver phase to a positional stalemate, military art at the opera-
tional level became increasingly devalued in favor of a purely
tactical approach to the trench deadlock. The combatants' failure to
find an operational solution to this unique situation led to the
slaughter of Verdun and the Somme, and even greater carnage on the
Eastern Front. In Russia the price of failure was too great and
brought in its wake military collapse and social revolution.
When war broke out in August 1914 the Russian plan for the
strategic deployment of its forces unfolded according to a schedule
much like that of the other belligerents. The western theatre of war
was divided into two theaters of military activities, embracing
Germany and Austria-Hungary, respectively. These became, in turn,
the geographical bases for the deployment of two fronts, the creation
of which had been envisioned as far back as 1900. The Northwestern
Front had the task of driving the Germans out of East Prussia and
advancing on Berlin, while the Southwestern Front was to destroy the
Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia, before crossing the Carpathian
Mountains and moving on to Budapest and Vienna. As the war pro-
gressed, the Russian supreme command (Stavka) in turn created the
Northern (1915), Romanian (1916) and Caucasus (1917) fronts. The
French, German and Austro-Hungarian armies also went on to create
analogous army groups.
The Southwestern Front was commanded by Gen. N.I. Ivanov, whom
a subordinate described as 'narrow, indecisive and incoherent'.61
Ivanov's command included the Fourth, Fifth, Third and Eighth armies,
which were initially opposed by the Austro-Hungarian First, Fourth
and Third armies, under the nominal command of Archduke Ferdinand.
However, the real power was wielded by Gen. Conrad von Hotzendorf,
chief of the General Staff. At the beginning of the Galician fight-
61 A.A. Brusilov, Moi Vos pominaniia [My Memoirs], 2nd ed. (Moscow,
1941), p. 62.
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ing the Austro-Hungarians outnumbered their adversaries by a margin
of 787,000 to 691,000, due to the Russian army's slower pace of
mobilisation, although new units continued to arrive on both sides
throughout the battle.	 The Russians did, however, enjoy a Blight
superiority in artillery of 2,099 guns to 1,854.63 Moreover, the
Russians' morale was certainly higher than in the heterogenous forces
of the Dual Monarchy.
Both sides' initial plans called for an opening offensive and
were suffused with a desire for a quick victory, characteristic of
the major belligerents' prewar beliefs. Each sought to recreate a
new Sedan on an even larger scale by turning the enemy's flank and
destroying his forces in a gigantic battle of annihilation. The
Russians planned a concentric advance by all four armies against the
Austro-Hungarian armies in southern Poland, in order to cut off their
retreat through Cracow and across the Dniester. According to this
scheme, Fourth and Fifth armies would advance due south on Przemysl
and Lemberg (L'vov), while Third and Eighth armies would move on
Lemberg and Galich from the east. For its part, the Austro-Hungarian
command planned to launch its major blow with First and Fourth armies
due north between the Vistula and Bug rivers, while Third Army
guarded the flanks of the advance around Lemberg. Conrad then hoped
to continue the main drive north to meet what he believed would be a
corresponding German attack out of East Prussia, thereby cutting off
the Russian forces in the Polish salient west of Brest-Litovsk.
However, both plans were founded on a number of serious miscal-
culationB, which would come to have a decisive influence on the
course of the battle. The most serious of these was Conrad's error
in assuming a major German thrust across the Narew, without which the
Austro-Hungarian plan made no sense at all. Another was the convic-
tion that the Russians would not deploy sizeable forces east of
Beloi, pp. 54-56.
63 A. Kolenkovskii, Manevrennyi Period Pervoi Mirovoi Imperialistichesk-
oi Voiny , 1914 g. (The Maneuver Period of the First World Imperialist War,
1914] (Moscow, 1940), p. 81.
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Lemberg, and that the Third Army alone was therefore strong enough to
meet any threat from that direction. This grievous error was com-
pounded by Conrad's foolish dispatch of the Second Army to the
Serbian front, instead of deploying it against the Russians, as had
originally been planned. This army was only beginning to arrive in
Galicia when the fighting began. The Russians erred by assuming that
the Austro-HungarianB would deploy their forces along the border in a
way that would facilitate their planned double envelopment. As it
transpired, Conrad's decision to concentrate his forces further south
and west of the frontier seriously reduced the Russians' chances of a
successful turning movement and ensured that the opening battles
would play out as frontal collisions.
The Battle of Galicia (18 August-21 September, 1914) is conven-
tionally divided into the Lublin-Cheim (19 August-3 September) and
the Galich-L'vov (18 August-3 September) operations, followed by
still more fighting and a subsequent pursuit.
Fighting first broke out on the northern wing, where the
Austro-Hungarian First Army crossed the frontier on 20 August. North
of the San River it collided head on with A.E. Zal'ts's Fourth Army,
moving south from Lublin. On the 23rd the Austro-Hungarian left wing
struck one of the Russian corps south of Krasnik and drove it back.
Austro-Hungarian efforts to turn the Russian right flank along the
Vistula continued the next day, as the latter gave ground slowly
before superior forces. The Russians struck back in the centre, but
the fighting yielded no clear-cut result; nor did it relieve the
enemy pressure on the right. Zal'ts, worried about the threat to his
communications with Lublin, ordered his army to fall back late on the
24th to a position south of the city. For his poor handling of the
fighting, the elderly Zal'ts was removed from command and replaced by
A.E. Evert.
Ivanov, concerned about the heavy enemy pressure on Fourth
Army, ordered V.K. Pleve's Fifth Army to come to the assistance of
its hard-pressed neighbor by changing its axis of advance from due
south to southwest, with the object of striking the Austro-Hungarians
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in the flank. This change of direction through Zamosc and Rava-
Russkaia, however warranted by Fourth Army's situation, did not take
into account the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, which was moving
northeast from Przemysl.
The two armies collided the next day in a series of battles
between the Wieprz and Bug rivers. The Austro-Hungarians quickly
attacked and defeated Fifth Army's right flank, forcing it to fall
back on Krasnystaw, while the Russian centre was likewise bested
north of Tomaszow. The fighting continued in the area for the better
part of a week, with both sides suffering heavy casualties, but with
the Austro-Hungarian superiority in numbers gradually beginning to
tell. Fifth Army's units were slowly pushed north and east towards
Krasnystaw and Komarow, respectively. However, the army's divergent
paths of retreat created a dangerous gap between the its isolated
wings and opened the way for a determined Austro-Hungarian advance on
Chelm. To the west, enemy pressure continued against the Russian
Fourth Army, although the danger of an Austro-Hungarian breakthrough
towards Lublin was receding, thanks to a combination of heavy enemy
casualties and the timely arrival of Russian reinforcements to the
army's beleaguered right wing. The serious threat to Pleve's flanks
continued, however, and he was finally forced to order an withdrawal
on the 30th. The Russians here conducted a skillful fighting retreat
and the exhausted Fourth Army was unable to pursue them with any
success. By 3 September the Russians had safely retired to positions
stretching from the Vistula west of Lublin, southeast to the area of
Vladimir-Volynskii.
To the south matters developed more slowly, although the
fighting was no less fierce. Here the battle began with the movement
of Gen. A.A. Brusilov's Eighth Army from Proskurov to the frontier on
18 August, followed the next day by N. y. Ruzskii's Third Army out of
Dubno. At first, the two armies encountered no serious resistance,
and the Austro-Hungarians seemed content to remain behind their
Lemberg positions. In spite of their preponderance of strength, the
Russians' advance here was not as swift as it might have been,
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particularly in light of the developing threat to the front's north-
ern wing. In fact, as early as 25 August the front command had
ordered Ruzskii to swing his main forces north of Lemberg, in order
to maintain contact with Fifth Army's left wing as it executed its
wheel to the southwest. However, the commander of Third Army disre-
garded these instructions and continued his advance towards Lemberg.
The first heavy fighting occurred along the Zolotaia Lipa
east of Lemberg, where the Austro-Hungarians attacked Ruzskii's
forces, despite being heavily outnumbered. During the first two days
(26-27 August) the Russians fought off repeated enemy attacks along a
60-kilometer front, inflicting heavy casualties. On the 28th the
Russians themselves attacked and drove the Austro-Hungarians out of
their positions back to the Gnilaia Lipa. The fighting resumed the
next day, as the Austro-Hungarian Second and Third armies launched
another series of attacks. In a three-day battle (29-31 August) the
Russians broke through the enemy position southeast of Lemberg.
Another enemy attack was beaten off north of Galich by Brusilov's
army, which then began its own advance on Lemberg from the southeast.
With their last defensive line broken, the Austro-Hungarians aban-
doned the city and retreated to a position around Gorodok. On 3
September the Russian forces entered Lemberg.
Although the Russian armies in the east had won a significant
victory, it had been purchased at the expense of Fifth Army, which by
now was pulling back on Chelm. Third Army's fixation on Lemberg had
continually drawn it to the southwest, away from the critical situa-
tion on Fifth Army's front. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, in
fact, had been seriously alarmed by Ruzskii's dispatch of a single
corps towards Rava-Russkaia and had slowed its pursuit of the Fifth
Army accordingly. Only now, however, under intense pressure from
both Ivanov and the Stavka, did Third Army turn to the northwest.
The results of the two operations were thus decidedly mixed,
although the overall state of the front's two wings gave some grounds
for optimism. In the north, Fourth and Fifth armies had been roughly
handled, but not beaten. In fact, the Russian forces here were
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growing stronger each day, with the arrival of fresh units, of which
the creation of P.A. Lechitskii's new Ninth Army on 3 September was
the most tangible result. The state of the eastern armies was even
more favourable following the capture of Lemberg. Here the Russians
had an excellent opportunity to finish of f the Austro-Hungarians and
roll up their entire right wing, with results that would inevitably
affect the situation to the northwest. The foundation of a Russian
victory was already present, if Ivanov could only get his armies to
act in concert.
The situation called for a reappraisal of both sides' plans.
Of the two, the Austro-Hungarian solution was the most radical,
corresponding to its weaker position. With the hope of a German
attack from East Prussia all but gone, and the growing threat to
Fourth Army's rear, Conrad realized that a further advance on Lublin
and Chelm was pointless, especially in light of growing Russian
strength in the area. The chief of staff thus ordered his First Army
to take up defensive positions against Ninth and Fourth armies. To
the south, Third and Second armies were to regroup for an attack
against Eighth Army. Most audaciously, Conrad then detached part of
Fourth Army to watch the supposedly-beaten Russians in the Zamosc-
Hrubieszow area, while the greater part of the army would turn 180
degrees due south to close the gap in the Austro-Hungarian line and
strike the Russian Third Army in the flank. The plan was daring, and
even foolhardy, but it was the only alternative to a major Austro-
Hungarian withdrawal from what was becoming an increasingly untenable
situation.
The Russian plan, on the whole, remained faithful to Ivanov'e
original idea of a concentric offensive by all his armies. Thus
Ninth and Fourth armies would attack southwest towards the lower San,
while Fifth Army was to put itself in order and move south on Tomasz-
ow. Third Army would advance with the greater part of its forces
north of Lemberg in the direction of Jaroslaw, and Eighth Army was to
support this move from the south by pushing the enemy out of his
Gorodok position and back on Sambor. Ivanov's plan was cautious and
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unimaginative, but it had the virtue of simplicity, compared to
Conrad's scheme, and sought to employ the front's armies in a coordi-
nated fashion. They plan may also have reflected the Russian comman-
der's lingering fear of a German attack in the rear of his front,
particularly following the spectacular defeat of Gen. Samsonov's
Second Army at Tannenberg in late August, which effectively uncovered
the route to Warsaw from the northwest. However, for reasons of
their own, the Germans elected to move against the remaining Russian
First Army and left their Austro-Hungarian allies to their own
devices.
The Russian counteroffensive began in the north on 4 September
with a concerted attack by all three armies. These forces advanced
cautiously against the outnumbered Austro-Hungarian defenders, who
nonetheless launched a number of local counterattacks. However, the
weight of numbers slowly began to tell and the Russians took Zaniosc
on the 6th, as the Austro-Hungarian right wing started to bend back
under the pressure. To the east, the bulk of the rejuvenated Fifth
Army bore down on the weak enemy screen in the Komarow area and was
approaching the rear of Fourth Army's main forces, which had pivoted
south in accordance with Conrad's instructions and now occupied
positions in the Rava-Russkaia area. On the 9th, Fifth Army took
Tomaszow, thereby increasing the pressure on Fourth Army's exposed
left flank. To the west, the Russians continued their methodical
advance against the First Army.
West of Lemberg, Third and Eighth armies had reached the
Gorodok position along the Vereshchitsa River in most places by the
5th. Once again, the fighting took the form of an extended meeting
engagement along most of the front, while both sideB tried to Out-
flank the other north of Rava-Russkaia. However, the approach of
Fifth Army's units from the north caused the Austro-Hungarians to
break off these attempts and pull back their line, first to the west,
then further to the southwest, where it came under increasing pres-
sure from the reunited Russian forces. Further south, Third and
Eighth armies had to withstand repeated attacks over several days (8-
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12 September) along the entire front south to the Dniester by the
greater part of three enemy armies. At times it seemed as though the
Austro-Hungarians would break through to Lemberg, but the Russians
managed to hold on, and on 12 September the exhausted attackers broke
off the action.
Far to the northwest, meanwhile, First Army continued to fall
back against Russian attempts to turn its flanks. By 10 September it
had withdrawn south of Krasnik under growing pressure. The impending
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian left wing was fraught with danger
for the main armies fighting to the east and southeast, which were in
danger of having their escape routes to the west cut off. Here,
Fourth Army was in particular danger of being outflanked by Russian
attacks north and east of Rava-Russkaia. The town fell on the 11th
and the Austro-Hungarian situation became critical, and it seemed as
though the Russians would soon break into their rear. At this point,
Conrad at last realized that he was beaten, and that same day issued
an order for a general withdrawal to the west.
The Austro-Hungarian retreat soon got out of hand as the armies
streamed back to the west and southwest. By the 15th the Russians
had reached the line of the lower San and were approaching Sambor on
the upper Dniester. The Russians pursued as best they could, but the
terrible state of the primitive roads and their own supply shortages
enabled the enemy to escape. The front line finally stabilized east
of the Dunajec and the Russians were able to blockade two enemy corps
in the fortress of Przemysl.
Although the Russians had failed to achieve their goal of
destroying the Austro-Hungarian armies, the Battle of Galicia was
nevertheless a great victory and a much-needed antidote for the
disaster in East Prussia. According to Soviet figures, The Austro-
Hungarians lost 326,000 men in the fighting, of which more than
100,000 were prisoners, including 400 guns. Russian losses are put
at 230,000, of which 40,000 were prisoners. 	 The overall strength
Beloi, p. 353.
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of the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia fell by some 45% during the
battle. 65 The Dual Monarchy had suffered a major defeat and would
henceforth need substantial German assistance in order to survive.
Aside from its immediate battlefield results, the Battle of
Galicia is significant for what it reveals about the further develop-
ment of the operation, according to a number of indices. In purely
quantitative terms, the operation had grown immensely in scope over
the last ten years. At the height of the fighting well over a
million men were involved in continuous fighting that lasted along a
more or less continuous front, which at its greatest length stretched
some 400 kilometers and had ebbed and flowed in places to a depth of
200-250 kilometers.
In a qualitative sense, the fighting in southern Poland repre-
sents the first clear-cut example of Russian operational command and
control at the front level. As has been shown, Kuropatkin commanded
a front in all but name at Mukden, but his purely tactical view of
the battle and his failure to employ his armies as such negated the
operational significance of this development. Likewise, Gen. Zhilin-
skii's incompetent handling of the Northwestern Front's armies during
the East Prussian operation (17 August-15 September, 1914), indicated
that he had no clear conception of his role as commander-in-chief in
a theatre of military activities. Unfortunatey, Ivanov's front-level
conduct of the Battle of Galicia showed that he understood his role
little better.
Ivanov's faults in conducting the operation stem mainly from
his 'hands-off' approach to the operation and the activities of his
subordinate army commanders. Gen. Ruzskii's conduct in blatantly
ignoring the front commander's orders is a particularly egregious
example of this. The impunity with which he acted may stem as much
from the pre-war Russian belief in giving the individual army com-
manders the maximum freedom of action as it does from the front
commander's own lack of will in imposing his vision of the operation
65 Ibid, p. 276.
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on his subordinates.
The Russian victory in Galicia posed a serious threat to Cracow
and Germany's upper Silesian industrial area, bringing about a shift
in both sides' efforts to the left bank of the Vistula. The result-
ing fighting included the large-scale Warsaw-Ivangorod (28 September-
8 November, 1914) and Lodz (11-24 November, 1914) operations, which
brought neither side a decisive victory. Thereafter, the front in
the east atabilised for the winter.
The problems of waging war under modern conditions had by 1915
fully matured into a positional stalemate on both the Eastern and
Western fronts. This novel situation was in direct contradiction to
much of prewar Russian and other theory, which held that a decision
would most likely be achieved on the enemy's flanks. By 1915 the
possibilities for such a maneuver were nil, as the extremes of both
fronts were now anchored on the sea or neutral territory. The
conditions of trench warfare were by no means uniform, however, and
on the Eastern Front a greater degree of fluidity always existed, due
to the vast distances involved and the uneven quality of the opposing
troops. These factors made breakthroughs in the trench line and the
restoration of limited maneuver somewhat easier than in the West.
This was demonstrated most clearly at Gorlice in May 1915, when a
powerful Austro-German assault broke through the Russian position and
proceeded to roll up their entire front in Galicia. The retreat
continued throughout the summer and fall, as the Russians yielded up
Poland and Lithuania in a campaign which eventually cost them more
than two million casualties and 1,300,000 prisoners.M Thereafter
the front stabilised once again as the Central Powers turned their
backs on Russia to seek a decision in the West.
By the spring of 1916 the Russian armies had recovered suffi-
ciently from the previous year's disasters to once again consider
offensive operations against the Central Powers along a front stret-
ching more than 1,200 kilometers from Riga in the north, southward
N.N. Golovin, Voennye Usiliia Rossii v Mirovoi Voine [Russia's
Military Efforts in the World War] (Paris, 1939), II. 139.
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through Dvinsk, Baranovichi, Pinsk, Rovno and Tarnopol', and ending
at the Romanian border. The Russian forces were now organised into
three fronts: Northern, Western and Southwestern, numbering some
1,732,000 men, facing a combined Austro-German force of 1,061,000.67
However, while at first glance the Russian superiority seems impres-
sive, their advantage was considerably degraded by a chronic shortage
of artillery and a continuing qualitative inferiority via a via the
better-trained and better-led Germans.
The Russian high command met in April 1916 at Stavka headquar-
ters in Mogilev to map out the details of the summer campaign. This
group included Tsar Nicholas II, chief of staff Gen. M.V. Alekseev,
and the three front commanders. The conference decided to make the
summer's main attack by Gen. A.E. Evert's Western Front towards
Vil'nius, just south of the Bite of the disastrous March offensive at
Lake Naroch. Gen. Kuropatkin's Northern Front would assist this
effort with an attack towards Vil'niu g
 from the Dvinsk area. Geri.
A.A. Brusilov, the newly-appointed commander of the Southwestern
Front, was to begin the offensive cycle by attacking towards Lutsk in
order to draw enemy reserves away from the main blow. That the
Southwestern Front would attack at all was due to Brusilov's insis-
tence on an offensive role for his forces, as opposed to the other
front commanders who openly despaired of success. 	 The attitude of
those commanders entrusted with the main offensive role is especially
perverse, given the Russian's superiority in men along the front
north of the Pripiat' Marshes.
Returning from the conference, Brusilov assembled his army
commanders to dictate his plans for the upcoming offensive. As had
been decided at Mogilev, the Southwestern Front's main effort would
be made from the Rovno area towards Lutsk. However, Brusilov,
instead of following the usual practice of massing all his forces
here for a single narrow breakthrough, sekected a radically different
67 Cherkasov, p. 186.
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approach. The front commander demanded that each of his four armies
prepare an attack zone along its front, as well as in a number of
corps sectors. This meant, in effect, that the Southwestern Front
would be attacking along almost the entire length of the 450-kilome-
ter front in order to deprive the enemy 'of the possibility of
gathering all his forces in one place', so that he would not be able
to determine 'where the main blow will be launched against him'.69
Such a radical dispersal of force was particularly novel in
light of the slight overall advantage in men and materiel which the
Southwestern Front possessed. On the eve of the attack the Russians
outnumbered the Austro-Hungarians in infantry by 573,000 to 437,000
men, while remaining significantly inferior in heavy artillery.70
However, if the Russians would be attacking with what was a bare
superiority of force, they nonetheless possessed a number of distinct
advantages over the enemy. The most salient of these was their clear
moral superiority over the dispirited Austro-Hungarian armies, many
of whose Slavic contingents were less than eager to support the Dual
Monarchy against their Russian cousins. The Austro-Hungarian chief
of staff further compounded the weakness of hiB forces by siphoning
off many of his best troops and artillery to carry out his Asiago
offensive against the Italians in May. Thus Brusilov would be
attacking the enemy coalition at its weakest point along much the
greater part of his front, with the tougher Germans holding only the
area north of Lutsk.
Brusilov chose to make the front's main effort in the Eighth
Army's sector, whose commander, Gen. A.M. Kaledin, would attack due
weSt towards Lutsk, supported by demonstration attacks on either
wing. The enemy was to be further confused by a cavalry raid aimed
at Kovel'. Brusilov also planned a second offensive in Bukovina with
Lechitskii's Ninth Army, for the purpose of defeating the Austro-
69 Ibid, p. 183.
70 L. Vetoshnikov, 'Brusilovskii Proryv (Kratkii Operativno-Strategich-
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Hungarian Seventh Army and inducing the Romanians to enter the war on
the Allied side. Brusilov's two centre armies (Eleventh and Seventh)
were assigned Bupporting roles with the task of drawing off enemy
strength from the main breakthrough areas.
Brugilov's formula was certainly novel for its time. Hereto-
fore, the Russians had essentially copied Western methods of organis-
ing a breakthrough, which involved the massing of overwhelming
numbers of artillery and infantry along extremely narrow sectors of
the front, in order to punch a hole through the enemy's deeply-
echeloned defence. Such preparations were typical of offensive
operations for most of the war, particularly on the Western Front, in
spite of the many and obvious drawbacks. Not only was this procedure
tremendously expensive in terms of shells and manpower; the factor of
surprise was also completely negated, as such large-scale offensive
preparations could rarely be hidden from an opponent possessing
modern reconnaissance means, particularly aircraft. Any remaining
doubts as to the actual sector of the attack were soon removed by a
lengthy artillery bombardment, during which time the defender could
always bring up reserves to meet the impending offensive. Brusilov's
solution was not only the proper one, given his limited resources,
but more in tune with the peculiar conditions of the Eastern Front.
The Russian attack commenced in the early hours of 4 June with
an artillery bombardment along the entire front. The infantry attack
which began the next day was quite successful, except in the north,
where the combined infantry-cavalry raid quickly broke down in the
swampy terrain. Repeated attacks in this area brought no more than
minor gains at great expense. To the south the Eighth Army's main
effort made great progress and completely uprooted the defenders from
their heavily-fortified positions. The breakthrough here was com-
plete and by the 7th the Russians had taken Lutsk and advanced 25-35
kilometers along a 70-80 kilometer front. Even more profound was the
almost total collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, which had
quickly 'melted away into miserable fragments', according to a
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disgusted German observer. 71
 Indeed, such was the magnitude of the
disaster that Russian sources report capturing over 72,000 prisoners
and 94 guns in this sector alone in the first five days.72
Unfortunately for the Russians, Brusilov lacked the means to
exploit his success properly. Eighth Army's units were already fully
committed to the battle, and what should have been the army's mobile
reserve was being frittered away in useless attacks north of Lutsk,
an area manifestly unsuited for large-scale cavalry actions. Thus
when the road to Kovel' lay practically undefended, the RussianB had
no forces at hand to take the city. The defenders could hardly
believe their good fortune. As Gen. Ludendorff, the German deputy
commander in the East, later testified; 'The Russians had not fol-
lowed up very smartly in a westerly direction, although a great
victory was beckoning themf.Th
At this critical juncture in the offensive Brusilov seems to
have been almost as bewildered by his success as the Austro-Germans,
as he watched his supporting attack quickly become the greatest
Russian success of the war. However, instead of driving into the gap
with the forces on hand, he now ordered his units to consolidate
along the Styr' River and to expand the penetration along either
flank, while the cavalry was to continue its efforts to break through
to Kovel'. Brusilov's hesitation at this point shows that he had
little in common with the romanticized 'fighting general' image which
he and successive generations of Soviet and western historians have
constructed.
The Stavka intervened to further complicate an already diff i-
cult situation on 9 June, when Alekseev ordered Brusilov to call off
the advance on Kovel' and, instead, move southwest on Rava-Russkaia.
The same message also informed the front commander that Evert's
71 E. von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical
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attack had been postponed to 17 June. In an odd swing of moods,
Alekseev's initial doubts as to the wisdom of Brusilov's attack had
been transformed by unexpected success into a desire to achieve a
larger decision. By moving on Rava-Russkaia, Alekseev evidently
sought to turn the Austro-Hungarian flank in the north and split the
Hapsburg armies off from their German allies. This was a task for
which the front's meager resources were entirely insufficient, all
the more so as the other fronts remained inactive. Bru gilov protest-
ed this order and was thus able to get the axis of his main advance
shifted to the less-ambitious direction of Vladimir-Volynskii.
The Eighth Army, temporarily diverted from Kovel', continued
its attack due west, pushing across the Styr' against feeble Austro-
Hungarian resistance. By now Brusilov had come to realize the
futility of his cavalry attack and began switching what remained of
this force southward to exploit the success around Lutsk. By 15 June
the army had penetrated as far as the Stokhod River, equidistant from
Kovel' and Vladimir-Volynskii. To the south, Eleventh Army was able
to take advantage of its neighbour's success to push its right flank
nearly to Brody. Matters developed less well on Seventh Army's
front, where the Russians continued to flail ineffectually at the
enemy's second defensive zone. Ninth Army renewed its offensive on
10 June and was immediately successful when the enemy withdrawal got
out of hand and became a rout, on 18 June the Ninth Army forced the
Prut River and captured Chernovtsy.
As word of the Austro-Hungarian collapse spread, the Germans
acted with their usual despatch to shore up their faltering ally.
The Dual Monarchy was forced to shut down its Italian offensive and
move forces back to Voihynia, while the Germans began to frantically
strip units from both the Eastern and Western fronts and rush them to
the Kovel' area. The Germans were immensely aided in these efforts
by their highly-developed rail net and their interior lines of
communications, which enabled them to rapidly switch forces from one
front to another.
On 16 June a mixed Austro-German force began a series of
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counterattacks along the entire perimeter of the Lutsk salient.
However, the attacks achieved little and only succeeded in pushing
the Russian lines back a few kilometers, flattening the bulge's nose.
The German commander, Gen. von Linsingen, had not waited to assemble
a sufficient striking force, but had committed his units into the
battle as they arrived, thus reducing the counterattack's effective-
ness. By 21 June the attack's impetus was spent and the initiative
once more passed into Russian hands.
However, Brusilov continued to be hobbled by the Western
Front's delays in launching its Vil'nius attack. Evert's reluctance
to move was well known and his grand offensive was further postponed
until early July. Furthermore, it was decided to switch the main
effort south to the Baranovichi area, a move which set back the
timetable even more. This useless maneuvering gave the Germans a
free hand to shift their troops from Evert's and Kuropatkin's fronts
to meet the crisis at Lutsk. Brusilov was beginning to receive
reinforcements as well from the other two fronts, whose commanders
were probably just as glad to be deprived of the means for conducting
offensive operations. On 24 June Evert's left-flank Third Army caine
under Brusilov's command, although this infusion of strength did
nothing but lengthen the latter's front, and could do little to
restore the opportunity forfeited by repeated postponements of the
main attack.
Brusilov's order for the renewed offensive were issued on 25
June. Third Army was to move due west towards Gorodok and Manevichi,
while Eighth Army was to launch its main drive on Kovel', with a
secondary blow aimed at Vladimir-Volynskii. Eleventh Army was to
continue attacking towards Brody, and the Seventh was to move on
Monasterzhiska. Ninth Army would reorient its advance northwest,
towards Stanislavlov and Galich, with the date of attack set for 4
July.
For once the RuBsian high command managed to achieve a modicum
of strategic coordination. The Western Front's Baranovichi offensive
opened on 2 July, although this ostensible main effort actually
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preceded the 'supporting' attack by two days. But the lack of prepa-
ration in switching forces to this new front told early on and the
attack was a complete and bloody failure. Evert called off the
offensive after just nine days, with a loss to the Russian Fourth
Army of some 80,000 men.74
The Southwestern Front's renewed offensive now enjoyed only
mixed success, with the armies on either wing (Third, Eighth and
Ninth) advancing furthest, while the centre armies (Eleventh and
Seventh) were held to minor gain8. In the south, Ninth Army contin-
ued its successful drive between the Prut and Dniester rivers and
pushed the Austro-Hungarian back still further. The fighting was
most fierce to the north, in the area between Lutsk and the Pripiat'
River, where Russian casualties were averaging 15,000 men per day.75
Here Eighth Army was able to push only a few kilometers across the
Stokhod River before being halted by German reserves. The Third
Army's attack gained considerable ground between the Styr' and
Stokhod, and at one point seemed poised to break through to Kovel'
from the northeast. Ludendorff called this time 'one of the greatest
crises on the Eastern Front', when it seemed unlikely that the Dual
Monarchy's hapless troops could hold out against the repeated Russian
attacks. 76 But stiffened with German reserves, they just managed to
hold on and the Russian attacks gradually exhausted themselves.
Brusilov halted the offensive on 11 July and immediately set about
reorganising his forces for another effort.
By now the Stavka had finally realised the importance of
BruBilov's attack and had begun shifting forces to the Southwestern
Front in earnest. By the latter half of July Russian forces south of
the Pripiat' Marshes numbered 711,000 men against 421,000 Austro-
Germans, a significant increase over the slight superiority of early
A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Mirovaia Voina, 1914-1918 (The World War, 1914-
1918], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1931), p. 269.
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June.	 However, this added advantage served no particular purpose
except to tempt Brusilov into making more expensive attempts to take
Kovel'. The element of surprise which had served the Russians so
well at the beginning of the offensive was now entirely gone, and the
Central Powers could make better use of their inferior numbers by
using their superior rail system to switch troops to the threatened
sectors.
Nonetheless, Brusilov resumed his attacks all along the front
on 28 July, with Third Army striking towards Kovel' and Eighth Army
moving westward on Vladimir-Volynskii. Unfortunately, lack of
success along the main axis did not stop him from repeatedly throwing
his troops into bloodily unsuccessful attacks against the enemy's
positions along the Stokhod. Gen. von Falkenhayn recalled that the
Russian losses during this period 'must have been nothing short of
colossal'. 78
 This was hardly the imaginative and resourceful com-
mander of June, who sought to do his best with the small numerical
superiority available to him. The end result of this senseless
attrition was a few kilometers of ground gained before the attack was
once again halted.
In the south the Russians fared better against armies which
were substantially Austro-Hungarian in composition. Here the Rus-
sians were able to take Brody and advance to within 50 kilometers of
the vital rail centre of L'vov. The greatest successes took place on
Ninth Army's front, where the Russians took Stanislavlov , and in
August, Galich and Kolomyia, and threatened to push through the
passes of the Carpathian Mountains onto the Hungarian plains.
However, given the secondary nature of this sector and the poor state
of Russian communications in the area, the offensive here soon died
out from lack of sustenance, although the fighting here and along the
rest of the front sputtered on fitfully well into autumn.
By mid-August, the Southwestern Front's great offensive, for
Cherkasov, p. 8.
78 Falkenhayn, p. 270.
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all practical purposes, had ended due to the exhaustion of all
parties and the enormous casualties on both sides. Brusilov later
claimed to have inflicted 1,500,000 casualties on the enemy, plus
another 450,000 captured through mid-November.
	 Russian casualties
are more difficult to arrive at, although Falkenhayn was by no means
exaggerating. The Southwestern Front suffered 497,000 casualties in
the offensive's first ten days alone, and the government was forced
to call up an additional 1,900,000 men to make good the army's
losses.
Although intended purely as a secondary effort, the Southwest-
em Front's summer offensive did achieve a number of important and
unexpected strategic results. The substantial drain in resources
forced the Austro-Hungarians to call of f their successful Italian
offensive, and the Germans had to forgo their plans for a preemptive
attack against the British offensive preparations along the Somme in
France. 81
 The offensive's initial success prompted Romania to join
the Allies, although its belated effort was later crushed in a
lightning campaign which left the Central Powers even stronger in the
Balkans than before. Finally, the front's offensive completed the
destruction of the ramshackle Austro-Hungarian army as an effective
fighting force, at least on the Eastern Front.
However, it is at the operational level that the 'Brusilov
offensive' presents the greatest interest, particularly during the
initial breakthrough phase and the early attempts at exploitation.
As we have seen, Brusilov eschewed the practice of launching a
single major attack along a narrow front in favor of several separate
army and even corps efforts at widely-separated intervals, in support
of the front's major effort. This method of tactical-operational
concentration along the projected breakthrough zones, against an
operational-strategic scheme of dispersion south of the Pripiat'
Brusilov, p. 206.
80 Zaionchkovskii, p. 271.
81 Falkenhayn, p. 250.
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Marshes, and aided by the indifferent quality of the enemy forces,
ensured a rapid breakthrough in several places at once, with the
greatest success along the main sector. During the of fensive's first
two weeks the Eighth Army advanced to a depth of 75 kilometerB, which
was quite good for the time, even in the more mobile conditions of
the Eastern Front. Such rates even compare favorably with several of
the 1918 offensives on the Western Front, which demanded a far
heavier investment in men and materiel.
But the attack's initial impetus quickly exhausted itself, and
after mid-June the gains were few and horrendously expensive, except
in the south, where Ninth Army ultimately penetrated up to 150
kilometers. The answers for the Russian failure to achieve a deci-
sive operational success must be sought in the shortcomings of the
front command, and in the meager materiel support allotted to the
offensive, which in turn was the result of prior decisions at the
strategic level.
Brusilov's chief problem lay in the contradiction between his
original conception of his front's supporting role and the great
vistas revealed by the operation's first spectacular successes. His
original desire to engage and occupy the enemy in as many places as
possible led him to approve the Eighth Army commander's plan to
launch two separate attacks on Kovel', leading to an unnecessary
dispersal of force along the axis of the main advance. Thus the
main, or southern, wing attacked with all its corps arrayed in a
single echelon along the front, without a second echelon to impart
depth and sustainability. The few reserve divisions available were
inadequate and were, in any event, quickly consumed during the
breakthrough. Thus the Russian attack remained a 'one-punch' affair
without the means for following up any success. The harsh lesson of
the Lutsk operation was that in order to break through a deeply-
fortified enemy front and exploit the penetration, the attack must be
organised in depth as well.
In spite of these faulty initial dispositions, Kovel' might
have fallen in June had either Kaledin or Brusilov demonstrated the
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requisite flexibility in adapting to their unexpected success.
Unfortunately, Brusilov's conduct was marked by indecision during
this time, when a commitment to a rapid push to Kovel', even without
reserves, might well have been successful.
However, if Brusilov proved himself no better than his contem-
poraries in exploiting his opportunities, his actions, once the
offensive's original impetus had exhausted itself, place him among
the worst of a bad lot. By taking Lutsk, the Southwestern Front had
already done far more than was ever expected of it, and Brusilov can
hardly be held responsible for the Stavka's failure to insist on an
immediate attack by the other fronts. Brusilov, having failed to
push on to Kovel' after the breakthrough, should have been content to
rest on his laurels. Unfortunately for the Russians, once the
Southwestern Front became the 'main front' and began to receive the
lion's share of reinforcements, Brusilov seems to have lost the
capacity for original thinking forced upon him by his former scarcity
of resources and reverted to the labourious and grinding attacks
favored by too many of his contemporaries. Far from bringing any
benefit to the Russian cause, this senseless prolongation of the
attack went far towards undermining what remained of the army's
offensive spirit. As the fighting along the Stokhod continued into
the autumn, incidents of entire regiments refusing to leave their
trenches were reported; a development which presaged the army's final
collapse in l9l7.
In retrospect, it would have been wiser to have shut down the
offensive no later than mid-July, as its original justification as a
prelude to the Western Front's main blow had by then evaporated.
Soviet operational theoreticians of the 1920s would later make much
of the notion of not pushing an offensive beyond a point where the
risks and losses incurred begin to outweigh the results achieved. In
the Lutsk operation, they found a lesson and a warning.
The continuing slaughter at the front, combined with Russia's
Cherkasov, p. 15.
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mounting economic troubles, led to the overthrow of the Romanov
dynasty in March, 1917. The newly-formed Provisional Government
later appointed Brusilov supreme commander-in-chief, from which post
he oversaw the final, disastrous Russian offensive of the war. This
was the so-called June operation (29 June-28 July), in which troops
of the Southwestern Front attacked south of Lemberg. The Russians
made respectable progress at first, but the political confusion and
defeatist rot which had seized the army was now too strong, and the
offensive ground to a halt south of Galich. A counterattack by
combined Austro-German forces quickly threw the Russians back to
their starting positions and beyond. The retreat became a rout and
by the end of July the Russians had lost Tarnopol' and Chernovtsy.
This defeat fatally undermined what was left of the Russian army and
helped to set the stage for the Bolshevik coup three months later.
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CHAPTER II
OPERATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR AND THE WAR WITH
POLAND, 1918-1920
A. Introduction
As a background to the study of operational art, the Russian
Civil War constitutes an extremely interesting, although highly
contradictory phase in the theory's development. The peculiarities
of the conflict, at once grandiose in its immense spatial scope, and
at the same time anachronistically small in the numbers of men and
equipment actually engaged, represent a highly eccentric break with
the heretofore orderly quantitative development of a number of
operational indices. For example, at its greatest length in early
1919 the 'front' stretched some 8,000 kilometers, from the Gulf of
Finland south along the border with the Baltic states, then east
across southern Ukraine to the Volga River and the Caspian Sea. The
line then moved north through the Volga-Kama basin, before turning to
the northwest until it reached the Finnish border north of Petrograd
(Leningrad/St. Petersburg). From mid-1918 the fighting centred along
two main fronts, which alternated periodically in strategic impor-
tance. These were the Eastern, generally between the Volga and the
Ural Mountains, and the Southern, embracing most of Ukraine, the Don
River basin and the northern Caucasus Mountains. During the war with
Poland the front came to include the western districts of Ukraine and
Belorussia, to the ethnic border of Poland and beyond. Secondary
fronts also existed at various times in Estonia, the area south of
Archangel and Murmansk, the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far
East. The Soviet forces held the interior of this line, while their
enemies, the Whites, operated from the periphery.
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The troops available to man this front were hopelessly inade-
quate, due not only to an objective shortage of manpower, but to
their irrational employment as well. For example, at its peak
strength in 1920 the Worker' and Peasant's Red Army (RKKA) numbered
nearly five million men, of which 874,000 were regular troops and a
mere 295,000 were combatants. 1
 The White armies, for their part,
never totaled more than 640,000 men at best, although they made up
somewhat for their inferiority by the high proportion of trained
officers in their ranks. 2 In material terms the situation was even
worse, due to the almost complete collapse of industrial production
during these years. For example, by the end of the Civil War the Red
Army still possessed only 2,300 artillery pieces, or about as many as
were in the German Fifth Army, which attacked along a 15-kilometer
front at Verdun in 1916. Rarely in the history of modern warfare
have the forces of the warring parties been so minuscule in relation
to the stakes involved.
These factors made the maintenance of a continuous defensive
front impossible and shifted the advantage decisively in favor of the
attacker, who could generally break through the defender's porous
front or turn his position by means of a flanking movement. This
helped to make the Civil War a conflict of exceptionally wide-ranging
maneuver, particularly in comparison with the limited movement of the
Great War. The scarcity of reserves on both sides, coupled with the
defender's single-echelon formation, made even the slightest break-
through or turning movement a potential disaster for the defence.
Thus while offensives on the Western Front in 1914-18 could often be
measured in hundreds or thousands of yards gained, Civil War opera-
tions flowed back and forth over hundreds of kilometers. For exam-
Movchin, p. 43.
2 Kamenev, p. 58.
I.M. Kravchenko, 'Kharakternye Cherty Operativnogo Iskusstva i Taktiki
RKXA v Gody Grazhdanskoi Voiny' [Characteristic Features of the RKKA's
Operational Art and Tactics During the Civil War]. In 1.1. Mints, ed., Iz
Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voiny i Inteventsii, 1917-1922 [From the History of the
Civil War and Intervention, 1917-1922] (Moscow, 1974), p. 208.
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pie, during the Red Army's 1919-20 offensive on the Eastern Front the
White forces were driven all the way from the middle-Volga to Lake
Baikal, a distance of several thousand kilometers.
The Russian Civil War was also a conflict of almost unimagin-
able savagery, in which centuries-old hatreds and ideological fanati-
cism were given free rein. Prisoners taken by either side were
routinely shot, while bloody reprisals and other atrocities against
civilians unlucky enough to be members of a particular 'class' were
all too common. The privations caused by the war and the preceding
World War led to a complete breakdown in the infrastructure of a
modern society. Millions of people may have starved to death during
and immediately following the war, which had a deleterious effect on
the army's performance as well. One particpant in this struggle
later recalled that of the 2.2 million casualties suffered by the Red
Army from late 1918 through the end of 1920, only 800,000 were
directly related to combat causes, with the remainder attributable to
diseases caused by lack of food and medicine.4
In brief, the military problem for the Bolsheviks was to break
out of their central Russian redoubt and extend their control over
the outlying areas of the country. The problem for the anti-commu-
nist forces was just the opposite: to pierce the Soviet heartland
from one or more of their strongholds and bring down the regime by a
march on Moscow. However, both sides were hobbled by a number of
serious economic, military, political and other liabilities. For
example, the Whites at one time controlled territory which before the
war produced 85% of the country's iron ore, 90% of the coal, three-
quarters of the steel, almost all of the oil, and which housed two-
thirds of its military factories. 5 The White forces could also
count on significant aid from Western governments, although what
direct military intervention there was by the Allies was insuff 1-
G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia [Remeniscences and
Reflections], 11th ed. (Moscow, 1992), I. 121-22.
M.V. Zakharov, ed., 50 Let Vooruzhennvkh Sil SSSR [50 Years of the
Armed Forces of the USSR] (Moscow, 1968), p. 46.
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cient. The Whites also possessed greater initial military expertise,
although this became less of a factor as the war progressed.
The Bolsheviks, however, were not without their advantages,
which ultimately proved decisive. The Reds, although they initially
occupied only a fraction of the country's territory, did hold the
most populous areas and hence the larger recruiting base. They also
enjoyed the inestimable benefit of interior lines, which allowed them
to switch forces from one threatened front to another as the situa-
tion demanded. During the war 70% of the Soviet divisions fought on
two or more fronts, with some employed on as many as five. 6
 This
was in contrast to the Whites, who were never able to establish a
continuous front under a single commander-in-chief, and whose of f en-
give operations were consequently uncoordinated. The same was true
in the political sphere, where the White effort suffered continuously
from factionalism and the inability to articulate a coherent and
popular program, as opposed to the Bolshevik leadership, which
combined superior political insight and flexibility of method with
utter ruthlessness of execution.
Both sides relied on a solid core of ideologically-committed
volunteers, while the bulk of their forces consisted of reluctant
peasant conscripts who were essentially indifferent to the political
quarrels involved. Peasant loyalties were particularly weak, and
large-scale desertions were common on both sides. For example,
between January 1919 and December 1920 the Red Army tallied 2,846,000
cases of desertion or otherwise absent without leave. 7 The fidelity
of most soldiers was ensured by harsh discipline and consistent
military success, rather than any sort of political allegiance.
Indeed, so great was the reluctance to fight in Russia that the Red
Army throughout relied heavily on the military skills of former
6 Kamenev, p. 77.
G.F. Krivosheev, ed., Grif Sekretnosti Sniat. Poteri Vooruzhenn yk Sil
SSSR v Voinakh, Boevvkh Deistviiakh i Voenn ykh Konfliktakh. Statisticheskoe
Issledovanie [The Seal of Secrecy Removed. Losses of the USSR'S Armed Forces
in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts. A Statistical Study] (Moscow,
1993), p. 39.
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German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who had converted to
communism. About 50,000 Hungarians, Czechs, Germans and other
nationalities fought on the Soviet side during these years and
accounted for as much as 10-11% of the Red Army's strength in late
1918. 8
 The Whites also had their foreign allies, including former
Czech and Slovak prisoners of war.
Alongside the Red Army's numerical growth caine a corresponding
development of its organs of strategic and operational control. At
the top stood the Communist Party's Central Committee, although this
body played a secondary role to the more powerful Politburo. The
party exercised direct control over the war effort through the
Council of Worker's and Peasant's Defence, created in November 1918
and renamed the Council of Labour and Defence in April 1920. The
Bolshevik leader V.1. Lenin headed this body, which served as the
prototype of the 1941-45 State Defence Committee under Stalin.
Direct control of military operations was exercised through the
Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR), created in
September 1918. L.D. Trotskii, who was also the People's Commissar
for Military Affairs, headed this body. The highest strictly mili-
tary post in the Red Army was that of commander-in-chief, or Glavko,
who was at the same time a member of the RVSR and carried out its
directives. The first commander-in-chief was 1.1. Vatsetis, a
Latvian and former tsarist colonel, who occupied the post from its
creation in September 1918 until his removal in July 1919, as the
result of a policy dispute. He was succeeded by S.S. Kamenev, also a
former colonel, who served in the post throughout the remainder of
the war. The working organ of the RVSR and the commander-in-chief
was the RVSR Field Staff, created in September 1918 and charged with
drawing up strategic plans and transmitting orders to the fronts and
independent armies.
The Soviets abolished officers' ranks and other reminders of
the old regime, but were quite willing to adopt several of the more
8 S.E. Rabinovich, Istoriia Grazhdanskoi Voin y (A History of the Civil
War], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1935), p. 63.
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useful tsarist military practices, such as the front level of com-
mand. The Red Army organised its first front, the Eastern, in June
1918, which was followed over the next several months by the creation
of the Northern, Southern and Ukrainian fronts, among others. Civil-
war fronts, compared to those of the late empire, were quite small,
numbering only about 46,000 to 147,000 men and 245-660 artillery
pieces. The armies of the period were also pale reflections of their
imperial predecessors and contained anywhere from 14,000 to 28,000
men and 72-216 guns.9
Following the successful Bolshevik coup in November 1917, both
Red and White began to prepare for war. At first the new regime had
to guard against the Germans, who as a result of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovek in March 1918, had occupied the Baltic states, and much of
Belorussia and Ukraine. Resistance to Soviet rule was particularly
strong in the south, where White troops under P.N. Krasnov and A.I.
Denikin had raised the standard of revolt among the Cossacks of the
lower Don and Northern Caucasus. Throughout the summer and fall of
1918, British, American, French and Japanese troops landed at various
ports in the north, south and east. The greatest threat at this
juncture came from a Czechoslovak force, which was advancing by rail
across the middle Volga towards its destination of Vladivostok in the
Far East, and which at one time threatened to link up with White
forces in the south. The Soviets recovered, however, and in a six-
month series of offensive operations (September 1918-February 1919),
threw the Whites back nearly to the Urals and restored communications
with Soviet authorities in Central Asia. The German collapse in
November 1918 further strengthened the Soviet position, as the Red
Army moved in to fill the vacuum left by the Kaiser's retreating
army. By the beginning of 1919 the Red Army's position was better
than it had been for some time, although the Whites already preparing
new offensives for the spring.
1.1. Kravchenko, 'Kharakternye Cherty Nastupatel'nykh Operatsii
Krasnoi Armii v Grazhdanskoi Voine' [Characteristic Features of the Red Army's
Offensive Operations in the Civil War], V-IZh (1976), no. 3, pp. 97-98.
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B. The Military Specialists
It is one of the ironies of the Russian Civil War that the most
pressing military problem which the Bolsheviks faced during their
first months in power was one of their own making. The party had
spent much of 1917 undermining the former imperial army in order to
deprive the successor Provisional Government (March-November 1917) of
armed support. The Soviet leaders had not foreseen the need to
create a regular army, believing that their coup would be the signal
for similar acts in the West. Instead, the regime was immediately
confronted not only with the prospect of civil war, but of interven-
tion by a still-vigorous imperial Germany, and was forced to build a
new army almost from scratch. This would prove to be no easy task in
a country already exhausted by more than three years of war and whose
huge but demoralized army was incapable of offering effective resis-
tance to anyone.
This untenable situation compelled the Soviet government to
establish the Red Army in January 1918, units of which were soon in
action against German troops. These early formations usually con-
sisted of Red Guards, the party's military arm, and other like-minded
volunteers. However, this expedient failed to provide a sufficient
number of recruits to meet the regime's growing military respon-
sibilities. By May 1918 the Red Army still numbered only 306,000
men, which was far from adequate to suppress the growing White
resistance in the south and east, or to fend off German probing in
the west. 1° Accordingly, the Soviets adopted working-class con-
scription that same month, which quickly raised the size of the army
to 800,000 by the end of 1918, and to over five million by the end of
the war.11
However necessary, the army's rapid expansion and the inflation
10 N. Movchin, 'Komplektovanie Xrasnoi Armii v 1918-1920 gg.' [The
Manning of the Red Army, 1918-1920]. In Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, II. 76.
Ibid, pp. 87, 89.
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of its ranks with masses of untrained and semi-literate workers and
peasants made the shortage of qualified officer cadres all the more
acutely felt. The Bolsheviks, for so many years an underground
political movement, were almost devoid of members with command or
staff experience, which stood in sharp contrast to the White armies,
which always contained a high proportion of experienced officers.
As the Civil War approached its first crisis in the summer of
1918 the Soviet authorities were forced by circumstances to conscript
the former officers as well, although this policy was accompanied by
a great deal of controversy. The Bolsheviks' anxiety about employing
large numbers of former tsarist officers is understandable, given the
party's ideological hostility to the officer class as a matter of
principle, and the army's pre-revolutionary role as the mainstay of
the autocracy. Even Lenin, who supported the policy, felt that the
former officers were 'permeated throughout with bourgeois psycho-
logy', and that 9/10 of them were 'capable of treason at any opportu-
nity'. 12 For many veteran Bolsheviks the very idea of former tsar-
ist officers commanding units in the proletarian army was an abomina-
tion, and they waged an active campaign against this policy.13
Trotskii, the People's Commissar for Military Affairs and the chief
proponent of employing the former officers, castigated the bigoted
attitudes of these 'semi-partisans', for whom military science was
'identified with treason and treachery'. 14
 This bitter dispute
festered throughout the remainder of 1918 and the policy was not
officially adopted until the following March at the eighth party
congress. However, the feelings engendered by this controversy would
linger long after the war itself was over.
12 v•• Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (Complete Works], 5th ed.
(Moscow, 1958-65), XXXVIII. 142; XIIIL. 242.
13 See E. Iaroslavskii, 'Kak Vossozdat' Armiiu' (How to Recreate the
Army], Izvestiia (Moscow), 15 June 1918, pp. 1-2; V. Sorin, 'Komandiry i
Komissary v Deistvuiushchei Armii' [Commanders and Commissars in the Field
Army], Pravda (Moscow), 29 November 1918, p. 2.
14 L.D. Trotskii, Kak Vooruzhalas' Revoliutsiia [How the Revolution
Armed] (Moscow, 1923-25), I. 172-73.
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For their part, many of the former officers, particularly the
older ones, detested the new regime, which they blamed for the
collapse of the old army and the hated Brest-Litovsk peace, as well
as the loss of their former privileges and authority. The latter
included such 'democratic' innovations of 1917 as the abolition of
ranks and saluting and the election of officers by go-called 'sol-
diers' committees'. As one former officer recalled, the 'overwhelm-
ing majority' of officers viewed the idea of serving in the Red Army
as 'almost shameful'.15
The former officers' reasons for serving were varied and
sometimes contradictory. Some served the Reds for patriotic motives,
in spite of the Bolsheviks' 'internationalist' pretensions. Such
feelings were certainly uppermost in the minds of those who joined
during the winter of 1917-18, when a renewed German advance threat-
ened to take Petrograd; and in the spring of 1920, following the
Polish invasion. Others, albeit a distinct minority, seem to have
sincerely supported the party's program, or had come to believe that
the Bolsheviks represented the choice of the people. 16
 Others
joined because they knew no other profession and could have served
the Whites just as easily.
The majority, however, undoubtedly served under some duress.
This pressure took several forms, the most lenient of which was
Trotskii's proposal to ensconce unwilling officers in concentration
camps, while Lenin threatened 'saboteurs' with shooting. 7 Certain-
ly the most barbaric measure was the war commissar's order to arrest
the relatives of commanders who defected to the Whites, a practice
15 M.D. Bonch-Bruevich, Vsia Vlast' Sovetam (All Power to the Soviets]
(Moscow, 1957), p. 284. The author, a former general-major, was one of the
first high-ranking officers to serve in the Red Army. His brother was the
veteran Bolshevik V.D. Bonch-Bruevich.
16 One of these was Gen.-Maj. A.I. Verkhovskii, a former war minister
in the Provisional Government. He joined the Red Army in 1919, after spending
several months in prison for plotting against the state. For an account of
his 'conversion', see his Na Trudnom Perevale (At a Difficult Crossing]
(Moscow, 1959), pp. 415-20.
17 Trotskii, I. 22S; Lenin, L. 141.
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which foreshadowed one of the more odious practices of the Stalin
era. 18
 In such an atmosphere no former officer was above suspicion,
and even the Red Army's first commander-in-chief, 1.1. Vatsetis, was
briefly arrested in 1919 on charges of treason. 19
 Evenly the slav-
iBhly loyal Bonch-Bruevich later wrote that 'Many tsarist generalB
and officers became victims of the red terror', although he excused
the repression as justified by the Whites' actions.2°
Under these circumstances, one of the party's chief tasks was
to assert and maintain its authority over this potentially-treasonous
group. The Bolsheviks achieved this through the institution of
political commissars, an expedient of radical regimes since the
French Revolution. Political commissars had served in the Russian
army since the February Revolution of 1917, and following their
seizure of power the Bolsheviks immediately set about expanding this
system and bringing it under their control. In April 1918 the All-
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars was established, which became
the RVSR Political Directorate the following year. Such future party
notables as K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Kirov, N.S. Khrushchev, V.V.
Kuibyshev and J.V. Stalin gained considerable experience as 'the eyes
and ears' of the party during this period.
Military councils (voennye sovety) were created at the front
and army level to ensure party control, while individual commissars
were assigned to units down to the battalion level. The military
councils generally consisted of two political commissars and the
commander, who, at this level was almost always a former officer. In
theory, the commander was to enjoy operational freedom, while the
commissars answered for the unit's political loyalty. In practice,
however, the commanders' prerogatives were often encroached upon by
overzealous commissars intent on ferreting out 'treason' and inter-
18 The text of this decree is reprinted in Trotskii, I. 153.
19 L.D. Trotskii, Stalin, trans. C. Malamuth (New York, 1941), pp. 315-
16.
20 Bonch-Bruevich, p. 283.
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fering in purely military matters. The key to the commissar's power
was the provision that no operational directive could be implemented
without his countersignature. The ambiguity inherent in this ar-
rangement became fertile ground for mischief-making by any ambitious
commissar, as happened on a number of occasions. The system of dual
command and the inBecurity it bred amongst the former officers was
one of the prime causes of so much of the red tape and inefficiency
in the Red Army's conduct of operations during the war.21
One of the most egregious examples of political interference in
the former officers' command functions took place in the summer of
1918. This incident is important not only as an illustration of the
problems which the former officers encountered in their work, but as
revealing the attitudes of two men, Stalin and Voroshilov, whose
attitudes and policies would shape the Red Army for a generation.
Stalin arrived in Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad/Volgograd) in June 1918
to supervise the requisitioning of the area's grain supplies for
Russia's urban areas. The city was threatened at the time by Kras-
nov's Cossack troops, who were attempting to cut the Soviets' Volga
River lifeline and link up with the White forces in Siberia. Stalin,
although he had not been delegated military powers, used his politi-
cal position (at the time he was a member of the party's Politburo
and Central Committee, as well as people's commissar for nationali-
ties) to usurp the city's defence from the military authorities. One
of hiB first acts was to arrest the commander of the North Caucasus
Military District, the former officer Gen.-Lt. A.E. Snesarev, and
several of his staff on charges of treason. According to some emigre
sources, Stalin later ordered the staff officers placed aboard a
barge, which was towed to the middle of the Volga and sunk.22
21 E. Shilovskii, '0 Tekhnicheskoi Storone Upravleniia Armii v
Grazhdanskuiu Voinu' (On the Technical Aspects of Army Control in the Civil
War], Voennaia Nauka i Revoliutsiia (Military Science and Revolution] (1922),
no. 2, pp. 13-27.
Rapoport and Alexeev, p. 128; A. Antonov-Ovseenko, The Time of
Stalin, trans. G. Saunders (New York, 1981), p. 8. Although these authors
cite no evidence for their claim, the incident was obliquely confirmed by
Soviet sources during the dictator's lifetime. See E. Iaroslavskii, ed.,
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The extent of Stalin's enmity towards the former officers may
be gathered from two letters written to Lenin during this period. In
the first letter, Stalin denounced the officers as 'cobblers' (a
slang term meaning 'idiots'), and blamed them for the city's defence
problems. In anther letter, Stalin complained that the former off i-
cers were actually allies of the Cossacks and Anglo-French 'inte-
rventionists'.	 As the letters indicate, Stalin's penchant for
seeing 'spies' and 'saboteurs' everywhere was already highly devel-
oped. The dictator's hostility towards the former officers was
confirmed years later by his lieutenant and eventual successor,
Khrushchev. He wrote that following the Civil War 'Stalin used to
enjoy telling us that he refused to have anything to do with the
bourgeois officers whom Trotskii dispatched to Tsaritsyn and that
they invariably turned out to be traitors'. Stalin, according to
this source, remained a 'specialist eater all his life'.24
Stalin ruled virtually unhindered at Tsaritsyn for two more
months, until mid-September, when the Southern Front was established,
embracing the area along the lower Don and Northern Caucasus. Its
military council consisted of Stalin, the former general-major P.P.
Sytin, Voroshilov, and S.K. Minin. This was an impossible arrange-
ment, given the personalities involved and the political members'
ingrained mistrust of the former officers. Trotskii called Voroshil-
ov 'The man who most detested the military specialists ..., not
overly intellectual but shrewd and unscrupulous'. Minin, he said,
'suffered from a blinding phobia of all tsarist of ficers'. 25 The
military council was continually torn by disagreements over command,
Vos'moi S"ezd RKP(b) [The Eighth RKP(b) Congress] (Moscow, 1933), p. 148.
23	 v• Stalin, Sochineniia [Works] (Moscow, 1946-52), IV. 118, 124.
24 N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, ed. and trans. S. Talbot
(London, 1971), pp. 18, 20.
25 Trotskii, Stalin, pp. 289-90.
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supplies, and even the location of front headquarters. 26 The situa-
tion eventually became so intolerable that Stalin was recalled to
Moscow in October, while Voroshilov was transferred to Ukraine two
months later.
Although Stalin and his allies had been temporarily dispersed,
they would be reunited with even more disastrous consequences in the
war with Poland (see section D). Their defeat had been by no means
final, and their enmity, if anything, towards Trotskii and the former
officers had increased. This group (Voroshilov, S.M. Budennyi and
E.M. Shchadenko) would later become the nucleus of the Stalinist
faction within the army, which was to have tragic consequences for
specialist and non-specialist alike.27
For all of the commissars' vigilance, however, there were a
number of cases of real treason by former officers. The most spec-
tacular of these was that of former Lt.-Col. M.A. Murav'ev, the first
commander of the Eastern Front. Murav'ev, a Socialist-Revolutionary,
joined his party's disastrous uprising against the Bolsheviks in July
1918, but failed and was killed in a gun battle. A similar fate
awaited all those who betrayed Soviet power, or who failed to carry
out orders with sufficient vigor; a policy which was applied to
specialist and commissar alike. Indeed, Trotskii's policy of execut-
ing commissars for their units' failures and his supposed favoritism
towards the former officers soon became part of the growing indict-
ment against him by many of the army's political officers. One of
these later reported that by the time of the eighth party congress
the majority of military delegates, who were presumably, for the most
26 For a description of these events, see I. Kolesnichenko, 'K Voprosu
o Konflikte v Revvoensovete Iuzhnogo Fronta (Sentiabr'-Oktiabr' 1918 Goda)'
(On the Question of the Conflict in the Southern Front's Revolutionary
Military Council (September-October 1918)], V-IZh (1962), no. 2, pp. 39-47.
27 One Soviet historian has recently claimed that Voroshilov 'maintained
his prejudice and dislike of the old army's former officers and fully
displayed these during the massive Stalinist repressions against the Red
Army's command staff in 1937-38'. See V.M. Ivanov, Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskii
[Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskii] (Moscow, 1990), p. 32.
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part political officers, were personally opposed to Trotskii.28
In spite of these difficulties the policy of recruiting the
former officers was a great success. Beginning with the first
partial mobilization of June 1918, and continuing through the end of
the war in November 1920, nearly 75,000 former officers passed
through the Red Army's ranks, although the exact figure remains in
dispute.	 This total accounted for 56% of the 130,914 Red Army
commanders of all backgrounds and nearly 30% of the pre-revolutionary
officer corps (career and wartime officers), according to the most
reliable source. Those former officers who served in the White
armies accounted for some 40% (100,000) of the total, while the
remaining 30% (75,000) managed to avoid service on either side by
going into hiding or emigrating.3°
The Red Army's haul of former officers, despite the small
overall percentage, was nevertheless impressive in terms of quality,
and included a significant number of those formerly attached to the
tsarist General Staff apparatus--the army's administrative and
intellectual elite. A White source has calculated the number of
General Staff officers at the end of 1917 at about 1,500, of whom 319
(21%) eventually served in the Red Army, although this figure is
28 Gusev, Grazhdanskaia Voina i Krasnaia Armiia (The Civil War and
the Red Army] (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925), pp. 20, 214-15; S. I. Aralov, Lenin
vel Nas k Pobede (Lenin led Us to Victory) (Moscow, 1962), p. 99.
Kavtaradze (p. 176) puts the figure at 73,311. This is indirectly
supported by another source which calculates the Red Army's command staff at
the end of 1920 at 217,000, of which 34% (73,780) were former officers. See
Zakharov, p. 159. The most commonly cited figure is that of 48,409 former
officers drafted between 12 June 1918 and 15 August 1920. See N. Efimov,
'Komandnyi Sostav Krasnoi Armii' [The Red Army's Command Element]. In Bubnov,
Kamenev, Eideman, II. 95. However, the author excludes from this figure the
large number of officers who volunteered before June 1918 and the former White
officers who subsequently joined the Red Army, as well as those called up
between 15 August and the end of the war. Kavtaradze (p. 175) calculates the
number of officers in the first two categories alone at 20,000. Two emigre
sources do nothing more than to repeat the standard figure of 48,409. See
Zaitsov, p. 183; N.y. Piatnitskii, Voennaia Organizatsiia Gosudarstvennoi
Oborony SSSR (The Military Organization of the State Defense of the USSR]
(Paris, 1932), p. 116.
3° Kavtaradze, pp. 176-77.
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disputed by a number of other sources.31
These officers had an especially important role to play in
resurrecting the country's system of higher military education, where
their knowledge of the arcana of staff work and military administra-
tion was particularly valuable. Their efforts were centred in the
new Academy of the RXXA General Staff, which opened its doors in
December 1918. This institution was the successor to the defunct
imperial staff academy, which had led a curious twilight existence
amidst the turmoil of war and revolution, and had continued to
graduate students as late as the spring of 1918. The new academy's
first chief was former Gen.-Maj. A.K. Klimovich, who was succeeded
the following year by Snesarev, who was fortunate to be alive follow-
ing his run-in with Stalin. 32
 Among the teaching staff were such
former General Staff officers as N.A. Danilov, V.F. Novitskii, N.A.
Suleiman, A.A. Neznamov, and A.A. Svechin. Neznaxnov read the course
on strategy, as he had done in prewar days, and Svechin taught the
history of military art. These officers, as the living repositories
of what was best in the Russian military tradition, no doubt had a
great impact on their eager but untutored pupils, among the first of
whom were the future marshals K.A. l4eretskov, V.D. Sokolovskii, I.V.
Tiulenev, and the outstanding operational theorist of the interwar
period, V.K. Triandafillov.33
31 A. Baiov, 'General'nyi Shtab vo Vremia Grazhdanskoi Voiny' (The
General Staff During the Civil War], Chasovoi (The Sentry] (1932), no. 84, pp.
3-4. Soviet sources, not surprisingly, tend to place the figure somewhat
higher. Kavtaradze (p. 196) maintainB that of 1,932 General Staff officers,
639 (33%) served the Reds, while another author states that the number varied
from 526 (36%) to 407 (28%) of a total pre-revolutionary General Staff
complement of 1,450. See L.M. Spirin, 'V.1. Lenin i Sozdanie Sovetskikh
Komandnykh Kadrov' (V.1. Lenin and the Creation of Soviet Command Cadres], V -
IZh (1965), no. 4, pp. 12-13. However, both Soviet authors include post-
revolutionary General Staff academy graduates, which inflates the percentages.
32 Even in the relatively peaceful setting of the academy, Snesarev and
the other specialists were still subjected to persecution. One student later
recalled that the former officers were often used as hostages and 'were
regularly put behind bars each time the internal situation took a turn for the
worse'. See A. Barmine, Memoirs of a Soviet Di1omat, trans. G. Hopkins
(London, 1938), p. 108.
T.P. Bulgakova, ed., Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba [The General Staff
Academy], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1987), pp. 12, 14, 17.
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Due to the widespread opprobrium attached to the word 'officer'
at the time, the first officer volunteers were called variously
'military experts', 'military consultants', or 'technical leaders'.
It was only from the spring of 1918 that the term 'military special-
ist' (voennyi spetsialist) became standardized in the army. M
 A
recent Soviet source defines 'military specialist' as 'a general,
admiral, officer or bureaucrat of the old Russian army and fleet,
recruited for service in the Soviet army and navy during the Civil
War and foreign intervention in Russia'. 35
 However, this definition
lacks precision and the importance of the term requires a closer
examination.
First of all, the so-called 'military bureaucrats' should be
eliminated from the equation as having nothing in common with those
officers serving in line, staff or pedagogical positions. Secondly,
one must exclude from this group the large number of wartime officers
(approximately 90% of this total) who were commissioned from the
ranks or otherwise made officers during the First World War.
	 And
while their experience was certainly greater than that of the mili-
tary bureaucrats, it would be a gross error to equate the wartime
officers' level of practical and theoretical (particularly the
latter) training with that of the career officers. Despite their
educational shortcomings, however, many wartime officers went on to
highly successful careers in the postwar Red Army. Among these were
F.I. Tolbukhin, V.K. Triandafillov, I.E. Petrov, I.P. Uborevich, A.I.
Antonov and A.M. Vasilevskii.
Qualitative judgements concerning the small number of former
Kavtaradze, p. 13.
A.A. Grechko, ed., Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia (Soviet
Military Encyclopedia] (Moscow, 1976-80), II. 274.
Kavtaradze (p. 222) calculates the number of wartime officers at more
than 65,000 of nearly 75,000 officers recruited overall. This view is
partially supported by Voroshilov, who pointedly excluded from the category
of specialist the lowest-ranking junior officers, the praporshchiki, an
exclusively wartime rank. See his Stat'i i Rechi [Articles and Speeches]
(Moscow, 1937), p. 227. However correct, Voroshilov's well-known antipathy
towards the military specialists probably drove him to minimize their
contribution.
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career officers who served in the Red Army must also be made, for the
differences in training and education within this group were as
profound as those separating them from the wartime officers. 37
 The
higher officers' ranks (general-field marshal, general, general-
lieutenant, general-major) would have been overwhelmingly represented
by men who had graduated from the old General Staff Academy and/or
who had commanded operational-level formations, or who had served in
field staffs at a corresponding level. 38
 Among this group the Sovi-
ets managed to recruit such operational practitioners and theorists
as Brusilov, A.A. Samoilo, Svechin, A.I. Verkhovskii, P.P. Lebedev
and Mikhnevich.
A slightly larger group consisted of those mid-level officers
(colonels and lieutenant colonels) who threw in their lot with the
Bolsheviks. 39
 A number of these officers had attended the General
Staff Academy before the World War, particularly during the relative-
ly innovative period between 1906 and 1912. While these officers
lacked the generals' command and staff experience at the operational
level, they were probably less conservative and more open to new
ideas; necessary qualities in the radically different conditions of
the Civil War and a new political order. In this respect, they may
reasonably be compared to those middle-ranking Reichswehr officers
(Guderian, von Manstein, etc.) whose ideas profoundly influenced the
German army after 1933. Among this group were such notable command-
ers and staff officers as Vatsetis, Kamenev, A.I. Egorov, Shaposhnik-
ov, A.I. Gotovtsev, and F.P. Shafalovich.
The numerous group of lower-ranking officers (captain, staf f-
captain, lieutenant, second lieutenant) was a potentially rich source
The exact size of this group is difficult to determine, and estimates
vary. Kavtaradze (p. 222) states that there were less than 10,000 former
career officers in the Red Army. Another source puts the figure at 6%
(13,020) of 217,000 Red Army commanders. See Zakharov, p. 159.
Kavtaradze (p. 178) claims that 775 former generals served the Reds.
Another Soviet source puts the figure at more than 1,000. See Fediukin, p.
39.
Kavtaradze (p. 178) claims that 980 former colonels and 746
lieutenant colonels served in the Red Army.
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of future commanders, even though their overall level of theoretical
preparation was little different from that of the wartime officers.
These officers' experience had been entirely at the tactical level,
and only a very few had attended the imperial General Staff Academy,
mostly in accelerated courses during 1915-18. Nevertheless, this
inexperienced group was to furnish many of those who would later
occupy important command positions in the wartime and postwar Red
Army, and who would make a significant contribution to operational
theory as well. These officers included A.I. Kork, N.E. Varfolomeev,
E.A. Shilovskii, and M.N. Tukhachevskii.'
At first glance the military specialists' (in the narrow sense
of the term used here) overall contribution seems quite small, no
more than 7% of the whole, compared with the much larger proportion
of wartime officers, former NCOs and others who constituted the Red
Army's command element during the Civil War. However, in qualitative
terms, the specialists' influence was far greater than their numbers
would indicate and ultimately decisive to the conduct and outcome of
the war. This was due to the former career officers' virtual monopoly
of the army's most important administrative, command and staff
positions, which could only be filled by those with the requisite
skills. This is was particularly true at the strategic-operational
level, where the chief operations were conceived and conducted.
For example, both commanders-in-chief (Vatsetis and Kamenev)
were former colonels and graduates of the imperial General Staff
Academy. Both finished the academy during its most innovative period
between 1906 and 1912. The commander-in-chief's executive organ, the
RVSR Field Staff, was headed successively by the former general-
majors N.I. Rattel', F.V. Kostiaev, Bonch-Bruevich and Lebedev.41
Tukhachevskii did not attend the General Staff Academy, having been
commissioned a second lieutenant only in July 1914. However, a recent
biographer states that Tukhachevskii was already familiar with the works of
Leer and Mikhnevich. See Ivanov, p. 24.
41 Kavtaradze, pp. 109, 238, 243, 245-46, 251; S.S. Khromov, ed.,
Grazhdanskaia Voina i Voennaia Interventsiia v SSSR. Entsiklo pediia (The Civil
War and Military Intervention in the USSR. An Encyclopedia] (Moscow, 1983),
pp. 71, 87, 152, 251, 289, 319.
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These officers provided a much-needed leavening of professionalism at
a critical command juncture.
The situation was little different at the front level, where
the specialists held the great majority of command and staff posi-
tions, Of the 20 men who commanded the chief fronts between 1918 and
the end of 1920, 16 (80%) were military specialists, while the
remainder were professional revolutionaries, of whom M.V. Frunze
demonstrated the greatest military capabilities. Ten (50%) of the
front commanders were graduates of the old staff academy, and two
(10%) had completed the academy course between 1906 and 1912. Of the
28 men who served as the fronts' chief of staff, 27 (96%) were
documented regular officers, Of this group, 26 (93%) had graduated
from the imperial General Staff Academy, which was proof of the
Bolsheviks' high opinion of their professional training. Moreover,
12 (43%) of the staff officers were graduated between 1906 and
l912.' Thus of the 46 men who occupied one or both of these posi-
tions, 41 (89%) can be shown to have been former career officers,
while 34 (74%) were graduates of the old staff academy. Of this
number, 14 (30%) completed the course between 1906 and 1912.
At the army command and staff level the dominance of the
military specialists remained strong, if somewhat reduced. Of the 85
men who commanded major armies between 1918 and the end of 1920, 66
(78%) can be shown to have been former career officers, although the
actual percentage is probably higher, due to incomplete information.
Of these, 39 (46%) were graduates of the imperial General Staff
Academy, with 11 (13%) graduating between 1906 and 1912. In all, 130
men occupied the post of chief of staff in these armies, of which 86
(68%) were documented military specialists, although once again
complete information is lacking. Of this number, 77 (59%) were
graduates of the tearist staff academy, although this figure is
almost certainly too low. Of these, 22 (17%) came from the 1906-12
' Kavtaradze, pp. 109, 207-08, 236-37, 239-46, 248-54, 256, 259-62;
Khromov, pp. 39, 48, 51, 68, 87, 117, 149, 152, 205, 216, 245, 251, 263, 289,
316, 319, 362, 366, 394, 412, 424, 451, 483, 521, 527, 555, 575, 605-06, 612,
631, 666, 675-76, 678; Azovtsev, et al, IV. 529-33.
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classes. 43
 In all, 182 men held one or both posts, of which 89
(49%) were former career officers. Of these, 89 (49%) had graduated
from the old General Staff Academy, with 25 (14%) having completed
the academy course during 1906-12.
These figures constitute overwhelming proof of the military
specialists' decisive contribution to the planning and conduct of the
Red Army's operations during the Civil War. This is hardly to be
wondered at, as the influence of the former tsarist officers could
only have been profound, given the army's primitive state during
these years. This circumstance made it relatively easy to graft the
tsarist army's theory and practice of conducting operations upon the
tabula rasa of the Red Army, which did not suffer from the weight of
the past. In fact, it was this very combination of messianic revolu-
tionary enthusiasm, tempered by the positive aspects of the old
Russian military tradition and the peculiar conditions of the Civil
War which created the conditions for a specifically Soviet approach
to operations.
As to the larger question of the specialists' contribution to
the Reds' ultimate victory, such judgements often have as much the to
do with the observer's political loyalties as anything else. For
example, two Soviet historians have gone so far as to claim that the
military specialists 'were never the leading force of our command
cadres, and did not play a decisive role' in defeating the Whites.'4
The opposing view, not surprisingly, was held by the White general
A.I. Denikin, who while he considered the specialists traitors to
their country and class, nevertheless believed that the 'Red Army was
built exclusively by the brains and experience of the 'old tsarist
' Kavtaradze, pp. 16, 109, 145, 193, 199, 206, 208-09, 216-18, 236-39,
241-62; Khromov, pp. 22,29, 40, 48, 51, 65, 78, 86-87, 115, 118, 131-32, 138,
14041, 149, 152, 154, 172-73, 186, 205, 219, 249, 260-62, 288, 311-12, 316,
318-19, 331, 343, 345, 352, 354, 366, 394, 411, 421, 443-45, 451, 486, 521,
530-31, 536, 544-555, 568, 594, 597, 601, 606-07, 631, 633, 636, 651, 653-56,
661, 663-65, 668-69, 679; Azovtsev, et al, IV. 533-44.
'4 D.A. Voropaev and A.M. Iovlev, Bor'ba KPSS za Sozdanie Voennykh
Kadrov [The CPSU's Struggle for the Creation of Military Cadres], 2nd ed.
(Moscow, 1960), p. 41.
108
generals'. 45
 However, Lenin, who certainly cannot be accused of any
favoritism towards the White cause, nevertheless believed that the
Red Army had been able to win only with the aid of the former off i-
cers.46
C. Civil War Operations, 1919-1920
By early 1919 the White forces in the East had recovered from
their defeats of the previous autumn and were once again ready to
resume the advance on Moscow. This time they were led by Admiral
A.V. Koichak, who had seized control of the anti-Bolshevik movement
in Siberia from more democratic elements the previous November. By
the beginning of the offensive in early March, Kolchak's forces
numbered some 113,000 men and more than 200 guns against 111,000 Red
troops and 379 guns. 47
 The White forces were organised into the
Siberian and Western armies in the north, and the 'Southern Army
Group', Orenburg and Ural'sk armies in the south. Opposed to them
were the Soviet troops of the Eastern Front under S.S. Kamenev, which
were divided from north to south into the Third, Second, Fifth,
Turkestan, First and Fourth armies. These forces occupied an 1,800-
kilometer front which stretched from the forests north of Perm' to
the Caspian Sea.
The White advance began on 4 March along a broad front from
Perm' to Orsk, with the main effort concentrated along a 450-kilome-
ter front from Perm' to Uf a. The WhiteB apparently were seeking to
link up with allied forces near Kotlas and in the Northern Caucasus
simultaneously, which, if correct, represented a dangerous dispersion
of scarce manpower. Nevertheless, this assault was immediately
successful against the scattered Soviet forces in the area, which had
been neglected in favor of the armies currently fighting in Ukraine.
Denikin, Ocherki, III. 144.
" Lenin, XL. 199.
Bubnov, Kanienev and Eideman, III. 172-73.
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tJfa fell on 14 March, while to the south Kolchak's forces severed the
tenuous Soviet link with Central Asia and threatened to cut off the
Red garrisons at Orenburg and Ural'sk. The danger was particularly
great in the centre, where Gen. M.V. Khanzhin's Western Army was
pressing Tukhachevskii's Fifth Army back to the Volga south of the
Kama River. By mid-April Koichak's forces had succeeded in opening a
large gap between Tukhachevskii and the Second Army and threatened to
break through to the river in the direction of Simbirsk and Samara.
Once the scale of the White advance became apparent the Soviets
quickly set about preparing a counterattack. The most visible
response was to split the Eastern Front into two semi-independent
groups for greater ease of control: the Southern (Fourth, First,
Turkestan and Fifth armies), commanded by the veteran Bolshevik N.y.
Frunze, and the Northern (Second and Third armies), under the former
tsarist colonel V.1. Shorin.
The energetic Frunze immediately set about drawing up plans for
a counterstroke against the exposed southern flank of Khanzhin's
widely-scattered forces which were nonetheless pressing inexorably
towards the Volga. His initial plan foresaw the creation of a
powerful infantry-cavalry strike force to attack the enemy's left
flank and pushing him back to the north. However, numerous transport
difficulties slowed the concentration of this force, and the necessi-
ty of shoring up Tukhachevskii's collapsing army soon forced Frunze
to send part of his planned strike force north to reinforce the Fifth
Army's left wing. Frunze, in a message to Kamenev before the start
of the counteroffensive, outlined the operation's goals, which
included launching a concentrated attack between the widely-separated
White forces in the Suguruslan-Zagliadino area, 'for the purpose of
separating these corps and routing them in detail'. 48 To compensate
for the lost of part of his strike force, Frunze directed Fifth Army
to attack towards Buguruslan and Bugul'ma, while at the same time
units of the First Army's left flank would pin down enemy forces and
Frunze, I. 176.
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cover the advance from the right.
Frunze resorted to a good deal of internal regrouping to create
his striking force. His final arrangements for the offensive are an
excellent example of employing the maximum concentration of force at
the point of decision, even given the watered-down version which he
was forced to adopt. Of the approximately 70,000 troops under his
command at the end of April, Frunze managed to concentrate for the
attack some 49,000 men and 152 guns along a 200-kilometer front,
leaving the remaining 700 kilometers of his front to be manned by a
mere 23,000 troops and 70 guns. 49
 Frunze, by ruthlessly scraping
together men and materiel from the less active sectors, was able to
achieve by late April a hefty superiority over Khanzhin's army, the
leading uflitB of which, due to a combination of desertions and combat
losses, had shrunk to between 18,000 and 22,000 men.5°
Frunze was so concerned by the White's continued progress
against Tukhachevskii's left flank in the Sergievsk-Chistopol' area
that he ordered his strike group to attack on 28 April, before it had
fully concentrated. The offensive's opening phase was highly suc-
cessful, as the Soviet units flowed easily into the 60-kilometer gap
between the White corps, which was screened only by detachments.
Resistance was therefore minimal at first, and by 30 April leading
units of the Fifth Army had cut the Ufa-Samara railroad east of
Buguruslan and were poised to continue the drive to the northwest in
the direction of Belebei. Meanwhile, unmindful of the threat to his
left, Khanzhin pressed on to Samara, which was practically undefend-
ed. The continuation of this advance would have soon put the Whites
in the strike group's rear, even as the latter strove to cut them
off. Kamenev therefore ordered Frunze to shift the axis of the
advance from the northeast to the north (Turkestan Army) and north-
west (Fifth Army), in the general direction of Bugul'ma. 51
 At a
Rotmistrov, I. 398.
50 Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 190.
Azovtsev, et ci, II. 663.
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single stroke Frunze's deep flanking movement was reduced to an
attempt at a shallow envelopment of the leading White units, while
the movement's former spearhead, the Turkestan Army, became, in
effect, the flank guard for Fifth Army's right wing.
Frunze's understandable irritation with his superiors' inter-
ference undoubtedly increased due to personnel changes in the Eastern
Front command caused by political intrigues in Moscow. On 5 May
Kamenev was replaced by A.A. Samoilo, a tsarist major-general. P.P.
Lebedev, also a former major-general, became his chief of staff.
Samoilo's first order of business upon arriving at front headquarters
in Simbirsk was to remove the Fifth Army from Frunze's control and
subordinate it directly to himself. This move caused Tukhachevskii
to later claim that Samoilo's interference 'completely ruined the
brilliant beginning of our counteroffensive and allowed the Whites to
put their retreat in order'.52
The second half of the Buguruslan operation saw considerable
heavy fighting as the Soviets continued to press the Whites from the
south, southwest and west. Khanzhin correctly guessed the Soviets'
intention to cut him off west of Bugul'ma, and began to withdraw his
troops through the town before the Reds could close the trap. The
Whites, in order to keep their lifeline open, made a number of
spirited counterattacks north of Bugurualan in early May. The
Soviets successfully fended these of f, but were delayed just long
enough to allow the Whites to extricate their troops through Bugul'ma
ahead of the Fifth Army. With the town's fall on 13 May the opera-
tion ended.
The ensuing Belebei operation constituted the missing second
half of Frunze's original plan for a drive to the northeast, which
had been aborted by Kamenev's reorienting of the strike group towards
Buguruslan. The shallow and inconclusive movement which resulted
made an advance on Belebei the logical next step in the unfolding
Soviet counteroffensive towards Uf a. Indeed, the first clashes
52 Tukhachevskii, II. 224.
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preceding the counteroffensive's next phase were already taking place
north and west of the town even as the Buguruslan operation was
drawing to a close.
However, Frunze's plan for reviving the advance to the north-
east was very nearly upset by Samoilo's growing concern over the
continuing White advance north of the Kaina River. Here, Czech Gen. -
Lt. R. Gajda's Siberian Army was slowly pushing back the Soviet
Second and Third armies on Viatka and Kazan'. At this point the
front commander began to entertain the vague notion of switching
Tukhachevskii's army northward across the Kama against the enemy left
flank. Frunze quickly saw that the diversion of the now-powerful
Fifth Army away from the Belebei-Uf a axis would leave his remaining
forces too weak for further offensive operations, and took his case
directly to Samoilo. Frunze, in a heated exchange with the front
commander on 12 May, insisted on a deep turning movement by Fifth
Army in order to cut off the enemy's retreat to the east. 53
 And
although Frunze failed to reassert his control over the Fifth Army,
he did convince Samoilo to allot him two divisions to continue the
attack.
Frunze's plan aimed at the destruction of the White troops
barring the way to Uf a. Due to the fighting for Buguruslan and
Bugul'ma and the removal of Fifth Army from Frunze's control, most of
what remained of the original striking force now lay along the 1k
River on the Southern Group's extreme left. Frunze accordingly
ordered the First and Turkestan armies to move northeast along the
Ufa-Samara railroad in order to pin down the enemy forces south of
Belebei, while a mixed infantry-cavalry force was to attack north of
the city 'for a deep envelopment in order to cut the enemy off from
his communications with Uf a'.54
The Soviets moved out on 15 May. They advanced slowly, howev-
er, although speed was essential if the railway was to be cut ahead
Azovtsev, et al, II. 673.
Frunze, I, 187.
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of the retreating enemy. The White unit g
 slowly fell back on Belebei
and Soviet troops entered the town on the 17th. Further north, Red
units closed on the town from the west, although too slowly to block
the Whites' retreat. Although Frunze had pushed the Whites back some
distance during the short offensive, the Belebei operation must be
regarded as a distinct disappointment for the Soviets. Once again,
the Whites had slipped away and still barred the road to Uf a, al-
though they were showing signs of tiring of the fight.
Undaunted, Frunze pressed his offensive, and once again singled
out the Turkestan Army to make the main assault. Cavalry and inf an-
try would spearhead the latest effort, designed to push the Whites
northeast across the Belaia River. Once across this formidable
barrier south of Uf a, elements of Frunze's forces would move directly
on Uf a from the south, while the movement's flanks would we covered
by others advancing on Birsk and Sterlitamak. For the operation,
Frunze could count not only on a reasonable superiority in men and
materiel, but on spreading defeatism within the White ranks as well,
where some units were already showing an alarming tendency to 'turn
their coats' when pressed.
Once the operation got underway on 25 May the Turkestan Army,
subordinated for the duration directly to Frunze, had little trouble
in achieving its preliminary objective of closing to the Belaia along
the entire front, as the outnumbered Whites elected to fall back and
make a stand along the river. Further to the north there was heavy
fighting along Fifth Army's front, where the Whites suffered heavy
losses in a yam attempt to halt the Soviet advance. This victory
had important consequences for the Uf a operation by eliminating a
potential threat to Frunze's left and allowing him to move up inf an-
try reserves to assist the crossing south of Ufa. By the time the
Turkestan Army closed to the river in early June strong forces were
available for crossings north and south of the city.
South of Uf a heavy White artillery fire and the river's swift
current foiled the southern wing's initial attempts to cross. The
Soviets were more fortunate further north, where as early as 4 June
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rifle units were able to secure a bridgehead below the city. By 8
June Frunze had ferried an entire division to the eastern bank in an
improvised crossing, as further Red attempts to force the river south
of Uf a were beaten back. The White command was alive to the danger
that the northern crossing represented and launched repeated and
bloody counterattacks against the Soviet bridgehead over the next two
days. These attacks, however, led only to heavy casualties on both
sides and an overall weakening of the White defence. The Soviets
finally broke out of their bridgehead on 9 June and captured Uf a the
same day. Meanwhile, Soviet cavalry and infantry units persisted in
their efforts to cross the river south of the city, succeeding only
on 14 June. Red units continued to push to about 50 kilometers east
of Uf a, where a shortage of troops and supply difficulties forced
Frunze to call a brief halt in operations.
Following the capture of Uf a, the Eastern Front's story is
quickly told, as the Soviets resumed their advance against Kolchak's
disintegrating armies in June. The Perm', Zlatoust, Ekaterinburg and
Cheliabinsk operations in June-August cleared the important Urals
industrial region of White forces and set the stage for the conquest
of Siberia. The Petropavlovsk, Omsk, Novonikolaevsk and Krasnoiarsk
operations (August 1919-January 1920) completed the destruction of
the White armies and brought the Soviets as far east as Lake Baikal,
where they were halted by the presence of foreign troops. Although
more than two years of fighting remained before Soviet troops actual-
ly reached Vladivostok, the events of 1919 effectively ensured the
triumph of Soviet power in Siberia and the Far East.
But it is the Soviet conduct of the Buguruslan, Belebei and Ufa
operations which constitutes the most interesting period, from the
point of view of the operation's development. The six-week period of
almost non-stop fighting began with the Reds everywhere falling back
and ended with the initiative firmly in their grasp. During the
counteroffenBive the Soviets advanced from 350-400 kilometers along a
front several hundred kilometers in breadth. The most signal charac-
teristic throughout was the Soviets' use of maneuver and their
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frequent reliance on flank attacks aimed at the enemy's communica-
tions. In all three operations, Frunze, after first pinning down
part of the enemy front, launched turning movements against the
Whites' flanks. That these operations often fell short of expecta-
tions was primarily due to the Reds' overall insufficiency of force,
their low mobility, and the disruptive changes in the Eastern Front's
command and organisation.
The Soviets were quite fortunate that the time of greatest
danger in the East coincided with a period of relative quiet along
the other main theatre of war in the South. Here the Bolsheviks had
taken advantage of the Austro-German collapse in the autumn of 1918
to occupy almost all of Ukraine and the Crimea. The only White force
remaining to oppose them was Gen.-Lt. A.I. Denikin's 'Armed Forces of
Southern Russia' (Volunteer, Don and Caucasus armies), based primari-
ly on the Cossack populations of the lower Don and Northern Caucasus,
and on those officers who had managed to escape south following the
Bolshevik coup. Denikins forces began to move in strength only in
May 1919, after the tide had turned against Kolchak, although the
Reds were still preoccupied by the situation in the East. The White
advance in southern Russia was aided by Cossack uprisings in the
Soviet rear, as well as by Allied military support now streaming into
the various Black Sea ports. Denikin's forces successively defeated
the qualitatively inferior Soviet forces of the Ukrainian and South-
ern fronts, and by early autumn were deployed along a huge arc
stretching from Zhitomir through Chernigov, Orel, Voronezh, Tsaritsyn
and Astrakhan'. Elsewhere Polish troops menaced the Soviets in
Belorussia, while further north Gen. N.N. ludenich advanced for the
second time on Petrograd from his Estonian base.
However, much as Kolchak, Denikin's forces rested upon an
extremely weak political-military base, which collapsed almost
immediately upon the first serious reverses. Denikin claimed to have
had in the early autumn only 98,000 troops to man his 1,800-kilometer
front against a Bolshevik force which he estimated at between 140,000
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and 160,000 men. 55 Nor were Denikin's forces of a uniformly high
quality. The summer's rapid advance had carried the Whites far from
their anti-communist base and had necessitated the drafting of large
numbers of reluctant Russian and Ukrainian peasants, which diluted
the army's strong officer base and led to an overall decline in White
military efficiency; heretofore their strongest suit. Finally,
Denikin's forces were greatly hampered by bands of semi-anarchist
peasants in their rear under N.I. Makhno, who hated the Whites even
more than the Reds. At the height of the October fighting Makhno's
forces numbered 28,000 infantry and cavalry, supported by 50 guns and
200 machine guns, and even briefly threatened Denikin's headquarters
at Taganrog. 56 The necessity of dealing with this and other inter-
nal threats forced the White command to divert significant numbers of
men from the front at critical moments, and so helped pave the way
for their ultimate defeat.
The Soviet high command, in response to the rapid White ad-
vance, on 13 September split off from the Southern Front the Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh armies to form a new Southeastern Front, under the
command of the military specialist V.1. Shorin, to man the line south
of Voronezh. What remained of the Southern Front (Eighth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth armies, joined by the Twelfth Army from the Western
Front in mid-October) continued under the command of former Gen.-Lt.
V.N. Egor'ev. The scaled-down front was at first given the support-
ing role of aiding the Southeastern Front to realize the Soviets'
cherished goal of splitting the White forces in two by striking
southwest from the Balashov-Tsaritsyn area towards Rostov. However,
this reorganisation was not actually effected until 30 September, by
which time the situation had changed considerably. Kursk had fallen
to Denikin's forces on 20 September and it was now the White advance
along the Orel-Tula axis which presented the greatest danger to the
Soviet Republic. Here the 'threatening proportions of a strategic
Denikin, Ocherki, V. 230.
56 Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 282.
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catastrophe' forced the Soviet command to shift its attention to the
area immediately south of Moscow.57
The Soviets commendably resolved to halt Denikin's advance on
Orel by launching an attack of their own. To this purpose, Glavkom
Kamenev in late September ordered the concentration southeast of
Briansk of 10,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 80 guns, which was to
form the core of the Soviet counterattack southeast of Orel. 58
 In a
9 October directive to his army commanders, deputy front commander
A.I. Egorov, a former tsarist colonel, outlined the plan for the
coming counteroffensive. The strike group, under the command of
former general A.A. Martusevich, was to advance from the Kromy area
and strike at Denikin's communications along the Orel-Kursk railroad
in the general direction of Maloarkhangel'sk and Fatezh. The Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth armies were to halt their withdrawal and
support the strike group, which was to be subordinated to Thirteenth
Army for the occasion.59
The Soviet response to this latest crisis was as rapid and
decisive as it had been on the Eastern Front. With the proclamation
of the Southern Front as the main area of operations in early July,
the Bolshevik military machine swung into action. The steady influx
of men which this designation brought in its wake enabled the Soviets
to bring the Southern Front up to a strength of 113,439 infantry,
27,328 cavalry and 774 guns by the start of the operation, against a
White force of 58,650 infantry, 48,200 cavalry and 431 guns.6°
Hand in hand with these feverish offensive preparations went a
number of steps intended to strengthen the defences south of Moscow.
On 22 September the RVSR created the Moscow Defence Sector, embracing
the city and a number of provinces in a large semicircle to the south
A.I. Egorov, Razarom Denikina, 1919 (The Rout of Denikin, 1919]
(Moscow, 1931), p. 133.
58 Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 264.
Azovtsev, et al, II. 349-50.
60 Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 262.
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of the capital. The city's defence was subsequently broken down into
four separate defensive belts girding the approaches to the capital
from the southwest, south and southeast, which eventually reached a
depth of 440 kilometers. These defences were manned by internal
divisions, whose strength grew by the end of October to over 53,000
men. These troops, as well as civilian labourers, were employed in
digging trenches and constructing troop obstacles ultimately total-
ling several hundred kilometers in length by the end of the opera-
tion. 61
 These preparations are among the earliest examples of a
Soviet attempt to construct an operational-level defence. Though
primitive compared to later efforts, and never tested, these forti-
fied lines are nevertheless an interesting example of the scale of
Soviet thinking along these lines and a harbinger of even more
impressive efforts during World War II.
Meanwhile, some 250 kilometers southeast of Orel, events were
also reaching a crisis for the beleaguered Red forces. Here Gen.
V.1. Sidorin's Don Army was pressing the Soviets back in the Voronezh
area and had opened a 130-kilometer gap north of the city between the
Thirteenth and Eighth armies, which threatened to unhinge the entire
Soviet front. Kamenev, to forestall a disaster, ordered S.M. Budenn-
yi's cavalry corps northward from the middle Don on 7 October, with
instructions to destroy the White cavalry and, in conjunction with
the Eighth Army, to retake Voronezh, which had been abandoned the
previous day.
	 Front commander Egor'ev's instructions to these
units merely repeated Kamenev's orders and set the line of the Don
River as the final objective. 63
 However, at this early stage in the
operation's planning there was no attempt on either commander's part
to coordinate the Orel and Voronezh counteroffensives, and from the
very first the situation around the latter city was of secondary
importance in Soviet calculations.
61 Agureev, p. 52.
Belov, et al, p. 480.
Azovtsev, et al, II. 347-48.
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The Soviet counteroffensive in the Orel area opened on 11
October in an extremely fluid situation which saw both sides advanc-
ing and withdrawing simultaneously. So lightly manned were the White
lines west of Kromy that the spearhead's initial assault hit only air
and did not even encounter the enemy in any strength until the next
day. However, the Soviets moved forward slowly and succeeded in
taking Kromy only on the 14th. The group's plodding advance was due
not only to stubborn White resistance, but also to Martusevich's
justified fear for his lengthening flanks, as he followed with
growing concern the retreat of the Red infantry units on either side.
These and other Soviet units were literally fighting for their lives
as the White forces maintained the pressure, seemingly indifferent to
the Soviet attack. The situation was even more critical to the
northeast, where the Whites took Orel on the 13th, tearing a danger-
ous gap between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth armies and opening the
way to the military-industrial centre of Tula.
For the strike group to have continued to advance in the
original direction would have meant putting its head further into the
noose. Egorov, now front commander, reacted to this new threat by
changing the axis of the group's advance and orienting it due east
towards Eropkino station to threaten the White communications and
attack towards Orel from the southwest. The primacy of Orel in the
developing situation was reemphasized on 17 October, when Egorov
ordered the newly-arrived Estonian Rifle Division into the attack
directly on Orel.
	 Egorov later regretted having to make this
change his plans, but defended his decision by maintaining that to
have continued to push the front's spearhead in the original direc-
tion 'would have led to catastrophic results'.65
Actually, very little now remained of the original plan for a
deep strike against the White communications. Instead, the two
exhausted armies continued to batter at each other in what had become
Ibid, pp. 354, 356.
65 Egorov, p. 164.
120
an extended meeting operation along the entire front, and the strike
group's efforts now differed little from any of the other headlong
collisions now taking place. The Whites continued to advance to the
east of Orel and captured Novosil' on 17 October. But the Soviet
advantage in numbers was beginning to tell and the Reds recaptured
the town two days later. The Whites, by now beset on three sideB,
also abandoned Orel on the 20th, although they continued to attack in
the Kromy area.
While the fate of the Orel counteroffensive hung in the bal-
ance, Egorov harried his left-wing units (Eighth Army and Budennyi's
corps) to speed up their attack towards Voronezh. However, the
Soviet units in this area seemed in no hurry to move and limited
themselves to some heavy sparring with the White cavalry east and
southeast of Voronezh. Egorov's orders on 18 October were more
detailed, and for the first time implied a connection between the
activities of his left wing and centre. The front commander ordered
Budennyi to defeat the enemy in the Voronezh area and to cover the
Eighth Army's advance across the Don. The cavalry was then to
advance on Xastornaia and Kursk, which would put the Soviets in the
rear of the Volunteer Army engaged around Orel and threaten it with
the loss of its communications to the south.
The skirmishing east of Voronezh climaxed on 19 October, when
the White cavalry struck S.K. Timoshenko's cavalry division, and the
melee quickly expanded as units from both sides were fed into the
fighting. The Whites were ultimately defeated in the brisk, close-
quarters battle, and they withdrew into Voronezh, their path of
retreat 'paved with their corpses', in Budennyi's colorful phrase.67
The Soviets failed in their attempts to take Voronezh on the march.
They then brought up their forces for a coordinated assault and began
their attack on the city on the 23rd: the cavalry corps from the east
and north, with the Soviet infantry attacking from the southeast.
Azovtsev, et al, II. 359-60.
67 Budennyi, I. 272.
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The Whites, to avoid encirclement, abandoned the city and took up
defensive positions across the Don. Two days later the Eighth Army's
left-flank units took Liski to the south.
Egorov, with the initiative in the Orel area now in his hands,
hurried his armies forward. His order of 20 October reoriented the
axis of the spearhead's advance away from Orel and back towards
Fatezh and Kursk, while the remainder of Fourteenth Army was to
continue its attack towards Dmitrovsk and Dmitriev, and Thirteenth
Army moved south on Livny and Kastornaia.
	 Once again, however,
the Soviet attacks became snarled in a series of costly frontal
engagements all along the line. The lumbering Soviet style of attack
did involve, however, an attrition which the Reds could afford far
better than the Whites, whose meager resources were already stretched
to the breaking point. Nevertheless, for the time being the Whites
stubbornly answered each Soviet attack with an assault of their own
during the Bee-saw fighting which characterized the next two weeks.
Denikin's units, pressed by superior forces, gradually began to give
ground.
As the fighting around Orel swayed first one way and then
another, the Soviet command began to look more and more to Budennyi's
corps to tip the scales. This was particularly true of the Novosil'-
Elets area, where a White breakthrough towards Lipetsk and Tambov
appeared imminent. Budennyi began crossing the Don on 28 October
north of Voronezh and in the first days of November fought off
numerous attacks in the Zemliansk area. Here the Soviet cavalry was
able to link up with the Thirteenth Army advancing south and close
the gap in their line. By 8 November both units had closed to
Kastornaia from north and east. The Whites could ill afford to lose
this vital rail junction, which afforded the best most direct commu-
nications route between the Don and Volunteer armies. Throughout the
following week the Red and White cavalry traded blows in the sur-
rounding villages, each side first advancing, then retreating.
Azovtsev, et aX, II. 360.
122
The weight of numbers was decisive here as well, however, and
Budennyi was able to maneuver southeast of the rail junction and
drive a wedge between two White cavalry corps. Soviet cavalry,
attacking from three sides, finally took Kastornaia on 15 November.
With the town's fall the operation came to a close, with the Soviets
well-placed to continue the drive south. Although the Voronezh-
Kastornaia operation had always occupied a secondary place in Soviet
calculations, its importance had nevertheless increased as the
counteroffensive around Orel faltered. No less an authority than
Denikin credited the Soviet offensive out of Voronezh with forcing
him to abandon Orel.69
Time was also running out for the White cause in the Orel area,
where the Volunteer Army continued to fall back before spirited, if
inept, Soviet attacks. The Whites tried to organise a defence in the
Dmitrovsk-Eropkino area, but Soviet infantry broke through on the
morning of 3 November. Red cavalry surged into the breach and
advanced to cut the Orel-Kursk railway at Ponyri the next day, while
another unit raided as far south as Fatezh. The disorganisation
which these incursions caused in the White rear only served to speed
up the defenders' collapse. Sevsk fell on the 6th, as the White
front began to buckle. Dmitriev finally fell to the Reds on 13
November, and another cavalry raid on Lgov captured that town on the
17th, cutting the a vital east-west rail link. With the fall of
Kursk the same day the operation came to an end.
In contrast to the rapid Soviet advance in the East, more than
a month of heavy fighting during the Orel-Kursk (11 October-18
November) and Voronezh-Kastornaia (13 October-16 November) operations
had thrown back the outnumbered Whites no more than 160 kilometers.
Nevertheless, the two operations had brought about a complete rever-
sal of military fortunes in favor of the Red Army. Thereafter the
Soviets moved swiftly to realize their strategy of destroying Denikin
by driving a wedge between the Volunteer and Don armies and splitting
69 Denikin, Ocherki, V. 233.
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the White forces in two against the Sea of Azov. An undertaking of
this magnitude involved for the first time the cooperation of both
the Southern and Southeastern fronts, necessitating their strategic
coordination by the commander-in-chief. The Khar'kov and Khoper-Don
operations in November and December cleared eastern Ukraine and the
middle Don of White forces. The subsequent Donbass operation in
December captured that vital industrial region and set the stage for
the Rostov-Novocherkassk operation in January 1920, which irreparably
split the White armies into eastern and western halves. A number of
operations remained to be conducted before Soviet power was finally
established in the South, notably in the Kuban' River area, the North
Caucasus and southwestern Ukraine, all in the face of military
exhaustion and a typhus epidemic which ravaged both sides equally.
With the lone exception of the Whites' Crimean stronghold, by the
spring of 1920 the war in the South was over.
While they were ultimately highly successful, the two opera-
tions which constituted the autumn counteroffensive reveal a number
of flaws in Soviet execution, particularly during the Orel fighting.
While it must be acknowledged that in the Volunteer Army the Soviets
faced an opponent of higher quality than Koichak's ragtag legions,
they nevertheless frittered away their significant advantage in
numbers by ignoring a number of baBic military principles, chief
among these being the importance of maneuver. Thus while the Red
Army displayed its usual skill in massing large numbers of men along
the desired axes, the practice of launching frontal attacks did much
to negate the advantage gained.
On the credit side, the Soviet practice of creating strike
groups with a heavy cavalry complement increased the range, shock
power and mobility of the units significantly. On the Eastern Front
the cavalry's role had been relatively minor due to its small numbers
and the proletarian army's lack of familiarity with this historically
aristocratic arm. By the autumn of 1919 this situation had changed
considerably, and the Soviet cavalry's growth in numbers and skill
during the year meant that these units could be used more effectively
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as a shock force to crack the enemy's thinly-held positions and
exploit the subsequent breakthrough in depth. The Red Army was not
slow to see the potential of even larger formations of this type, and
the creation of Budennyi's First Cavalry Army in November 1919
indicated the lines along which their thinking was to develop.
Following the end of the Soviets' war with Poland (see section
D), the last hope of the faltering White cause lay in the Crimea and
the area immediately to the north, where the shattered remnants of
the Volunteer Army maintained a small bastion against the Red forces.
Here Gen.-Lt. Baron P.N. Wrangel had succeeded Denikin in command of
the remaining anti-communist forces in early 1920. Although Wran-
gel's rechristened 'Russian Army' (First and Second armies) was piti-
fully small, he was able to take advantage of the Red Army's preoccu-
pation with the Poles to move successfully against the weak Soviet
forces in June. This offensive soon reached the line of the lower
Dnieper, although repeated attempts to eliminate the Soviet foothold
across the Dnieper at Kakhovka failed. By early September Wrangel
was in a position to threaten Ekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk) and the
Donbass industrial area. However, spirited White attempts to take
these areas were beaten back and by early October Wrangel had been
forced to retreat to a shorter line.
The Soviet high command responded to this latest challenge by
reconstituting the Southern Front on 21 September. This force
initially included the Sixth and Thirteenth armies, as well as the
newly-created Second Cavalry Army, later augmented by the formation
of a new Fourth Army and the arrival of Budennyi's First Cavalry Army
from the Polish front in late October. M.V. Frunze, newly arrived
from the Turkestan Front, was appointed commander. As long as the
situation with Poland remained uncertain, Frunze remained on the
defensive, content to repel White forays and build up his own forces.
He fretted over the latter's slow arrival, fearing that Wrangel might
foil his planned counteroffensive by withdrawing his forces into the
security of the Crimean peninsula. By the end of October Frunze
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could count on a heavy numerical and technical superiority of 99,500
infantry, 33,685 cavalry, and 527 guns against a meager White force
of only 23,070 infantry, 11,795 cavalry, and 213 guns.7°
Frunze's 26 October directive described the goal of the opera-
tion as to destroy the enemy's 'main forces by a coordinated, concen-
tric offensive', so as to cut off his retreat back into the peninsu-
la. According to this plan, the Fourth and Thirteenth armies would
attack to the southwest, with the latter breaching the Melitopol'
fortifications and pursuing the enemy with its cavalry. While this
force occupied the defenders' attention, the main blow would come
further west, along the Dnieper. The Second Cavalry Army would
attack due south out of its Nikopol' bridgehead towards Seragozy, in
order to 'surround and destroy the enemy's main forces', which
Wrangel had concentrated against the Kakhovka bridgehead. Meanwhile,
the Sixth Army would force its way out of the bridgehead and head
south to cut off the Whites' retreat through the Perekop isthmus.
The army, at the same time, would open a path for the First Cavalry
Army to drive to the east. The Soviet cavalry was to pour into the
breach made by the infantry and, with its main forces turn north
towards Seragozy to link up with the Second Cavalry Army, while also
dispatching a smaller force to cut the railroad leading from Melito-
p01' into the peninsula.71
The most striking feature of Frunze's plan was its fatal
multiplicity of objectives, even taking into account his crushing
superiority of force. While he correctly strove to cut off the
enemy's forces in the Seragozy area with his mounted armies, he then
proceeded to undermine his own plan by dispatching part of this force
for a raid further east against the Whites' communications. Frunze's
attitude is all the more puzzling in light of his earlier proposal to
Kamenev to move the Second Cavalry Army south to the Xakhovka area,
7° I.S. Korotkov, Razgrom Vrangelia [The Rout of Wrangel], 3rd ed.
(Moscow, 1955), p. 206.
71 Azovtsev, at al, III. 484-85.
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which would have enabled the Soviets to strike in force across the
base of the White position, resulting in a larger envelopment of the
White army. 72 Kamenev, however, rejected this suggestion.
Still, given the numbers involved and the unfavorable configu-
ration of the White's 350-kilometer front, there could be little
doubt as to the final outcome when the Soviet offensive began on 28
October. The fighting had actually begun two days before with the
Second Cavalry Army's attack out of its Nikopol' bridgehead, although
progress in this sector was limited at first. The Reds had greater
success to the east, where the Whites methodically pulled back and
the Fourth and Thirteenth armies advanced as far as Balki and Bol'-
shoi Tokmak. Elsewhere, part of Sixth Army made good progress
towards Perekop. Budennyi's army, arriving late, was unable to
advance much beyond Sixth Army's forward units in the Kakhovka area.
However, the first day's mixed successe did nothing to dampen
Frunze's enthusiasm. If fact, so impressed was the front commander
by misleading reports of Second Cavalry Army's alleged victories
south of Nikopol' that he radically altered his operational plan. On
the 29th he ordered Budennyi to extend his attack to Sal'kovo and
Genichesk (the latter on the Sea of Azov).Th However, he failed to
allocate additional forces for this new task, while the original goal
of trapping the White forces around Seragozy remained in force. As a
result, two cavalry divisions turned northeast towards Seragozy,
while the other half of the army pushed southeast to the Azov
coast. It was a division of effort which would cost the Reds dearly.
However, all seemed to well at first, as Budennyi's cavalry
moved almost effortlessly through the undefended White rear. By the
evening of the 29th Soviet cavalry had advanced as far east as
Novonikolaevka, barely 40 kilometers from the Sea of Azov. To the
west, Sixth Army had reached the Black Sea coast and the White
defences athwart the Perekop Isthmus. Units of the First Cavalry
72 Ibid, pp. 475-76.
Ibid, III. 488-89.
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Army reached the sea at Genichesk the next day, while to the north-
east the Thirteenth Army finally captured Melitopol' in a disappoint-
ingly slow advance. It appeared as though the Whites were trapped.
But Wrangel was not yet beaten. His forces facing the Thir-
teenth, Fourth and Second Cavalry armies had managed to break contact
with their pursuers, which reduced the pressure from that quarter and
gained the White commander valuable time to pull his forces south,
where the fate of hiB army was being decided. Wrangel was quick to
see the opportunity presented by Budennyi's overextended line in the
Sal'kovo-Genichesk area, and he decided to attack in order to pin the
Red cavalry against the Sivash, an arm of the Sea of Azov, just north
of the peninsula. The White counterattack began on 1 November and
the fighting was particularly fierce north of Sal'kovo. Here half of
the First Cavalry Army was fighting virtually alone against an
increasing number of White units being funnelled through the remain-
ing escape route to the peninsula. The Soviets were forced to
abandon their blocking position and fall back to the west to rejoin
the main forces. By 3 November the last White forces had passed
through the bottleneck and had taken up defensive positions covering
the approaches to the peninsula. In spite of this incomplete suc-
cess, the Reds claimed to have taken upwards of 20,000 prisoners,
thus fatally weakening the White forces.74
Final victory came in the course of the succeeding Perekop-
Chongar operation (7-17 November 1920), which drove the Whites from
the Crimea and which ended most organised resistance to Soviet rule.
With the exception of minor fighting in the Caucasus, Central Asia
and the Far East, the Civil War in Russia was over.
Although the front command's overconfidence and the White's
fighting abilities had rendered the Soviets' success incomplete, the
October battles nonetheless represent a step forward in the Red
Army's conduct of large-scale operations. Once again we see the
Soviets striving for a decision based on turning the enemy's flank,
' Korotkov, p. 229.
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followed by a deep drive into his rear, for the purpose of surround-
ing his forces and cutting off their retreat. Unfortunately for the
Soviets, this otherwise laudable approach was blunted by their
failure to adequately reinforce their main strike arm. This was
another instance of inadequate means in pursuit of decisive ends,
which had led them into disaster just a few months before. Frunze'a
limitations and those of his army commanders also detracted from the
ultimate victory, particularly in their failure to pursue the enemy
vigorously.
The Soviets' use of their cavalry arm during the operation is
especially noteworthy. It was not deemed expedient, given the heavy
White fortifications ringing the Kakhovka bridgehead, to attempt a
breakthrough with cavalry forces alone, as had been the case at
Voronezh the previous autumn, when the mounted formations had
breached the front without infantry support. The Kakhovka position
was the one instance in the Civil War in which conditions approached
those of the Great War's trench conditionB on the Western Front. At
Xakhovka the Soviets were forced to break through the enemy's tacti-
cal defence before they could exploit the success in depth with their
cavalry. This method of infantry-cavalry cooperation later serve as
a point of departure for a technically-updated Red Army's later
theoretical work on the theory of the deep operation.
D. Operations in the War Against Poland, 1920
As a result of the 1772, 1793 and 1795 partitions of Poland by
Austria, Prussia and Russia, the Polish state ceased to exist for
more than a century. Poland was reborn, following the collapse of
these same empires in 1917-18, and immediately set about reconstitut-
ing itself at the expense of its late masters. Chief among these was
Russia, against which the Poles harbored territorial claims stretch-
ing far to the east of the country's ethnic boundaries. However,
other than seizing large tracts of land in Belorussia and western
Ukraine, Poland remained neutral in the conflict between Red and
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White, even when a determined offensive in conjunction with Denikin's
summer 1919 advance might well have meant the end of the Bolshevik
regime. That the Poles ultimately refrained from intervening is
hardly surprising, given that the White slogan of 'Russia, great and
indivisible', was more hateful to them than even the pernicious
social doctrines emanating from Moscow. By the spring of 1920 it had
become clear with whom the Poles would have to deal, and they acted
at last. The Poles, following a series of insincere negotiations on
both Bides, attacked in Ukraine on 25 April 1920, while the Soviet
armies were still recovering from the previous winter's exertions.
The invaders easily brushed aside the weak Soviet forces in the area
and captured the Ukrainian capital of Kiev on 6 May. This new
threat, coupled with the increasing aggressiveness of the White
forces holed up in the Crimea, meant that the Soviet Republic had
reached another critical pass.
But the Polish invasion did not catch the Soviets completely
off guard, as the latter had been expecting war for some time and
were already taking measures. The Soviet plan for first countering,
and then throwing back the Polish attack was chiefly conditioned by
the Pripiat' Marshes, a 270,000 square kilometer expanse of forest
and swamp between Gomel' and Brest. This feature makes the large-
scale lateral movement of troops difficult and effectively divides
the western theatre of war into northern and southern halves. At the
beginning of the war the northern sector was covered by Tukhachev-
skii's Western Front (Fifteenth and Sixteenth armies, plus the
'Mozyr' Group'), while Egorov's Southwestern Front (Twelfth, Four-
teenth and Thirteenth armies, with the latter covering the Crimea),
guarded the theatre's southern half.
As early as 18 March G].avkoa Kamenev informed Egorov that the
Western Front would constitute the 'main axis', while the Southwest-
ern Front would conduct operations along the line Berdichev-Rovno-
Kovel'-Brest in support of its neighbor. 75 However, the Western
Belov, et al, pp. 674-75.
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Front's first attempt (14 May-8 June) to force the Polish front in
the Polotsk area ended in failure, when a Polish counterattack from
the Molodechno area threw the Soviets back nearly to their starting
positions. The Western Front's aborted offensive nonetheless had the
salutary effect of drawing off significant Polish forces north of the
marshes, thus weakening their front around Kiev, where Egorov was
preparing his own attack.
The Polish advance in the south had carried Marshal Joseph
Pilsudski's Southeastern Front (Third, Second and Sixth armies) as
far as the Dnieper River south of Zhlobin, from whence the front
followed the river to a point just south of Kiev, before curving
southwest back to the Romanian border along the Dniester River. The
Poles also held a small bridgehead on the Dnieper'B left bank oppo-
site Kiev. Here the Poles dug in, in effect, leaving the initiative
to the Reds. The latter were not slow in taking advantage of the
opportunity and immediately began reinforcing the area. Crucial to
this effort was the arrival of the First Cavalry Army, following a
53-day journey from the Northern Caucasus, where it had been engaged
in mopping up the remnants of Denikin's.shattered army. The army, in
the course of its 1,000-kilometer trek to the west, also engaged in
considerable fighting with anti-Soviet guerillas in southern Ukraine.
By late May the army finally reached its assembly point near Uman'.
Egorov issued detailed instructions to his commanders on 23
May. Budennyi's cavalry army was to constitute the front's strike
group, charged with the task of splitting the Polish front in two.
The First Cavalry Army, after taking Berdichev and Kazatin, was to
'act in the enemy's rear', a vague order which was to cause a good
deal of confusion later on. The Twelfth Army was to force the
Dnieper north of Kiev and cut the railway to Korosten'. I.E. lakir's
'Fastov Group' and I.P. Uborevich's Fourteenth Army would assist the
main effort by attacking and tying down enemy forces along their
respective sectors • 76
76 Azovtsev, at al, III. 158-59.
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The most striking aspect of this order was its failure to call
for the encirclement of the Polish Third Army, based on Kiev, in
spite of the existence of advantageously-placed Soviet forces on
either flank. Egorov's failure to employ the highly-mobile cavalry
army for anything more than extended raiding in the enemy rear,
leaving the main task of cutting the enemy's communications through
Koristen' to the slower Twelfth Army, is particularly incomprehensi-
ble, and reminds one of the front commander's unimaginative approach
during the fighting around Orel. Added to the plan's flawed concep-
tion was the front's overall lack of means to achieve even these
goals. The most even-handed sources give the Poles a superiority of
60,000 to some 37,000 infantry and cavalryJ? However, Egorov did
follow standard Soviet procedure in providing for the maximum concen-
tration of force along the decisive areas of his 400-kilometer front.
This was in contrast to the Polish practice of dispersing their
forces more or less evenly along the front. This meant that the
First Cavalry Army was able to field over 15,000 troops, most of them
mounted, and 53 guns in its breakthrough sector, against a slightly
smaller Polish force, only about half of which was cavalry, and 77
guns 78
The Soviet attack jumped off on 26 May but met with varying
success along the front. Twelfth Army, supported by units of the
Dnieper flotilla, made a number of unsuccessful attempts to cross the
river and only managed to secure a small bridgehead north of Kiev by
1 June. The 'Fastov Group' made good progress at first towards
Belaia Tserkov', but a Polish counterattack on 30 May threw it back
almost to its original position. The First Cavalry Army moved out on
27 May but had to spend several days dispersing CosBack mounted
'bandit' detachments which had helped to screen the Polish front.
The first days of June were spent probing the Polish lines in what
Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 352.
78 F. Zhemaitis, 'Proryv Pol'skogo Fronta 1-i Konnoi Armiei' [The
Piercing of the Polish Front by the First Cavalry Army], V-IZh (1940), no.
6(11), p. 6.
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was nonetheless heavy fighting. Budennyi, in order to crack the
enemy front, organised his army into two echelons for the break-
through and exploitation along a narrow front. On 5 June the army
broke through at the boundary of Third and Sixth armies, and by the
end of the day it had advanced some 30 kilometers into the enemy
rear. The following day the cavalry army cut the Kazatin-Kiev
railway. But the Poles reacted quickly to this threat and counterat-
tacked, closing the break in their lines and effectively cutting
Budennyi of f. The Red commander's response to this dilemma was to
continue his raid into the Polish rear, capturing Zhitomir and
Berdichev on the 7th, before falling back towards Fastov to link up
with lakir, having covered some 140 kilometers.
However, wrangling within the Soviet camp ultimately nullified
whatever success the cavalry could claim. Repeated altercations
between Kamenev and Egorov over what direction the operation should
take led to the cavalry army being moved first to Fastov, back
towards Zhitomir and Kazatin, then back on Kiev, over several days.
The constant change in direction exhausted the troops and wasted
precious time, and was only exacerbated by Budennyi's loss of radio
contact with front headquarters for several days, during which time
his army roamed uselessly in the Polish rear. Twelfth Army's inef-
fectual attempts to cut the Poles' retreat through Korosten' also
contributed to the Soviets failure to encircle the Third Army. The
Southwestern Front did manage to retake Kiev on 12 June, as the
Polish armies began to fall back, but the Soviets' confusion enabled
Pilsudski to extricate his forces in time. As a result, an operation
which might have ended in the capture of considerable enemy forces,
merely Bucceeded in pushing them back.
For the time being, at least, this was sufficient, and the Kiev
operation heralded the beginning of a lengthy Polish retreat, al-
though the Poles managed to keep their forces together throughout.
The Southwestern Front now pursued the Poles across Volhynia and
Galicia, which resulted in the Novograd-Volynskii (19-27 June), Rovno
(28 June-li July) and L'vov (23 July-20 August) operations. None of
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these, however, yielded a decisive result and the fighting here was
eventually overshadowed by events to the north.
The most operationally-notable feature of the Kiev operation,
aside from the Soviet command's failure to plan for or achieve the
enemy's encirclement, was the employment of massed cavalry to pierce
the static Polish defence and to subsequently exploit this success in
their rear. This time the breakthrough was achieved by echeloning
the attacking units in depth, because of the more permanent character
of the Polish defence. The Soviet approach represented a refinement
of the methods used against Denikin's forces the previous autumn in
the more open conditions of southern Russia and testified to growing
Soviet skill in the handling of large mobile formations.
After the fall of Kiev, the Soviets shifted their attention
back to the area north of the Pripiat' Marshes. The Soviet high
command, while fully recognizing the political and psychological
importance of regaining the Ukrainian capital, never lost sight of
the fact that the shortest and most decisive route to victory lay
along the Minsk-Warsaw axis. Following the failure of the May
operation, the Soviets took advantage of the Poles' preoccupation
with western Ukraine to renew their attempts to break through to the
Polish heartland. For this purpose, Tukhachevskii was reinforced
with two new armies (Third and Fourth), which brought his total force
at the beginning of July to 91,463 infantry and cavalry, against the
Polish Northeastern Front (First and Fourth armies, and the 'Poles'e
Group'), which numbered 72,6OO.
Thkhachevskii's plan closely resembled his preparations for the
May operation, and consisted, as he put it, of 'resting our right
flank against Lithuania and East Prussia and throwing back the Polish
forces' against the Pripiat' Marshes. 	 The front commander's plan
called for a concentrated blow by the front's powerful Fourth,
Fifteenth and Third armies to the north of the sluggish Berezina
Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 366-67.
Tukhachevskii, I. 128.
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River, which would then sweep around the Polish left towards Mob-
dechno like the swinging of a giant gate. The southern wing (Six-
teenth Army and the 'Mozyr' Group') would tie down the Polish forces
by attacking towards Minsk. Central to the main effort's success was
G.D. Gai's 3rd Cavalry Corps, which was positioned on the advance's
right shoulder, with the mission of operating in the enemy rear
following the breakthrough. If the Soviets moved swiftly enough, so
this proletarian version of the Schlieffen Plan proposed, the Polish
units around Minsk and to the south would be pinned against the
marshes and destroyed.
Tukhachevskii, in drawing up his plans for the new offensive,
was aware that the conditions of the relatively static front along
the Berezina more nearly approached those of the recent World War
than had heretofore been the case in the Civil War. Thus he would
need to create a superiority of force along the axis of the main
attack which would ensure the density of force necessary for the
attack's success. Tukhachevskii, by the usual Soviet practice of
ruthlessly skimming men from the more passive sectors of his front,
thus managed to create a superiority of 60,000 to 33,000 along the
strike group's 135-kilometer attack sector, while the remainder of
the 450-kilometer front had to make do with the remainder.81
It is therefore hardly surprising, given this superiority, that
the Soviet attack on 4 July enjoyed great success from the outset.
The advance north of Minsk was steady, as the badly-outnumbered Poles
began to fall back to the southwest. Gal's advance was especially
swift as he pushed his cavalry into the breach opened up by the
Fourth Army. In less than a week the Soviet cavalry advanced some
120 kilometers to take Sventsiany (Svencionys) on the 9th. Progress
was almost as swift to the south, where the Fifteenth Army took
Mobodechno on the 11th, while Minsk fell to the Sixteenth Army the
same day. The line of the old German trenches was quickly pierced,
and on 14 July Gal's cavalry captured Vil'nius, followed quickly by
81 Bubnov, Xamenev and Eideman, III. 364.
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Lida and Baranovichi to the south, as the Polish retreat gathered
speed. In late July the Soviets crossed the Nieman and Shara rivers
and took Grodno, while to the south they occupied Pinsk. By the end
of the July operation the Soviet forces had advanced more than 300
kilometers in some places and were poised to cross over into ethnic
Poland.
However, as spectacular as the operation had been in terms of
territory regained, the overall military results for the Soviets were
slim. While the Polish armies had been severely handled, they
nonetheless managed to evade Tukhachevskii's trap and fall back
relatively intact. This was chiefly due to the Red Army's low level
of mobility, it's primitive supply system, and the chaotic command
and staff arrangements engendered by the Western Front's rapid growth
in June. The marshy and wooded terrain of much of Belorussia and the
proximity of the Latvian and Lithuanian borders also hindered the
advance by constricting the area for maneuver and channeling the
attack into predictable directions which could more easily be defend-
ed. But the absence of any decisive victory and the expected large
haul of prisoners failed to temper the euphoria which seized the
Soviet command in late July. Indeed, there seemed little cause for
concern at the time, as Egorov's forces pressed on south of the
marshes, capturing Rovno and Ternopol'. In this buoyant atmosphere
Kamenev became lax in his strategic coordination of the two fronts
and allowed his subordinate commanders' immediate operational objec-
tives to develop at variance with his own plans.
Before late July it had been understood by all parties that the
axis of the Southwestern Front's advance would be to the northwest,
in the general direction of Brest. However, emboldened by their
success in Volhynia in June and July, Egorov and his political
commissar, Joseph Stalin, petitioned Kamenev on 22 July to reorient
the axis of the front's advance on L'vov.
	 Kamenev agreed the next
day, shortly after issuing instructions to Tukhachevskii for the
Azovtsev, et al, III. 225-26.
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final advance on Warsaw, the capture of which he scheduled for 12
August.	 That Kamenev was so quick to agree to this fundamental
change in his plans is indicative of the unfounded optimism then
reigning in Moscow. He may also have been unwilling to defy Stalin,
a member of the party Politburo, whose intense dislike of the mili-
tary specialists, of which Kamenev was one, was well known in the
army. Whatever the reason, what was to have been a converging
movement on Warsaw from the east and southeast had, instead, become a
two-pronged assault along diverging axes. Kamenev, by agreeing to
split the Soviet effort, had inadvertently set the stage for the
Poles' 'miracle on the Vistula'.
At this juncture, however, there seemed little cause for alarm,
as the Western Front continued to advance against spotty Polish
resistance, which generally took the form of brief defensive battles
organised along the river lines. The Red Army captured Belostok on
29 July and Brest three days later. The Soviets, pushing beyond the
Bug and Narew rivers, had by 9 August reached a point only about 35
kilometers from Warsaw. Tukhachevskii, in orders issued the next day
outlined his plan for piercing the line of the Vistula River. The
front commander, who based his plan on the erroneous assumption that
the main Polish forces were located north of Warsaw, ordered the
Fourth, Fifteenth, and Third armies, as well as most of the Sixteenth
to force the Vistula north of the city in order to cut the Poles'
supply lines to their Western allies, which led through the Polish
Corridor. The remainder of his forces were to close to the river
south of the capital.
Tukhachevskii's decision to weight the advance north of Warsaw
put a serious strain on his weak left flank, which was already
overextended by the deflection of Egorov's front towards L'vov. The
Western Front's left wing was now anchored on the weak 'Mozyr'
Group', which had been intended as the link between the two fronts as
Belov, et &1, pp. 704-05, 643-44.
Azovtsev, et al, III. 78-79.
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they traversed the marshes. With the fronts now going their separate
ways, this minuscule force had become the linchpin of the Red Army's
entire effort, prompting fears that the Soviet front could 'snap like
an overstretched string', in Kamenev's prophetic phrase. 85
 Tukhache-
vskii's problems were also increasing due to his staggering supply
problems, brought about by the previous month's rapid advance, which
had already carried some units as much as 600 kilometers. This and
the miserable condition of the Soviet railroads meant that as many as
60,000 reinforcements were stranded in the rear and unable to reach
the front, just as the battle was approaching its climax.
Still Tukhachevskii pressed gamely on, although Polish resis-
tance was beginning to stiffen noticably all along the line, and it
became apparent that they were determined to give battle north and
east of the Vistula. By mid-August, however, the Western Front
numbered only 102,700 infantry and cavalry against 145,000 Poles.87
The two sides' forces were deployed as follows: north of the Bug
River the Soviet Fourth, Fifteenth and Third armies were opposed by
the Polish Fifth Army and the 'Lower Vistula Group'. South of the
Bug the Sixteenth Army was approaching Warsaw and the middle Vistula,
against the Polish First and Second armies, which disproved Tukhache-
vskii's contention that the chief enemy units were deployed north of
the Polish capital. However, the real danger was the Poles' Central
Front (Fourth and Third armies), which was preparing a counteroffen-
sive aimed at the sector held by the weak 'Mozyr' Group'. Tukhachev-
skii, true to his operational plan, had assembled most of his force
north of the Bug and had even managed to create a small advantage in
numbers here. But the Poles had been able to put together a crushing
superiority of force in the Deblin area and were preparing to strike
the Soviets' 'overstretched string' and split their front in two.
The Polish advantage need not have been decisive, however, had
85 Ibid, pp. 79-80.
Tukhachevskii, I. 145.
87 Kakurin and Melikov, p. 290.
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the Soviets carried out the planned regrouping of their forces in
time. Kamenev, as early as 3 August, had instructed both front
commanders to prepare for the transfer of the Southwestern Front's
Twelfth and First Cavalry armies to the Western Front, followed three
days later by an order transferring the Fourteenth Army as well.
And although Egorov issued the necessary instructions to implement
the order, he seems to have done everything in his power to hinder
this movement by plunging his armies deeper into the L'vov fighting.
Events finally reached a crisis on 14 August, when Stalin, exercising
his prerogative as a member of the front's military council, refused
to countersign the necessary orders turning over the armies, until
they were finally signed by another member. Had the Twelfth and
First Cavalry armies been dispatched to the Lublin-Deblin area on
time, as Kainenev and Tukhachevskii had wished, the two armies' 26,000
troops (including 15,000 cavalry) would have eliminated the Polish
advantage in the area and foiled their counteroffensive.89
The Polish attack, thus unhindered, began on 14 August with the
Fifth Army's assault north of Modlin. The Soviet Fourth and Fif-
teenth armies began to give way, while to the south the Sixteenth
Army took Radzymin and was approaching the outskirts of Warsaw. A
surprise attack by Polish cavalry the next day broke through the
Soviet lines and captured Fourth Army's headquarters at Ciechanow,
completely disrupting its communications with the front command in
Minsk and with its own divisions. Gai, thus unmindful of the true
state of affairs in his rear, continued to push his cavalry corps to
the west, with the aim of cutting off the Polish corridor from the
hinterland. Soviet cavalry even crossed the Vistula at Wloclawek on
the 16th, before being ordered back to participate in the counterat-
tack being prepared against the Fifth Army. However, while the
fighting north of the Bug seesawed back and forth for several days,
it was quickly overshadowed by the decisive events taking place at
Belov, et al, 646-47.
Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, III. 437.
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the other end of the Vistula front.
Here Pilsudski launched his main attack due north from the
Deblin area against the Soviets' thin covering screen. The Poles
easily brushed the defenders aside, pushing the 'Mozyr' Group' to the
east and rushed into the yawning gap between the two fronts. By 17
August the Poles had reached Siedlce and were approaching Brest, well
in the rear of the Soviet forces still tied down before Warsaw.
Tukhachevskii, not yet aware of the magnitude of the danger, gamely
continued to spur his armies onward. That same day the front com-
mander ordered his three northern armies to continue their attacks,
while Sixteenth Army was to pull back its left flank to cover the
Soviet rear. He ordered the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies to
assemble in the Chelm-Vladimir-Volynskii area, prepatory to taking
the Polish counteroffensive in the rear.
	 But the Southwestern
Front command continued to delay the dispatch of Budennyi's army,
although it is doubtful if it would have made any difference at this
late juncture. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that at the very
moment when Soviet armies were facing disaster before Warsaw, Egorov
and Stalin felt free to continue their own private campaign against
L ' vov.
By 20 August Tukhachevskii realized that he was beaten and
ordered his armies to fall back from the Polish capital. He still
seems to have considered the recent fighting only a temporary set-
back, from which he would soon resume the attack, for on the 24th he
ordered the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies to advance on Krasnystaw
and Lublin, deep in the rear of the enemy's strike force. 91 This
time the armies finally moved and managed to advance as far as the
line Zamosc-Chelm, before they were turned back at the end of August.
Their arrival, in any event, was much too late to do anything other
than discomfit the Poles, who had closed to the East Prussian border
in the Miawa area, cutting off 3rd cavalry Corps, Fourth Army, and
9° Azovtsev, et al, III. 84-85.
Ibid, pp. 89, 92.
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part of the Fifteenth Army. These units crossed into Germany, where
they were interned for the duration of the war. The other Soviet
armies managed to escape, although they were terribly worn down.
Successive Polish attacks through the autumn gradually forced the
exhausted and outnumbered Soviets back to approximately the line
where they had begun the war in May. An armistice in October finally
halted the fighting and allowed the Soviets to transfer troops south
for the final confrontation with the Whites.
The Soviet drive on Warsaw had been frustrated by a number of
factors, most of them of their own making. Chief among these were
miscalculations by the responsible commanders: Egorov, for pursuing
secondary ends to the detriment of the common goal; Tukhachevskii,
for his overconfidence and cavalier attitude towards his supply
situation, and; Kamenev, for his failure to assert his authority and
allowing his headstrong subordinates' actions to dictate strategy.
To these and the Poles' unexpected powers of recovery must also be
added the tendency of Kanienev and Tukhachevskii to push the operation
beyond the point where the army's rear organs could possibly sustain
it. In retrospect, it would have been wiser to have halted the
Western Front's advance along the Bug and Narew rivers in order to
rest and reinforce the troops, before making a final effort which
might well have been successful. As it was, the exhausted armies
were driven beyond their endurance against an enemy who was able to
fall back upon his sources of human and materiel supply. And just as
Tukhachevskii had hoped to defeat the Poles with his version of the
Schlieffen Plan, so he was defeated on the Vistula as the Germans had
been on the Marne in 1914, and for much the same reasons. The Warsaw
operation seared itself into the Red Army's collective consciousness
and provided a theme to which a number of its leading intellects
would return to often during the years to come.
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CHAPTER III. THE BIRTH OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ART, 1921-1929
A. Introduction
Marx's theory had predicated the outbreak of a proletarian
revolution in a given country on the achievement of a sufficiently
high level of industrial development and the presence of a working
class which constituted the bulk of the population. In one of the
great ironies of history, the Bolsheviks' coup had been carried out
in a country which still lagged considerably behind the more devel-
oped capitalist economies of the West, and where the industrial
working class was a very small minority in a society where the great
mass of people were still peasants. Moreover, the country had been
seriously weakened by an estimated 16,000,000 deaths as the result of
two wars and a subsequent famine. 1 Added to this was the country's
other population decline, due to the postwar settlement, in which the
Soviet Republic lost large territories (Finland, the Baltic States,
Poland and Bessarabia) along the former empire's western frontiers.
In addition to these disasters, the Bolsheviks' own harsh
policy of 'War Communism', combined with the widespread disruption of
the Civil War, had by the end of the conflict reduced the national
economy nearly to the subsistence level. The decline in many areas
of industry had been precipitous. For example, the production of
coal fell from 29.1 million tons in 1913 to 9.5 million in 1921; oil
from 9.2 to 3.8 million tons; iron from 4.2 to 100,000 tons, and;
steel dropped from 4.2 million tons to 200,000 tons. 2 The decline
in production in many other areas was just as bad, or worse. Even
the sympathetic H.G. Wells spoke of 'a vast irreparable breakdown',
D.H. Aldcroft, The European Economy , 1914-1970 (London, 1978), p. 16.
2 V.T. Chuntulov, Ekonomicheskaia Istoriia SSSR (An Economic History of
the USSR] (Moscow, 1969), p. 230.
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and it was not until 1925-26 that the economy finally achieved the
prewar level of production.3
The armed forces were affected no less than the rest of society
by the dislocations and shortages of these years. Upon the conclu-
sion of the Civil War in the European part of the country, it became
apparent that the armed forces could no longer be maintained at their
current size in light of the country's economic problems. During the
first half of the 19208 the armed forces were drastically reduced
from a high of 5,300,000 at the end of 1920, to 1,600,000 a year
later, followed by further cuts which had pared down the military
establishment to a mere 562,000 by mid-1924. Of this number, nearly
530,000 served in the army, evidence of the military's primitive
condition. 4 This figure was quite small for a country the size of
the USSR, which still suffered from occasional domestic flareups,
such as the Tambov uprising in 1921 and a protracted struggle against
Central Asian nationalists throughout the decade.
The sharp decline in the army's numbers had an inevitable
effect on the command element, which was successively reduced from a
high of 130,932 at the end of 1920, to 49,319 at the beginning of
1924. Much of this reduction came at the expense of the older
generation of former officers, which had received its training in the
imperial army. This is evident by the proportion of former military
specialists (the term was abolished after the end of the Civil War)
serving in command positions, which fell from a high of 34% at the
end of the Civil War, to 14.1% in 1925, and a mere 10.6% in 1928.6
The army's greatly reduced size meant that only a small portion
of the yearly draft contingent could be accommodated. The Soviets
H.G. Wells, Russia in the Shadows (London, 1920), p. 11.
I.B. Berkhin, Voennaia Reforma v SSSR (1924-1925 gp. (The Military
Reform in the USSR (1924-1925)] (Moscow, 1958), pp. 40, 77.
N. Efimov, 'Komandnyi Sostav Krasnoi Armii' (The Red Army's Command
ElementJ. In Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, II. 96, 102.
6 A.M. Iovlev, Deiatel'nost' KPSS P0 Podgotovke Voennykh Kadrov (The
CPSU's Activity in Preparing Military Cadres] (Moscow, 1976), p. 77.
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Bought to resolve this problem by introducing a mixed cadre-territo-
rial system, the latter units of which combined civilian labour with
periods of military service over a period of several years. While
the quality of the territorial units often left much to be desired,
the Soviets had little alternative but to press ahead with this
system of recruitment, which soon came to occupy an important place
in the armed forces. By the end of 1923 territorial units accounted
for 17.2% of all rifle divisions, a figure which had increased to 56%
by l928.
It was fortunate, given the army's weakened state, that the
USSR was not involved in any major conflicts during the decade. The
only clash of note occurred in late 1929 in Manchuria, where Soviet
troops fought a brief war with the Chinese army. The dispute grew
out of a local warlord's seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railroad,
which belonged to the USSR and provided the shortest route between
Vladivostok and the interior. The Soviets reacted by forming the
Special Far Eastern Army, commanded by the Civil War hero V.K.
Bliukher. The Soviet offensive to regain the railroad began in
October and lasted a little more than a month, ending in a complete
victory over the technically-inferior Chinese. An agreement between
the two countries in December restored the prewar situation, after
which Soviet troops returned home.
Important changes were also taking place in the higher military
organs during these years. Overall control of military affairs
continued to be exercised through the Council of Labour and Defence
and the RVSR, which in 1923 became the RVS USSR. The RKKA completely
dominated the structure of the People's Commissariat for Military and
Naval Affairs, and the Worker's and Peasant's Red Fleet (RXKF) played
a distinctly secondary role. The air force was even more closely
tied to the ground forces, existing merely as a directorate (upravie-
nie) within the defence commissariat. In 1921 the All-Russian Main
Staff, a wartime administrative organ, was merged with the RVSR Field
Zakharov, p. 174.
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Staff to form the RKKA Staff, which continued to be run by P.P.
Lebedev, an imperial General Staff Academy graduate. He was succeed-
ed in this post by the impeccably proletarian Frunze in 1924, fol-
lowed a year later by Kamenev, another academy graduate. Tukhachev-
skii, who in spite of his own 'specialist' background, was always one
of the more virulent exponents of the party line, occupied the post
from 1925 to 1928, and upon his resignation was succeeded by the 1910
academy graduate, B.M. Shaposhnikov. The post of G1avko was abol-
ished in 1924 and Kamenev was relegated to the military inspectorate,
although he continued to hold a number of important positions until
his death in 1936.
In a highly-politicised society like the USSR it would have
been surprising had the armed forces managed to remain aloof from the
fierce intra-party quarrels which characterized the period from the
onset of Lenin's fatal illness to Stalin's consolidation of power at
the end of the decade. On the contrary, the armed forces were torn
by the same factional battles as the party, and as the only reason-
ably coherent institution apart from the party within the shattered
society, their support was invaluable in the struggle for power.
This fact and the presence of some of the major contenders on both
political and military bodies, ensured that the armed forces would be
drawn into the political strife of the time, with significant reper-
cussions for individuals and policies alike.
Lenin's great authority within the party had usually managed to
curb the institutional and personal rivalries of its leading figures.
However, his lingering illness from the end of 1922 allowed these
pent-up tensions increasingly full play. Central to the struggle to
succeed Lenin was Trotskii, who as People's Commissar for Military
and Naval Affairs, member of the Politburo, member of the Council of
Labour and Defence, and chairman of the Military Revolutionary Coun-
cil, wielded enormous power within the party and the armed forces.
He was opposed by the triumvirate of G.E. Zinov'ev, L.B. Kamenev (no
relation to the commander-in-chief) and Stalin, the latter of whom
had become the party's general secretary in 1922. The three began to
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savagely attack the war commissar even before Lenin's death, taking
skillful advantage of the latter's unpopularity within some segments
of the party, due to his arrogance and belated conversion to Bolshe-
vism in 1917. These efforts bore their first real fruit in early
1924, with the removal of Trotskii's ally, V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, as
chief of the RVS Political Directorate and his replacement by A.S.
Bubnov, who proceeded to subordinate the armed forces more closely to
the party apparatus increasingly controlled by Stalin.
Trotskii's position had already been weakened by his wartime
sponsorship of the military specialists and the wrangle over the
formulation of a military doctrine for the Red Army (see section B).
The triumvirate was able to manipulate disagreements over these
questions and paint the war commissar as a 'reactionary'. Matters
came to a head shortly after Lenin's death in January 1924, when his
enemies succeeded in ousting Trotskii's deputy on the RVS and re-
placed him with Frunze, who certainly had no reason to support his
new chief. And although Trotskii continued as RVS chairman, he was
effectively excluded from most day-to-day activity, and it fell to
Frunze to carry out the introduction of the cadre-territorial system
and the concept of 'unified command', which greatly increased the
unit commanders' powers vis a vis the political officer. Under these
circumstances, Trotskii's final humiliation was almost anticlimactic,
when he was replaced by Frunze in January 1925 as both war commissar
and chairman of the RVS.
However, Frunze's tenure at the top of the country's military
establishment lasted a mere nine months. The war commissar, only 40
years old, suffered from stomach ulcers and was ordered by the
Politburo, against his will, to undergo an operation. An overdose of
chloroform brought on a heart attack and Frunze died on 31 October
1925. He was succeeded by K.E. Voroshilov, the commander of the
Moscow Military District and a follower of Stalin's from the early
days of the Civil War.
Voroshilov's appointment, while a political coup for the Stalin
faction, ultimately proved disastrous for the armed forces and the
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Country's defence as a whole. Under the war commissar's inept
management the Soviet military establishment became the obedient tool
of Stalin's personal dictatorship, although this did not save it from
the tyrant's murderous purge of 1937-38, in which Voroshilov played a
leading role. In other areas, Voroshilov's innate conservatism in
military affairs repeatedly stymied the efforts of many of the Red
Army's brightest minds to bring the armed forces up to the demands of
modern war. His devotion to the outdated cavalry methods of that
conflict led him to promote to high posts such military non-entities
associated with that arm as Budennyi and E.A. Shchadenko, whom one
historian aptly called 'the new type of political soldier, the ex-NCO
associated with Stalin, possessing a rudimentary military education,
but a ruthless power of estimating situations in terms of narrow
loyalties'. 8 Voroshilov's incompetence was made manifest in the Red
Army's poor showing during the 1939-40 war with Finland, and he was
finally relieved soon after. However, 15 years of mismanagement
could not be overcome so easily and Voroshilov must bear a large
burden of the responsibility for the disasters of 1941.
Thus Frunze's death was extremely opportune for Stalin, and a
number of historians have speculated on the dictator's complicity in
the former's demise. 9 Stalin's marriage of convenience with his
nominal allies was also coming to an end. The breach in the trio's
partnership came out into the open at the 14th party congress in
December 1925, in which the so-called 'left opposition' of Zinov'ev
and Kamenev was decisively defeated by Stalin and the party machine.
The two, along with Trotskii, were in turn expelled from the Politbu-
ro the following year. This was followed by two years of relative
peace, characterized by Stalin's adherence to Lenin's moderate New
Economic Policy (NEP). However, this interlude was not fated to last
and Stalin next turned on his erstwhile supporters, N.I. Bukharin and
8 Erickson, p. 179.
Ibid, pp. 199-200; R. Medvedev, '0 Smerti M.V. Frunze i F.E.
Dzerzhinskogo' (On the Death of M.V.Frunze and F.E. Dzerzhinskii], V-IZh
(1989), no. 3, pp. 54-61.
147
A.I. Rykov, now styled the 'right opposition', who had become alien-
ated by the general secretary's harsh ways and his increasingly
radical program for transforming industry and agriculture. They were
defeated after a brief battle and by the end of 1929 Stalin was the
undisputed master of the party and the army.
B. Doctrinal and Strategic Debates
One of the chief tenets of Marxist-Leninist military thought
holds that a state's military system is a product of the economic
relationships between classes, whether the society in question is
characterized by slave-owning, feudal or capitalist productive
relationships. It was in this vein that Friedrich Engels wrote in
1851 that 'The emancipation of the proletariat ... will have its own
special expression in military affairs and will create its own
special and new military method'. 1° And just as the French Revolu-
tion, for example, had ushered in radical changes in the conduct of
war, so the Soviets believed that their revolution would bring about
similar changes. However, just as a number of pre-revolutionary
developments in France reached maturity only under Napoleon, the same
was true of the Soviet Union after the Civil War. Here, the Red
Army, for all of its radical sloganeering, continued to draw heavily
from the tearist military legacy.
This link was particularly evident in the army's early attempts
to elaborate a military doctrine tailored to the needs of the new,
proletarian state. This effort was, in many respects a continuation
of the doctrinal debate which took place in the tearist army in 1911-
12. Among those who took an active part in this discussion were such
future military specialists as A.M. Zaionchkovskii, M.D. Bonch-
Bruevich and Neznamov. However, this promising movement soon fell
victim to the same reaction which had driven the 'Young Turks' from
the General Staff Academy, and the tsar expressly forbade further
10 F. Engel's, Izbrannve Voennve Proizvedeniia (Selected Military Works)
(Moscow, 1957), p. 635.
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debate on the subject. 11 The discussion was resumed briefly in 1920
on the pages of Military Affairs, the house organ of the Red Army's
more intellectual military specialists before it was closed down that
same year for views later described as 'non-Marxist and under the
influence of the old military thinking'. 12
 However, this episode
was merely the prelude to the more intense and militarily-significant
controversy which followed.
The first shots in the renewed debate were fired at the 10th
party congress in March 1921, during which Frunze and S.I. Gusev
presented their proposals for the reorganisation of the Red Army in
peacetime. The most important point in their program was Frunze's
call for transforming the army into a 'unified organism', held
together 'by a unity of views as to the character of the military
tasks facing the republic', which he called the 'unified military
doctrine' (edinaia voennaia doktrina). 13 At this time the imposi-
tion of an official system of military views was a major demand of
the army's more earnestly proletarian military elements, of which
Frunze himself was the most outstanding example. It was also a
thinly-veiled challenge to Trotskii, who had aroused a good deal of
enmity among this group with his enthusiastic sponsorship of the
military specialists during the Civil War. There were more personal
reasons as well. The pair's antipathy towards Trotskii dated from
their service on the Eastern Front in 1919, when they successfully
reversed the war commissar's removal of Xamenev as front commander
during the spring counteroffensive. However, Trotskii's authority
could not be overcome at this point and the proposals were withdrawn.
But Frunze refused to be silenced for long and he renewed his
P.A. Zhilin, ed., Russkaia Voennaia Mvsl'. Konets XIX--Nachalo XX V.
(Russian Military Thought. The End of the XIX--Beginning of the XX Centuries]
(Moscow, 1982), pp. 143-46; and his 'DiskussiaoEdinoiVoennoiDoktrine' [The
Discussions About a Unified Military Doctrine], V-IZh (1961), no. 5, pp. 61-
74.
12 O.Iu. Shmidt, ed., Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklo pediia (The Great
Soviet Encyclopedia] (Moscow, 1926-47), XII. 217.
13 Frunze, II. 3.
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attack later that year in a major article, 'A Unified Military
Doctrine and the Red Army', which developed his ideaB on the subject
more fully. Most importantly, Frunze defined his doctrine as
that teaching adopted in the army of a given state, which
establishes the character of the construction of the country's
armed forces, the methods of the troops' combat training and
their leadership on the basis of the state's prevailing views
as to the character of the military tasks before it and ways of
solving them, which spring from the class essence of the state
and which are determined by the level of development of the
country's productive forces.14
Frunze divided his doctrine into two parts--the technical and
the political. The first is concerned with the more mundane aspects
of military life and embraces such matters as troop training, organi-
sation and military equipment. The second, and more important, is a
product of the state's political system, which is determined by its
dominant social class. Couched in these terms, Frunze's doctrine
also constituted a clever appeal to the army's class- conscious
coterie of red commanders, which had always resented Trotskii'g
employment of the politically-suspect military specialists.
The peripatetic war commissar was not slow in rising to the
challenge and he summoned all of his considerable polemical skill to
rebut Frunze's proposal. In an article venomously entitled 'Military
Doctrine, or Pseudo-Military Doctrinairism', Trotskii proceeded to
heap scorn on what he regarded as the juvenile ideas of Frunze and
his allies. He charged that 'Only hopeless doctrinaires think that
the answers to the problems of mobilisation, organisation, instruc-
tion, strategy and tactics can be derived from ... the premises of
sacred "military doctrine"'. 15 On the contrary, he warned, 'Mili-
tary affairs are a very empirical, very practical matter', and that
attempts to codify the art of war into a set of eternal laws run the
14 Ibid, p. 8
15 Trotskii, Kak Vooruzhalas', III. Book II, p. 238.
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risk of stultifying the development of thought in this area.16
It would be a mistake to conclude from this passage, however,
that Trotskii was advocating anything like freedom of expression
within the army, or that he was any less insistent on the principle
of party control of the armed forces than his opponents. His politi-
cal credentials on this score were every bit as good as Frunze's, and
he had shown himself on several occasions to be utterly ruthless in
carrying out the party's directives. His reasons for opposing
Frunze's doctrine were more subtle than his words would indicate and
had as much to do with the emerging political struggle within the
party as with the issue at hand. The vehemence and length (30 pages)
of his reply suggest that Trotskii may well have suspected Frunze of
being the cat's paw in an attempt to undermine his control of the
armed forces.17
It was a considerably chastened Frunze who returned to the
question in early 1922, with a lengthy article entitled 'The Mili-
tary-Political Education of the Red Army'. Frunze had been deeply
stung by Trotskii's criticisms and now went to some lengths to
distance himself from his doctrine's more extreme tenets. A major
concession involved the word 'doctrine' itself, which, Frunze now
admitted, indeed 'smacks of something doctrinaire, opposed to that
spirit of creativity, initiative and activity', which he believed
should be the Red Army's hallmark. 18 This acknowledgement set the
stage for a number of significant concessions on the points so
beloved of the red commanders. Among the most important of these was
the belief in the existence of a uniquely proletarian military art.
Frunze was now ready to admit that the Red Army 'had introduced
nothing new into the fields of tactics and strategy', and for the
time being, at least, would have to make do with the equipment and
16 Ibid, p. 219.
17 Trotskii seems to have felt no great personal dislike for Frunze,
although he considered him prone to abstractions and a poor judge of people.
See L.D. Trotskii, Moia Zhizn' (My Life] (Berlin, 1930), II. 254.
18 Frunze, II. 35.
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methods of the old regime. 19 It was a bitter pill for Frunze and
his allieB to swallow, but they would have their revenge.
Neither Trotskii nor Frunze had much opportunity or wish to
debate the issue further after 1922. More immediate concerns, such
as the army's ongoing demobilisation and the crisis in the party
caused by Lenin's illness, took precedence over such seemingly
abstract concerns. Intellectually, Trotskii was the clear winner and
had compelled Frunze to retreat from or modify some of his more
extreme Btatements. The latter's capitulation on the main point of
contention was made complete at a conference of military delegates to
the 11th party congress in March 1922, at which Trotskii was also
able to engineer the removal of Frunze's ally, Gusev, as head of the
armed forces' political directorate and replace him with his own man,
V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko. Here Frunze conceded that 'there can be no
kind of revolution in the sense of creating an independent proletari-
an tactics and strategy', due to the inability of the country's
economy to meet all but the army's most basic needs. However, he
consoled himself with the belief that with the recovery of the
country's industry, the development of a uniquely proletarian mili-
tary method was inevitable.20
Ultimately, however, it was Frunze who replaced Trotskii as war
commissar, just as it was his interpretation of military doctrine
which was imposed, almost word for word, on the Red Army. This was
because, despite his outward victory, the debate over military
doctrine was deeply damaging to Trotskii's position in the army in a
way which had little to do with the merits of the case and everything
with the armed forces' ideological makeup and the ambitions of his
enemies. At bottom, Frunze's proposal to create a proletarian
military doctrine had an inherently greater appeal to the large
number of politically-minded red commanders who had come of age
during the Civil War and who constituted the largest and most ambi-
19 Ibid, p. 43.
20 Ibid, p. 97.
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tious of the army's various groups. This faction despised Trotskii
for his intellectual arrogance and sponsorship of the military Spe-
cialists, who occupied positions of power and influence which its
spokesmen felt belonged to them by right. One such red commander
later recalled that during this period 'A sort of underground opposi-
tion to Trotskii ... began to show its head both in the Party and in
the Army. Its rallying points were Stalin and Voroshilov'. 21
 And
whereas Trotskii seemed to relish insulting this group's theoretical
pretensions, Frunze wisely appealed to its highly-developed sense of
mission as the heralds of a new era in military affairs.
The doctrinal controversy, in turn, stimulated a wide-ranging
debate among many of the army's leading theoreticians regarding the
nature of a future war, the determination of which was one of the
primary tasks of Frunze's doctrine. Prominent among those who took
part were a number of former tsarist officers and their red counter-
parts. However, this was no mere academic discussion, but a matter
of crucial importance to a military leadership which foresaw a
renewed clash between the socialist and capitalist systems as inevi-
table. ThiB apocalyptic mood was contained in a secret internal
study, entitled Future War, prepared by Tukhachevskii's RKKA Staff
apparatus in 1928. According to this study, in the event of a
renewed capitalist assault on the USSR, the most likely belligerents
would be Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, the Baltic
States and Italy. Another group, which included Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium, Japan and the
United States, might be drawn into an anti-Soviet coalition at some
point. The two remaining groups consisted of those countries which
would remain neutral, and those, including China and the European
colonial holdings, which would remain friendly with the USSR.
As the debate developed through the 1920s, the participants'
21 Barmine, p. 164.
22 Budushchaia Voina (Future War] (Moscow], 1928, TSGASA, fond 33988,
opis' 2, delo 682, pp. 35-36.
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attention increasingly focused on four major issues. The first of
these concerned whether or not a future war would be a protracted
struggle on the model of the First World War, or one resolved in a
quick campaign. The second dealt with whether or not the Red Army
should pursue an offensive or defensive strategy. Third, would a
future war see a repetition of the Great War's positional stalemate,
or would the art of maneuver reassert itself as it had during the
Civil War? Finally, would a future war be another clash of predomi-
nantly infantry armies, or would they be replaced by smaller, more
mechanised forces? All of these problems lay squarely within the
realm of military strategy and dealt with the nature and conduct of
war at the highest level. Their resolution, for better or worse,
would inevitably have a profound impact on the development of Soviet
views on conducting operations.
The debate over the duration of a future war had its roots in
the Red Army's defeat before Warsaw and the ebbing of the revolution-
ary tide elsewhere in Europe in the 1920s. This check forced the
Soviets to face the facts of their own political isolation and caused
them to make some adjustments to their revolutionary optimism. Also,
the capitalist world's unexpected recovery and the Soviets' own dire
economic straits injected a further note of caution into the regime's
military pronouncements, along with a growing realisation that a
future war, at least one involving one or more of the Great Powers,
was likely to be an extended one. Thus even a man of Frunze's
impeccably communist credentials could write in 1924 that a future
war against the capitalist world would be a 'protracted and cruel
contest, putting to the test all the economic and political founda-
tions of the belligerent sides'. 23
 He was seconded on this score by
Tukhachevskii, who, in spite of his 'specialist' background as a
junior officer, or perhaps because of it, had emerged as one of the
'redder' commanders in the debate. However, even the normally
impetuous Tukhachevskii was forced to conclude that in a future war
23 Frunze, II. 133.
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the Soviet Union would face an economically superior capitalist
coalition, and that the ensuing struggle would be 'protracted,
stubborn and bitter'.24
These conclusions, not surprisingly, found a good deal of
support among an erudite group of former officers, whose professional
training and relative lack of revolutionary zeal inclined them
towards a more sober view. Among these was A.A. Svechin, an imperial
academy graduate and a bitter enemy of the more radical commanders.
Svechin's holistic view of war led him to conclude that a prolonged
conflict was inevitable, due to the mobilisation constraints inherent
in modern economies and the extended time needed to accumulate the
necessary resources. This, he argued, is because the nation's
military economy always lags behind the overall growth in productive
forces and the former's period of maximum exertion cannot usually be
attained before the war's second year. 25 This would create a situa-
tion similar to that of the Western Allies during the greater part of
1915, when they were forced to forgo major offensive operations due
to the exhaustion of prewar stockpiles. Svechin's colleague, Shap-
oshnikov, who had accommodated himself more successfully to the new
regime, also stressed economic factors. Given the Soviet Union's
reigning weaknesses in this regard, he urged the country's leadership
to prepare for a 'protracted and intensive exertion' in a war which
would last at least as long as the 1914-18 struggle.26
The same held true of a war against the USSR's smaller western
neighbors, particularly, as if expected, they were supported by the
Great Powers. Incredible as it seems to a generation accustomed to
viewing the former Soviet Union as a military superpower, Soviet
military planners of the l920s had to seriously consider the military
24 Tukhachevskii, I. 255.
25 A.A. Svechin, Strateiia [Strategy], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1927), p. 43.
26 B.M. Shaposhnikov, Moz Armii (The Brain of the Army] (Moscow, 1927-
29), I. 245; B.M. Shaposhnikov, Doklad Nachal'nika Shtaba Predsedateliu
Revoliutsionnopo Voennogo Soveta Soiuza S.S.R. (The Chief of Staff's Report
to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR] (Moscow],
19 March 1929, TiGASA, fond 4, opis' 2, delo 515, p. 4.
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strength of Poland and Romania. Thus the authors of Future War
calculated that both Estonia and Latvia could be defeated in a
single, quick campaign, due to their small territory and the insig-
nificant size of their armies. Poland, however, could be expected to
field as many as 70 divisions and could only be defeated in an
arduous struggle lasting as long as three years, only after which
could Romania be successfully engaged. The only hope the Soviets had
of shortening such a war lay in achieving an overwhelming superiority
in men and materiel and supplying the army with the necessary trans-
portation resources. These, the study indicated, the Red Army
neither possessed, nor was likely to have in the near future.27
The surprising degree of unanimity as to the notion of a
prolonged war stood in sharp contrast to the bitter polemical debates
which raged about some of the other questions. The resulting consen-
sus was no accident, however, and was conditioned in large part by
the experience of the World War and the Red Army's own protracted
struggle in 1918-20. The Great War had convincingly demonstrated
that modern wars could no longer be won in a single campaign, and
that victory demanded an intensive and sustained effort, in which a
state's economic and political measures were as important as its
military ones. The Civil War only reaffirmed those lessons, even
though both sides had relied on a more primitive industrial base than
had the belligerents of 1914-18, and the Bolsheviks' victory was due
as much to their enemies' political disarray as to their military
superiority.
That the Red Army was able to accept the likelihood of a
protracted war showed that its leaders could tolerate some limita-
tions on their revolutionary optimism, provided they were faced with
incontrovertible facts which did not clash excessively with their
ambitions. This was certainly the case in the 1920s, when the Soviet
Union, confronted with its own political, economic and military
inferiority, had no choice but to accept the premise of a prolonged
27 TsGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, pp. 22, 57, 60-61.
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conflict and to prepare for it accordingly.
However, this consensus was overshadowed by the bitter struggle
over whether the Red Army should adopt an offensive or defensive
strategy in a future war. In this area, more than in any other,
political considerations played a role in the final outcome. This
was because more than any other, the question of offence versus
defence went to the very heart of the Red Army's conception of itself
and what its leaders believed it should be.
As in so much else, the controversy had its origins in the
initial debate over military doctrine. Here, Frunze had admitted
that the Red Army remained technologically inferior to the armies of
the capitalist countries. However, he believed that this advantage
could be negated by what he regarded as the Red Army's inherently
offensive character, which was a product of its proletarian class
composition. From this he concluded that the proletarian army 'can
and will attack', and that the Red Army should be trained in the
spirit of 'energetic, decisively and daringly conducted offensive
operations'. 28 This was the essence of what became the extreme
'red' position, although Frunze's own ideas were to evolve signif i-
cantly from this unsophisticated beginning.
The impetus for some of this change came from his enemy Trot-
skii, whose caustic attacks did much to quell Frunze's revolutionary
ardor. The war commissar was particularly contemptuous of Frunze's
attempts to extract an inherently offensive strategy on the basis of
the Red Army's class composition and its experience during the Civil
War. Trotskii Bought to undermine the notion of the army's offensive
character by pointing out that the Red Army had not only not invented
'offensiveness' (nastupatel'nost'), but had actually learned from the
Whites the art of 'rapid breakthroughs, flanking movements and
penetrations into the enemy rear'. 	 Moreover, he added, strategic
defence and retreat had been major components of Soviet military
28 Frunze, II. 17.
Trotskii, Kak Vooruzhalas', III. Book II, p. 232.
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strategy during the war, as the Red Army was forced more than once to
abandon large areas on one front in order to build up a force for a
counteroffensive on another. Trotskii concluded this broadside by
denouncing the idea that an offensive strategy was peculiar to the
Red Army and not the product of objective conditions prevailing in
the Civil War, which had affected both sides equally.30
However, Frunze was more hesitant to concede this point to
Trotskii, and his modified position was hedged with reservations
indicative of his reluctance to abandon a belief so dear to the
militants in his own camp. The most he would do to temper his
offensive-mindednesB was to admit the expediency of a retreat under
certain circumstances. However, he insisted that such a retreat be
viewed merely as a 'feature' of an overall offensive strategy and a
forced preliminary to launching a 'new and decisive offensive'.31
Frunze, as this example indicates, was maturing as a military think-
er, although he was not entirely free of political prejudices, and
his formula for adopting the defensive only under duress soon became
standard policy in the Red Army.
The controversy soon shifted to the merits of the so-called
'strategy of destruction' (strategiia sokrusheuiia) versus the
'strategy of attrition' (strategiia izinora). These terms came to
define the debate over an offensive or defensive strategy, although
in ways which could easily be misleading. The debate also came to be
personified in the speeches and writings of the decade's two out-
standing strategic theorists, Svechin and Tukhachevskii.
Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin was born into a military family in
1878 and graduated from an artillery school in 1897. He finished the
General Staff Academy in 1903 and served briefly in Manchuria.
Between wars Svechin occupied a number of command and staff positions
and began a long and fruitful scholarly career as well. During the
World War he served as a regimental and division commander and as
Ibid, pp. 232-33.
31 Frunze, II. 49
158
chief of an army staff. Svechin joined the Red Army in 1918 and
served briefly as chief of the All-Russian Main Staff, after which he
devoted himself entirely to academic work in various military acade-
mies. During the 1920s he produced the multi-volume Histor y of
Military Art, The Evolution of Militar y Art, and his famous Stratev,
which remained the single most important work on the subject in the
Soviet Union until the 1920s. As a theorist, Svechin was the most
outstanding representative of the imperial military tradition in the
Red Army, and his erudition and breadth of knowledge far exceeded
that of any of the red commanders who so despised him, as well as
many of the younger specialists who aided with them. However, a man
of Svechin's forthright views could not possibly survive what was
coming in the army and he was consumed, as were thousands of others,
by the vast killing machine and died in 1938.
Svechin was an unabashed defender of the strategy of attrition,
which might just as easily be termed the strategy of the 'indirect
approach', in which such concerns as 'Geographical points, embodying
political and economic interests', become paramount. 32 The strategy
of destruction, on the other hand, is the strategy of immediacy,
which seeks a decision in the shortest time possible by the applica-
tion of the maximum force at the decisive point. The strategy of
destruction is unilinear and sees the destruction of the main enemy
force or coalition partner as the only correct solution. According
to Svechin, in its violent, headlong pursuit of a rapid decision, the
strategy of destruction disregards 'all secondary interests and axes,
all geographical goals'. 33 And whereas the destructive approach
recognizes no impediments in its search for an overwhelming victory,
the strategy of attrition takes into account any number of military,
political and economic constraints. And while this approach eschewed
an immediate military decision as inexpedient, it was far from being
a defensive strategy, as many of Svechin's critics charged. On the
32 Svechin, StrateQiia, p. 181.
Ibid, p. 174.
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contrary, Svechin wrote, the strategy of attrition may pursue the
'most decisive ultimate goals', and should never be confused with a
war of limited aims.	 Rather, the strategy of attrition would
follow the path of least resistance, gradually accumulating politi-
cal, economic and military advantages, which would enable it eventu-
ally to deliver the final 'knockout' blow. Svechin, by way of
illustration, criticized the Western Allies' 'destructive logic' in
World War I of Paris-Berlin with the preferred and more gradual
attrition strategy of Paris-Salonika-Vienna-Berlin.35
Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that a certain defensive bias
is inherent in the strategy of attrition, particularly during the
opening stages of the war. Trotskii had made this point in 1922
during the original doctrinal debates. This was the war commissar at
his most 'defensive', arguing that in the event of war with a techno-
logically-superior enemy possessing greater initial mobilisation
capabilities, Soviet strategy should be essentially defensive. He
counselled that in such a case the Red Army should withdraw into the
country's vast spaces in order to gain time and draw upon itB greater
recruiting base, which would ultimately allow it to launch a counter-
offensive.	 Svechiri would later agree with the war commissar,
arguing that the absence of 'geographical values' along the Soviet
Union's western frontier might justify a withdrawal at the beginning
of a war. 37 A.I. Verkhovskii, Svechin's academy colleague, was
more explicit in his recommendations and maintained that in such a
situation it would be more expedient to withdraw and give up Minsk
and Kiev than to take Belostok and Brest. 	 Unfortunately, such
statements left their proponents open to charges of 'defensivism' and
Ibid, p. 41.
Ibid, p. 181.
Trotskii, Kak Vooruzhalas', III. Book II, p. 256.
Svechin, Strateaiia, p. 165.
38 A.I. Verkhovskii, Osnovy Nashei Taktiki. Opon', Manevr, Maskirovka
[The Fundamentals of our Tactics. Fire, Maneuver, Deception] (Moscow, 1928),
p. 131.
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lack of revolutionary spirit, which was by no means an idle charge in
those days. It is particularly ironic then, that long after such
ideas had been declared anathema, the Red Army was forced by circum-
stances to adopt an extreme variation of this strategy in 1941-42.
The man who led the attack against these views was Tukhachev-
skii, who had become the unofficial spokesman of the red commanders
in spite of his own 'specialist' background. Moreover, he had even
been born into the provincial gentry in 1893. Upon graduation from a
tsariat military school in 1914, he served briefly in World War I
until his capture the next year. Tukhachevskii succeeded in escaping
two years later, and upon returning to Russia he aligned himself with
the Bolsheviks. He held a number of high-ranking positions during
the Civil War, including the command of the Western Front during the
latter's ill-fated invasion of Poland. The recriminations which
followed that campaign made him several powerful enemies (Stalin, and
Voroshilov) , who came to oppose many of his initiatives and who
ultimately precipitated his downfall. Tukhachevskii also served the
Soviet cause in liquidating the Kronshtadt mutiny and ruthlessly
putting down a peasant uprising in the Tambov area in 1921. Follow-
ing a period of mixed command and academic activity, he headed the
RXKA Staff from 1925 to 1928. Tukhachevskii, as the result of a
policy dispute with Stalin and Voroshilov, resigned this post and was
relegated to a sort of military exile as commander of the Leningrad
Military District, from whence he was summoned back to Moscow in 1931
to take charge of the armed forces' ambitious rearmament program. In
1935 he was created a marshal and the following year first deputy
defence minister and chief of the RKKA directorate of military
training. Tukhachevskii's fall, however, was even swifter. In May
1937 he was unceremoniously dismissed from his central administrative
duties and relegated to the command of the Volga Military District.
Shortly afterwards he was arrested, quickly tried and executed.
Tukhachevskii, in what could only have been a reply to Svechin
and his followers, denounced in his 1926 brochure 'Problems of Modern
Strategy', as 'military nihilism' the attitude which 'rejects the
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possibility of changing the correlation of forces by military means',
and reduces the entire conduct of war to economic competition
alone. 39 This blast, however, indicated that its author had either
completely misread Svechin or was deliberately distorting his oppo-
nent's views in order to score debating points. Svechin had never
been an unquestioning advocate of a defensive strategy in all cases,
although he clearly felt that the latter more closely suited the
Soviet Union's existing capabilities. Svechin, in the same way he
had opposed the imposition of a military doctrine before and after
the revolution, was trying to educate the Red Army in a broader
spirit of intellectual speculation and save it from doctrinaires of
all stripes. Above all, his was a call for realism and moderation in
military affairs. Ironically, his advocacy of the maximum flexibili-
ty in the pursuit of unchanging ends showed Svechin to be a better
Leninist than many of his politically-correct opponents.
Tukhachevskii was much closer to the mark, however, in doubting
the USSR's capacity to wage the kind of incremental war preferred by
Svechin. On this occasion, Tukhachevskii proved to be the better
practical strategist, warning that the Soviet Union could not afford
'to endlessly prolong its war', and that it must strive to achieve a
military victory by the 'swiftest and most economical means' possi-
ble, through an offensive strategy. 40 Svechin, for all of his un-
doubted erudition, seriously overestimated the Soviet Union's ability
to wage a war of attrition. Poor and all but isolated in the mid-
1920s, the USSR was in no position to wage a protracted, eighteenth
century-style war against a superior capitalist coalition. This was
a particularly egregious error for someone with Svechin's knowledge
of military history who failed to see how the Soviet Union's position
resembled that of Germany in 1914, in which the only alternative to a
slow defeat lay in a quick offensive war to defeat the enemy coali-
tion before it could mobilize fully.
Tukhachevskii, I. 257.
'° Ibid, p. 257.
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The response to this in other quarters varied widely and often
depended as much on political considerations as military ones. One
of the most extreme positions was taken by V.A. Melikov, who approv-
ingly called the strategy of destruction 'the soul of revolutionary
class war'. 41
 He was supported this instance by his literary asso-
ciate N.E. Kakurin, a former tsarist colonel and 1910 General Staff
Academy graduate. Kakurin, writing in 1921, declared that 'future
class wars will always be offensive', and will be characterized by
'extreme energy, decisiveness and rapidity of execution'. 1 A more
moderate appraisal was offered by Kakurin's academy classmate Shap-
oshnikov, whose skill in negotiating the treacherous currents of Red
Army politics ranks him as one of its great survivors. He artfully
managed to keep a foot in both camps when he wrote that 'a future war
will take on the character of an attrition struggle', although he did
not altogether exclude the strategy of destruction. 43
 Frunze, for
his part, had also moderated his tone and sought to strike a balance
between the two camps. By 1924 he had lost much of his former
offensive spirit and was advocating a 'transition from the strategy
of lightning, decisive blows to a strategy of exhaustion' (strategiia
istoshcheniia). This was a significant concession to Svechin's point
of view. But for political reasons Frunze could not renounce entire-
ly an offensive strategy and sought to salvage hiB position by
stressing the shakiness of the enemy rear. A future war with the
Soviet Union, according to this view, would so exacerbate class
conflicts within the capitalist bloc that a determined offensive by
the Red Army might so undermine the enemy that victory would be
assured.	 However, Frunze' g clumsy compromise found few followers
in either camp.
41 V.A. Melikov, Z4arna-19l4 Goda. Visla-1920 Goda. Smirna-1922 Goda (The
Marne-1914. The Vistula-1920. Smyrna-1922] (Moscow, 1928), p. 96.
N.E. Kakurin, Strategiia Proletarskogo Gosudarstva (The Strategy of
the Proletarian State) (Smolensk, 1921), pp. 22, 28.
' Shaposhnikov, Mozc Armii, I. 245.
Frunze, II. 133-34.
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In fact, the increasingly tense atmosphere of the late 1920s
allowed little scope for moderation of any kind in a party and army
which were becoming more intolerant of deviations from the general
line. Svechin was to come under even harsher criticism, as the
advocates of the destruction strategy gained the upper hand from the
middle of the decade onwards. Their victory was formally sealed at
the first all-union congress of the army'B Military-scientific
Society in 1926, whose delegates overwhelmingly supported Tukhache-
akii's formula. In retrospect, it is hardly surprising that the Red
Army came to endorse such an approach, given the aggressive nature of
Marxist-Leninist thought, and the primacy of the offensive was
fundamental to Soviet military art from the beginning. Henceforth
the Red Army would devote almost exclusive attention to the offensive
at all levels and relegate defensive preparations to the backwaters
of military thought.
Closely tied to this question was the controversy over whether
a future war would see a reversion to positional fighting, or whether
maneuver would predominate.
Trotskii, for his part, was particularly contemptuous of those
revolutionary parvenus who sought to project into the future the
limited experience of the Civil War, particularly as concerned the
Red Army's supposedly 'inherent' maneuver qualities. Such a notion
was completely false, he maintained, and he pointed out that the
Whites' strategy had been highly maneuverable from the start, due to
their smaller numbers, and it had fallen to the Red Army to learn the
art of maneuver from it enemies. Whatever maneuver qualities the
army had demonstrated, he continued, were less the product of revolu-
tionary virtue than of the objective conditions of the war itself,
which had facilitated wide-ranging maneuver. Trotskii concluded that
one cannot consider maneuverability (anevrennost') 'a special
expression of the Red Army's revolutionary character'.45
The war commissar's attack had its usual sobering effect on
Trotskii, Kak Vooruzhalas', III. Book II, pp. 228-29.
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Frunze, who had begun his peacetime career as an extreme proponent of
maneuver. Frunze's retreat was a fence-straddling compromise in
which he sought to reconcile his heart with his head. He now urged
his followers to study the positional phase of the Great War, al-
though he reaffirmed his belief that maneuver would predominate in a
future conflict involving the Soviet Union. 1
 However grudging,
Frunze's acceptance of the First World War's positional phase was
significant. Now the trench deadlock on the Western Front could no
longer be 80 easily dismissed as evidence of the failure of 'bourge-
ois' military art, but as a legitimate, if regrettable, alternative
brought about by objective conditions which might someday have
application to the Red Army.
Frunze's shift also made it possible for a number of other
commanders to make the transition to a more realistic point of view.
One of these was Tukhachevskii, who, not surprisingly, had started as
a maneuver advocate of the Frunze type. In 1923 he was adamantly
opposed to any form of positional warfare and declared that a future
war would feature 'decisive and overwhelming' maneuver. 47
 By 1928,
however, he had retreated considerably from this position. The
monumental Future War, edited by Tukhachevskii in his capacity as
Chief of the RKKA Staff, now dismissed as 'simplified' those views
which held that the Red Army was uniquely qualified to wage a war of
maneuver. Moreover, the study directed the army to examine in
particular the experience of the Eastern Front during 1914-17, while
the Civil War was to be studied chiefly for the influence of politi-
cal factors. 1'8
 This could not have been an easy step, as the notion
of a war of maneuver was so tightly bound to the red commanders'
strategy of destruction. Tukhachevskii's new formula was also
significant for the way it so obviously denigrated the experience of
the Civil War in favor of the more technically-advanced fighting of
46 Frunze, II. 46-47.
'a Tukhachevskii, I. 110.
48 TaGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, pp. 53-54.
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World War I as a guide for the Red Army's future development.
Svechin, not surprisingly, found the notion of a war of posi-
tion more palatable, given his preference for the strategy of attri-
tion. Svechin believed that the next war might well follow the
pattern of the recent World War, in which an initial period of
maneuver would then give way to a 'loss of offensive spirit' and the
adoption of positional methods, as the weight of material factors
began to assert itself. He predicted, however, that a positional war
in the East would differ from one in the West, just as it had in the
Great War, and for much the same reasons: the theatre's greater
spatial scope and the lower technical saturation of the front. This
would result in 'softer forms' of positional warfare, such as predom-
inated on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1914-15, and which still
offered some scope for maneuver.49
The idea that a future Eastern Front would differ from one in
the West was readily accepted by Red Army theorists of various
backgrounds. This is understandable, as it allowed a measure of hope
that the army could avoid the horrors of a trench stalemate. One of
these was the promising young staff officer V.K. Triandafillov. He
believed that even though the favorable conditions of 1914 and 1920
would not be repeated, there still remained considerable scope for
'broad maneuver activities', even though these would develop more
slowly than in the West. This would involve, in particular, the
widespread employment of large cavalry formations against the enemy's
flanks and rear. 5° The former officer and imperial staff academy
graduate N.Ia. Rapustin adopted a somewhat more optimistic view in
1927. Kapustin predicted that 'spatial conditions alone' will impart
to operations 'a greater scope in both front and depth' than even the
opening weeks of the 1914 campaign in the East. 51 Verkhovskii was
' svechin, Strateaiia, pp. 171, 189.
50 Triandafillov, 'Vozmozhnaia', pp. 42-43.
51 N.Ia. Kapustin, Operativnoe Iskusstvo v Pozitsionnoi Voine [Opera-
tional Art in a Positional War], (Moscow and Leningrad, 1927), p. 14.
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even more sanguine and saw great prospects for maneuver in a future
war in connection with the army's mechanisation. He predicted that
the opening battles of a future war would resemble those of 1918-20,
and called the Red Army's 1920 offensive against Poland the 'proto-
type' of future battles. 52
 This position, while wildly at odds with
the army's existing capabilities, proved to be remarkably prophetic
and was a fairly accurate forecast of several of the Soviets' major
offensive operations during 1944-45.
The minor disagreements as to the extent of maneuver in a
future war only serve to emphasize the fair degree of unanimity which
existed on this point towards the end of the 1920s. By 1928 the Red
Army had arrived at a compromise of sorts in which a war of position
was seen as a distinct possibility, although it was believed that the
art of maneuver would ultimately reassert itself to a greater or
lesser degree. Psychologically, it was probably asking too much of
the generation of highly-ideological commanders which had emerged
from the Civil War to consider the prospect of a positional stalemate
with anything other than distaste. In much the same way, the belief
in the prospects for maneuver was undoubtedly a source of consolation
to an army painfully conscious of its own materiel inferiority.
The Soviet preference for a large citizen army had its politi-
cal roots in the Bolsheviks' belief in the mass appeal of their
program, which would, it was asserted, eventually lead the numerical-
ly-superior working class to victory. As much as any other, the idea
of the 'nation in arms' was inherent in Soviet military thought, as
was the companion notion of total war, involving the complete mobili-
sation of the state's human and other resources.
A corollary of this belief was the broad disdain felt in the
Red Army for certain theories then current in the West, which advo-
cated to varying degrees replacing the mass national army with a
smaller, highly-mechanised force, staffed by a core of professional
soldiers. Among those who objected to these ideas was Frunze, whose
52 Verkhovskii, Osnovy , p. 232.
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views were of a political rather than a technical nature. He be-
lieved that by creating small professional armies the capitalist
states were attempting to substitute technology for mass, in order to
secure the loyalty of the armed forces by creating a caste of profes-
sional mercenaries. According to this view, the exacerbation of the
class struggle in the West meant that the ruling classes could no
longer rely on the loyalties of a mass army based upon universal
military service. This conviction was fully in accord with the view
that in a future war between the capitalist and communist camps, the
latter would be able to count on significant working class support in
the enemy rear.53
The idea of a large national army found support in a more
militarily-substantial fashion as well. Writing in 1927, Triandaf ii-
b y sought to substantiate the need for a large army by analyzing the
mobilisation capabilities of the Soviet Union's likely enemies.
Triandafillov concluded that the improvements in production methods
since 1918 had made it possible for the advanced capitalist nations
to actually increase the percentage of the population drafted into
the armed forces, compared with that of the First World War, making
it likely that future armies would be even larger than during 1914-
18. On a grimmer note, he concluded that large armies would continue
to be necessary, as ongoing refinements in the means of destruction
would lead to greater personnel losses, thus requiring larger drafts
to maintain the army's strength.54
However, the above should not be taken to mean that the Red
Army rejected the idea of mechanisation. On the contrary, it impa-
tiently awaited the time when the country's industrial base recovered
sufficiently to supply the necessary numbers of tanks and aircraft to
satisfy the dreams of the army's mechanisation advocates. One of
these was Frunze, who declared in 1925 that a future war, 'to a
Frunze, II. 40.
'. Triandafilbov, 'Vozmozhnaia', pp. 20, 34.
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significant degree, if not completely, will be a war of machines'.55
Another was Tukhachevskii, who had become an enthusiastic proponent
of mechanisation in all its forms and who was to conduct his own
experiments in armoured organisation as commander of the Leningrad
Military District. By 1928 the former zealot was writing that
'revolutionary spirit, without the necessary equipment, cannot
triumph in a future war'. 56
 It was a significant statement on Tukha-
chevskii's part, showing not only how hiø thinking had matured, but
also the direction in which he would lead the armed forces.
That direction was indicated most clearly on the pages of
Future War, produced under Tukhachevskii's direction on the eve of
the Red Army's massive mechanisation effort. However, in 1928 the
army was still a largely infantry and cavalry force, with the more
technical arms comprising only a small percentage of the total. A
force as primitive as this lacked both the striking power and mobili-
ty to penetrate modern defences, or even the transportation means to
maintain a successful advance to any appreciable depth, which raised
the specter of a prolonged positional conflict. The study admitted
the Red Army's shortcomings in this area and recommended that it be
increasingly supplied with 'technical means, particularly the means
of attack and suppression'. Among the measures listed were those
increasing the size, power and mobility of the army's artillery park;
introducing light, heavy and 'breakthrough' tanks; increasing the
size of the air force; and strengthening the cavalry's firepower and
armour. 57
 By 1933 these recommendations would be well on their way
to realization and would soon achieve a scope the authors had not
dared dream possible.
In fact, there had never really been a serious debate over the
question of mass and mechanisation, and the issue was resolved
without the rancor which accompanied the era's other strategic
Frunze, II. 343.
56 Tukhachevskii, II. 27.
TsGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, pp. 72-73, 93-94, 96.
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controversies. Indeed, no one had seriously questioned the need for
a large army, and the few proponents of a smaller, more mechanised
force remained isolated and lacking in influence. Likewise, it had
never been a question of if the Red Army would adopt a large-scale
mechanisation program, but of when.
Thus by the end of the 1920s a theoretical compromise had been
reached, which involved marrying Russia's traditional Btrength in
numbers and the ideologically-correct reliance on a large army with
the military necessity of pushing ahead with mechanisation in order
to deal with future enemies on equal terms. There was really very
little else the Soviets could do, as it would still be some time
before the economy could hope to satisfy the army's technical needs.
Likewise, the high command could hardly be expected to renounce its
only asset--the country's enormous manpower reserves. With the
benefit of hindsight, one may conclude that the compromise reached,
however dictated by circumstances, was the most intelligent solution
for the time, and one adopted by all the major belligerents during
World War II.
By the close of the 1920s Soviet military thought had arrived
at a more or less settled position regarding the four main strategic
questions discussed here. Their resolution was personified in Tu-
khachevskii, whose evolution as a thinker mirrored many of the army's
shifting views on strategic policy. Tukhachevskii best summed up
this view in his 1928 article, 'War as a Problem of Armed Struggle',
in which he predicted that in a future war
Decisive actions may be punctuated by positional phases,
dividing one period of war from the other. A prolonged strug-
gle, with the exertion of all economic and social forces and
accompanied by the exacerbation of class contradictions,
characterizes modern mass wars, in which both sides strive to
decisively defeat the enemy's armed forces, employing enormous
forces and means .
In broad outline, these were the conclusions reached. However,
58 Tukhachevskii, II. 23.
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it is impossible to do justice to the intellectual complexity of
these controversies in the small space allotted to them here. Also,
the welter of political, bureaucratic and personal loyalties high-
lighted here are also, to a certain extent, artificial. Thus even
the most vigorous supporters of the mass proletarian army did not
reject the prospect of mechanisation, although for political reasons
they were highly suspicious of gimilar efforts abroad. Likewise, the
debate over the place of maneuver and positional warfare eventually
found the participants separated by degrees of emphasis, in spite of
the potential for disagreement due to ideological considerations.
Also, as we have seen, the likelihood of a prolonged war was never
seriously disputed, even by the proponents of an highly offensive
strategy. As always, the main point of controversy concerned the
question of the strategy of destruction versus the strategy of
attrition, in which the myth of inherent proletarian offensiveness
clashed repeatedly with certain theorists' more sober estimates of
the Red Army's capabilities.
Nor should the reader view the strategic debate solely in terms
of a 'fathers and sons' confrontation between a young 'red' cadre and
an 'old guard' of former military specialists, although some of the
more zealous red commanders certainly tried to present their case in
this light, for reasons which varied from sincere conviction to
outright careerism. 59
 Such an approach is too simplistic.
A more useful and accurate means of understanding the final
result is to focus less on the debate's confrontational aspects and
more on the final synthesis of the opposing sides' views. As has
been shown, the terms of the debate were not always distinct and
there were numerous borrowings and changes of position along the way.
Apart from the destruction versus attrition controversy, the results
of these debates were never a clear-cut victory for one side or
another, but rather the melding of their parts to produce a recognis-
able body of Soviet strategic thought. The resulting alloy, for
Barmine, pp. 163-64.
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better or worse, represented a fusion of much of the pre-revolution-
ary military legacy with the dynamism and aggressiveness of communist
ideology. In turn, these strategic conclusions were to serve as the
theoretical point of departure for the emerging Soviet theory of
operational art.
C. The Shaping of Operational Art
As has been shown, the Soviet strategic debate of the 1920s
ultimately led to a number of far-reachng conclusions regarding the
nature of a future war. The most important of these from the opera-
tional point of view was the Red Army's adoption of the strategy of
destruction, which posited the defeat of the enemy's forces by the
overwhelming application of military power, in which all other
considerations are secondary. Given the hierarchical nature of
Soviet military art and operational art's Bubordination to strategy,
the same political-military demands which shaped the strategic
thought of the period had predictable consequences for the conduct of
operations. Thus it was no accident that the desire for a decisive
outcome by the most violent and direct means possible came to domi-
nate the field of operations as well.
It should not be assumed, however, that the notion of destruc-
tive operations originated with the Soviets or that it was exclusive-
ly the product of the regime's ideological predilections. In fact,
the quest for the enemy's destruction in battle has been a part of
the modern Russian military tradition since Peter the Great. Thus
while many Western armies during the 18th century preferred to
maneuver for an advantageous position rather than fight a battle, the
Russian army showed a marked inclination to seek a battlefield
decision, as at Poltava in 1709, and Xunersdorf in 1759. The same
was true during the Napoleonic Wars in such battles as Eylau (1807)
and Borodino in 1812. And while neither encounter yielded a decisive
result, they were amongst the bloodiest battles of the age and
testify to a desire to destroy the enemy at almost any cost. This
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tradition remained strong among the army's healthier elements, in
spite of the Russians' languid efforts in Manchuria and World War I,
the conduct of which reflected a deep-set systemic decay as much as
the incompetence of individual commanders.
The tradition was revived with a vengeance by the successor Red
Army, whose more politically-minded leaders favored the swift and
decisive methods which had figured so prominently in the Civil War.
Among these was Frunze, then chief of the RXKA Staff, whose views
were reflected in an operational manual issued under his aegis in
1924. In fact, the manual begins with the declaration that 'The task
of each operation and battle is the destruction of the enemy's armed
force', which is to be achieved by 'daring and decisive actions'
employing wide-ranging maneuver. 	 These sentiments were echoed in
another staff document, Future War, which appeared four years later.
Here, the authors stated that 'operations must be waged with the
greatest possible energy, to destroy the enemy', in order to exhaust
him and create the conditions for a civil war in the enemy rear.61
These views found strong support among an influential group of
young theorists who were just beginning their academic careers.
Chief among these was Thkhachevskii, whose views on the strategy of
destruction are already known, and whose approach to operations was
no less aggressive. In his 1924 pamphlet,Problems of the High
Command, Tukhachevskii unambiguously declared that 'Operations are
conducted to destroy the enemy's armed force, which is necessary for
achieving the war's aims'.	 V.A. Melikov reached the same conclu-
sion in his history of recent military operations in France, Poland
and Turkey. The author fully endorsed the idea of the 'destructive
battle', which has as its goal the 'complete rout of the enemy army',
60 M.V. Frunze, Vysshee Komandovanie. Ofitsial'noe Rukovodstvo dlia
Komanduiushchikh i Polevvkh U pravlenii Armii i Frontov [The High Command. An
Official Manual for Commanders and the Field Organs of Armies and Fronts]
(Moscow, 1924), p. 5.
61 TSGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, p. 98.
Tukhachevskii, I. 185.
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according to the dictates of the strategy of destruction. 63
 A.K.
Kolenkovskii, a 1912 General Staff Academy graduate, wrote in 1929
that the 'of fensive operation must become dominant' in the Red Army's
operational art.61'
One of the few voices raised against this view was Svechin's ,
who courageously sought to resist the monolithic tide of offenBivism
in operational art, just as he had in the strategic debate. As
always, his reasons were subtle and reflected his reaction to the
crude theories of the red commanders, as well as strictly military
considerations. He was particularly appalled at his opponents'
single-minded search for a decision, which he felt limited the
commander's freedom of choice in reacting to circumstances. Svechin
roundly criticised the offensive operation conducted according to the
strategy of destruction, which, he maintained, threatens to become an
end in itself. He recommended instead waging operations with limited
aims, which would ultimately bring about victory through the gradual
accumulation of military and other advantages. 65 These views were
later denounced by Triandafillov as 'operational opportunism' and
evidence of the author's 'decadent attitudes'.	 Such charges were
not only an unfair characterization of Svechin's views, they also
amply illustrate the increasingly intolerant tone which came to color
Soviet military writings towards the end of the decade.
However, Svechin was fighting a hopeless rearguard action, as
the issue had already been decided in favor of the offensive party,
which is hardly surprising, given the prevailing political climate.
This took place at the same All-Union Congress of the Military-
Scientific Society which had approved Tukhachevskii's destructive
strategy. Here the assembled delegates wholeheartedly endorsed the
Melikov, Mama, p. 96.
64 A.K. Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi 0peratsii Armii, Vkhodiashchei
v Sostav Fronta (On the Offensive Operation of an Army as Part of a Front]
(Moscow, 1929), p. 11.
65 Svechin, Strategiia, pp. 177, 180-81.
Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 161.
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views of Tukhachevskii, Triandafillov and others and Bet the Red Army
firmly on the path of offensive operations. Henceforth, the army's
theorists would focus almost exclusively on the planning and conduct
of the offensive, generally at the army level, while defensive
operations remained little more than an afterthought in all but a
very few works. The one-sided development of operational theory, as
in the strategic sphere, while understandable, ultimately led to a
serious neglect of defensive preparations which would cost the army
dearly in 1941.
These and other of the decade's important operational questions
were thrashed out within the RXKA General Staff Academy, which was
the lineal descendant of the imperial staff academy, which had gone
out of existence in 1918. The institution was renamed the RKKA
Military Academy in 1921, and became the Frunze Military Academy in
1925, in honor of the recently-deceased war commissar. During these
years the academy was headed by the former officers A.E. Snesarev
(1919-21), Tukhachevskii (1921-22), A.I. Gekker (1922), P.P. Lebedev
(1922-24), and R.P. Eideman (1925-32). Frunze, the only non-profes-
sional, headed the academy briefly in 1924-25. Of this group,
Snesarev, Gekker and Lebedev were graduates of the old General Staff
Academy.
The tsarist army's influence was just as strong among the
faculty, which included such representatives of the old regime as
Svechin, Verkhovskii and V.F. Novitskii, among others. Indeed, so
heavily was the old professorate represented that some complained
that the academy was in danger of becoming merely a red imitation of
its imperial predecessor.67
The academy, as the army's premier military-educational estab-
lishment, did not escape the bitter political struggles which racked
the party and the armed forces throughout most of the decade. Here,
as in other areas, the Stalinist faction, gained the upper hand, as
successive groups of 'Trotskyites', 'left' and 'right deviationists'
67 E. Shilovskii, 'Evoliutsiia Akademicheskoi Podgotovki' (The Evolution
of Academic Instruction], V&R (1928), no. 11, p. 24.
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were defeated and expelled. In spite of these interruptions, the
academy was nevertheless able to make a significant contribution to
the development of a Soviet theory of operations.
Easily the most important of these achievements was the cre-
ation of a separate theory of operational art. As we have seen, the
development of operational thought during the late imperial period
was hobbled by a chronic reluctance to make a clear distinction
between the province of operations and the older disciplines of
strategy and tactics. More often than not, operations were viewed as
an adjunct of strategy and were not recognized as occupying a theo-
retically independent niche. This terminological confusion continued
into the early post-Civil War years, during which time the field of
operations was variously referred to as the 'operational direction of
troops', the 'tactics of mass armies', 'operational affairs', the
'tactics of the theatre of military activities', and 'strategic art
in the operation', among others. 69 One Soviet historian has claimed
that the term 'operational art' did not appear in the military
literature until 1922, although he unfortunately fails to cite the
source for this claim. 70 Another participant in these events gives
the despised Svechin credit for coining the term during the 1923-24
academic year.71
This remark may refer to a lecture which Svechin gave in late
1924, entitled 'The Integral Understanding of Military Art', which,
due to its importance, deserves to be quoted at some length. Sve-
chin, during his address, declared that
strategy and tactics are separated by an intermediate
member--operational art; we think that retaining the old
division of military art into strategy and tactics at the
L. Papirmeister, 'Partorganizatsiia Voennoi Akademii za 10 Let' [The
Military Academy's Party Organization After 10 Years], V&R (1928), no. 11, pp.
35, 46-47; Voronov, p. 61; Barmine, pp. 165-66.
69 Danilov and Kravchenko, p. 38.
70 Semenov, p. 112.
71 Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', p. 84.
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present time is absurd, because ... the general engagement,
which once served as the basis for this division, has disap-
peared. We believe that each of the disciplines, into which
military art is divided, must embrace a field having a certain
internal integrity .... For tactics, such a field is the
modern reality of the battlefield .... Operational art orga-
nizes the separate tactical activities into the operation,
proceeding from the criterion of the operation as a whole.
Finally, the tasks of grouping operations or achieving the
war's political aim falls on strategy •••• 2
Svechin's formula was soon adopted within the Red Army, in
spite of the deep-set hostility which many commanders felt towards
his views.Th One of Svechin's most erudite supporters on this score
was an academic colleague, N.E. Varfolomeev, a former tsarist captain
and graduate of the final 1918 class of the old staff academy. In an
important 1928 article entitled 'Strategy in an Academic Setting',
Varfolomeev stated that due to the appearance of large armies and the
spatial growth of the former battlefield,
The study of the operation has gone beyond the framework of
tactics, the lOt of which was the study of a single battle, but
not of a group of them. The modern operation, in grouping
battles, is a complex act; meaning the totality of maneuvers
and battles in a given sector of the theatre of military
activities, directed at achieving the overall, final goal in a
given period of a campaign. The conduct of operations is
beyond the capacity of tactics. It has become the lot of
operational art. Thus the former two-part formula of 'tactics-
strategy' is now becoming a three-part one--
tactics	 operational art	 strateqv
combat	 operation	 war'4
By the end of the decade the need for a separate and indepen-
dent sphere of operational art had been fully accepted within the
army. Something approaching official recognition of this term
appeared in a 1928 article in the Great Soviet Enc yclopedia. The
72 A.A. Svechin, 'Integral'noe Ponimanie Voennogo Iskusstva' (The
Integral Understanding of Military Art), Krasnve Zori (Red Dawns] (1924), no.
11(22), p. 23.
Svechin's prickly relations with other faculty members and students
are detailed in M.I. Kazakov, Nad Kartoi Bylykh Srazhenii (Over the Map of
Past Battles) (Moscow, 1971), pp. 24, 38; Sandalov, pp. 8-9, 12-13.
7'. Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', p. 83.
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article, written by Svechin, and edited by Voroshilov and Tukhachev-
skii, proclaimed operational art an independent component of military
art. 75 The fact that the leading representatives of the Red Army's
major factions--Voroshilov (the party), Tukhachevskii (the young
commanders), and Svechin (the older generation) were able to agree on
this point is testimony to the degree to which it had become part of
the army's intellectual baggage.
The army's changing view of operations was reflected in the
academy's program of instruction. In the early years, studies were
broken up into so-called 'cycles', of which the most important were
strategy, tactics and military history. 76
 What later became known
as operational art was initially taught as part of the strategic
cycle, although the study of operations during this period tended to
overshadow the cycle's actual designation and hearkened back to the
pre-revolutionary past, when even a corps was considered a unit of
strategic significance.	 This terminological dissonance led to a
situation in which so-called 'higher strategy' (the study of war as a
whole) remained tied to 'lower strategy' (operations), which, in
turn, became entangled with 'higher tactics'. 78 The resulting con-
fusion can be directly traced to Leer's formula of more than 30 years
before and indicated how much still needed to be done in establishing
operational art as a separate discipline.
The situation was clarified somewhat in 1924, with the division
of the strategic cycle into two separate departments: 1) the study of
war; and 2) the conduct of operations (vedenie operatsii); headed,
respectively, by Tukhachevskii and Triandafillov. One participant in
theBe events later noted that with the department's establishment,
'operational art became a part of the academy' scientific-educational
practice, both in the capacity of a definite scientific concept, and
Shmidt, XII. 218.
76 Shilovskii, 'Evoliutsiia', p. 18.
Neznamov, p. 194.
Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', pp. 81-83.
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in the capacity of an educational discipline'. 79
 The study of oper-
ationa]. art was further enhanced by the expansion of the academy's
program in 1925 from two to three years. While the first two years
were chiefly devoted to tactical problems, the third year was given
over to the study of operational-strategic questions; in particular
the conduct of operations at the army and front level.	 However,
the delineation of the various disciplines remained imprecise, and
this problem was not satisfactorily resolved until the 1930s.
During these years the staff and graduates of the academy
produced a number of works which greatly contributed to the Red
Army's understanding of operations. Among these were an important
joint effort by Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, entitled
The Army Operation. The Work of the Command and Field Directorate, in
1926. Others included Svechin's Strateav (1923, 1927), Triandafil-
b y 's The Character of Operations of Modern Armies (1929), N.Ia.
Kapustin's Operational Art in a Positional War (1927), N.N. Movchin's
Consecutive Operations Accordin g to the Experience of the Marne and
the Vistula (1928), and A.K. Kolenkovskii's On the Offensive O pera-
tion of an Army as Part of a Front (1929).
The academic developments of the 1920s represent the logical
culmination of operational art's long struggle for theoretical
independence. In retrospect, the most notable feature of this
decades-long journey is not the length of time required, but that the
final product so closely resembled what had gone before. From Leer's
'tactics of the theatre of military activities', to 'operatics', and
Neznamov's views on the place of operations in military art, it was
but a short step to a formula which has remained essentially un-
changed after more than 60 years. The fact that the prime movers in
this evolution's final steps were former tsarist officers, by virtue
of their superior training and expertise, should come as no surprise,
Ibid, p. 84.
80 Shilovskii, 'Evoliutsiia', p. 19; P.A. Kurochkin, ed., Obshchevoisko-
vaia Armiia V Nastuplenii (The Combined-Arms Army in the Offensive] (Moscow,
1966), p. 9.
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and illustrate once again the profound influence which the represen-
tatives of the imperial military tradition still wielded in certain
areas of the Red Army.
One of the most interesting and productive areas of research
during these years involved devising a method of conducting opera-
tions at the army level. As the 'smallest operational unit', an army
was viewed as responsible for 'grouping ... a series of combats',
while its own activities constituted one or more of the intermediate
phases of a larger front operation. 81 In practical terms, the army
organises the numerous tactical actions of its subordinate divisions
and corps, while at the same time it fulfills a similar function vis
a vis the front, which pursues its own strategic mission. Such
statements also highlight the central position occupied by the army
operation and, by extension, operational art, in the theoretical
order of things. This formula was aptly summed up by Varfolomeev in
1928, who wrote that 'combat is the means of the operation, tactics--
the material of operational art; the operation--the means of strate-
gy, operational art the material of strategy'.
One author, N.N. Movchin, went to some lengths to explain the
nature of the army operation, in particular as it differed from the
front operation, which is at once both larger, in terms of the men
and materiel involved, and more complicated as to the multiplicity of
goals it can pursue. However, Movchin insisted that the army opera-
tion was more than a mere subset of the front operation, but a combat
episode possessing independent elements, in spite of its subordinate
status. He defined the army, or 'simple' operation as one which, due
to its limited resources, is capable of pursuing only one objective
at a time; possesses sufficient resources for achieving this goal;
has a command organisation responsible for controlling the army's
activities and establishing intermediate objectives, and; which
81 Kapustin, p. 20; Kolenkovskii, pp. 13, 15.
Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', p. 84.
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encompasses all activities during the operation.
Movchin's use of the term 'simple' (prostaia) operation to
describe the activities of an army pursuing a single objective is
particularly interesting, given its historical antecedents. Mikhne-
vich was writing about the 'simple operational line' as early as
1911, if not before, to describe an operation in which the army
pursues 'a single object of activities' along the front. He distin-
guished this from what he called the 'complex operational line',
whereby an army or group of armies pursues more than one objective
simultaneously. 	 Mikhnevich's notion of 'operational lines' was
never adopted by the Soviets, but his division of operations into
'simple' (army) and 'complex' (front) types was briefly employed by
the Red Army to highlight the differences between these forms.
Soviet military theory during this period recognised three
kinds of army operations, the approximate outline of which had been
identified by Neznaniov as early as 1911. The first and most inten-
sively studied was the offensive against a defender awaiting attack.
This form was considered the most likely to occur and reflected the
experience of the Great War, in which positional forms had been
dominant. Such a situation would require a breakthrough operation to
restore maneuver, although the Soviets assumed that even a relatively
stable front in the East would be more vulnerable to a penetration
than had been the case during the 1914-18 trench stalemate in France.
The second form was the meeting operation, during which both sides
launched attacks. This situation, it was believed, would most likely
arise at the beginning of hostilities, or in the presence of open
flanks along an otherwise stable front. The third and final form was
the much-ignored defensive operation, which was viewed as a forced
measure, to be adopted only under duress.
The outstanding theorist of the army operation during the 1920s
was Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafillov, who for all of his immense
Movchin, Posledovatel'nve, pp. 19-20.
Mikhnevich, Strategiia, I. 178, 180.
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importance to the development of Soviet operational art is a figure
almost unknown in the West. Triandafillov was born in 1894 to a
family of Greek descent near Kars, in what is now northeastern
Turkey. He was drafted, like others of his generation, into the
Russian army upon the outbreak of World War I and eventually rose to
the rank of captain. Triandafillov, as did many other specialists
and wartime officers, joined the Red Army in 1918 and held various
command and staff positions on the Eastern, Southern and Southwestern
fronts in the Civil War. He enrolled in the RKXA General Staff
Academy in 1919, although combat postings and other assignments
delayed his graduation until 1923. In 1924 Triandafillov was ap-
pointed chief of a section in the RKKA Staff's operational director-
ate, and head of the directorate a year later, while also serving as
head of the staff academy's operational department. In 1928 he
became deputy Chief of the RXXA Staff, and returned to that position
in 1930, following a year's service as commander of a rifle corps.85
Triandafillov died in an airplane crash near Moscow on 12 July 1931;
an accident which also claimed the life of the Red Army's leading
armoured theoretician, K.B. Kalinovskii. As evidence of the great
esteem in which he was held in the army, Triandafillov's ashes were
interred in the Kremlin wall alongside other Soviet notables.
Triandafillov, as a young wartime officer, naturally gravitated
to the camp of the strategic and operational 'destructionists' and
enthusiastically supported Tukhachevskii and other like-minded
commanders in their bitter polemics with the older military special-
ists. However, Triandafillov was no single-minded bigot, but a
talented and innovative theorist and author of several articles on
A. Golubev, 'Vydaiushchiisia Sovetskii Voennyi Teoretik' (An
Outstanding Soviet Military Theoretician], V-IZh (1968), pp. 107-14. One
source states that Triandafillov also served briefly as Chief of Staff in
1931. See the article by M.V. Zakharov, in A.M. Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 3rd ed. (Moscow,
1969-78), VI. 224. Another claims that he was acting Chief of Staff in 1929.
See Kadishev, Voprosy , p. 552. However, no other work on the General Staff
or Triandafillov makes either of these claims. See the relevant articles in
Grechko, II. 512, and VIII. 107. Nor does Zakharov repeat his claim in his
posthumous history of the General Staff. See M.V. Zakharov, General'n yi Shtab
v Predvoennye Gody (The General Staff in the Prewar Years] (Moscow, 1989), p.
311.
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military history. His intellectual partnership with Tukhachevskii--
what one observer called 'a happy combination of two minds'--was
particularly fruitful, and the two were able to implement a number of
changes in the army, despite Stalin's objections.
Triandafillov's writings reveal a convinced exponent of the
offensive operation, conducted to destroy or capture the enemy force
in the swiftest and most decisive manner possible. 87 However, un-
like many of his contemporaries, Triandafillov's enthusiasm was
tempered by a sober calculation of those factors which had greatly
increased the difficulty of realising such an operation. Among these
were the defence's vastly-augmented powers of resistance, due to both
qualitative and quantitative developments in weapons since the war.
Triandafillov calculated that the density of machine guns per kilome-
ter along a future Eastern Front would exceed the 1914 figure by some
six to eight times, while similar improvements were taking place in
the armies' artillery, air and transportation arms.
Another factor is the great spatial depth of modern defensive
arrangements, which enable the defender to withstand serious of fen-
sive shocks without collapsing and to maneuver his reserves to meet
any threat. Triandafillov calculated the depth of the enemy's
tactical defence at between eight and ten kilometers, an area which
embraced the front line to the limit of his corps reserves. He
defined the operational defence as encompassing the defender's army
reserves, which generally extend to a depth of 25-35 kilometers,
although in certain cases this zone may reach back as far as 80-100
kilometers, given the presence of a sufficiently large truck park.
He classified any deeper reserves as 'strategic', which would be
G. Isserson, 'Zapiski Sovremennika 0 M.N. Tukhachevskom' (A
Contemporary's Notes on M.N. Tukhachevskii], V-IZh (1963), no. 4, p. 69; N.I.
Koritskii, S.M. Mel'nik-TukhaChevskaia, B.N. Chistov, comps., Marshal
Tukhachevskii. Vospominaniia Druzei i Soratnikov [Marshal Tukhachevskii.
Memories of Friends and Comrades-in-Arms] (Moscow, 1965), p. 133.
87	 V.K. Triandafillov, Razmakh Operatsii Sovremenn ykh Armii (The
Operational Scope of Modern Armies] (Moscow, 1926), p. 3.
Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 75.
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brought up to the front by rail.89
Triandafillov's chosen instrument for overcoming these formida-
ble obstacles was the 'shock army' (udarnaia araiia),a combined-arms
force designed not only to break through the enemy's tactical de-
fence, but to continue the offensive through his operational depth
and beyond. The shock army would ideally contain from 12 to 18 rifle
divisions, organised into four or five corps, yielding a structure
similar in size to a number of pre-revolutionary calculations for an
army of 150,000-200,000 men.	 However, the similarity here was in
numbers only, for the shock army was vastly superior to its primitive
prewar counterpart in terms of both itB striking power and mobility.
Triandafillov wanted to increase the former by reinforcing it with as
many as 16-20 artillery regiments for suppressing the enemy's machine
guns and artillery fire during the critical breakthrough phase, while
imparting additional mobility and depth to the blow through the
addition of eight to 12 tank battalions. He further proposed streng-
thening the army through the addition of two or three aviation
brigades of light and heavy bombers, for strikes deep in the enemy
rear, while four or five fighter squadrons would provide cover for
the ground attack.91
Triandafillov modelled his shock army after the powerful German
right-flank armies which invaded Belgium and France in 1914, and a
similar grouping organised by the Soviet Western Front in 1920. The
shock army, as these examples indicate, was to assume the leading
role in frontal operations along the most important strategic axes,
although under conditions and in a form which differed radically from
its predecessors. 92 With the prospect of some form of positional
warfare seen as increasingly likely, the shock army had to be config-
ured to the need for disrupting the enemy defence and maneuvering in
89 Ibid, p. 116.
Ibid, p. 97-98; Neznamov, p. 194; Leer, Strategiia, 4th ed., II. 13.
91 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 98-99.
92 Ibid, p. 96.
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depth. This requirement, in turn, made it necessary to increase the
proportion of specialised arms within the army. The idea of the
shock army was quickly adopted by other Soviet theorists and its
composition was continuously debated throughout the 1930s. However,
for a variety of reasons, the shock army, as originally conceived,
never lived up to its initial promise, although a number of such
armies were eventually created during World War II.
Triandafillov rejected the idea of mounting an offensive along
a narrow front, which had been the practice in both East and West
during the greater part of World War I; the major exception being
Brusilov's 1916 effort. He argued that an attack along a narrow
front can destroy, at most, only an insignificant portion of the
defender's front-line troops and reserves, leaving the remainder free
to form a new defensive front or launch a counterattack. Triandaf ii-
b y, as proof, cited the Germans' great March 1918 offensive, which
had unfolded along an 80-kilometer front, or little more than 11% of
the entire 730-kilometer Western Front. As a result, the German
offensive initially affected only 29 Allied infantry divisions,
leaving the remaining 146 divisions untouched and able to concentrate
against the threat and thus halt the German advance. 93 Triandafil-
b y concluded that 'A breakthrough operation may count on success
only if it ties down a significant portion of the enemy's forces'
occupying a given front, which he calculated at between one-third and
one-half of the defender's total forces. 94 By this, the author
evidently had in mind Tukhachevskii's opening offensive against the
Poles in July 1920, which embraced the entire enemy army group north
of the Pripiat' Marshes and approximately half of the total Polish
forces at the front.
Triandafillov's views were supported by a broad spectrum of the
Red Army's leading theorists of varying backgrounds. Among these was




and who was destined to become one of the most influential authors on
operational art during the 1930s. Isserson, also chose as his point
of reference the March 1918 offensive and, like Triandafillov,
reproached the German high command for launching the offensive with
less than a third of its forces along a strategically-insufficient
share of the front. He concluded that in order that the offensive go
beyond mere tactical success, 'it is necessary to keep the enemy's
reserves in place along the entire front', so as to prevent the
defender from concentrating his unengaged forces against the break-
through area.	 Others included Kamenev and Tukhachevskii, the
latter of whom declared in 1924 that 'The wider the breakthrough
front, the greater the destruction inflicted upon the enemy'.
Triandafillov defined this necessary frontage at no less than 150-200
kilometers. He calculated that an attack of this scope would immedi-
ately engage anywhere from 15-20 enemy divisions, and would require
as many more to seal the breach. He further concluded that such a
large diversion of troops to the threatened sector would likely be
beyond the capabilities of an army numbering only 60-65 divisions, by
which he clearly meant Poland.97
That the Soviets came to prefer offensive operations along a
broad front is hardly surprising, given the various political and
military factors that entered into their calculations. Among these
was the assumption that a future war might easily involve all the
Soviet Union's western neighbors, creating a 3,000-kilometer front
from the Barents to the Black seas. The absurdity of trying to
achieve a decisive result along a narrow front, given the distances
involved, was obvious, particularly given the high command's belief
that an offensive along a 300-kilometer front might remove some of
the smaller members (Estonia and Latvia) of the expected coalition at
G. Is gerson, Martovskoe Nastuplenie Germantsev v Pikardii v 1918 Godu
[The Germans' March Offensive in Picardy in 1918] (Moscow, 1926), p. 47.
Kamenev, p. 71; Tukhachevskii, I. 189.
' Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 122.
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a single stroke.	 Another was the proven effectiveness of the
offensive launched on a broad front, particularly in the East, where
the vast distances and the resulting lower troop densities made a war
of maneuver more likely. This had been the case in 1916, when even
the poorly-supplied Southwestern Front defeated the Austro-Hungarians
and came close to a stunning strategic result. The situation was
somewhat different in the cramped conditions of France, but the
Allies did ultimately adopt the strategy of launching continuous
offensives along broad sectors of the front during their final
summer-autumn drive in 1918.
The notion of the broad-front offensive quickly became official
army policy and its utility was never seriously questioned by any of
the major theorists. During World War II these ideas were put into
practice, and the conduct of enormous offensive operations, involving
one or more fronts, quickly became a standard feature of Soviet
operational-strategic practice.
Triandafillov's solution for overcoming the enemy's tactical
defence and carrying the offensive into his operational and strategic
depth was twofold. The first step involved concentrating large
numbers of men and materiel at the decisive point, in order to
increase the initial weight of the attack and overwhelm the defence
at the very outset. He calculated that even a reinforced shock army
can mount an effective attack along a front of no more than 25-30
kilometers and recommended that the divisions carrying out this
attack be assigned sectors of two to three kilometers in breadth, for
a first-echelon strength of eight divisions along the projected
breakthrough zone.	 Artillery densities for the main attack would
range from 50 guns per kilometer for purposes of infantry support, to
75 guns per kilometer in those instances where the artillery has a
98 M.N. Tukhachevskii, N.E. Varfolomeev and E.A. Shilovskii, Armeiskaia
Operatsiia. Rabota Komandovaniia i Polevo go Upravleniia [The Army Operation.
The Work of the Command and Field Directorate] (Moscow and Leningrad, 1926),
p. 24.
Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 121, 110.
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counter-battery mission as well. In certain cases, the artillery may
be partially replaced by tanks, which may be massed to a density of
20-30 machines per kilometer to support the infantry attack against a
built-up defence. When extended operations are called for, this
figure may rise to as many as 60 tanks per kilometer.
The principle of the maximum concentration of force at a single
point, in the context of an extended front and an overall scarcity of
resources, was as old as the Red Army itself. This had been amply
demonstrated on a number of occasions, as during the counteroffensive
by Frunze's Southern Group and Egorov's 'shock group' near Orel in
1919, as well as Tukhachevskii's preparations for his summer 1920
offensive. This principle underwent further theoretical elaboration
following the Civil War. Both Tukhachevskii and Kolenkovskii, for
example, believed that army commanders should strive to achieve a
five or sixfold superiority over the defender to ensure success, and
established a threefold superiority as a minimal condition for a
successful attack against an entrenched opponent. 101 Kapustin, in
his work on army operations in a positional war, recommended an even
greater concentration of force: 20-25 divisions attacking along a 15-
20 kilometer breakthrough front, supported by approximately 50 guns
per kilometer. 102 Kapustin, however, was writing two years before
Triandafillov, and relying chiefly on the experience of the Great
War, while the latter was already looking forward to a more techni-
cally-advanced army which did not have to rely so heavily on large
masses of infantry.
Triandafillov also recommended launching a number of secondary
attacks to deceive the defender as to the place and direction of the
main blow, and to pin down his front-line forces and reserves. These
auxiliary attacks would involve two or three divisions, attacking
100 Ibid, pp. 82-83.
101 Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, pp. 53-56; Kolenkovskii,
o Nastupatel'nOi, p. 27.
102 Kapustin, pp. 79, 85.
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along a 20-25 kilometer front. This would yield an offensive front-
age of some 45-50 kilometers for the shock army as a whole, with a
first-echelon strength of 10-11 divisions. Due to the main attack's
demands, however, those forces making secondary efforts would have to
rely on their organic means, although Triandafillov allowed that in
exceptional cases they might be reinforced with units from corps
artillery. 103 Kolenkovskii, in a similar fashion, divided his army
into 'shock', 'holding' and 'demonstration' groups. The shock group,
according to this scheme, would make the main attack with no less
than two-thirds of the army's forces. It would be supported by the
other two groups along the attack front's secondary sectors according
to their designation.04
The second ingredient of operational success, following the
disruption of the enemy's tactical defence, is to sustain the force
of the initial blow into the defender's operational depth and beyond.
Triandafillov warned that this would be no easy task under modern
conditions, and that the first-echelon divisions could expect to
suffer 12-20% casualties in a period of five to six days. 105 He
suggested that one way to compensate for the effects of these losses
would be to arrange the army's main attack into second or third
echelons, containing one-third to one-half of the first echelon's
strength. '106 This backup force would enable the corps commanders
to maintain the necessary attack densities along their lengthening
fronts and sustain the offensive's momentum by continuously feeding
the advance.
This arrangement was a radical departure from Civil War prac-
tice, when even an army attacking along the main axis was lucky to
have as much as a division in reserve, much less supporting echelons.
Triandafillov's recommendations were further developed during the
103 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 110.
104 Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi, pp. 28-29.
105 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 133.
106 Ibid, p. 97.
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succeeding interwar years and received an added, technical dimension
with the advent of mechanised and armoured forces. This development
reached its apogee during the latter half of World War II when, in
several of the larger front and multi-front operations, entire armies
came to constitute the follow-on echelons.
The theorists of the 1920s dealt only briefly with the actual
minutiae of the operation, so its unfolding can only be sketchily
reconstructed through their writings. For Triandafillov, the key to
success lay in quickly overcoming the enemy's tactical defence zone
and defeating in succession his operational reserves as they arrive
to seal the brekthrough. This presupposed the enemy's suppression
throughout his entire tactical-operational defence and is best
illustrated by the activities of the shock army's air arm during the
initial operation. Bomber aviation would begin the battle with
strikes against the defender's front-line troops and immediate rear
targets, such as troop concentrations and artillery positions, while
fighter aviation would work to gain air superiority over the battle-
field and secure the main attack's deployment and penetration of the
tactical defence. As the offensive moved into the defender's opera-
tional zone, bomber aviation would gradually shift its efforts to
disrupting the arrival of the enemy's reserves by concentrating on
such rear-area targets as troop columns and rail junctions, while
fighter aviation would protect those units advancing along the most
important axes. The depth of air combat activity in such cases might
reach 50-75 kilometers and more.107
Triandafillov calculated the daily rate of advance during the
immediate breakthrough phase at five to six kilometers, which meant
it would take two days to pierce the enemy's tactical defence, while
another three to four days would be necessary to clear the area of
the defender's army reserves. 	 Kapustin recommended creating a
special 'breakthrough group' (proryvaiushchaia gruppa) of first-
107 Ibid, p. 113; Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi, p. 61.
108 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 116.
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echelon divisions to carry out the difficult task of overcoming the
enemy's tactical defensive zone. He also anticipated Triandafillov
in his insistence that this group be reinforced with extra artillery,
tanks and chemical weapons for the task. The shock army commander,
once the defender's tactical position had been breached, would then,
according to this plan, commit his 'maneuver group' (manevrennaia
gruppa) to develop the attack against the enemy's flanks and rear.
The maneuver group would consist of infantry divisions and large
numbers of cavalry, and its mission was quite distinct from that of
the second and third echelons. 1
	Whereas the latter were charged
with reinforcing the advance, the maneuver group would spearhead the
advance, raiding the defender's communications and disrupting the
arrival of his reserves.
Triandafillov, for his part, did not assign this group a
particular organisational status within the army, and he envisaged a
formation composed primarily of so-called 'strategic cavalry', which
was a more up-to-date version of Budennyi's First Cavalry Army. This
group would be reinforced with mobile artillery, light tanks and
motorized machine-gun units. This formation would operate on the
shock army's flank to depth of 75-100 kilometers, raiding and carry-
ing out the 'tactical encirclement' of the defender's forces.11°
The idea of a special mobile force for exploiting infantry
success is as old as the cavalry itself. However, the advent of
trench warfare in 1914-18 seemed to herald the end of the mounted
arm's usefulness, even on the Eastern Front. The situation changed
dramatically during the Civil War, where the cavalry was reborn under
conditions which facilitated broad-ranging maneuver. As the Red Army
became more skilled in their employment, large cavalry formations
quickly became a decisive means for exploiting the infantry's success
at the front level, most notably during the First Cavalry Army's
breakout from the Kakhovka bridgehead in 1920. In this sense, the
109 Kapustin, pp. 18, 20, 213.
110 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 166.
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idea of a separate maneuver group in an army operation did not
represent much of an advance over previous practice. However, the
advent of large-scale mechanisation during the 1930s created the
technical basis for the development of a much more powerful maneuver
group, composed of motorized infantry, cavalry and tanks. These
formations, whether known as the mobile group or the breakthrough
development echelon, eventually became the cavalry-mechanised groups
and tank armies of World War II, in which capacity they were often
the decisive means for exploiting success during front offensive
operations.
While tactics deals with zones, sectors and densities, the
proper sphere of operational art is the axis of advance, making the
form and direction of the blow a matter of prime importance to the
army commander. Soviet operational art during these years recognized
three basic forms of offensive maneuver. These had been identified
by Neznaniov as early as 1911, and consisted of 1) a movement to turn
one of the enemy's flanks; 2) a movement to turn both flanks; and 3)
a frontal attack resulting in a breakthrough. 111 The first two
forms were more likely to be encountered in conditions of maneuver
warfare, such as a meeting operation, in which the enemy's flanks
would be open or lightly held, although frontal attacks were certain-
ly not excluded. The latter case was much more likely to occur in a
positional setting, in which case a successful breakthrough would
almost always turn into single or double turning movement.
Some theorists favored the so-called 'ram' (taran) approach,
which is the offensive operation aimed at turning the enemy flank
along a single axis, and which could come about as the result of a
meeting operation involving open flanks, or following the break-
through of the enemy's tactical defence under positional conditions.
This maneuver had been tried most recently by the Germans during
their 1914 advance to the Marne, and by the Western Front during its
ill-fated drive to the Vistula in 1920. Tukhachevskii, oddly enough,
Neznamov, pp. 21-22; Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi, p. 24.
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continued to speak favorably of this maneuver, in spite of his own
disastrous experience before Warsaw. However, he was not completely
blind to the maneuver's flaws, the most serious of which was that
such a narrow approach quickly reveals it g intentions to the enemy,
thus giving him time to prepare a counterattack. 112 Kolenkovskii
was even more guarded in his approach, although he allowed that a
single turning movement might still be useful in certain cases.
Among these were situations in which a single blow would enable the
attacker to pin the outflanked enemy against a natural barrier or
foreign border, resulting in his isolation and destruction.113
Triandafillov's rejection of the ram was more forceful, and he
believed that such an expedient could rarely be effective, as the
defender would be able to ward off such an obvious maneuver by
counterattacking or withdrawing to a new position. In purely logis-
tical terms, a major offensive along a single axis would also be more
difficult to supply over a limited road and rail net than a more
dispersed effort, in which supplies and reinforcements could be
brought up along more than one avenue of advance. Thus Triandaf ji-
b, as had Kolenkovskii, saw the ram's usefulness limited to those
exceptional cases where the presence of impassable natural obstacles
or a neutral border would furnish the missing flank and allow a
single blow to cut off the enemyi4
Triandafillov believed that the most decisive form of maneuver
was a series of offensives 'along intersecting axes', in order to
'surround, capture and destroy' the defender in a pincer movement.
He recommended, in order that the projected encirclement cut off not
only those elements of the enemy's tactical defence still holding out
at the front, but his army reserves as well, that the enveloping
wings be heavily reinforced with mobile formations (cavalry and
motorized troops) to carry the attack quickly to a depth of 35-50
112 Tukhachevskii, I. 142.
113 Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi, p. 21.
114 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 163-65.
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kilometers. A movement of this scope implies the mounting of two
major offenBive operations along widely-separated areas of the front,
and Triandafillov proposed an attack by two shock armies along an 80-
kilometer front, in conjunction with an attack by another such army
along a 40-50 kilometer sector along another part of the front.115
These and other recommendations had their roots in both pre-
revolutionary theory and the Red Army's own experience in the Civil
War. In the latter conflict, Soviet attempts at single or double
turning movements usually failed due to a lack of troops and the
army's low level of mobility, and there are no instances of a large
haul of prisoners as a result. Despite these failures, however, the
idea of cutting off and encircling the defender was never seriously
questioned. Other theorists would develop this idea further in the
next decade, and it would reach fruition in several of the Red Army's
great encirclement battles of 1942-45.
Many of the recommendations put forward by the operational
theorists of the 1920s applied equally to the army operation in a
positional war as well as to the meeting operation. The latter,
however, possessed a number of specific qualities which required
further elaboration. The most important of these features was that
the army would not be previously deployed, as in a positional situa-
tion, but would do so from the line of march, often with only a
limited knowledge of the enemy's forces and deployment. Thus Triand-
afillov calculated that an army on the march would occupy a front 90-
100 kilometers in breadth and 65-70 kilometers in depth within three
to four days of the expected encounter, although this frontage was
expected to contract to 50 kilometers by the eve of the battle.6
His recommendations concerning troop and artillery densities
were similar to those he deemed necessary for success in a positional
setting. According to this scenario, the army would launch its main
attack along a 25-kilometer front, with eight divisions in the first
115 Ibid, pp. 123-24, 165.
116 Ibid, pp. 102, 104.
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echelon, while another two or three divisions would carry out sup-
porting attacks along a 20-25 kilometer front. The army commander,
with no field fortifications of substance to deal with, might vary
the density of his artillery along the main attack front from as low
as 30 guns to as high as 60 guns per kilometer. These calculations
were supported in the main by Kolenkovskii, who recommended attacking
along a 25-30 kilometer front, with an artillery density of only 24
guns per kilometer along the main attack front.117
The attack was expected to conclude with a breakthrough of the
enemy's front, followed by its subsequent exploitation in depth.
Much the same applied to the turning movement directed against the
enemy's open flank. Should either attack fail, it was likely that
the front would stabilize, at least in the immediate area, perhaps
resulting in a positional stalemate, as had been the case after the
first great clashes of 1914.
It is not surprising, given the marked Soviet penchant for
offensive operations, that Triandafillov devoted so little time to
their defensive counterpart, and even these remarks were imbued with
an aggressiveness which viewed the defensive as a temporary, forced
measure preparatory to launching a counteroffensive. Triandafillov's
recourse to the defensive was the direct result of his offensive
preparations, and he philosophically accepted the inevitability of
defensive measures along sections of a lengthy front on which one
cannot be strong everywhere, particularly if sufficient forces are to
be gathered for a decisive offensive along another sector.
The army's defence rests primarily on its organic reserves.
Once the enemy has penetrated the army's tactical defence zone, the
defender's ability to restore the situation rests with the speed with
which he can bring these reserves to the threatened area, a factor
which also determines the ultimate depth of the defender's possible
withdrawal. Triandafillov hoped to limit the retreat in most cases
to 30-40 kilometers and finally bring the offensive to a halt by
117 Ibid, pp. 110-11; Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi, pp. 64, 70.
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directing the reserve forces' counterattacks against the attacker's
lengthening flanks. The defender in the case of a particularly large
breakthrough, may be forced to make use of his strategic reserves and
carry out the lateral movement of other forces from the unaffected
sectors of the front.118
The Character of Operations of Modern Operations was easily the
single most important work on the subject of operations produced
during the interwar period. The author's achievement is all the more
remarkable in light of the Red Army's existing technical state at the
end of the 1920s. At the time the army was still an overwhelmingly
infantry force which derived whatever mobility it did possess from
its large but outdated cavalry arm. However, great changes were in
the offing, and it is to the author's credit that he was able to see
beyond the army's current backward state to a time when it would be
technically capable of realizing hia ambitious plans. Triandafillov
was able to go beyond previous historically-based studies and con-
struct an 'operational calculus' for determining the methods and
resources for operational success in a future war. The result was a
veritable primer for plotting the breakthrough of the enemy's front
and conducting operations in depth. In fact, so prescient were many
of his ideas that they were easily grafted onto the more-mechanised
Red Army of the 1930s. For this reason, Triandafillov was considered
by a number of contemporaries to be the father of what later became
known as the 'deep operation'i 19 This theory, in turn, became the
theoretical prototype for many of the Red Army's great wartime
offensive operations.
D. The Theory of Consecutive Operations
As we have seen, Soviet military theory in the l920s had
expressed itself forcefully in favor of the decisive offensive
118 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 130-31.
119 Vasilevskii, p. 78; Sandalov, p. 6.
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operation, aimed at the destruction or capture of the enemy army in
the quickest and most violent manner possible. However, the chief
drawback to this approach was the fact that 'Modern armies possess
colossal survivability', as Frunze observed in 1924, and that a final
military decision involving such armies 'cannot be achieved by a
single blow'. 120 The then-deputy war commissar, in this statement,
was merely acknowledging one of the salient characteristics of modern
armies since the xnerican Civil War, during which time their amazing
resilience to destruction in a single great battle first became
apparent. Even following such battles as Second Manassas, Chancel-
lorsville and Gettysburg, the defeated army escaped to fight another
day, while as often as not, as at Shiloh and Stone's River, the two
sides fought to the point of mutual exhaustion. The few exceptions
to this trend occurred at Metz and Sedan in 1870, but their outcome
owed far more to the French command's shortcomings than to its
armies' fighting capabilities.
The problem had been raised in Russia as early as 1911 by the
future military specialist Neznamov. He declared that the decisive
'general engagement', in which the outcome of a war is decided by a
single battle, was a thing of the past. Oddly enough, Neznamov
persisted in praising the single decisive battle as the 'Ideal of
military art', although he admitted that such an event had occurred
only once in recent history, at Jena in 1806, where Napoleon routed
the main Prussian forces in a single day. He warned that in most
cases any victory was likely to be incomplete, enabling the defeated
army to withdraw intact, while its remnants would serve as the basis
for a new line of resistance. In such cases, the victor might be as
disorganised and exhausted as the loser, preventing him from quickly
exploiting his success and causing the process to begin anew.12'
Neznamov may have had in mind the Battle of Borodino, in 1812, in
which Kutuzov was defeated, but managed to withdraw his army in the
120 Frunze, Izbrannve, II. 133.
121 Neznamov, pp. 10-11.
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face of the equally exhausted French and recovered to drive the enemy
out of Russia. He was more likely to have recalled his own experi-
ences in Manchuria, where the Russians suffered a tactical defeat at
Liao-Yang and a near-disaster at Mukden, but were able to avoid final
destruction. The Japanese, in each instance, were too bloodied to
take advantage of their victories and finish the Russians off.
The First World War and the Soviet-Polish War provided ample
confirmation of this trend on an even larger scale, in spite of the
vastly different materiel circumstances in which they were waged. By
far the most notable example of a modern nation's inability to end a
war in a single climactic battle was the failure of the Germans' 1914
advance to the Marne River, which was conducted under the auspices of
the strategy of destruction. In this case, the British and French
were able to recover from their early reverses and throw the Germans
back from Paris to the Aisne and nearly four years of trench dead-
lock. The Red Army attempted much the same feat in its headlong
advance to the Vistula in 1920. However, the Soviets soon became the
victims of their own success and arrived before Warsaw worn out and
understrength, and the devastating Polish counteroffensive which
followed threw them back hundreds of kilometers, where the war soon
ended in mutual exhaustion.
These and other events provided considerable grist for the Red
Army's intellectual mills following the Civil War. Among the many
theorists who pondered the implications of this dilemma were a number
of military specialists and non-professional commanders as well.
Senior among these was Glavkoa Kamenev, who may well have attended
Neznamov's lectures at the imperial Staff Academy and who reached
much the same conclusions ten years later. Xamenev wrote that in a
modern war involving large armies, 'general engagements ... have lost
their acute character' and are no longer capable of determining the
outcome of a war at a single stroke. 122 Tukhachevskii's knowledge
of modern armies' resilience had been earned the hard way against the
122 Kamenev, p. 64.
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supposedly defeated Poles in 1920. That sobering experience soon
brought him around to his former commander-in-chief's views, and the
difficulty or impossibility of deciding the outcome of a war in a
single battle or operation was a them to which he would return often
during the decade. 123 Svechin, the bete noire of the red command-
ers, readily expressed his solidarity with this viewpoint, declaring
that 'Only on very rare occasions' could a decision now be achieved
in a single battle.124
The conclusions regarding the demise of the decisive general
engagement were supported in a number of historical studies by other,
less well-known authors, who also shared the idea that the modern
state had become impervious to a single 'knock-out' blow. Among
these was Movchin, who wrote in 1928 that 'in modern war it is
impossible to destroy the enemy's entire army with a single blow, no
matter how powerful it is'. 125 In a similar vein, other theorists
were struck by the enhanced ability of modern armies to sustain even
serious defeats and recover relatively quickly by falling back on
their sources of supply, as had been the case in both World War I and
the Russian Civil War.126
Probably the most comprehensive summation of the Red Army's
views on the question was delivered by Triandafillov at the above-
mentioned congress of the Military-Scientific Society. In a lengthy
article based upon his report to the congress, he declared that
the experience of recent wars showed that it is impossible
to achieve the enemy's major defeat by a single operation. A
single operation engages only part ... of the enemy's entire
forces. A single operation, in conditions of modern war, may
123 Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, p. 79; Tukhachevskii, I.
107, 141-42, 261, II. 23.
124 Svechin, Strategiia, p. 14.
125 Movchin, Posledovatel'n ye, p. 5.
126 V.F. Novitskii, Mirovaia Voina, 1914-1918 g.p. Kampaniia 1914 Goda
v Bel' pii i Frantsii [The World War, 1914-1918. The 1914 Campaign in Belgium
and France] (Moscow, 1926-28), II. 384-85; A. Vol'pe, 'Presledovanie v
Grazhdanskoi Voine' (Pursuit in the Civil War]. In Bubnov, Kamenev and
Eideman, II. 234.
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result in the rout or capture of only a certain part of the
foe's armed forces. 'Cannaes'--as they were depicted in the
prewar literature,--cannot be realized through a single opera-
tion. 27
Thus during the l920s the Red Army faced the critical problem
of devising a successful offensive method under conditions in which
many of the criteria which formerly constituted victory were no
longer attainable. The impossibility of destroying the enemy's
armies in a single battle or operation inevitably gave rise to the
notion of achieving the same goal over an extended period, which
would require several operations. Such a conclusion dovetailed with
the growing realization in Soviet strategic circles that any future
conflict was likely to be a prolonged affair, and that even a war
with the USSR's western neighbors 'cannot be concluded within a few
months', as the RKKA Staff's Future War cautioned in 1928.128 The
combination of these factors was to launch many of the army's leading
thinkers on a series of investigations which ultimately produced one
of the Red Army's most interesting and least known contributions to
military thought--the theory of consecutive operations.
Not surprisingly, this theory had its roots in the brief period
of intellectual vigor which characterized parts of the Russian army
from 1905 to 1914. Neznamov, as we have seen, was quite pessimistic
as to the efficacy of the general engagement in deciding the war's
outcome, and saw only the likelihood of renewed fighting against an
enemy likely to grow stronger as he fell back on his sources of
strategic supply and reinforcement. Neznamov sought a way out of
this dilemma by maintaining the pace of the advance, and suggested
that if the winner of the general engagement 'could uninterruptedly
continue his offensive', then 'the war would soon become impossible'
for the defeated party to prolong. 	 Elchaninov, his academic
127 Triandafillov, Razmakh, p. 3.
128 TSGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, p. 62.
129 Neznamov, p. 11.
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colleague, was more specific still, and wrote of a situation in which
an 'unbroken series of local decisions' would culminate in a decisive
result, following a prolonged effort.1 	 This, in rudimentary
form, was a formula for conducting a series of consecutive operations
in which each operation would succeed a previous one and would, in
turn, create the conditions for launching the next one, according to
a larger strategic plan. While admittedly sketchy, these ideas did
establish the groundwork for further work in this area and are one
more indication of the continuity of operational theory in Russian-
Soviet military thought.
These views were realized, in part, during World War I, al-
though the positional stalemate which characterized much of the
fighting tended to obscure the conduct of consecutive operations and
relegate them to the war's more mobile periods. For example, one can
detect elements of consecutiveness in the early weeks of the war in
the West, which saw in quick succession the so-called 'Battle of the
Frontiers', the German pursuit to the Marne River, and the Allied
counterattack. In the East, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians
eliminated the Russian salient in Poland in a series of operations
during the summer of 1915, while a year later the Southwestern Front
launched a number of consecutive offensives in the Lutsk area. The
first systematic 'dosing' of operations took place during the spring
and summer of 1918 (the Somme, 21 March-4 April; Flanders, 9-29
April; the Aisne, 27 May-4 June; Noyon-Montdidier, 9-13 June; and,
Champagne-Marne, 15-17 July), as Ludendorff's offensives unfolded
consecutively in time but separately in space along the front.
Equally impressive was the Allies' series of offensive operations
(the Aisne-Marne counteroffensive, 18 July-6 August; Amiens, 8
August-4 September; St. Mihiel, 12-16 September; and the various
offensives against the German salient in northern France from late
September to the Armistice) during the summer and fall, which did
ultimately achieve the desired strategic result.
130 Elchaninov, p. 309.
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And while the Red Army's offensive operations were distin-
guished by a spatial scope which far exceeded that of the Great War,
the same pattern of consecutive operations held true in an even more
pronounced fashion during the Russian Civil War. In most cases, the
final strategic objective was attained only after a series of consec-
utive operations. This was due not only to the war's thinly-held
fronts, which made operational breakthroughs relatively easy to
achieve, but also to the primitive supply situation which prevailed,
especially in the Red Army. The first factor was more pronounced
during the Civil War, while the second asserted itself with a ven-
geance during the brief conflict with Poland, with disastrous results
for the Soviets.
During 1918-1920 the Red Army conducted a number of multiple-
army and front consecutive operations. The most noted of these are
listed, according to front, in the table on the following page.
One of the most talented of the former military specialists
noted in a 1928 article that'The theory of a series of consecutive
operations is a direct reflection of the Civil War's experience in
the operational sphere'. 131
 The Civil War and the war with Poland,
more so than any other factor, were critical and in shaping the Red
Army's views on conducting consecutive operations. This is hardly
surprising, as the great mass of commanders could hardly have been
expected to be familiar with the small body of literature on the
subject, nor did all but a very few have the necessary command
experience at the operational level during the Great War. The Civil
War, for the greater part of the postwar command element during these
years, had been the defining moment in their military careers, and
they were eager to draw any number of theoretical conclusions from
it. To a great extent, then, the theory of consecutive operations
was to be the work of a small group of young, former military spe-
cialists and wartime officers, with only a small assist from the
older specialists.


























































































The acceptance of this formula in the Red Army was reflected in
the writings of a number of theorists of various backgrounds. One of
these was Tukhachevskii, who on the basis of his experience against
the Poles, wrote in 1923 that the impossibility of destroying the
enemy's forces in a single battle now compels the attacker to achieve
this 'through a series of consecutive operations', which now served
the same purpose as the discredited general engagement. 132
 He was
supported on this point by Kamenev, who stressed the 'uninterrupted-
ness' of the Red Army's Civil War operations, as well as by Xolenkov-
skii. '33
 Nor did Svechin have any trouble endorsing this position,
and in language that was surprisingly similar to Tukhachevskii's.
Svechin, in a typical historical analogy, noted that whereas the
battles of Marengo and Jena had yielded Napoleon Italy and Germany at
a single stroke, the French commander would now have to conduct a
series of increasingly difficult consecutive operations in order to
achieve the same ends.1'
Another was Triandafillov, who devoted a good deal of thought
to the subject in several of his works. For Triandafillov, a suc-
cessful breakthrough of the enemy front and its subsequent develop-
ment into the enemy's depth inevitably raised the prospect of con-
ducting 'a series of consecutive operations, following one after the
other in time and space'. He firmly believed in the efficacy of such
operations as a means of achieving strategic goals and, in fact, one
of his primary demands of the shock army was that it be able 'to
conduct a series of consecutive operations from beginning to end',
based upon its own resources. 135
The best summation of this theory was delivered in a 1928
article by Varfolomeev, one of the younger former military special-
ists. Victory is now achieved, he wrote, through
132 Tukhachevskii, I. 141-42.
133 Ramenev, pp. 72-75; Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastupatel'noi, pp. 46-47.
134 Svechin, Strategiia, p. 177.
135 Triandafillov, Razmakh, p. 4; Kharakter, p.. 96.
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an entire series of operations, consecutively developing
one after the other, logically linked between themselves,
united by the commonality of the final goal, and each achieving
limited, intermediate goals ... the operation's goals--the
destruction and complete rout of the enemy's armed force; the
method--an uninterrupted offensive; the means--a prolonged
operational pursuit, avoiding pauses and halts and realized by
a series of consecutive operations, of which each is an inter-
mediate link on the road t the final goal, achieved in the
final, decisive operation.
One of the most interesting and thorough analyses of the nature
of consecutive operations was delivered by Nikolai Nikolaevich
Movchin, and RKXA Staff worker and graduate of the Frunze Military
Academy, whose Consecutive Operations According to the Experience of
the Marne and the Vistula appeared in 1928. The book's title is
indicative of the Red Army' continuing preoccupation with the
Germans' 1914 advance on Paris and its own ill-fated war against
Poland in 1920, the latter of which had left a deep and educational
scar on the army's collective consciousness. The same theme was also
taken up by the former specialist V.F. Novitskii's two-volume study
of the 1914 campaign in Belgium and France, and by the red commander
V.A. Melikov's history of the Marne and Vistula campaigns, as well as
the Greek army's 1922 defeat by the Turks in Anatolia. This focus
was not accidental, as all three episodes shared a number of opera-
tional-strategic traits: the dominant idea of 'destruction'; the
attacker's early victories, followed by a period of sustained and
deep pursuit to the enemy's heartland; the attacker's growing weak-
ness due to combat losses and supply problems, and; the defender's
ultimately successful counteroffensive, which the authors believed
distinguish modern operations.
Movchin's work is particularly interesting for his remarks on
the place of consecutive operations in the three-tiered Soviet
formulation of military art. He believed that the theory of consecu-
tive operations served as the 'theoretical foundation' and 'most
important part' of operational art, while at the same time being an
instrument of strategy, in accordance with the hierarchical subordi-
136 Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', p. 88.
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nation already established by such writers as Svechin and Varfolo-
meev. 137 However, by so closely identifying the theory with opera-
tional art, I4ovchin found himself disagreeing with some of his more
famous colleagues, who tended to emphasize the theory's strategic
applications. Indeed, Tukhachevskii had already identified the Red
Army's willingness to conduct consecutive operations as 'the founda-
tion of our strategic success', while Triandafillov went even fur-
ther, calling the theory 'one of the chief questions of modern
strategy'. 1	The pair's wording is, at best, ambiguous, and it is
difficult to determine whether they considered the theory of consecu-
tive operations a branch of operational art, or an integral part of
the theory of Btrategy itself.
This lack of clarity was also apparent in determining the place
of the front in the theory of consecutive operations, and in opera-
tional art altogether. This ambiguity was a function both of the
tearist military legacy, as well as of the varying missions which the
Red Army's fronts were required to accomplish during the Civil War.
It should be recalled that the tsarist front/group of armies, occupy-
ing a theatre of military activities, was a body designed for carry-
ing out purely strategic tasks, as did the Northwestern and South-
western fronts, for example, in 1914. The Red Army copied this
formula almost exactly with the creation of the Western and South-
western fronts in 1920, although these pursued more strictly opera-
tional objectives. At the other extreme were the Eastern Front's
operations during 1919, which are a unique example of a front carry-
ing out a strategic mission embracing an entire theatre of war,
despite the fact that the front was no larger than an average army.
As a result, the inclusion of the front operation within operational
art was a gradual one and not fully realized until the latter half of
the 1930s.
137 Movchin, Posledovatel'nye, p. 123.
138 Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, p. 86; Triandafillov,
Razmakh, p. 4.
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Triandafillov had been primarily concerned with the operations
of a single shock army and only briefly mentioned the front. His
plan for a decisive offensive along a 200-kilometer front would
require at least 50 divisions in the first echelon alone, a force
which would necessarily entail the participation of several other
armies as part of a larger front operation. These armies, inferior
in strength to the shock army/armies, would mount supporting attacks
simultaneously with the main effort, because the main attack can only
succeed if the defender can be prevented from shifting his reserves
from the secondary sectors or withdrawing unhindered. Triandafillov
recommended launching the front's secondary attacks with armies of
three to four rifle corps in strength, each attacking along a 60-80
kilometer front. These attacks, because of the limited resources
allotted to them, cannot generally count on significant success
against a solidly-entrenched defender, at least at the start of the
operation. However, from the moment of the shock army's/armies'
breakthrough along the main front and the onset of the operation in
depth, it was expected that the secondary attacks would achieve
'independent success' • 139
Movchn's focus, on the other hand, was primarily on the front,
and his more abstract analysis tended to emphasize the qualitative
distinctions between army and front operations more than had Trianda-
fi].lov. The quantitative distinctions are obvious , as the army,
which possesses fewer human and materiel resources than the front, is
more restricted in its ability to conduct operations of the same
duration or to the same depth as the latter. For example, Movchin
calculated the average depth of a single army operation at 75-90
kilometers over a period of six to seven days, and that of a front at
120-150 kilometers over 10-15 daysi0
However, although the front operation is composed of any number
of separate army operations, the former is more than just the sum of
139 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 122, 125-26.
140 Movchin, Posledovatel'nye, pp. 96, 101.
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its parts, and the qualitative distinctions between them according to
goal are of a different order altogether. An army, given its limited
resources, can safely pursue one operational objective at a time,
while the front is capable of pursuing a number of such goals simul-
taneously. Movchin classified such operations as either 'simple'
(army) or 'complex' (front), which recalls Mikhnevich's similar
division of 'operational lines' according to the number of objectives
an army or front might have. 141 This distinction had important
consequences for defining the front's role in conducting consecutive
operations, as only the front possessed the requisite strength to
realize operations to the necessary depth and to simultaneously
achieve the manifold objectives, such as a double envelopment,
required to decisively disrupt the enemy front. Because only the
front can carry out these tasks simultaneously, Movchin concluded
that 'The theory of a series of consecutive operations is the theory
of a series of front (complex) operations'.1
Movchin argued that the demands of a modern war required the
creation of the front level of control between the high command and
the armies in the field, and singled out for criticism the younger
von Moltke's attempt to coordinate his seven armies on the Western
Front from general headquarters, when, in fact, the latter were
conducting three separate front operations. Conversely, Movchin
warned that the high command should not burden the front commander
with the conduct of more than one series of complex operations and
supported the creation of fronts containing as few as three to four
armies. 143 In fact, the Soviets eventually came to practice a vari-
ation of this proposal in World War II, during which the Soviet-
German front at one time contained as many as a dozen fronts. This
was sharply at odds with the previous habit of creating only one or,
at most, two fronts per theatre of war.
141 Ibid, p. 116; Mikhnevich, Strategiia, I. 178, 180.
Movchin, Posledovatel'nve, p. 120.
143 Ibid, pp. 11, 120.
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Triandafillov favored the Stavka-front-army system of subordi-
nation for controlling the multiplicity of front and army operations,
as had been the imperial practice in the First World War. The
Stavka, as the supreme arbiter of military activities, outlines the
fronts' operational-strategic tasks and provides the forces and
materiel for achieving them. In certain cases, such as an offensive
launched at the juncture of two fronts, the commander-in-chief may
take direct control of operations. The Soviets eventually caine to
adopt an enlarged version of this proposal during World War II,
whereby high-ranking Stavka representatives would sometimes coordi-
nate the operations of as many as three fronts.
In the same fashion, the front commander would assign purely
operational objectives to his subordinate armies in accordance with
his plans. These included the latters' immediate objectives to a
depth of 30-50 kilometers, in which the army commanders enjoy a good
deal of latitude, beyond which they are assigned subsequent objec-
tives in the enemy's operational-strategic depth.1
Finally, Soviet writers also sought to distinguish a series of
operations from the broader concept of a campaign. This was a simple
task, as the groundwork for such a distinction had already been laid
by Mikhnevich, who wrote in 1911 that 'Each war consists of one or
several campaigns; each campaign--of one or several operations, from
the initial strategic deployment to the final battle'.' 45 Tukhachev-
skii reached a similar conclusion in 1926, when he defined the cam-
paign as that portion of a war which may coincide with a series of
consecutive operations, while l4ovchin saw the campaign as the 'total-
ity of actions in a defined theatre of military activities over an
extended period of time', which may include a number of consecutive
operations, as well as non-consecutive ones. 146 This definition
was in accord with the Soviets' own recent experience, in which a
144 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 180-82.
145 Mikhnevich, Strategiia, I. 152.
146 Tukhachevskii, I. 260; Movchin, Posledovatel'n ye, p. 116.
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number of fronts had conducted one or more series of consecutive
operations as part of a larger campaign. This pattern would be
repeated during World War II, most strikingly during the 1943-45
period, when the Red Army conducted a large number of consecutive
offensive operations along the entire length of the Soviet-German
front.
Equally interesting were Movchin's thoughts on the 'operational
anatomy' of the two campaigns. From this he concluded that consecu-
tive operations by large, modern armies in conditions of mobile
warfare have certain elements in common. Chief among these was
their division into three identifiable stages: the initial operation,
the pursuit operation, and the decisive operation.
The most important of these is the initial operation (iskhodna-
ia operatsiia), which begins the cycle and whose result inevitably
has a great influence on the conduct and outcome of succeeding opera-
tions. This operation,--or operations, as several initial operations
may unfold simultaneously along modern broad fronts--proceeds direct-
ly from the belligerents' strategic deployment plans and encompass
the first, large cross-border collisions. In those cases where both
sides pursue offensive aims, the initial operation may develop as a
meeting engagement of strategic proportions, as when the Allied and
German armies collided in the so-called 'Battle of the Frontiers' in
August 1914. At other times, the operation may unfold more one-
sidedly, as when the Soviet Western Front attacked the Poles in
Belorussia along a static front, where the latter had long since
renounced any offensive intentions.
l4ovchin stated that in most cases a clear cut victory in the
initial operation would ensure success in the succeeding ones.
Neznamov had earlier voiced the same hopes, although in 1911 he was
still thinking in terms of one or two opening general engagements of
a less than decisive variety. 147 However, the most salient feature
of the two campaigns' initial operations had been their strategical-
147 Movchin, Posledovatel'n ye, p. 23; Neznamov, p. 11.
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ly-indecisive result, even though one of the sides suffered a sharp
reverse. In both cases the losers were able to avoid a decisive
defeat by disengaging and withdrawing into the interior of their
respective countries. The inconclusive result, in turn, laid the
foundation for the conduct of future operations in depth. However,
Movchin warned that in certain extreme cases the opening operation
might yield such meager results that the entire continuity of opera-
tions is disrupted at the very outset, and the attacker must under-
take a new initial operation/operations, although this time from a
point considerably closer to his opponents's vital areas.148
The pursuit operation (operatsiia p0 presl.edovaniiu) begins
when the defender admits defeat in the initial operation and attempts
to save himself by retreating in the face of superior forces. In
modern conditions this phase differs greatly in scope from earlier
notions of pursuit, in which the dispirited elements of the defeated
army were ridden down within the tactical radius of the battlefield.
In the 20th century pursuit may be strategic in its scope and involve
the greater part or all of the loser's armies along a broad front to
a depth of several hundred kilometers. This was certainly the case
in the two campaigns under study and encompasses the Allies' with-
drawal from the Meuse and Sambre rivers to the Marne, and the even
deeper Polish retreat from central Belorussia to the area between the
Bug and Vistula rivers. Thus the pursuit phase had ceased being the
finale of a single battle and had become an operationally-distinct
part of a larger entity.
Movchin divided the pursuit operation into two distinct phases,
based upon the defender's reaction to his initial defeat and the
emerging strategic situation. The first phase comes about as the
result of the defender's unwillingness to accept the magnitude of his
defeat and sacrifice large territories by means of a strategic
retreat. During this period he attempts to halt the attacker along a
number of intermediate lines, such as at Le Cateau and Guise in 1914,
148 Movchin, Posledovatel'nve, p. 112.
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and in some instances may mount local counterattacks. The second
stage begins when the defender realizes the inadequacy of these
measures against an attacker who is still considerably stronger, and
makes the decision to avoid a further, and possibly decisive, defeat
by falling back upon his heartland. This phase also witnesses the
extensive regrouping of the defender's forces to the threatened
sector. The attacker, meanwhile, is hobbled by a damaged rail net
and is unable to shift his own forces laterally to meet this chal-
lenge. This caused Movchin to note that while the pursuit's first
phase is the 'logical conclusion of the initial operation', its
second phase already contains a number of 'elements of a new opera-
tional grouping for the forthcoming decisive operation'.149
The 'decisive operation' (reshitel'naia operatsiia) is the
result of the attacker's desire to seize the enemy's political and
economic heartland and the defender's resolve not to relinquish them
without a major battle. For the former, it is the capstone of the
operational cycle, while the defender finds himself in a classic
'backs against the wall' situation, in which the loss of these areas
might mean losing the war as well. The latter is a debatable point,
as even an Allied defeat along the Marne and the subsequent loss of
Paris would by no means have meant a final German victory, even given
a French political collapse. On the other hand, a Polish defeat on
the Vistula and the fall of Warsaw would certainly have meant,
barring foreign intervention, the sovietization of Poland. What is
not in question is that in both cases the defenders were able to
mount a devastating counteroffensive which changed the course of the
war. How this came about and how to avoid a similar catastrophe in a
future war was to prove one of the knottier problems the Red Army
encountered in formulating a theory of consecutive operations.
For if the conditions of modern warfare had created a situation
in which the consecutive conduct of operations was all but inevita-
ble, these same conditions also rendered final victory increasingly
149 Ibid, pp. 28-29.
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difficult and drawn out. As we have seen, one of the chief reasons
for modern armies' enhanced viability, even in defeat, is the enor-
mous strain which the fighting puts on the winner, who may emerge
nearly as weakened and disorganised as the loser. The problem is as
old as war itself and one which has become particularly acute in an
age of mass armies, with their heightened demands on equipment and
personnel. Clausewitz had defined the problem nearly a century
before in his apt phrase 'friction in war' (Friktion i Xriege), a
collective term for the innumerable factors which serve to reduce an
attacker's combat effectiveness over time. Among the operationally-
significant factors contributing to 'friction' during the course of a
lengthy advance are the loss of troop strength to occupation duties,
losses due to fighting and sickness, the attacker's growing distance
from his sources of supply, and the necessity of conducting sieges.
Clausewitz believed that should the attacker persist in his advance
the gradual accumulation of these factors 'will usually swallow up
the superiority with which one began or which was gained by the
victory' 150
By far the most important of these factors is the problem of
supply, for a continuous series of operations must needs be supported
by the uninterrupted flow of men and equipment to the front. The
great increase in the size of modern armies, the growing complexity
of weapons and their increased rate of fire, put enormous supply
strains on 20th century armies which had not been felt by the mass
armies of the Napoleonic era, and which even the great improvements
in transportation could only partially alleviate. Neznamov had noted
this problem earlier and ranked supply difficulties and the necessity
of 'ensuring the uninterrupted influx' of forces from the rear as the
prime component of operational success. 151
 The validity of this
statement was borne out several times during the First World War,
during which the inability of the armies' rear services to meet their
150 Clausewitz, pp. 527, 570.
151 Neznamov, p. 33.
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offensive requirements often had as much to do with their failure as
enemy resistance, as had been the case during the Russians' 1916
summer offensive. Even the 1918-20 struggle in the former Russian
Empire, although waged at a lower level of military technology,
confirmed in the end the importance of continuous materiel supply to
operations.
At first it seemed otherwise, however, due to the highly-
politicised nature of the Civil War. The Eastern Front, for example,
was able to conduct a lengthy offensive and pursuit over several
thousand kilometers, with only minor interruptions, from April 1919
to January 1920. The same was true of the Southern Front's offensive
against Denikin, during which the Red Army was able to maintain
almost continuous offensive pressure on the White forces for over
five months. In both cases the Soviets were able to maintain or even
increase their strength by mobilising the human and materiel resour-
ces of the politically-friendly areas through which they passed, even
as their organic supply means fell hopelessly behind. Tukhachev-
skii's Fifth Army, for example, actually grew in size from 24,000 to
37,000 men during August-October 1919, while the Southern Front,
which began the autumn 1919 campaign with around 100,000 men, f in-
ished it with the same number, in spite of heavy losses due to
fighting and disease. 152 The Whites, on the other hand, could rare-
ly count on substantial local support outside certain areas, and
their armies tended to melt away rapidly when the fighting moved
beyond these areas and became prolonged or heavy. The Western Army,
for example, began the Uf a operation with 46,000 men and ended it
less than a month later with a mere 18,000, for a loss rate of 61%,
mostly through desertion. 153 The difference in the two armies'
conditions underlines the vital which political loyalties played in
the war.
152 N. Varfolomeev, 'Strategicheskoe Narastanie i Istoshchenie V
Grazhdanskoi Voine' (Strategic Accumulation and Exhaustion in the Civil War].
In Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, II. 269, 273.
153 Ibid, p. 268.
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However, once the struggle shifted to Poland and became a war
not of classes, but of nations, the Soviets were no longer able to
rely on the support of a sympathetic local population to cover their
supply and recruitment needs, and the further the Red Army pressed
into Poland the more its ability to 'live of f the land' declined.
Thus the Western Front, during its six-week offensive, lost up to 40%
of its strength and was unable to make good its losses, and many of
the divisions which had begun the campaign with 6,000-8,000 men
arrived at the Vistula with no more than 2,500-3,000.
	 We have
already seen that there were more than enough replacements available
in the rear areas, but they could not be brought up in time because
of damage to the rail network and the chaotic condition of the Soviet
quartermaster system. As one historian later put it, the Red Army's
attempt to 'mechanically apply' the 'methods and routines' of the
Civil War ended in disaster, as Tukhachevskii's exhausted armies
collapsed in the face of a renewed Polish attack.155
The Polish campaign's sobering experience did much to impress
the Soviets with the importance of the smooth functioning of the rear
services. By 1924 Frunze was writing that operational success now
depended more on the proper organisation of the rear organs than on
battlefield control. 156
 Even writers normally as divergent in
their views as Svechin and and the red commander Melikov found that
they could agree on the critical importance of uninterrupted materiel
supply. 157
 The best distillation of the new Soviet thinking on
the subject was delivered by Varfolomeev in 1928. He declared that
success in a series of consecutive operations carried to a great
depth now depends on proper supply, which Varfolomeev termed 'the
successful struggle against the consequences of accompanying strate-
154 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 132; Bubnov, Kamenev and Eideman, II.
277.
155 v Putna, K Visle i Obratno (To the Vistula and Back] (Moscow,
1927), p. 240.
156 Frunze, Izbrann ye, II. 177.
157 Svechin, Strategiia, p. 192; Melikov, Mama, p. 333.
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gic exhaustion' 158
In this regard, the most important factor affecting the attack-
er's ability to conduct a series of consecutive operations over an
extended period was the likely heavy losses in men and equipment.
Triandafillov calculated that the attacker's losses might reach 12-
20% of the first echelon's divisions in the initial operation, and no
less than 20-30% of all units during succeeding operations. He
proposed to offset these losses by creating reserve regiments equal
to 20-25% of the first echelon's corps to make good the losses
suffered during the initial operation, while army reserve units,
amounting to 20-25% of the army's total strength, would follow in the
advance's second echelon to maintain the attack's momentum.159
Movchin put the front's probable loss in the course of a month's
fighting at 30%, which he believed could be made good by preparing
immediate reserves totalling 10% of the front's strength, with the
remainder arriving during the course of operations. 0 The common
thread running through all these comments was that failure to take
into account the critical factor of uninterrupted supply would be to
repeat the attacker's mistakes along the Marne and Vistula, when they
arrived for the decisive battle exhausted and understrength, and in
no condition to meet the enemy counteroffensive.
However, the attacker's ability to satisfy these requirements
collides with the inherent contradictions of the pursuit phase
itself, which tend to work against the pursuer. On the one hand,
effective pursuit requires that the attacker's rate of advance equal
or exceed the defender's rate of retreat, in order to cut off the
latter's withdrawal and prevent the establishment of a new defensive
front. Triandafillov calculated the defender's capacity to retreat
along an undamaged rail network at up to 2 5-40 kilometers per day,
while the pursuer is limited to no more than an 8-12 kilometer ad-
158 Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', p. 88.
159 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 148, 160-61.
160 Movchin, Posledovatel'nye, p. 99.
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vance. 161
 Triandafillov and Varfolomeev both Bought technical so-
lutionB to close the gap. These consisted of creating highly-mobile
pursuit units of tanks and motorized infantry to carry out a parallel
pursuit along the enemy's flanks, attacking his rear units and
otherwise disrupting his withdrawal.
	 However, the means to ac-
complish this were not available to the Red Army, and would remain so
for some years.
Furthermore, any effort to increase the meager rates of advance
with the primitive means at hand ran into the seemingly-intractable
problem of adequately supplying the troops by rail. This is because
the rear organs' ability to keep the armies at strength during the
course of such a lengthy offensive is directly dependent upon the
rail system's optimal functioning. However, given the railroads'
vital importance, a retreating army is likely to carry out the
systematic destruction of not only the tracks, but of bridges and
supporting structures as well. This, in turn, necessitates a great
deal of repair work by the pursuer, with serious implications for the
conduct of operations to any appreciable depth. Triandafillov
predicted that future major operations would involve widespread rail
destruction on the defender's part, with the attacker capable of
repairing on the average only five to six kilometers per day, al-
though thiB figure might rise to as high as 15-20 kilometers in
especially favorable circumstances. Kolenkovskii was in agreement
with the first figure, while Movchin was slightly more optimistic,
calculating the average speed of railroad repair at eight to ten
kilometers per day. 	 Moreover, even a restored rail line could
not be brought up to full capacity immediately, causing further
delays in the delivery of men and supplies. Based on these figures,
161 Triandafilov, Kharakter, p. 164.
162 Ibid, p. 146; N. Varfolomeev, 'Dvizhenie Presleduiushchei Armii k
Poliu Reshitel'nogo Srazheniia' [A Pursuing Army's Movement to the Decisive
Battlefield), Revoliutsiia i Voina (Revolution and War) (1921), no. 13, p. 80.
'	 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 154; Kolenkovskii, 0 Nastu patel'noi, p.
53; Movchin, Posledovatel'nve, p. 40.
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Triandafillov calculated that a series of consecutive operations,
conducted to a depth of 300-350 kilometers over a month, would
outstrip the refurbished railroads by as much as 150-200 kilometers,
while Movchin predicted that operations conducted to a depth of 300-
400 kilometers over the same period would outrun their railroads by
120-150 ki1ometers.1
Nor was the situation improved appreciably by the inclusion of
horse or automobile transport into this system, due chiefly to the
primitive road network along the USSR's western frontier and the Red
Army's own low level of mechanisation. Triandafillov calculated that
an army based exclusively on horse transport for the final stage of
supply delivery may conduct consecutive operations only to a depth of
135-150 kilometers, which he declared insufficient for decisive
success against an opponent occupying a broad front. Even the
addition of thousands of supply trucks, which the Red Army did not
possess, would extend the attacker's reach by no more than 140
kilometers. These bleak figures forced him to conclude that existing
conditions of materiel supply limited the maximum depth of a series
of consecutive operations to 250 kilometers, and then only if the
attacker was well-supplied with motorised transport.165
Thus the vagaries of the attacker's supply situation tended to
put certain 'natural limits' on the depth and duration of a series of
consecutive operations. Movchin believed that these limitB would
come into play during the transition between the pursuit and decisive
operations.	 To ignore these limits and enter into the final
battle with an exhausted and undersupplied army was to risk a deci-
sive counteroffensive and defeat by a revived opponent.
Movchin's ideas on 'operational exhaustion' had much in common
with Clausewitz's earlier belief that even an advance begun under the
most favorable circumstances cannot be sustained indefinitely, due to
Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 157; Novchin, Posledovatel'nve, p. 104.
165 Triandafillov, Kharakter, pp. 157, 159-60.
Z4ovchin, Posledovatel'n ye, p. 113.
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the inevitable 'frictions' of war. Clausewitz had noted the of fen-
sive's tendency to wane over time and spoke of the 'culminating point
of the attack' (Xulminatsioupunkt des Angriff a) as that unseen line
beyond which 'the scale turns and the reaction follows with a force
that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack'.167
Thus even a successful operation, because of its dependence on
uninterrupted materiel supply and its tendency to outrun the latter,
carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, to paraphrase
Marx. These were notions which had a particular resonance for an
army still smarting from its defeat in 1920 and which inspired a
number of theorists to seek a way out of the dilemma.
One of the most thoughtful of these was Svechin, who was no
doubt attracted to Clausewitz's ideas regarding offensive 'overreach'
by the points which they shared with his own views concerning a more
moderate approach to conducting operations. Svechin's work also
reveals a conscious effort to find a formula for conducting opera-
tions which would impose some constraints on the more of fensive-
minded commanders, whose enthusiasm for the uninterrupted offensive
was pregnant with the very dangers which Clausewitz had pointed out.
Svechin emphasized that the attacker's decision to continue the
offensive, following the initial operation, places a growing strain
on his communications and ability to maintain his strength; the
further he moves into enemy territory the weaker he becomes via a via
the defender, who is able to draw upon an undamaged resource base and
a shorter supply line to alter the correlation of forces in his
favor. The experience of recent campaigns caused Svechin to conclude
that 'The responsibility of strategy is to not allow offensive
operations to drag out to the last gasp' and 'to halt the offensive
in time'.
This warning found a surprisingly sympathetic response among
the more offensive-minded commanders, perhaps because they had seen
167 Clausewitz, p. 528.
168 Svechin, Strategiia, pp. 224-25.
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for themselves what becomes of an offensive operation pushed beyond
its limits. These included one writer who repeated Svechin nearly
word for word, writing that a commander must 'foresee the culmination
point' of an operation and halt it in time. 169
 The same point was
also made by Melikov and Novitskii in their works on recent consecu-
tive operations. 170
 Triandafillov wrote in the same vein that 'The
art of the strategist and operator is to correctly feel that limit in
human and materiel means', beyond which follows exhaustion and
defeat.171
Movchin offered two practical recommendations for avoiding such
an outcome. The first was to bring the initial operation closer to
the enemy's vital areas by beginning the war with a number of limited
operations along the frontier. Such a move, he argued, would not
only place the enemy's heartland within range of any subsequent
operational sequence, but it would also ease the attacker's later
supply problems because of his more advanced state of mobilisation.
He also recommended a halt in the advance at the close of the pursuit
operation. This would enable the pursuer to bring up his lagging
supply organs and be reinforced so as to resume the offensive and
enter the decisive operation with a good chance of success.172
Triandafillov also recommended shutting down operations at some
stage to avoid overtaxing the pursuer's forces. Given the likely
rate of railroad repair, he calculated this pause at a minimum of two
to three weeks, in order to accumulate sufficient materiel supply
before resuming operations along the same axis. Triandafillov,
rather than grant the defender a respite during this period, recom-
mended mounting new operations elsewhere along the front.lTh The
latter presupposes the attacker's having the overall strategic
169 Vol'pe, p. 234.
170 Melikov, Mama, p. 203; Novitskii, I. 506.
171 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 162.
172 Movchin, Posledovatel'nye, pp. 110, 114.
173 Triandafillov, Kharakter, p. 170.
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initiative, which allows him to strike at will along widely-separated
sectors of the front, and forecast in broad outline the strategy
which the Soviets eventually pursued so skillfully in 1943-45.
However, the Soviets' obvious enthusiasm for this and other
mechanistic formulae should not cause the reader to think that the
Red Army was deficient in devising more concrete planB for conducting
consecutive operations against its enemies during the 1920s. These
plane were directed chiefly against the USSR'S western neighbors and
conditioned by the belief that the Soviet Union would have to wage a
future war against a coalition of these and other powers. Added to
this was the knowledge that the Red Army could not eliminate all of
these countrieB in a single campaign, but would require a series of
sustained efforts to complete the task. 174 That the conduct of
consecutive operations against these countries was inherent in Soviet
strategy is clear from Tukhachev gkii's 1926 exhortation that the Red
Army must have a plan for eliminating the enemy coalition 'in detail,
consecutively and systematically'. 175 Tukhachevskii, as Chief of
Staff, took a leading part in drawing up these plans.
Practically speaking, the swift conquest of Estonia and Latvia
did not present a particular problem, as their inconsequential depth
and small armed forces offered little hope of prolonged resistance
against a major attack. Tukhachevskii, in this case, favored a
decision in the course of a 'single decisive operation', which would
secure these countries before the British fleet could intervene. The
conquest of Rornania promised to be more difficult than the Baltic
States, due to its larger army and greater territorial depth.
However, this was by no means an insuperable problem, and it was
calculated that a series of consecutive operations would soon carry
the Red Army to the political and economic center of Bucharest and
quickly end the war.176
174 TSGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, pp. 57, 91.
175 Tukhachevskii, I. p. 256.
176 Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, pp. 24, 29-30.
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However, the Soviet Union's own military weakness dictated that
Romania could not be effectively dealt with until after the defeat of
Poland, the strongest military power in Eastern Europe, and as such,
the key to Soviet strategy in the region. Tukhachevskii's views on
this question ran the gamut from wildly optimistic to deeply pessi-
mistic. In 1926 he wrote that it was 'theoretically possible' to
defeat the Poles 'by a series of consecutive, uninterruptedly con-
ducted, operations', which would climax in a decisive battle along
the middle Vistula, some 300-350 kilometers from the Soviet bor-
However, only two years later his views and those of the
RKKA Staff had sobered considerably and he had renounced the possi-
bility of defeating Poland in a rapid series of such operations, and
was now predicting a much longer struggle, which might last as long
as three years.178
By the end of the 1920s the theory of consecutive operations
had become one of the prime components of the Soviet conduct of
operations. The theory, for all of its schematic quality and reli-
ance on the evidence of past wars, nevertheless performed the service
of focusing the Red Army on the critical role played by the rear
organs in offensive operations. In recognition of this fact, ques-
tions of materiel supply soon came to occupy a prominent place in the
Frunze Academy's course of operational instruction.	 Moreover,
the theory of consecutive operations, like that of the army opera-
tion, proved quite adaptable to the technically more-advanced army
that was coming. It also served as the theoretical basis for many of
the Red Army's great front and multi-front offensive operations
during the latter half of World War II, and remained a fixture of
Soviet operational thinking for many years beyond.
177 Ibid, pp. 28-29.
178 TSGASA, fond 33988, opis' 2, delo 688, pp. 56-57, 60-61.
179 Varfolomeev, 'Strategiia', pp. 91-92.
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CHAPTER IV. THE FLOWERING, 1930-1937
A. Introduction
It was a basic tenet of the Soviet view of war that a country's
military art is determined chiefly by its level of economic develop-
ment. This maxim applies to capitalist and socialist states alike
and its disturbing consequences were becoming increasingly obvious to
the Soviet leadership as the 1920s drew to a close. Although it was
true that by 1928 the USSR had regained or surpassed the prewar
(1913) level of production, the country still lagged dangerously
behind the developed capitalist powers, which had used the years
since 1918 to move even further ahead in the area of military tech-
nology. For the ever-suspicious Soviet leadership the situation was
pregnant with disaster. Joseph Stalin stated the problem succinctly
at a plenum of the party's Central Committee in late 1928. 'It is
impossible to defend our country's independence', he said, 'lacking a
sufficient industrial base for defence'. Stalin, honing the point
further, stressed the military necessity of economically overtaking
the advanced capitalist nations. 'Either we achieve this', he
warned, 'or they will wipe us out'.1
The dictator and his henchmen were determined to transform
backward, peasant Russia into a modern industrial and military power
overnight, regardless of the cost. They were determined that the
next war, when it came, would not find the country in the same
situation as tsarist Russia, which had been defeated by a smaller but
industrially-superior Germany. Nor were Stalin's concerns on this
score completely unfounded, as had been the case with previous 'war
scares'. The 1930s saw the overall worsening of the USSR's strategic
position in both Europe and Asia, due to the revival of Japanese
Stalin, XI. 248.
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expansionism and Hitler's accession to power in Germany. Japan's
conquest of Manchuria and Germany'B ambitious rearmament program
further exacerbated these fears. The Soviet Union's diplomatic
isolation and the prospect of a two-front war with what were regarded
as the harbingers of a renewed capitalist assault, caused Stalin to
press his 'revolution from above' with even greater ferocity.
The heart of the Stalinist program lay in the two Five-Year
plans (1928-37) for the social transformation of the country. The
outlines of the first Five Year Plan (1928-32) were drawn up at the
15th party congress in December 1927. However, the relatively modest
growth rates then envisaged were progressively radicalised throughout
1928 and gave Stalin the issue he needed to break with his former
allies, Bukharin and Rykov. The 16th party conference in April 1929
adopted in full the dictator's plan for the forced industrialisation
of the economy and the mass collectivisation of private peasant
holdings. During this period the remaining opponents of Stalin's
policies were quickly defeated and removed from their positions,
leaving the dictator and his followers free to pursue their course
without hindrance.
The overall quantitative results of this policy were indeed
impressive and Stalin's policies succeeded in transforming the Soviet
Union into a modern industrial state of sorts within a few short
years, even as the capitalist world was sliding into depression. By
the end of the second Five-Year Plan (1933-37), overall industrial
production had increased nearly 600% over the 1913 level, while the
output of the means of production increased by more than 1,000%.2
In fact, so great was the growth in industrial production that by the
end of 1937 the Soviet Union was in some areas the leading industrial
power in Europe, and lagged only behind the United States in the
world. The following table gives an idea of the surge in industrial
production during these years, according to a number of indices.
2 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravienie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,
Promyshlennost' SSSR. Statisticheskii Sbornik (Industry of the USSR. A
Statistical Collection] (Moscow, 1957), p. 9.
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Table 2. Soviet Industrial Production, 1928-37


























But the cost in human suffering was enormous and far exceeded
that of the harshest periods of development in the capitalist coun-
tries during the 19th century. Hardest hit were the country's
peasants, whose centuries-old way of life was brutally turned upside
down within a few short years. By 1937 93% of the nearly 25 million
peasant households had been herded into the new collective and state
farms, compared to a mere 1.7% in 1928, in one of the worst and least
known human disasters of the century. 4 It has been estimated that
as many as 14.5 million peasants died as the result of starvation and
the various punitive measures which accompanied collectivisation.5
The situation was hardly better in the cities, as millions of new
industrial workers were crowded into the new towns and factories
springing up all over the country, and made to labour and live under
the most primitive conditions. The standard of living plummeted
drastically, as every fiber of the nation was strained to meet the
goal of building 'socialism in one country'.
Equally grim was the vast network of labour camps run by the
GULag (Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps) and the concom-
itant growth in other mechanisms of the modern police state. The
Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,
Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR. 1922-1972. lubileinvi Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik
(The USSR National Economy, 1922-1972. An Anniversary Statistical Yearbook]
(Moscow, 1972), pp. 136, 138.
Tsentra'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,
Strana Sovetov za 50 Let. Sbornik Statisticheskikh Materialov [The Soviet
Nation After 50 Years. A Collection of Statistical Materials] (Moscow, 1967),
p. 116.
R. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and the
Terror-Famine (London, 1986), p. 306.
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camps had existed in one form or another since the early days of the
Soviet regime, but their numbers increased dramatically as the scale
of repression rose sharply after 1929. Forced labour played a key
role in the cOflBtruCtiOfl of such prestige projects as the Baltic-
White Sea and Moscow-Volga canals, which cost thousands of lives. By
the beginning of 1937 as many as five million prisoners may have been
held in these camps, and forced labour had become an essential compo-
nent of the Soviet economy.6
The sweeping changes taking place in the country's economy had
an equally dramatic effect on the qualitative growth of the Red Army,
which is discussed in greater detail in the next section. The
quantitative changes were also significant, and the armed forces more
than doubled in size from 617,000 men in 1928, to 1,433,000 in
1937. The transition to a larger and more technically-sophisticat-
ed army was the beginning of the end for the mixed territorial-cadre
system, which was increasingly incapable of meeting the army's needs.
In May 1935 the decision was made to gradually put the army on a
single cadre system of recruitment, and by the end of the year 77% of
all divisions were of the cadre type.8
Important changes were also taking place in the higher military
organs. In June 1934 the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval
Affairs became the People's Commissariat of Defence. Although
Voroshilov continued to head the military establishment, it was
widely recognized that the defence cornmissar lacked 'any practical
and theoretical basis in the field of military science and military
art', and had to rely on Tukhachevskii, Triandafillov and others.9
6 R. Conquest, The Great Terror. Stalin's Pur ge of the Thirties (London,
1968), p. 532.
A.A. Grechko, ed., Istoriia Vtoroi Mirovoi Voin y. 1939-1945 (The
History of the Second World War, 1939-1945] (Moscow, 1973-80), I. 270; P.N.
Pospelov, ed., Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voin y Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-
1945 (The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945]
(Moscow, 1960-65), I. 90.
8 Zakharov, 50 Let, p. 198.
Zhukov, I. 186-87.
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At the same time, the Civil War-era Revolutionary Military Council
was abolished and its functions taken over by the Defence Commission,
a permanent body attached to the Council of People's Commissars.
Later that same year the Military Council was created as an advisory
body to the defence commissariat. In April 1937 the Defence Commis-
sion became the Defence Committee and the old Council of Labour and
Defence was formally abolished. In September 1935 the RKKA Staff was
renamed the RKXA General Staff. Egorov, who had succeeded Shaposhni-
kov as Chief of Staff in 1931, continued at this post until the
latter's return in May 1937. Ia.B. Gamarnik had already succeeded
Bubnov as head of the RXKA Political Directorate in 1929 and served
as the armed forces' chief commissar until his suicide in May 1937.
For the most part, these were happy times for the Red Army,
which until 1937 remained the favored child of party and state, and
was spared, at least temporarily, many of the horrors being visited
upon other parts of Soviet society. The armed forces' leadership had
good reason to be pleased with the amount and variety of modern
equipment it was receiving and remained firmly behind the regime even
through the worBt of the collectivisation crisis. The army's loyalty
was rewarded in September 1935 with the introduction of officer's
ranks, although the term itself remained politically taboo. Two
months later, Voroshilov, Budennyi, Egorov, Tukhachevskii and Bliukh-
er were created marshals of the Soviet Union.
However, there were disturbing signs, which the army's leader-
ship would ignore at its peril. Among these was the growing imposi-
tion of Stalinist orthodoxy in all walks of life, including the
military. This phenomenon coincided with the dictator's achievement
of unchallenged authority by 1929 and was tirelessly propagated
throughout the armed forces by his creature, Voroshilov.10
Equally worrisome were the Shakhty trial (May-July 1929) and
10 Two of the more egregious examples of the Stalin cult in the army are
Voroshilov's article 'Stalin and the Red Army', which appeared on the
dictator's 50th birthday in 1929. See Voroshilov, pp. 346-64. See also R.
Eideman, 'K Izucheniiu Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voiny' [On Studying the Civil
War's History], V&R (1932), no. 2, pp. 90-99.
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the trial of the so-called 'Industrial Party' leadership (Nov.-Dec.
1930) on charges of 'wrecking', which were indicative of a growing
mania in society for rooting out 'spies' and 'saboteurs'. The trials
also represented the party's decision to break with the 'bourgeois
specialists' in favor of Soviet-era cadres, a move which had fateful
consequences for the remaining former tsarist officers in the army.
Prominent among those who fell afoul of the new order were Svechin,
Verkhovskii and the Civil War historian N.E. Kakurin, who were
arrested in 1930. Tukhachevskii used the opportunity to subject his
old rival's views to scurrilous criticism, labeling Svechin's ideas
as 'defeatist' and the author himself as 'an agent of imperialist
intervention'. 11
 Svechin and Verkhovskii were released in 1932 and
allowed to return to their teaching duties at the Frunze Military
Academy, while Kakurin languished in prison until his death in 1936.
On December 1 1934, S.M. Kirov, the Leningrad party boss, was
assassinated. Stalin was quick to take advantage of this deed to
begin a wholesale purge of the party and government apparatus, which
came to be known as the Ezhovshchina, named after Stalin's notorious
secret police chief, N.I. Ezhov. Among the victims were almost all
of the dictator's defeated rivals, whom he proceeded to accuse of
plotting with the exiled Trotskii to overthrow the state and restore
capitalism. One by one, Zinov'ev, Kamenev and other former notables
were found guilty of various fantastic crimes in a series of 'show
trials' and subsequently executed. Hundreds of thousands of lesser
officials perished in the same fashion, while millions more were
sentenced to almost certain death in the vast labour camp empire.
The armed forces at first seemed safe from the bloodletting,
but by early 1937 there were ominous signs that their privileged
status was coming to an end. Tukhachevskii was fleetingly implicated
in one plot, while a number of other officers were arrested by the
M. Tukhachevskii, '0 Strategicheskikh Vzgliadakh Prof. Svechina' [On
Prof. Svechin's Strategic Views] In K. Bocharov, I. Nizhechek and P. SuBlov,
eds., Protiv Reaktsionnvkh Teorii na Voennonauchnom Fronte. Kritika
Strategicheskikh i Voennoistoricheskikh Vzgliadov Prof. Svechina [Against
Reactionary Theories on the Military-Scientific Front. A Criticism of Prof.
Svechin's Strategic and Military-Historical Views] (Moscow, 1931), pp. 6-7.
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secret police, the NKVD. Stalin's intention of bringing the armed
forces to heel became evident that May, when the system of dual
command was restored, effectively binding the military even closer to
the party apparatus. Later that same month, Tukhachevskii and the
military district commanders I.E. lakir and I.P. Uborevich were
removed from their posts and the pace of arrests went into high gear.
B. The Red Army's Technical Reconstruction
The armed forces were the chief beneficiary of the USSR's
superhuman industrialisation effort during the 1930s. While the
great majority of the population endured unimaginable hardships,
those sectors of the economy linked to defence production were
comparatively well off. The military's total share of budgetary
allocations, for example, rose from 11% during the first Five-Year
Plan to 16.4% in the second. 12
 If anything, the figures probably
underestimate the military's share of the budget and include only
those expenditures directly related to the maintenance of the armed
forces, with other, related costs hidden within various commissari-
ats. Whatever the actual state of affairs, there is no doubt that
Soviet arms production did increase dramatically during this period,
as the following table illustrates.









12 Grechko, Istoriia, I. 213.


















An important milestone in the Red Army's technical makeover was
the Central Committee's July 1929 decree 'On the State of the USSR's
Defence', which charted in broad outline the future growth of the
nation's military and stressed the need for increasing the proportion
of technical troops by greatly expanding the numbers of tanks,
artillery, armoured cars and aircraft. 14 This general directive was
continually refined and a new plan for the 1934-38 period was adopted
four years later. Separate plans for the technical renovation of the
navy, air force and artillery were also drawn up during 1933-35. In
1929 the post of Chief of RKKA Armaments was established to oversee
this ambitious program. The first chief was the former tsarist
ensign, I.P. Uborevich, who was succeeded in 1931 by Tukhachevskii.
In 1936 a separate People's Commissariat of the Defence Industry was
established.
The rearmament program did not proceed smoothly, however, and
there inevitably arose a number of problems connected with an under-
taking of this magnitude. The breakneck speed with which the program
was adopted and the unthinking zeal for mechanisation in any form led
to an enormous waste of resources and several quantitative excesses
in certain of the combat arms, particularly the armoured branch.
Moreover, a chronic shortage of factories, materials, skilled workers
and experienced weapons designers plagued the military industry
throughout most of this period. In 1929, for example, the planned
output for tanks was achieved by only 20%, and as late as 1937 rifle
and artillery production was only 70% of projections. 15 The quali-
tative results were frequently disappointing as well, and many of the
early tank and aircraft modelB were decidedly inferior to their
western counterparts. Nevertheless, in spite of enormous difficul-
ties, the USSR'S rearmament drive was, quantitatively speaking, a
14 N.I. Savinkin, R.M. Bogoliubov, comps., KPSS 0 Vooruzhennvkh Silakh
Sovetskopo Soiuza. Dokumenty. 1917-1981 (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the
Soviet Union. Documents, 1917-1981] (Moscow, 1981), p. 259.
15 Grechko, Istoriia, I. 260, II. 90.
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huge success, as the following table reveals.16
Table 4. The Red Army's Weapons Park, 1928-35





































The steady influx of new weapons and equipment also gave rise
to plans for reorganising the Red Army along more modern lines. By
far the most ambitious of theBe was put forward by Tukhachevskii in
early 1930, when the rearmament program was barely underway. He
wrote from his semi-exile as chief of the Leningrad Military Dis-
trict, to which he had been dispatched in 1928 following a policy
dispute with Voroshilov. Tukhachevskii, in a report to his nemesis,
emphasised that the emergence of a qualitatively-new army made it
necessary to expand its size and increase its mobility and offensive
strike power by employing large numbers of tanks and aircraft. He
proposed creating the foundations of an army which could mobilise to
a strength of 200 divisions in 28 days, with the vast majority
arrayed against the USSR's western neighbors, particularly Poland.
The remainder would be confined to internal military districts and
the high command reserve. This force would be further supported by
50 artillery divisions, plus heavy gun and mortar units; 225 reserve
machine gun battalions; 40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks.17
Tukhachevskii's proposal is an example of the Soviet penchant
16 Ibid, I. 270.
17 M.N. Tukhachevskii, Dokladnaia Za piska Komanduiushchego Leningradsko-
ao Voennogo Okrupa Narodnomu Komissaru po Voennym i Morskim Delam ICE.
Voroshilovu (Memorandum of the Commander of the Leningrad Military District
to the People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, ICE. Voroshilov],
[Moscow], 11 January 1930, TSGASA, fond 7, opis' 1, delo 170, pp. 12, 16-17.
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for gigantism at its worst, and would be beyond the country's produc-
tive capacity to fulfill or the army's capacity to absorb for many
years to come. Stalin and Voroshilov brusquely rejected the plan as
'red militarism', and likely to undermine the national economy if it
were attempted. 18
 Tukhachevskii's views, however, were partially
vindicated in 1931, when he was recalled to Moscow to oversee the
implementation of a more modest version of his plan.
The practical effects of the army's makeover were not long in
making themselves felt in the army's organisation and equipment mix,
and that of its component parts. At the beginning of the l930s the
Red Army was divided into four services: the ground forces, air
force, navy and air-defence forces, Of these, the ground forces were
by far the largest in size and most important. They also dominated
the Defence Commissariat and upper echelons of the RKKA, where the
three other services existed as mere directorates. However, this
situation began to change with the arrival of more sophisticated
equipment and the consequent strengthening of the more technical
services at the expense of the ground forces, with its heavy infantry
complement. Thus despite the more than twofold increase in the armed
forces' size during these years, the ground forces' relative weight
within the RXKA actually fell from 92.6% in 1928 to 79.3% in 1935.
Conversely, the air force's share grew from a mere 2% in 1928 to 9.6%
in 1935, and that of the navy increased from 5.4% to 8.9%. The air
defence forces, which did not even exist as a separate service in
1928, accounted for 2.2% of the total by 1935.19
Within the ground forces (rifle troops, cavalry, armoured and
mechanised troops, artillery, airborne troops and others) similar
changes were taking place in favor of the more technical arms. This
led to an overall decline in the proportion of rifle troops from 58%
to 49%, despite a twofold growth in their absolute numbers between
18 s, Biriuzov, 'Voenno-Teoreticheskoe Nasledstvo M.N. Tukhachevskogo'
(M.N. Tukhachevskii's Military-Theoretical Heritage], V-IZh (1964), no. 2, p.
40.
19 Grechko, Istoriia, I. 270.
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1929 and 1938.	 At the same time, the infantry arm benefited tre-
mendously from the rearmament program in the direction of increased
firepower and mobility. Whereas a rifle division in 1925 had an
authorized strength of 12,800 men, 54 guns, 189 heavy machine guns
and 81 light machine guns, its 1935 counterpart contained slightly
more men, but had become much 'heavier' in other respects. It now
included 57 tanks, 96 guns, 180 heavy machine guns, 354 light machine
guns, and 18 anti-aircraft machine guns. A rifle corps, the largest
tactical formation, contained three rifle divisions, plus two artil-
lery regiments, an anti-aircraft battalion, a sapper battalion,
communications battalion and other units. 21 Nevertheless, the
growth of the other combat arms failed to impinge upon the infantry's
role as the centrepiece of the combined-arms battle. As Tukhachevsk-
ii, one of the Red Army's more zealous mechanisation advocates, wrote
in 1931: 'tanks only support the infantry in battle, but do not
replace it'.
The Red Army's mounted arm also changed considerably during
these years and, like the infantry, became 'heavier' in terms of
firepower. By 1936 a cavalry division contained four cavalry regi-
ments, a mechanised regiment, and artillery regiment, and smaller
specialized units. The infusion of modern technology had the effect
of reducing the percentage of actual horse soldiers in cavalry units
from 80% at the end of the 1920s to 60% in 1938. However, in con-
trast to the cavalry's precipitous decline in the armies of the other
industrialised nations, the absolute numbers of cavalry actually
increased within the Red Army in the 1930s. Thus the number of
cavalry formations grew from 14 divisions and seven brigades in 1929
to 32 divisions and two brigades by 1938, while the number of cavalry
corps (two-three divisions) increased from four to seven.23
Tiushkevich, p. 203.




While the retention of a large cavalry arms may have been
justified by the army's earlier low level of mobility, by the mid-
1930s this reason no longer sufficed. That a large cavalry estab-
lishment lingered on so long within the Red Army was primarily due to
the influence of two men, Voroshilov and Budennyi, who had been
associated with the mounted arm since their service together in the
First Cavalry Army in 1919-20. Voroshilov's military ignorance and
resistance to change were well known, while Budennyi continued to
propagate the virtues of cavalry from his post as RKKA Cavalry
Inspector, where he denounced as 'wrecking' those attempts to limit
its employment.24
The Red Army's artillery arm benefited enormously from the flow
of new weapons and was almost completely overhauled during the 1930s.
Among the new weapons which entered service were the 45-mm anti-tank
gun, 76-mm field gun, and the 122-mm howitzer, all pulled by horse
transport. Corps artillery received the 122-mm gun and 152-mm
howitzer, while the heavy gun park included the 203-mm howitzer--all
towed by mechanised transport, which would enable them to keep up
with the tanks and motorised troops. There were problems, however,
mostly in the number of guns produced. One observer recalled that at
one point the enthusiasm for tanks in the Red Army was such that
artillery production suffered and had to be made up for during
succeeding Five-Year plans. As a result, the number of guns of all
types in the army grew from 17,000 in 1934 to nearly 56,000 by the
beginning of 1939.25
This massive influx of weapons naturally had an effect on the
organisation and distribution of the Red Army's artillery park, which
was fortunate to have the competent N.N. Voronov as Chief of Artil-
lery from 1937. Voronov was able to at least partially offset the
baleful influence of G.I. Kulik, who from the same year headed the
24 s• Budennyi, 'Konnitsa v Sovremennoi Voine' (Cavalry in Modern War],
!	 (1930), no. 6, p. 23.
25 Zhukov, I. 224.
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Artillery Directorate. The Soviet artillery park during the 1930s
was divided into troop and reserve artillery, with the former receiv-
ing the lion's share of the guns. Thus a rifle division was rein-
forced with an anti-aircraft battalion and its organic artillery
regiment was increased in size from three to four battalions. Rifle
corps were supplied with an extra artillery regiment and an anti-
aircraft battalion. The High Command Artillery Reserve (ARGK), on
the other hand, would parcel out the forces at its disposal to
strengthen the offensive power of those formations carrying out
important tactical and operational missions. By 1938 this force had
grown to a strength of 24 artillery regiments and a number of heavy-
calibre battalions, from a mere four regiments in 1929.26
No single weapon was more important in transforming the Red
Army into a modern force than the tank. Prior to 1927 the Soviet
tank park consisted almost entirely of foreign models and captured
holdovers from the Civil War. Following the appearance of the T-18
light tank that year, new models succeeded each other in a bewilder-
ing array of types throughout the first two Five-Year plans. Among
these were the T-19, T-20, T-26, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, BT-8, BT-IS and T-
46-5 light tanks; the T-17, T-23, and T-27 tankettes; the T-37 and T-
38 amphibious models; the T-24, T-28 and T-29 medium tanks, and the
heavy T-35. The Soviets quickly surpassed their Western counterparts
in the sheer number and variety of armoured vehicles, and by 1937 the
Red Army's tank park was the largest in the world, numbering some
15,000 vehicles, of which nearly 12,000 were light T-26 and BT
models. 27 However, the haste with which this force had been assem-
bled was evident in the high proportion of light tanks and tankettes,
many of the latter of which were little more than armoured machine
gun platforms. All of these models lacked adequate armour protection
26 Tiushkevich, p. 199.
27 Zakharov, 50 Let, p. 202; P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i Tanki (Time and
Tanks] (Moscow, 1972), p. 46.
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and, with the exception of the T-28 and T-35, were too lightly
armed. 28
 At this point the Soviets began to cut back the production
of light tanks and concentrated instead on designing a new generation
of medium and heavy tanks, which began to appear in significant
numbers only in 1940.
The spectacular growth in the number of tanks engendered
equally important changes in their organisational structure. This
was the province of the Motorisation and Mechanisation Directorate,
established in 1929, and its leading lights, l.A. Khalepskii and K.B.
Kalinovskii. The directorate divided all arinoured and motorised
troops during this period into three types: armoured and mechanised
battalions and mechanised regiments, as organic components of inf an-
try and cavalry formations; tank battalions, regiments and brigades,
as part of the High Command Tank Reserve (TRGK), which, like its
artillery counterpart, was to reinforce offensive operations along
the most important axes. Finally, there were the mechanised brigades
and corps, which were to carry out operational missions in conjunc-
tion with the other combat arms. 29 The directorate also set up an
experimental mechanised regiment in 1929, which was expanded into a
brigade in 1930. In the autumn of 1932 two mechanised corps were
formed, followed by two more in early 1934. Each corps, according to
a 1935 organisational scheme, was to consist of two mechanised
brigades, a rifle-machine gun brigade, a tank reconnaissance battal-
ion, and a communications battalion,--in all 8,965 men, 463 medium
tanks and tankettes, 1,444 automobiles, plus supporting artillery.
In strictly organisational terms, this move put the Red Army well
ahead of the Germans, who did not establish their first three tank
28 Both the T-28 and T-35 mounted a 76.2-mm gun. The latter was also
armed with two 45-mm guns and had a maximum armor protection of 30 mm. See
V.D. Mostovenko, Tanki (Tanks], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1958), pp.. 96-98.
N.G. Andronikov, et al, Bronetankovye i Mekhanizirovannye Voiska
Sovetskoi Armii (The Soviet Army's Armored and Mechanised Forces] (Moscow,
1958), pp. 43-44.
30 A. Ryzhakov, 'K Voprosu o Stroitel'stve Bronetankovykh Voisk Krasnoi
Armii v 30-e Gody' (On the Problem of Building the Red Army's Armoured Forces
in the '30s], V-IZh (1968), no. 8, p. 108.
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divisions until in 1935.
After 1934, however, no new mechanised corps were created, due
chiefly to the opposition of Voroshilov, who considered 'far-fetched'
the whole idea of large armoured formations. 31
 The Red Army did
continue to form other, smaller units, and by 1936 had, aside from
the mechanised corps, six independent mechanised brigades, six
independent tank regiments, 15 mechanised regiments as organic parts
of cavalry divisions, and 83 tank battalions and companies as organic
components of rifle divisions. 32
 However, the practice of distrib-
uting armoured units within existing units for infantry support did
not prevent some Soviet theorists from speculating on the creation of
armoured armies. Among these was Tukhachevskii, who allowed that
future mechanised armies might someday be employed to carry out
'independent operations'. 33
 But Tukhachevskii would not live to see
this and the Soviet tank park would undergo several major organisa-
tional changes prior to the formation of the first tank army in 1942.
The Red Army's airborne forces, even more so than the armoured
troops, were indebted to the country's industrialisation program for
their rapid development. The Soviets had also carried out a number
of small airborne landings in the struggle against Central Asian
insurgents in the late 1920s, although the numbers involved were
militarily insignificant. Experiments continued in peacetime, and in
1931 a small parachute unit was formed in the Leningrad Military
District, a move which was successful enough to warrant the creation
of similar units elsewhere. In 1933 the first 'special designation
brigade' was formed, consisting of a parachute battalion, an artil-
lery battalion, and three squadrons of aircraft for transporting
31 A. Iovlev, 'Tekhnicheskoe Perevooruzhenie Krasnoi Armii v Gody Pervoi
Piatiletki' (The Red Army's Technical Rearmament During the First Five-Year
Plan], V-IZh (1964), no. 12, p. 11.
32 Zakharov, 50 Let, p. 202.
Tukhachevskii, II. 210. See also S.N. Krasil'nikov, Organizatsiia
Xrurnvkh Obshchevoiskovvkh Soedinenii (The Organisation of Large Combined-Arms
Formations] (Moscow, 1933), pp. 311-12.
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troops and equipment. 34 Two similar brigades were established in
1934-36, and airborne and parachute troops played a prominent role in
several of the larger military maneuvers of 1935-36. In the 1935
Kiev Military District maneuvers 1,200 paratroopers were dropped,
followed by a further 2,500 men, plus equipment, landed by plane.35
Similar jumps made the following year in the Belorussian Military
District maneuver, caused one western observer to praise them as
being 'well ahead of their time'.
These years also saw the creation of an entirely new service--
the air defence forces (PVO), which from 1927 had existed only as a
section of the RKKA Staff. The PVO was raised to the status of an
RXKA directorate, which became responsible for the air defence of the
entire country and the coordination of related civil defence mea-
sures. In 1934 Kamenev, the former commander-in-chief, became head
of the service, and he was succeeded upon is death two years later by
A.I. Sediakin. The PVO was outfitted with such new weapons as the
76.2-mm anti-aircraft gun and other, smaller ground-based weapons.
The Soviets also conducted their first experiments with radar during
these years. By 1935 29 fighter squadrons were available for air
defence purposes, although these remained under the operational
control of the military district air force chiefs. In organisational
terms, the PVO grew from a collection of anti-aircraft battalions and
regiments, to include brigades and divisions. In 1937 the first PVO
corps were created to defend such major cities as Moscow, Leningrad
and Baku, and included anti-aircraft divisions, searchlight, early-
warning, barrage balloon and machine gun regiments.37
The air force, under the stewardship of P.1. Baranov and Ia.I.
V. Kostylev, 'Stanovlenie i Razvitie Vozdushno-Desantnykh Voisk' (The
Making and Development of the Airborne-Landing Troops], V-IZh (1975), no. 9,
pp. 80-81.
1.1. Lisov, Sovetskie Vozdushno-Desantnye Voiska (The Soviet
Airborne-Landing Troops] (Moscow, 1967), pp. 19-20.
G. Martel, The Russian Outlook (London, 1947), p. 21.
P.F. Batitskii, ed., Voiska Protivovozdushnoi Oborony Strany (The
National Air Defence Forces (Moscow, 1968), p. 46.
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Alksnis, was completely remade during the 1930s. New aircraft such
as the 1-5, 1-15, 1-16 and 1-53 fighters, the TB-i, TB-3, DB-3 and
SB-3 heavy and medium bombers entered service and transformed, at
least quantitatively, the USSR into a major air power, with a force
of 10,000 combat aircraft by the end of 1937.38 Unlike the armoured
forces, however, the trend here was towards a heavier force. Whereas
in 1929 reconnaissance aircraft had accounted for a staggering 82% of
all combat aircraft, by 1935 bomber and assault aviation made up 51%
of combat planes, and reconnaissance vehicles a mere 19%.	 This
growth was reflected in organisational changes as well. Assault,
fighter and light bomber aviation was organised into both mixed and
homogenous air divisions, and in 1933 all long-range (heavy) bombers
were grouped into corps, each consisting of three brigades. In 1936
several heavy-bomber brigades were consolidated to form a 'special
designation army' (AON), which was subordinated directly to the high
command for carrying out independent operational-strategic missions.
The appearance of the heavy bomber naturally gave rise to
discussions as to the air force's chief mission; ground support, or
strategic bombing operations against political and economic targets.
Soviet ideas at this time were sharply at odds with the more extreme
'air power' theories then in vogue in the West, which saw the bomber
playing a decisive role in a future war, through terror bombing and
Btrikes against the enemy's war industry. Most representative were
the views of A.N. Lapchinskii, the Red Army's chief air theorist
during this period. Lapchinskii stressed the air force's role in
ensuring the success of ground operations through its reconnaissance
functions and strikes against ground and air targets in the enemy's
tactical and operational zones. Lapchinskii, although he supported
the idea of independent air operations against military targets deep
in the enemy rear, dismissed the notion that air power alone could
P. Avdeenko, 'Sovetskoe Samoletostroenie v Gody Predvoennykh
Piatiletok (1929-1940 gg.)' [Soviet Aircraft Construction During the Prewar
Five-Year Plans (1929-1940)], V-IZh (1974), no. 7, p. 86.
Pospelov, I. 93; Grechko, Istoriia, I. 270.
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win a war.1
Stalin himself put to rest any idea of an independent role for
the air force, when he declared in 1937 that 'He who thinks that one
can win a war by powerful aviation alone, is mistaken'. 41 The early
evidence of the Spanish Civil War bore Stalin out and, like the other
great land powers, Germany and France, the Soviet Union would also
relegate its air force to an almost exclusively ground support role.
The Soviet navy enjoyed a potentially more independent status
than its air counterpart, but it also played a very secondary role to
the ground forces during this period. Among the major problems the
navy faced was a shortage of bases, particularly in the northwest,
where the post-revolutionary independence of Finland and the Baltic
States had deprived it of its forward positions and confined the
Baltic Fleet to the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, from which it
could be easily blockaded. The Black Sea Fleet's situation was only
marginally better, and in the Far East the coastline was open to a
renewed Japanese attack. This gloomy picture was made worse by the
pre-1933 prediction that Great Britain was the most likely future
maritime enemy. This meant dealing with the world's strongest fleet,
which was capable of striking with virtual impunity anywhere along
the Soviet coast. The Soviets concluded that any attempt to build a
large surface fleet and attempt to take on the British in their
native element would be worse than useless, and that such a diversion
of resources would only derail ongoing efforts to construct an
effective interim defence. The Soviets thus rejected the idea of a
large surface fleet built around capital ships in favor of a smaller
and less expensive shore defence force.
This program was partially realized during these years, al-
though visible improvements came about more slowly, due to the longer
construction schedules involved. Submarine construction was particu-
4° A.N. Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia Aviatsiia [Bomber Aviation]
(Moscow, 1937), pp. 42-43.
41 Quoted in I.S. Prochko, Artilleriia--Bo Voin y [Artillery--the God
of War] (Moscow, 1946), p. 4.
240
larly pushed as a quick means of building a relatively inexpensive
defensive force capable of inflicting disproportionate damage on a
stronger enemy. The Soviets managed to build only six modern subma-
rines during the first Five-Year Plan, but 137 during the second, of
which 85 were of the large or medium type.	 Shore-based aviation
also grew at an impressive rate, and by 1937 the navy possessed 1,215
combat aircraft, divided almost equally between bombers, fighters and
reconnaissance aircraft. 43 This and similar growth in other areas
enabled the Soviets to establish the Pacific Fleet in 1935 and to
upgrade the status of the Northern Flotilla to that of a fleet two
years later. By the end of this period the Soviet navy was on the
verge of administrative independence from the ground forces, although
the gathering purge, which hit the navy especially hard, would soon
render such considerations academic.
The first half of the 1930s saw the Red Army transformed from
an overwhelmingly infantry-cavalry force into a relatively modern
army equal to those of the other major powers. The greater numbers
of tanks, motorised troops, aircraft and artillery, and their coales-
cence into operationally-significant divisions and corps, inevitably
had an influence on the development of the army's military theory.
Tukhachevskii had foreseen this as early as 1930, when writing of the
army's 'new proportions' of modern weaponry, which, he asserted,
'will call forth new forms of operational art'.
C. Strategy and Tactics
However, before examining the period's operational develop-
ments, a lengthy digression into the realms of strategy and tactics
is called for.' For it is only by understanding what was taking place
V. Dmitriev, 'Stroitel'stvo Sovetskogo Podvodnogo Flota v Mezhvoennyi
Period' (The Construction of the Soviet Submarine Fleet During the Interwar
Period], V-IZh (1974), no. 10, p. 85.
' Tiushkevich, p. 206.
T5GASA, fond 7, opis' 1, delo 170, p. 12.
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on either 'aide' of operational art that one can appreciate the
latter more fully.
Surprisingly, for all of the changes which were taking place in
the Red Army's weapons and equipment park, the basic assumptions
underlying Soviet military strategy changed relatively little during
these years. This is because questions of strategy, being more
closely tied to political and economic considerations, are generally
less subject to the influence of new technology than the subordinate
fields of operational art and tactics. What effect there was would
continue to be secondary to such realities as the USSR's ongoing
ideological confrontation with most of the rest of the world and its
resulting political isolation. These and other factors combined to
ensure that the basic premises of Soviet military strategy would
continue to resemble closely the conclusions already reached during
the previous decade.
As before, the Soviets viewed a future war as the inevitable
clash of two irreconcilable social systems,the capitalist and social-
ist, in which each side would strive to overthrow the other's social
order and replace it with its own. A high-stakes conflict of this
sort left no room for compromise and would be waged in the most
decisive manner possible. 45 It was widely believed that this would
be a war, not of nations, but of social classes. The USSR, which was
admittedly far weaker than its likely opponents, would thus enjoy the
advantage, it was said, of working class support within the capital-
ist camp, which one author described as a 'landing force' in the
enemy's rear. In the same vein, the Soviets continued to count on
the support of the inhabitants of the European colonial holdings and
other dependencies. 	 These factors would force the capitalist
nations to withdraw troops from the anti-Soviet front to put down
internal uprisings, thus realizing the Bolsheviks' slogan of changing
S.M. Belitskii, Voina [War] (Moscow, 1931), p. 11.
L.S. Amiragov, '0 Kharaktere Budushchei Voiny' [On the Character of
a Future War], y	 (1934), Sept.-Oct., pp. 12-13.
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the 'imperialist' war into a civil war. Finally, a future war would
pit the USSR against a coalition of it g immediate western neighbors,
supported materially by such larger capitalist powers as Britain,
France and Japan.47
The conclusions reached by Soviet theoreticians during the
strategic debates of the 1920s, regarding the military conduct of a
future war, retained, for the most part, their validity well into the
next decade and would serve as the basis for planning at the opera-
tional level. It will be recalled that these debates revolved
chiefly around the question of a future war's duration; whether it
would be a struggle of mass armies, or of smaller, highly-mechanised
forces; should the Red Army pursue an offensive strategy of 'destruc-
tion', or an essentially defensive one of 'attrition'; and the
relative place of maneuver and positional warfare. The preponderance
of opinion came to view a future war as a lengthy and exhaustive
struggle, waged by mass armies, outfitted with the latest technologi-
cal innovations. The Red Army would pursue an offensive strategy,
geared to decisively defeating the chief members of the capitalist
coalition as quickly as possible, although a defensive posture on
secondary fronts was not ruled out. Finally, while the army leader-
ship preferred a war of maneuver, it did not exclude positional
methods, particularly along the less decisive axes.
These basic tenets were reaffirmed by a number of theorists
during the 1930B. Among these was S.M. Belitskii, who declared that
a future war would become an 'extended and cruel contest', due to its
coalition character. He also predicted that a future war would be a
conflict of mass armies, in which technology would aid, but not
replace, the national army."8 This view was supported by Tukhachev-
skii, who remained a zealous advocate of the mass army, coupled with
a high level of mechanization, and who was outspoken in his contempt
Selitskii, pp. 4, 12; R. Tsiffer, 'Kharakteristika Predstoiashchei
Voiny' (A Description of the Coming War), 3
	
(1931), nos. 10-11, p. 5.
48 Belitskii, pp. 11-12, 61.
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for Western theories which called for the creation of small, highly-
mechanised professional armies. 49 Tukhachevskii also took the lead
in reiterating the Red Army's commitment to an offensive strategy,
which had been the point of greatest contention during the l920s. As
before, his views were expressed in ad homine attacks on the theo-
ries of his old rival, Svechin, who was derided for his alleged
'pacifism' and willingness to accept capitalism's military superiori-
ty. In 1930 Tukhachevskii accused Svechin of renouncing the of fen-
Bive, which another author praised as the 'single expedient for of
struggle' in an era of revolutionary wars. 5° Finally, while the
Soviets continued to prefer a war of maneuver over positional forms,
they had come increasingly resigned to the fact that the growing
power of defensive weapons had made periods of positional warfare
more likely in the future.51
The interplay of these and other factors in the Red Army's
strategic calculations is most clearly illustrated in an exchange of
internal documents between Svechin and Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov in
early 1930. The dialogue between the two former tsarist officers and
imperial academy graduates as to the possible contours of a future
war and the army's proper strategy provide a fascinating insight into
the thinking of the army's best minds.
Svechin opened the discussion with a detailed report to war
commissar Voroshilov in early March. Svechin outlined a future war
against the USSR as a coalition affair, led by Britain and France, in
which Poland and Romania would bear the brunt of the fighting as the
coalition's cat's paw in the West. To the north, Latvia, Estonia and
Finland would maintain an 'armed neutrality', in order to tie down
Soviet forces along their borders. The Soviet Union would enter such
a war much the weaker party against opponents who possessed signif i-
' Tukhachevekii, II. 152-53.
50 Ibid, pp. 134, 137-38; B. Burlak, 'Nastuplenie kak Sil'naia Forma
Reveoliutsionnoi Voiny' (The Offensive as a Powerful Form of Revolutionary
War], V&R (1935), Sept.-Oct., p. 40.
51 Belitskii, p. 58; Tukhachevskii, II. 247.
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cant technical advantages over the Red Army and who could mobilize
their forces more quickly. He sharply criticized Tukhachevskii and
Triandafillov for overselling the technological benefits of the
army's reconstruction program and predicted that the armed forces
would not achieve a technical parity with its likely enemies for
another 15 years. Nor could the USSR count on significant support
from working class uprisings within the enemy camp, as these could be
easily suppressed.52
Svechin predicted that the capitalist coalition would make its
main effort in the south, along the Black Sea coast, with the aim of
creating a continuous front from the Caspian Sea to the Pripiat'
Marshes. The British, according to this scenario, would land in the
Trans-Caucasus, with the object of seizing the oil centres of Baku
and Groznyi. The French would land in the Crimea and seize the
Donets Basin and the lower Dnieper River area, while Poland and
Romania would join in the attack along their own frontiers. Svechin
predicted that the achievement of these objectives would put the
enemy in possession of the USSR's chief industrial and extractive
areas and render a subsequent advance on Moscow relatively easy, or
even unnecessary.53
Svechin proposed a political-military counter-strategy to take
advantage of the coalition's lack of internal unity, in order to
prevent the union of the coalition armies and the formation of a
continuous front along the USSR's southern periphery. The Red Army,
to achieve this, must remain on the defensive along most of the
front, while directing its initial offensive efforts at Romania,
which he correctly identified as the coalition's 'weakest link'.
Svechin rather optimistically calculated that the Romanians could be
defeated in a quick, two-week campaign, which would drive a wedge in
52 A.A. Svechin, Budushchaia Voina i Nashi Voenn ye Zadachi [A Future War
and Our Military Tasks], (Moscow], 8 March 1930, pp. 1, 3-4. Considerations
of secrecy make it impossible at this time to cite this archival document in
the usual manner.
Ibid, pp. 3, 6-7.
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the enemy front and isolate the Polish forces to the north from their
allies along the Black Sea coast. He warned that at all costs the
Red Army should refrain from making its first major offensive against
Poland, either in Galicia or towards Warsaw. Svechin believed that
such an attack would only involve the army in an extended and indeci-
sive campaign, even as coalition forces linked up in the south, and
might even bring Germany into the war on the allied side. Likewise,
he denounced any major effort in the Baltic as a 'false step', which
would only take away forces from the southern front.54
Shaposhnikov, in his reply, was quick to agree with Svechin as
to the coalition nature of a future war and its likely composition.
Nor did he dispute the notion that the enemy would make its major
effort along the country's Black Sea coast, although he disagreed as
to the scale of the fighting. Shaposhnikov believed that the British
and French fleets would probably attack the USSR's southern and other
ports, although he considered it unlikely that they would undertake
any large-scale land operations in the interior. 55
 Rather, the main
point of contention between the two lay in Shaposhnikov's preference
for the strategy of destruction, which he defined in practical terms
as 'beginning the war with the defeat of the strongest and most
dangerous enemy' and avoiding secondary distractions. He contrasted
this to Svechin's familiar strategy of attrition, which he character-
ised as the 'strategy of limited goals, the strategy of circuitous
routes to the objective'.56
In practical terms this meant launching the initial attack
against Poland, which Shaposhnikov identified as the coalition's
strongest direct partner, and delaying the attack against Romania
until the latter's defeat. Neither would Romania's defeat be the
Ibid, pp. 8-10, 12.
B. Shaposhnikov, Otvet na Zapisku A. Svechina 'Budushchaia Voina i
Nashi Voennye Zadachi' [A Reply to A. Svechin's Note 'A Future War and Our
Military Tasks'], [Moscow], 28 March 1930, pp. 3, 6, 8, 10. Considerations
of secrecy make it impossible at this time to cite this archival document in
the usual manner.
56 Ibid, pp. 14, 29-30.
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simple task which Svechin imagined, and Shaposhnikov calculated that
the Red Army could reach Bucharest only on the 40th day following its
complete concentration along the Dniester. Such a move, if undertak-
en first, would also be threatened along its right flank by a major
Polish attack from Galicia. Launching the first attack against the
Poles would also be a major undertaking and would require 85-95
divisions north of the Pripiat Marshes, as well as another 40 divi-
sions to the south, including those defending the Romanian frontier.
An attack of thiB magnitude would also involve a secondary effort
through the Baltic States to turn the Polish flank. Shaposhnikov
calculated that an advance from the Polish border to the middle
Vistula would take 50 days. This would not include the initial
mobilisation and deployment period, meaning that the decisive opera-
tions would take place sometime during the war's third month.57
While both men's analyses contained much that was intelligent
and insightful, too often their judgement was clouded by wishful
thinking and ideological prejudice. The former was particularly true
of Svechin's rosy predictions of a swift victory over Romania, while
Shaposhnikov could not resist the temptation to fall back on politi-
cal cliches to support his argument, knowing that Svechin was partic-
ularly vulnerable on that score. 58 Before too long, however, such
interesting speculation would become superfluous and the vague
spectre of an enemy coalition would be replaced by a new and very
real enemy--Nazi Germany.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Soviet strategic
debate during these years was the question of the go-called 'begin-
ning period of the war' (nachal'uyi period voiny) and the problems
peculiar to it. One of the first to raise the question was Svechin,
who in 1927 had written of the 'pre-mobilisation' period and the
measures needed to shield the armed forces' concentration and deploy-
mid, pp. 7, 14, 25, 28-29.
58 Ibid, pp. 5, 33.
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ment upon the outbreak of war. 59
 A number of articles on this sub-
ject followed at the end of the 1920s, although they were often too
narrowly focused on the role of air power, or ignored the influence
of new military technology altogether.60
By the early 1930s, however, developments within the Red Army
and abroad were leading many theorists to reexamine the problem in
the light of recent advances in military technology. Whereas in the
past, military operations had developed slowly along a relatively
shallow front of strategic efforts, the appearance of such new
weapons as long-range bomber aviation and mechanised forces meant
that henceforth 'From the very beginning combat activities will take
on a deep and spatial character', as one Soviet author described the
situation. 61
 The vastly increased importance of the time factor,
combined with the deep strike range of modern weapons, had obvious
consequences for the mobilisation and deployment of a nation's armed
forces. Military planners could now no longer assume that their
country's mobilisation and concentration of its armies on the fron-
tier would be allowed to proceed unhindered, as had been the case in
1914. The dangers and opportunities inherent in this new situation
meant that the Red Army's efforts would be increasingly focused on
what one theorist called 'the right to deploy first', in which each
Bide would actively seek to disrupt his opponent's military prepara-
tions at the beginning of a war, in order to gain an advantage in the
opening operations.
However, despite the indisputable advantage of striking first,
Svechin, Strateiia, pp. 135, 138.
See G. Sokolov, 'Sovremenriaia Zavesa i Voprosy Strategicheskogo
Prikrytiia' (The Modern Screen and Questions of Strategic Coven, V&R (1928),
no. 4, pp. 15-21; A. Lapchinskii, 'Deistviia Aviatsii v Nachal'nom Periode
Voiny' (Air Activities in the Beginning Period of a War], V&R (1929), no. 6,
pp. 55-66; Ia. Alksnis, 'Nachal'nyi Period Voiny (The Beginning Period of a
War], V&R (1929), no. 9, pp. 3-22, no. 10, pp. 3-15.
61 E. Shilovskii, 'Nachal'nyi Period Voiny' [The Beginning Period of a
War],	 (1933), Sept.-Oct., p. 11.
R. Eideman, 'K Voprosu o Kharaktere Nachal'nogo Perioda Voiny' (On
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it was understood that no state can afford to maintain its armed
forces in a full state of readiness in peacetime without provoking
its neighbors or risking economic disaster. The problem for the Red
Army and its foreign counterparts was to devise the most effective
means of disrupting the enemy's mobilisation and deployment at the
beginning of a war, using a minimal initial amount of force to
achieve maximum results. The Soviets' preferred instrument for
carrying out this mission was the aptly named 'invasion army' (ariia
vtorzheniia), among other appelations. The invasion army, in order
to strike quickly and deeply into enemy territory, would be main-
tained at nearly full strength and liberally reinforced with mechani-
sed units, aircraft and cavalry. The army constituted, in effect,
the first echelon of the country's mobilisation efforts, in which
capacity it was charged with not only disrupting the enemy's deploy-
ment along the frontier, but also of facilitating the eventual
deployment of its own second and third strategic echelons inside
enemy territory.	 The latter, which greatly exceeded the first
echelon in strength, would then quickly advance to support it upon
the completion of their concentration.
It was generally agreed that a future war would begin with air
strikes in the enemy's strategic and operational rear, against his
political and economic centres and his forces already in the field.
These strikes, involving as many as 1,000-1,500 aircraft, and carried
out to a depth of 400-600 kilometers, would include among their
military objectives rail junctions, large troop concentrations and
supply depots directly connected to the enemy's ongoing deployment
efforts. Other targets, included the enemy's war industry, mines,
oil fields and seaports. The attacker would also seek out the
enemy's political and administrative centres for a terror bombing
V. Melikov, Problema Strategicheskoao Razvertvvaniia P0 Opytu Mirovoi
i Grazhdanskoi Voiny [The Problem of Strategic Deployment According the
Experience of the World and Civil Wars] (Moscow, 1935), I. 597, 599.
S.14. Belitskii, Strategicheskie Rezervy [Strategic Reserves] (Moscow,
1930), p. 255.
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campaign, which would include among its weapons not only conventional
ordnance, but incendiary and chemical weapons as well.65
The invasion army, simultaneous with the start of the air
campaign, would begin its advance to the frontier. The army's
composition and actions were outlined by S.A. Mezheninov, a former
tsarist captain and 1917 graduate of the imperial General Staff
Academy, who served as deputy chief of the RKKA Staff/General Staff
from 1933 to 1937. Mezheninov calculated the invasion army's
strength at a mere one or two rifle divisions, backed by a cavalry
corps, a mechanised corps, two or three anti-aircraft battalions,
plus a battalion each of motorised sappers and chemical troops and,
in certain cases, bridging units. The army's advance would be
covered by an air corps consisting of light bomber, assault and
fighter brigades. The preponderance of mobile arms and engineering
troops clearly indicated that the army was intended to launch little
more than deep 'spoiling attacks' against the enemy's covering forces
and his frontier obstacles. The army would advance into enemy
territory in a series of incremental leaps, destroying the enemy's
border troops and airfields and disorganising his communications and
control means and, in general, disrupting the defender's efforts to
hinder the Red Army's deployment. The mobile forces, having accom-
plished their mission, would then fall back on their own infantry and
conduct a defensive battle until the arrival of the main forces, as
represented by the second echelon's shock armies.
The RXKA Staff had earlier calculated that an invasion of this
size might penetrate up to 200-300 kilometers into enemy territory
along a future western front. However, even a success of this
magnitude could not be maintained for any great length of time
65 G. Isserson, Osnovy Glubokoi Operatsii (Fundamentals of the Deep
Operation], (Moscow], 1933, pp. 54-56. Considerations of secrecy make it
impossible at this time to cite this archival document in the usual manner.
See also TSGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18, pp. 145, 126-25.
S.A. Mezheninov, Razrabotka 0 Nachal'nom Periode Voiny (A Sketch of
the War's Beginning Period), (Moscow], 8 July 1934, pp. 170-71. Consider-
ations of secrecy make it impossible at this time to cite this archival
document in the usual manner.
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without sizeable reinforcements. It was elsewhere admitted that the
invasion could, at best, only create a 'series of crises' for the
defender's force, and that decisive results would have to await the
arrival of the attacker's main forces.67
As the Red Army's most gifted strategist, Tukhachevskii's views
on the nature and conduct of a future war's opening phase are partic-
ularly important. These were revealed most clearly in his writings
and conversations with fellow theorists. According to the latter, by
the end of 1936 Tukhachevskii was firmly convinced of Nazi Germany's
aggressive intentions and urged that it be considered the main
opponent in future exercises. He was equally certain that the old
formula of a country's unhindered mobilisation and deployment was a
thing of the past and that a future war would begin with surprise
attacks by air, sea and ground forces, as both sides seek to disrupt
the unfolding of the other's initial military preparations. This was
particularly true of the air force, which, he believed, was capable
of rendering a 250-kilometer border zone 'off limits' to the enemy's
mobilisation efforts and force him to deploy deep in his own rear,
while the attacker would be left free to deploy along the border.
The air attacks would be accompanied by large-scale airborne landings
to destroy rail lines, bridges and isolated enemy garrisons within
the 250-kilometer zone. Tukhachevskii, while his intentions were
overwhelmingly offensive, did warn, however, of similar enemy at-
tempts to disrupt the Red Army's deployment by launching a preemptive
strike of its own.
Tukhachevskii advised that ground operations would probably
unfold in a series of meeting engagements, particularly if both sides
pursue an offensive strategy, and, in general, maneuver would predom-
inate over positional forms. However, he did not exclude defensive
67 TiGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18, p. 144.
Isserson, 'Zapiski', p. 76; Tukhachevskii, II. 213-13, 217-18. The
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operations and periods of positional warfare along the front's less-
important sectors. The main ground force attack would be spearheaded
by the 'forward army' (peredovaia armiia), generously equipped with
mechanised units, cavalry and motorised infantry. This army, de-
ployed in peacetime near the border, would take advantage of the
enemy's confusion in the frontier zone to invade the enemy's territo-
ry and hold it for the deployment of friendly forces advancing in
succeeding echelons. However, Tukhachevskii warned that, as opposed
to the past, future border operations might drag on for weeks. In
such cases, the presence of 'deep operational reserves' to maintain
the attack would prove decisive.69
Unfortunately for the Red Army, Tukhachevskii had only a
limited opportunity to test his theories at a war game conducted by
the General Staff in early 1936. The strategic Betting for the game
envisioned a German-Polish invasion of the USSR, involving a mixed
force of 80 divisions, deployed between the Pripiat' Marshes and the
Dvina River. I.P. Uborevich, as commander of the Belorussian Mili-
tary District, led the Soviet force, while Tukhachevskii commanded
the enemy army. However, the latter's suggestion that the German-
Polish forces preempt the Soviets' efforts to concentrate troops
along the border with a surprise attack was brusquely rejected by
Marshal Egorov, who also dismissed Tukhachevskii's suggestion that
the enemy armies enjoy an initial superiority of forces. In fact,
according to the scenario laid down by Egorov's General Staff appara-
tus, it was the Red Army which would complete its concentration and
deployment first and enter the fighting with an equality of forces.
Given these absurd restrictions, it is not surprising that the game
ended in a series of frontal collisions along the frontier and failed
to yield a decisive result, and the Red Army was deprived of a
valuable lesson for the future.
Given the highly offensive nature of the Soviet approach to
69 Isserson, 'Zapiski', pp. 76-78; Tukhachevskii, II. 218, 220.
70 Isserson, 'Zapiski', pp. 72-74; Zakharov, General'nyi, p. 105.
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war, the fact that defensive considerations played such a small part
in the formulation of strategy should come as no surprise. While it
was true that the invasion army could also serve as a 'cover army'
(ariia prikrytiia) in the event of an enemy attack, the bias towards
the offensive remained dominant. 7' Defensive arrangements, however,
were more in evidence in the 12 'fortified areas' constructed along
the USSR's western frontier (Karelia, Kingisepp, Pskov, Polotsk,
MinBk, Mozyr', Korosten', Novograd-Volynskii, Letichev, Mogilev-
Iainpol'skii, Rybnitsa, Tiraspol') and in the interior (Kiev) between
1929 and 1938. These areas varied in length from 50 to 140 kilome-
ters and approximately 25 kilometers in depth, while the flanks were
usually anchored on some natural obstacle. However, in many cases
theBe areas were too lightly-armed, particularly in terms of anti-
tank defence.72
Unfortunately for the Soviets, much of the creative work
regarding the war's beginning ultimately came to naught and the Red
Army would shortly become the victim of the greatest surprise attack
in military history. G.K. Zhukov, who at the beginning of the war
served as Chief of the General Staff, later admitted that the majori-
ty of the higher military leadership still expected a war to begin in
the form of border engagements according to the pattern of 1914,
followed by the collision of the sides' main forces. No one, he
claimed, believed that it was possible for a fully-mobilised army to
launch a full-scale attack of such magnitude.Th That the Red Army
high command continued to believe this in spite of the recent evi-
dence of German methods in Poland and the West is indicative of a
serious degradation in the quality of the army's strategic thinking
following the 1937-38 military purges.
71 Melikov, Problema, I. 12.
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Equally important changes were also taking place from 'below',
in the realm of tactics. Here the Red Army faced the daunting task
of adapting its tactical doctrine, previously based on infantry and
cavalry, to the vastly increased fire and maneuver capabilities of
the new weapons then entering service. In this respect, at least,
Soviet theoreticians had much in common with their Western counter-
parts, who were also searching for ways of employing the new technol-
ogy in order to avoid a repetition of the 1914-18 deadlock. The
latter was certainly a possibility, for despite the impressive
advances in offensive weaponry since 1918, the defence still retained
a number of significant advantages vii a vii the attacker. This
prospect was particularly distasteful to the Red Army, whose entire
political-military ethos demanded decisive offensive actions.
The continued strength of modern defensive arrangements made it
imperative that the problem of breaking through the enemy's tactical
defence would first have to be solved. For without the disruption of
the defender's tactical position there could be no question of the
offensive's subsequent development into the enemy's operational and
strategic depth. Or, as one author put it, the operation's outcome
'is determined, in the final analysis, by tactical factors'. 74 So-
viet efforts to resolve this dilemma ultimately found expression in
the theory of the 'deep battle' (glubokii boi), which sought to
employ the enhanced offensive qualities of the new military technolo-
gy to achieve a breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defence and set
the stage for the operational exploitation of the success.
One of the earliest efforts in this area was a 1931 memorandum
by Triandafillov, which laid the theoretical basis for the new
approach in words which would be repeated many times in the years
ahead. In his report, Triandafillov stated that the new military
technology now made it possible to dispense with the method of
'gnawing through' (progryzanie) the enemy's defensive position in
favor of a 'siu1taneous attack against the enemy throughout the
G. Isserson, Evoliutsiia Operativnogo Iskusstva (The Evolution of
Operational Art], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1937), p. 98.
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entire depth of his tactical position'. 75 Equally intriguing, in
light of the author's untimely demise, were Triandafillov's notes on
the conduct of the deep battle, which were published in an appendix
to a posthumous edition of his The Character of O perations of Modern
Armies, in 1932. Triandafillov, at the time of his death, had been
revising his agnum opus to take into account the army's ongoing
technical transformation. From the outline it is evident that he was
planning to devote special attention to the tactical problems of
coordinating the different combat arms (infantry, armour, artillery,
cavalry, aircraft and airborne troops) during the attack.76
Triandafillov's pioneering work was taken up by others follow-
ing his death in the summer of 1931. In early 1932 the Revolutionary
Military Council commissioned Chief of Staff Egorov to prepare a
report on the army's tactical-operational views in light of its
technical reconstruction. The result, 'The RKKA's Tactics and
Operational Art at a New Stage', was basically a distillation of
Triandafillov'B 1931 work and summed up the main theoretical conclu-
sions reached up to that time, and established the general tone for
succeeding discussions and works. The report's most important
tactical conclusion was that the new military technology, due to its
increased range, mobility and destructive power, now
enables us to strike the enemy simultaneously throughout
the entire depth of his position, as opposed to current forms
of battle and attack, which may be characterized as the consec-
utive suppression of successive parts of the battle order.
The means are used so as to paralyze the fire of all defensive
weapons, regardless of the depth of their deployment, to
isolate one enemy unit from another, to disrupt cooperation
between them, and to destroy them in detail."
V.K. Triandafillov, Osnovnve Vopros y Taktiki i Operativnogo Iskusstva
v Sviazi s Rekonstruktsiei Armii [Fundamental Problems of Tactics and
Operational Art in Connection with the Army's Reconstruction] [Moscow], 1931,
TsGASA, fond 37977, opis' 3, delo 368, pp. 968-69.
76 v•x Triandafillov, Kharakter Operatsii Sovremenn ykh Armii (The
Character of Operations of Modern Armies], 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1932), pp. 177,
182, 184, 186-87.
TsGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18, p. 157.
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The report was later circulated among the military district
commanders and the heads of the various military academies, among
others, for their comments and criticisms. It subsequently became
the basis for the 'Provisional Instructions for Organising the Deep
Battle', which was issued in 1933 and which became the Red Army's
first manual on the subject.
The notions of simultaneity and depth in these and other
writings are the cornerstone of the Soviet theory of the deep battle
and distinguish its conduct from the tactical methods employed during
the Great War.Th For most of that conflict the method of attack had
been consecutive and linear, with the slow-moving infantry having to
bludgeon its way through the enemy's multi-layered defensive zone in
a series of grinding frontal collisions, which ultimately exhausted
the attacker. The little simultaneity that could be achieved was
limited to infantry-artillery interaction against the first defensive
position, while the depth of the attack was restricted by the range
and pace of the two arms' rate of advance. Moreover, the defence
could usually bring up reinforcements to the battlefield without
interference from the attacker. The appearance of large numbers of
tanks, aircraft and other weapons offered an escape from this posi-
tional 'dead end' by enabling the attacker to group these arms'
activities in such a way that both simultaneity of suppression and
depth of attack would be achieved, and the battlefield isolated from
the defender's reinforcements. This new-found capability, as one
author noted, marked the transition from the old linear tactics to a
new, multi-dimensional 'deep tactics' (glubokaia taktika).79
Of the new weapons, none was judged more important to the deep
battle's success than the tank, and its means of employment was to be
a source of intense debate for several years. One of the earliest
78 See P.V. 'Ispol'zovanie Sredstv Podavleniia v Operatsii Proryva'
(Employing Weapons of Suppression in a Breakthrough Operation], V&R (1931),
no. 10-11, pp. 20-27; S. Ammosov, 'Tanki v Operatsii Proryva' [Tanks in a
Breakthrough Operation), 3
	
(1932), no. 5-6, pp. 81-91.
Isserson, Evoliutsiia, p. 132.
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references to the tank's emerging role in the deep battle appeared in
the 1929 field manual, edited in large part by Triandafillov, in his
capacity as chief of the RXKA Staff's operational directorate.
Perhaps most significantly, two of the manual's articles recommended
the creation of special tank echelons to carry out the attack.8°
Triandafillov later advised forming three distinct tank echelons for
operating to various depths of the defender's tactical defence zone
and against specific targets. These echelons were first divided into
'infantry accompaniment tanks', 'machine gun destruction tanks', and
'artillery destruction tanks', according to their mission. They were
subsequently renamed 'direct infantry support' (neposredstvennaia
podderzhka pekhoty) tanks, or NPP; 'long-range infantry support'
(dal'niaia podderzhka pekhoty) tanks, or DPP; and, 'long-range
(da].'nee deistvie), or DD tanks, although their original designation
remained the same.81
Another question concerned the relative importance of the tank
in the deep battle vis a vis the other combat arms. Previous Soviet
theory had stressed the tank's role as an infantry-support weapon, as
when the 1929 field manual stated that the tanks' 'chief task' was
'to clear a path for the advancing infantry by suppressing the
enemy's fire resistance and destroying his artificial obstacles'.
As more and more tanks entered service, however, a number of theo-
rists began to view the tank as the prime element in the combined-
arms battle and to reduce the deep battle to the armoured attack
alone. This dalliance with the more extreme theories of tank warfare
did not last long, however, as the weight of opinion in the army
remained in favor of a more balanced approach. This was made of f i-
cial at a December 1934 meeting of the Military Council, during which
Egorov delivered a report reaffirming the supremacy of the infantry.
80 Polevoi, pp. 118, 127.
81 Triandafillov, 2nd ed., pp. 182, 184; TsGASA, fond 37977, opis' 3,
delo 368, pp. 969-70.
Polevoi, p. 127.
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He also condemned the existing three-stage (NPP, DPP and DD) echelon-
ment of tanks as cumbersome and unjustified, and recommended instead
a two-echelon (NPP, DD) grouping. These recommendations were subse-
quently adopted and formed the basis for the army's new 'Instructions
for the Deep Battle', which was issued in March l935.
The new theory encountered other, more serious obstacles during
these years, which threatened to channel its development in a more
restrictive direction. One of the chief impediments was Voroshilov,
whose reactionary views have been noted elsewhere. The war commissar
maintained that the deep battle was applicable only to conditions of
positional warfare, which required breaking through the enemy's
static front. This view, however, ignored the theory's relevance to
other, more mobile forms of warfare, such as the 'meeting battle'
(vstrechuyi boi).M Tukhachevskii protested that Voroshilov's atti-
tude was causing a good deal of confusion within the command element
and had raised fears that the theory might be renounced altogether.
Tukhachevskii's views ultimately prevailed, thanks to the support of
such powerful allies as Kamenev, Uborevich and I.E. lakir, the
commander of the Kiev Military District. Voroshilov's formal capitu-
lation on this score came at the same December 1934 meeting of the
Military Council, at which he retracted his earlier statements and
recognised the deep battle as a 'new form' of military endeavor.85
The capstone of these years of effort was the Provisional Field
Manual of 1936, which represented the final triumph of the Red Army's
more progressive thinkers, many of whom had less than a year to live,
and marks the high point of the deep battle's theoretical development
in the pre-purge period. The manual, as the army's guiding tactical
document, codified several of the deep battle's basic tenets, among
the most important of which was that it was above all a combined-arms
Zakharov, General'nyi pp. 90-91.
84 Ibid, p. 90.
85 Biriuzov, p. 44; G. Isserson, 'Razvitie Teorii Sovetskogo Operativnog
Iskusstva v 30-e Gody' (The Development of the Theory of Soviet Operational
Art in the '30s], V-IZh (1965), no. 1, p. 38; Zakharov, General'nyi, p. 91.
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effort, using the heightened strike and maneuver qualities of modern
weaponry 'to achieve a simultaneous attack against the enemy's combat
order throughout the entire depth of his position'.
	 This applied
to both defensive and offensive actions, although the latter was
preferred, culminating in the defender's encirclement and destruc-
tion. Finally, the manual reaffirmed the infantry's primacy, as all
other combat arms were explicitly subordinated to the interests of
the former.87
The manual divided the deep battle into three categories,
according to designation: the meeting battle; the attack against an
entrenched defender; and, the defensive battle. These battles,
despite their obvious differences, had several factors in common.
Among them was the rifle corps, which as the largest tactical unit,
constituted the battle's organisational heart, usually as part of a
larger operational effort. The corps, aside from its organic forces,
might also be reinforced with tanks, artillery and other weapons from
the high command's reserve. The manual recommended dividing these
forces into separate 'shock' and 'holding' (skovyvaiushchaia) groups
in both offensive and defensive situations. Within the shock group
are concentrated the greater part of the Corp's organic weapons, as
well as those allocated from above. The shock group's battle order
is arranged to a depth of two to three echelons, which were to
augment the first echelon's attack from the depth. Likewise, a
breakthrough anywhere along the attack front was to be immediately
exploited by units from the follow-on echelons and the reserve.
The holding group, would tie down the defender along secondary
sectors and prevent him from concentrating his forces against the
main effort. The holding group would generally not receive addition-
al forces for its supporting mission, and might be obliged to attack
along a relatively broad front in order to facilitate the massing of
Vremennvi, pp. 10, 16.
87 Ibid, pp. 9-li, 16.
Ibid, pp. 59-61.
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men and weapons along the main sector. However, the holding group's
attack cannot be limited to a mere demonstration, and it must carry
out its mission to the best of its limited means. As soon as the
enemy's defence along the main sector begins to give way, the holding
group's attack must merge with the larger effort. Likewise, in a
defensive battle, the holding group would try to weaken or halt the
enemy attack before it reached the main defensive position. If this
fails, the shock group would then launch a counterattack to restore
the situation.89
Tank battalions, Bubordinated to the infantry division command-
ers, made up the bulk of the infantry support tanks. Tanks detailed
from the high command reserve might be used to strengthen the infan-
try attack, or would be formed into a separate long-range tank
echelon under the control of the corps commander, or even of his
division commanders. The corps commander would also allocate his
organic and attached artillery park to special infantry support,
cavalry support and long-range tank support groups. In cases where
the corps was attacking a fortified area, a special 'destruction
artillery' (artilleriia razrusheniia) group would be formed. Final-
ly, asBault aviation would disrupt the arrival of the enemy's re-
serves; support the ground attack; attack enemy rail lines and
storage depots; disrupt his communications and control; and destroy
his aircraft on the ground. Fighter aviation had the task of de-
stroying the enemy's planes, both in the air and on the ground;
protecting the ground assault; and, in certain cases, attacking the
defender's ground forces. Light-bomber aviation would direct its
efforts against enemy troop concentrations, supply bases, communica-
tions and control, railways and airfields.
The meeting battle would unfold under conditions in which both
Bides were advancing towards each other in march formation. For this
reason, the commander was advised to organise his forces along the
Ibid, pp. 61-62.
9° Ibid, pp. 63-68.
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line of march with an eye towards their rapid deployment at the start
of the battle. To this end, the advancing column would generally
Consist of reconnaissance units, a vanguard, the main body, and a
rear detachment. If possible, it was recommended that cavalry tank
and motorised infantry, as well attached artillery, advance in a
separate column for ease of deployment.
In most cases the meeting battle would begin with air strikes
by both sides. These strikes would be directed primarily at the
enemy's troops, his artillery park and supply system, through straf-
ing and bombing attacks, and the dropping of 'poisonous substances'.
As the enemy approached, the vanguard would deploy against his
forward units and engage them. Part of this force would attack the
enemy in order to pin down his forward troops, while the vanguard's
main body moved against the enemy's flanks, in an effort to destroy
the enemy's vanguard before it could fully deploy.92
Should both sides persist in their efforts until the arrival of
their columns' main forces, further fighting would develop in the
manner already described. In this case the attacker's vanguard would
serve as the holding group for the formation's main effort by engag-
ing the enemy in a frontal assault, to divert his attention from the
forthcoming attack. The column's main forces, liberally supplied
with tanks, artillery and air power, would constitute the shock
group, which would deploy behind the holding group's screen for an
attack against the enemy's flanks and rear. If successful, the
attack would hit the enemy's main forces before they had time to
deploy, cutting off some units and destroying others. The battle
would conclude with the relentless pursuit of the enemy forces until
they were completely defeated.93
The 'offensive battle' (nastupatel'nyi boi) was the name given
to the attack against an entrenched defender, whether from the march,
S.A. Smirnov, Taktika (Tactics] (Moscow, 1935), pp. 176-79.
92 Vremennyi, pp. 85, 91; Smirnov, pp. 192-93.
Smirnov, pp. 194-95.
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or in circumstances in which the attacker also occupies a fixed
position. The manual also foresaw the necessity of attacking forti-
fied positions and overcoming the enemy's defence anchored on water
barriers. The attack might also take place in a maneuver setting, in
which the enemy's flanks are open and invite a turning movement, or
along a continuous front, necessitating a breakthrough. In any
event, the amount of space--at 37 pages this was easily the manual's
longest chapter--devoted to the subject indicates that the Soviets
expected such situations to predominate in a future war, a contention
supported by the editor's (Tukhachevskii) public statements.94
Preparations for the attack were complicated, reflecting the
difficulties in achieving the proper coordination of the dissimilar
combat arms and the expected problems of assaulting prepared defenc-
es. To carry this out, the commander was to concentrate two-thirds
of his force at the point of decision. This meant that a reinforced
rifle division would attack along a 3,000-3,500 meter front, with its
regiments aligned in one or two echelons, while the regiments'
battalions advanced in two to three echelons. The attacker'B artil-
lery, both organic and attached, would be grouped according to
designation as previously described, as would the tanks. It was
assumed that in most cases the DD tank attack would precede that of
the infantry and its NPP tanks, although in terrain deemed difficult
for tanks this order might be reversed. In such a case, the infantry
and the NPP tanks would advance first, in order to seize the enemy's
forward defensive zone and create gaps in his anti-tank defence. The
long-range tanks would then be committed into these corridors for the
subsequent drive into the enemy's defensive depth.
Air strikes, conducted against the targets already described,
signalled the beginning of the battle, while the attacker's 'artille-
ry preparation' augured the commencement of the ground assault. The
artillery preparation might last as little as 10-15 minutes, or
Tukhachevskii, II. 247.
Smirnov, pp. 155-56; Vremennyi, pp. 102, 106.
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continue for several hours, depending on the number and type of guns
available, and the number of tanks slated to take part in the attack.
The state of the enemy's defences also had a bearing on the duration
of this period, with permanent fortifications requiring a longer and
more systematic bombardment. During this phase the artillery's chief
targets were the defender's artillery, his anti-tank weapons, certain
fortifications, and the defender's machine gun emplacements in those
areas not slated for the tank assault. With the beginning of the
long-range tank attack, the artillery would concentrate its fire on
the defender's anti-tank weapons and artillery, while accompanying
the tanks through the enemy defences, with either a rolling barrage
or directed fire. The artillery, upon completing this phase, would
switch its efforts to supporting the infantry-tank attack, during
which it concentrates its fires on the defender's remaining anti-tank
weapons and machine guns.
The long-range tanks would begin their attack immediately upon
the cessation of the artillery preparation by moving into the gaps
blasted in the enemy's anti-tank defence, while at the same time
being covered by continuous artillery fire. The tanks were to avoid
protracted fighting wherever possible and, by bypassing centres of
resistance, would race into the enemy's rear to destroy his reserves,
communications and control centres and artillery, and to cut off the
retreat of those forces engaged at the front. Here the defender
would already be contending with the infantry-tank attack, which was
to begin immediately upon the DD tanks' passage into the enemy rear,
so as to take advantage of the disruption caused to the defender's
fire system. The NPP tanks, supported by artillery fire, would then
advance to clear a path for the infantry by suppressing the defend-
er's machine gun system. As soon as the tanks passed through the
forward defence line the infantry would begin its attack, following
behind the tanks at a distance of 200 meters and consolidating this
success by exploiting gaps in the enemy defence and moving into his
Vremennvi, pp. 111-12.
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rear. Elsewhere, the attacker's forces would beat off enemy counter-
attackB, resulting in the defender's encirclement and destruction.97
With the rupture of the enemy's tactical defence along the main
axis, the way was now open to exploit the success by a vigorous
pursuit in depth. The corps commander would direct his mobile units
to continue the attack along the enemy's flanks and in his rear. In
the air, assault and light-bomber aviation would harry the defender's
retreating columns, particularly at river crossings and other natural
obstacles, while fighter aviation would cover the pursuing columns.
The enemy forces still resisting along the attack's inner flanks
would be cut off and surrounded by the attacker's mobile units in the
rear, to be dealt with by the infantry units moving up from the rear.
At this point the tactical phase would end and the way now lay open
to transforming the success into one of operational proportions.98
The manual viewed the tactical defence as an unpleasant but
sometimes necessary measure to husband forces for an attack along
another sector; to win time in order to gather forces for an attack;
to occupy the enemy until the main attack has succeeded; to retain
vital territory; and, to foil the enemy's attack in order to launch a
counterattack. The defensive battle might be waged along a broad
front, based on non-contiguous but mutually-supporting Btrongpoints,
which would sacrifice territory in exchange for time, and; along a
continuous front, which was viewed as the most likely form.
The defence, in most cases, would consist of a forward zone of
engineering and chemical obstacles, up to 12 kilometers from the main
position, and manned by small infantry units and artillery. Behind
this lay a somewhat stronger zone of defensive strongpoints, one to
three kilometers from the main zone. The main defensive position
contained the bulk of the defender's forces and weapons, including
divisional shock groups. Behind this line, at a remove of 12-15
Ibid, pp. 106, 115; Smirnov, p. 165.
Vremennyi, pp. 119-21.
Ibid, pp. 132, 153-54.
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kilometers, lay the rear defensive zone. A rifle division in such an
arrangement would occupy a front of eight to 12 kilometers in breadth
and four to six in depth, with its subordinate units occupying
proportionately smaller
The manual stressed that modern defence must be, above all,
anti-tank in character, designed to Cut the enemy armour from its
supporting infantry and destroy it in detail. This involved creating
special anti-tank strongpoints within the main defensive zone,
specially configured so as to create corridors for the passage and
destruction of the enemy tanks. Thus those enemy tanks which sur-
vived the defender's artillery barrage to reach the main defensive
zone would be met by massed fire from anti-tank guns and the defend-
er's own tanks, The greater part of the defender's artillery and all
of his infantry weapons would be turned on the advancing infantry.
Those enemy tanks which failed to penetrate to the main defence zone
would, in turn, be attacked by the defender's anti-tank reserve and
his tanks, as the prelude to a larger counterattack by the shock
group. This attack, supported by artillery and aviation, would
either restore the situation or exploit the success into the enemy'B
position
The gap between theory and practice would ultimately reveal a
number of shortcomings in the Red Army's approach to the deep battle.
The most serious of these was the order of attack by the long-range
and infantry support tanks. Even the limited combat experience of
1939-40 would show how awkward this arrangement was in reality.
Moreover, future combat in Mongolia and Finland would show that even
a powerful artillery preparation could not be relied upon to destroy
enough of the defender's anti-tank weapons to enable the long-range
tanks to precede the ground attack without unacceptable losses.
Instead, the infantry and its support tanks would have to clear a
passage in the enemy's tactical defence for the long-range tanks, in
100 Ibid, 134-35.
101 Ibid, pp. 133, 136, 138-39, 149, 151.
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order to preserve the latter's strength for the attack in depth.
More laudable was the Red Army's balanced approach to the
combined-arms battle, which avoided such extremes as the Germans'
excessive reliance on the tank for achieving a breakthrough. This
was offset, however, by the Soviets' continued emphasis on the
employment of large cavalry formations, which was particularly
anachronistic in light of the army's enthusiastic embrace of mechani-
sation in all its forms.
D. The Deep Operation
Under modern conditions, however, it is not enough to simply
break through the enemy's tactical defence, as crucial as that first
step is, and the deep battle offers no solution to the problem of
sustaining an advance beyond the immediate tactical defence zone.
ThiB is because modern defensive arrangements are distinguished above
all by their great depth, and tactical success alone counts for
little against an operational defensive zone extending dozens of
kilometers behind the front line. This area, containing the defend-
er's army and front reserves, presents a serious obstacle to any
attack which seeks to develop a breakthrough beyond the initial
tactical defence and to maintain the offensive's impetus against
these forces. This had been shown to be the case repeatedly during
the Great War, most notably during the Germans' March 1918 offensive
in France, which for all its spectacular success, failed to yield a
decisive operational result.
Offensive gains during the war were confined to the defender's
tactical zone because of the attacker's limited mobility and his
inability to influence the fighting much beyond the immediate battle-
field, due to the restricted range, speed and reliability of existing
weapons. Under these circumstances, the attacker was unable to
exploit even the most favorable tactical success because he could not
push his infantry into and beyond the breach rapidly enough, while
the cavalry and armoured forces at his disposal were too vulnerable
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or technically unreliable to be of much use. As a result, the
defender's army reserves were usually free to move up relatively
unhindered to the threatened area to seal the penetration and restore
the situation, because the attacker's nascent long-range weapons
(tanks and aircraft) were as yet incapable of isolating the battle-
field and preventing their arrival. Thus by the end of the war,
despite a number of impressive tactical achievements, an operational
solution to the trench deadlock Beemed as remote as ever.
By the early 1930s, however, the new weapons had finally come
into their own and their potential could be fully realized. By then,
ongoing improvements in their range, speed and technical reliability
had begun to shift the advantage increasingly in favor of the of fen-
sive, despite impressive parallel improvements in defensive means.
At the same time, new tank and aircraft models were entering service
in amounts sufficient to form motorised divisions, mechanised corps
and air armies. The convergence of these qualitative and quantita-
tive trends prompted many of the Red Army's leading thinkers to take
up the problem of adapting the conduct of offensive and defensive
operations to the new technology.
The result was the theory of the 'deep operation' (glubokaia
operatsiia), the development of which was substantially completed by
1936-37, although the basic idea was continually refined for many
years afterwards. The deep operation was geared towards operations
at the army and/or front level and was at once larger, in terms of
forces engaged, than the deep battle, which in organisational terms
reached no higher than a corps. It was also considerably more
ambitious in its goal of combining the efforts of ground, air and
airborne forces to launch a 'simultaneous blow throughout the entire
depth of the enemy's operational defence', in order to prevent or
delay the arrival of his operational reserves by defeating these
units in detail; surround and destroy those units still at the front,
and; to continue the offensive into the defender's operational and
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strategic
Central to the deep operation's success was the composition of
the shock army, either acting independently, or with other armies as
part of a larger front operation. However, during these years, as in
the preceding decade, the single army operation remained the focus of
attention. The term had been popularized by Triandafillov, who made
the shock army the centrepiece of his The Character of O perations of
Modern Armies, and it retained its utility throughout the 1930s,
despite the army's changing structure. The shock army, according to
Triandafillov's original proposal, would consist of 12-18 rifle
divisions, grouped into four to five corps. These units would be
supplemented with some 16-20 artillery regiments and eight to 12 tank
battalions, plus additional fighter and anti-aircraft units to
provide air cover, as well as two or three air brigades for offensive
purposes, and miscellaneous chemical and other units.103
Although Triandafillov's original sketch was fairly modest by
modern standards, it still vastly exceeded the Red Army's technical
capabilities as of 1929. However, the quantitative achievements in
military production resulting from the first Five-Year Plan soon
caused Triandafillov to revise his projections. By 1931 he was
proposing a number of variations on the theme of the shock army,
comprising 12-15 rifle divisions (four or five corps). The shock
army, according to one proposal, would be reinforced for an offensive
operation with six to nine artillery regiments, plus another two or
three regiments of heavy guns. Another variant posited an additional
12-18 tank and tankette battalions, supplemented by one or two
additional battalions of heavy tanks. A third proposal foresaw a
more balanced distribution of offensive weaponry of up to three or
four artillery regiments, two to three heavy artillery regiments, and
eight to 12 tank and tankette battalions. The shock army might be
102 N. Varfolomeev, 'Operativnoe Iskusstvo na Sovremennom Etape'
[Operational Art at a Modern Stage], Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow), 3 June 1932,
p. 2.
103 Triandafillov, Kharakter, 1st ed., pp. 96-99.
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further reinforced by the inclusion of two or three aviation brigades
of assault and light-bomber aircraft, plus six to eight fighter
squadrons, for an overall strength, including organic air units, of
500-600 planes. 104 Triandafillov, to judge from the report, was
not immune to the zeal for mechanisation then sweeping the army,
although even more equipment-heavy proposals were to appear.
Triandafillov died not long after submitting the report, but
his work on the shock army's composition was continued by colleagues
in the RKKA Staff apparatus. These ideas were elaborated in the
report 'The RXKA's Tactics and Operational Art at a New Stage', which
was distributed in the summer of 1932 for study and comment by
military district commanders and other high-ranking personnel. And
although the document appeared over Chief of Staff Egorov's signa-
ture, the ideas expressed are unmistakably Triandafillov's and
represent a further distillation of his views.
One proposal, evidently tailored to an army attacking in an
area unsuited for the mass employment of armour, posited a 15-divi-
sion shock army, reinforced with 468 guns (108 of them of the heavy
type) from the High Command Artillery Reserve. Combined with the
rifle corps' organic complement of 1,515 small and medium-calibre
weapons, this yielded a total of 1,983 guns of all types, plus 250
tanks drawn from the corps' organic stocks. A second variant,
intended for an army attacking in an area more favorable for tanks,
proposed reinforcing the shock army with 348 guns, for a total of
1,863 artillery pieces, including 108 heavy guns. The reduction in
firepower would be offset by the addition of 20 tank battalions
(1,000 tanks) from the High Command Tank Reserve, or 1,500 tanks in
all, including organic corps vehicles. The shock army might be
further reinforced by the addition of between four and five assault
and light bomber brigades, two reconnaissance and five to six fighter
squadrons, which, including organic corps and other unitB, would
raise the army's air strength to some 850-900 aircraft. In case of
104 TBGASA, fond 37977, opis' 3, delo 368, p. 966.
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need, the shock army might also call upon the front'B heavy bomber
units.
Triandafillov's untimely death in the summer of 1931 left the
small fraternity of operational theorists 'orphaned' and lacking
direction, according to one participant. 106
 One of those who
helped fill the gap was Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev, who was
already known for his earlier writings on the theory of consecutive
operations and the place of operational art in military art. Varfo-
lomeev was born in 1890 and rose to the rank of captain in the
tsarist army during the First World War, and was a member of the old
General Staff Academy's final graduating class in 1918. He joined
the Red Army that same year and later served as chief of an army
staff and deputy chief of staff of a front during the Civil War.
Varfolomeev's peacetime career included a stint as a military dis-
trict chief of staff and service at the Frunze Military Academy,
where he was awarded the distinguished title of professor. From this
position he was ideally placed to pass on the old army's legacy to
the new, which he did through a number of influential articles and
books. Varfolomeev later served as chief of staff of the Leningrad
Military District during the 1939-40 war with Finland and was arrest-
ed as a result of the army's reverses during that disastrous cam-
paign. 107
 The manner of his death is unclear, although it is like-
ly that he was executed in October 1941 in Kuibyshev, along with a
number of other high-ranking commanders.
Varfolomeev's most important work was his 1933 book, The Shock
Army, a detailed analysis of the cycle of German and Allied offensive
operations conducted during the summer of 1918. The subject matter
reflected the Red Army's ongoing preoccupation with the operational
events of the war's climactic year and the lessons to be gleaned from
105 TSGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18, pp. 159-58.
106 Isserson, 'Razvitie', p. 39.
107 R.A. Medvedev, Let History Judge. The Origins and Conseguences of
Stalinism, ed. D. Joravsky and G. Haupt, trans. C. Taylor (New York, 1971),
p. 248.
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them. 108 This was because it was assumed that many of the condi-
tions which obtained in 1918 (continuous fronts, a deeply-echeloned
defence, etc.) would recur in a future war to greater or lesser
degree. Furthermore, the scope of the 1918 fighting was bound to
excite the imagination of an army which more than anything else
sought to avoid a repetition of the 1914-18 trench deadlock.
Varfolomeev's predominantly historical study was less concerned
with the deep operation's quantitative indices that Triandafillov had
been, and specific recommendations as to the size and technical
composition of the shock army are few, although the work's specula-
tive sections presuppose large numbers of aircraft, tanks and mecha-
nised troops. Rather, Varfolomeev focused on the mechanics of the
shock army's mission, which he defined as 'launching an uninterrupt-
ed, deep and shattering blow' along the main axis of advance. Such a
task required that the shock army possess the requisite forces,
firepower and mobility to overcome the enemy's tactical defence and
operational reserves and to complete the destruction of the main
enemy force through a series of consecutive operations.
Varfolomeev believed that the reality of deeply-echeloned
tactical and operational defensive zones called for comparable
measures by the attacker. Or, as he stated in a previous article,
'only a deep formation ensureB the launching of a deep blow'.110
This suggestion was not new, and during 1918 the Germans had attacked
using as many as three echelons. However, the attacks ultimately
foundered because of the attacker'B inability to strike deeply and
quickly enough into and beyond the defender's army reserves, in order
108 See also the articles by A. Mialkovskii, 'Udarnaia Armiia' (The
Shock Army], 3 (1931), no. 2, pp. 48-68; N. Varfolomeev, 'Nastuplenie 18-1
Germanskoi Armii Vesnoi 1918 g.' (The German Eighteenth Army's Spring 1918
Offensive], V&R (1931), no. 7, pp. 42-70, and; Ia. Zhigur, 'ProryvOboronitel-
'noi Sistemy p0 Opytu Mirovoi Voiny' [Breaking Through a Defensive System
According to the Experience of the World War], V&R (1935), Jan.-Feb., pp. 74-
89.
109 Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, p. 173.
110	 N. Varfolomeev, 'Glubokaia Operatsiia' [The Deep Operation],
Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow), 5 Nov. 1932, p. 2.
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to prevent the establishment of a new defensive front. The resulting
need to maintain the necessary tactical densities to carry out
repeated breakthroughs robbed the succeeding echelons of the strength
to sustain an advance into the operational depth. It was only the
appearance of large numbers of new offensive weapons and their
integration into the existing method of employment that enabled the
attacker to simultaneously launch an aBsault throughout the entire
depth of the enemy's army reserves and expand the initial breach of
the defender's tactical zone into a breakthrough of operational
proportions.
Varfolomeev accordingly divided his shock army into two eche-
ions, distinguished by their differing objectives and the numbers and
types of forces allotted to them. The first was the 'tactical
breakthrough echelon' (eshelon takticheskogo proryva), composed of
reinforced rifle corps. These would be backed up by a second line of
divisions from the army's reserve, to sustain the force of the
initial breakthrough attempt. These forces would launch the initial
assault against the defender's tactical zone to a depth of some 15-20
kilometers and contact with his army reserves.111
At this point the army commander would commit hiB second, or
'operational breakthrough echelon' (eshelon operativnogo proryva), to
expand the tactical breakthrough into one of operational scope by
striking deep into the enemy rear. Whereas the first echelon empha-
sised raw striking power in order to pierce the layered enemy de-
fence, the second relied on speed and mobility. This echelon,
heavily reinforced with tanks, mechanised infantry and cavalry units,
would seek to turn the enemy's now-exposed flanks and encircle hiB
forces still engaged along the front, possibly in conjunction with
another shock army's attack. Other units, aided by deep air strikes,
would press the attack into the operational and strategic depth,
defeating the defender's reserves as they move up to the battlefield,
and destroying his communications, command and supply points.
111 Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, pp. 173, 184.
272
Varfolomeev warned that to prevent the enemy's escape, those units
pursuing from the front must advance at a rate of at least 20-25
kilometers per day, while those mobile units operating against his
flanks and rear must cover as much as 40-45 kilometers per day.112
Other proposals were offered during this period in an effort to
'flesh out' the shock army's organisational structure. Among the
most balanced of these was put forward by Varfolomeev's academic
colleague, P.1. Vakulich. The latter's projected shock army consist-
ed of 15-16 rifle divisions; one motor-mechanised and one cavalry
formation; 12-15 tank battalions; nine to 12 additional artillery
regiments; four to six light aviation brigades and a fighter unit, as
well as other air and anti-aircraft units, and, if necessary, light
and heavy bombers from the front command.113
There were a number of excesses as well, which is hardly
Burprising, given the spirit of the times and the pace of the Red
Army's mechanisation drive. One of the more egregious examples of
this was put forward in 1932 by 1a.M. Zhigur, an instructor at the
Frunze Military Academy. Zhigur advocated creating a shock army of
four to five rifle corps, motor-mechanised and cavalry units, 2,000
tanks and as many aircraft, plus 12-15 regiments of guns from the
High Command Artillery Reserve.114
Even these figures are small compared to those contained in a
report compiled by the staff of the Urals Military District in the
autumn of 1936. A shock army, according to this proposal, would
consist of 12 rifle divisions; a mechanised corps and an independent
mechanised brigade; three cavalry divisions; a light-bomber brigade
and two brigades each of assault and fighter aircraft, plus three
reconnaissance squadrons; six tank battalions; five artillery regi-
112 Ibid, pp. 173, 183.
113 p • Vakulich, 'Sovremennaia Operatsiia' [The Modern Operation]. In
V.N. Levichev, ed.,Voina i Voennoe Delo (War and Military Affairs] (Moscow,
1933), p. 557.
114 Ia. Zhigur, '0 "Glubinnoi Taktike" i "Prostranstvennoi Operatsii"'
(On "Deep Tactics" and the "Spatial Operation"], Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow), 15
Aug. 1932, p. 2.
273
ments, plus two heavy artillery battalions; and two battalions of
chemical troops. The shock army, at full strength, would number
nearly 300,000 men; 100,000 horses; 1,668 small-calibre and 1,550
medium and heavy-calibre guns; 722 aircraft, and 2,853 tanks.115
Such extreme proposals were not only far-fetched for the time,
but in numbers of armoured vehicles they greatly exceeded even the
large tank armies of World War II. Considerations of the Soviet
penchant for gigantism aside, these and other, more moderate studies
dealing with the shock army nevertheless represent one of the more
intriguing and productive areas of military though during the inter-
war period. By 1937 the Red Army possessed, at least in theory, a
powerful instrument, which would enable it to meet any operational
eventuality.
The deep operation, as did the deep battle, recognized three
subordinate types. These were the meeting, breakthrough and defen-
sive operations. The latter is self-explanatory and will be dealt
with later. Confusion most often arises when dealing with the other
two types, which are variations of the generic offensive operation.
Whereas the breakthrough operation against an enemy along a continu-
ous front is by and large the defensive operation's opposite number,
the meeting operation occurs when two or more armies, each attacking,
collide. Such a situation most often arises at the beginning of a
war, when both sides are pursuing an offensive strategy, and usually
represents the first major operations along the belligerents' respec-
tive frontiers. The most noteworthy example of a series of meeting
operations occurred along both fronts in August 1914, when the chief
belligerents launched major offensives in the war's first weeks. A
meeting operation might also take place along the still-open flanks
of an otherwise-continuous front, or, on rare occasions, following a
particularly successful breakthrough operation, in which freedom of
maneuver has been temporarily restored.
115 shtab Ural'skogo Voennogo Okruga, Proekt--Osnovy Vedeniia Operatsii
(A Draft--Fundamentals of Waging Operations], (Sverdlovsk], 10 Oct. 1936, pp.
153-54. Considerations of secrecy make it impossible at this time to cite
this archival document in the usual manner.
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The meeting operation, because it is most likely to occur in
the war's first weeks, is closely bound up with the armed forces'
strategic deployment plans. These plans, dictating the army's
placement and initial actions along the frontier, inevitably contain
the germ of the war's opening operations, just as Neznamov had noted
some 20 years before. 116
 This was still the case, although the
armed forces' technical composition had changed dramatically since
1911, with an emphasis on greater range, mechanisation and striking
power. These developments, in turn, had a decisive effect at the
strategic level, as reflected in various theories, discussed earlier,
under the rubric of the 'beginning period of the war'.
As we have seen, the armed forceB' mobilisation and deployment
efforts at the beginning of a war would consist of several strategic
echelons, arriving consecutively from the interior. The first
strategic echelon, according to one scenario, would actually consist
of a number of smaller, operational echelons, divided among them-
Belves according to their range, speed and mobility. The first
operational echelon would consist of aviation, both army organic and
long-range front or strategic forces, capable of bombing targets in
the enemy rear and clearing the way for the ground forces' advance.
The latter would be spearheaded by the second, or army 'vanguard
echelon' (avangardnyi eshelon), or AVE 1 made up of mechanised and
motorised units, plus 'mechanised cavalry'. This would be followed
by the third, or main echelon, containing most of the army's men and
materiel. Finally, the army's reserve echelon, consisting of late-
arriving units and heavier weapons, would bring up the rear. In all,
it was calculated that this invasion army would stretch some 250-300
kilometers to the rear as it advanced, while its front occupied a
mere 75-100 kilometers in breadth.7
Such an extensive echelonment in depth creates several problems
116 Neznamov, p. 15.
Isserson, Evoliutsiia, pp. 79-80; Isserson, Osnovy, p. 64; N.
Varfolomeev, 'VstrechnaiaOperatsiia' (The Meeting Operation], V&R (1930), no.
7, p. 28.
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for the shock army commander. Chief among these is that the vanguard
echelon would engage the enemy first, even as succeeding echelons
were still moving up to the front. This raised the spectre of the
shock army being defeated by a superior enemy before the commander
could bring his entire force to bear, making the uninterrupted
replenishment of the forces at the front by succeeding echelons
critical, lest the army be overwhelmed and defeated in detail. Such
fears led one theorist, G.S. Isserson, to the somewhat schematic
conclusion that in the meeting operation 'ultimate success will go to
him whose operational formation is deeper'.118
Another difficulty was the vital importance which such a deep
formation placed on the proper pre-battle disposition of forces.
That is, the speed at which the different echelons advance makes
large-scale regroupings on the march exceedingly difficult. There-
fore, it was vital that the future shock grouping, or some other
offensive intention already be present in the army's march order. A
turning movement, under these circumstances, was deemed particularly
promising, given the likelihood of open flanks at the onset of
hostilities, and one theorist urged that front commanders to organise
their subordinate armies' marches so that even a frontal collision
would lead to the turning of the enemy's flanks and the encirclement
of his main forces.9
The meeting operation would actually begin in the air, prece-
ding the collision of the ground forces. Prior to this, the army's
'aviation group' would be primarily concerned with covering the
forwards units' march and deployment, and challenging the enemy for
local air superiority. As the two forces approached, the aviation
group's efforts would be increasingly directed against the enemy's
118 Isserson, Evoliutsiia, p. 82.
119 E. Shilovskii, 'Vstrechnaia Operatsiia' (The Meeting Operation],
Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow), 11 Nov. 1932, p. 2. Among others who felt that the
army's march order should reflect its future battle order were Isserson,
Osnovy, p. 66; Varfolomeev, 'Vstrechnaia', p. 29, and; A. Bazarevskii,
'Vstrechnaia Operatsiia' [The Meeting Operation], Voennaia M ysi' (Military
Thought] (1937), no. 3, p. 104.
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troops, supply lines and rail installations. In certain cases,
bombing and other air activity may be conducted to a depth of 300
kilometers and be accompanied by gas attacks and airborne landings in
the enemy reari2°
The ground battle would open with the vanguard echelon's attack
against the approaching enemy's flanks. This echelon, as it closes
with the enemy, may leap forward as much as 100 kilometers ahead of
the main body, while remaining in supporting distance by the latter.
Smaller forces will simultaneously launch a supporting attack to aid
the main effort, or, if defending, tie down enemy forces while the
main attack progresses. The battle would continue with increasing
intensity during the second and third days, as the vanguard echelon
is steadily reinforced by infantry and other units arriving from the
main body. The shock army, even while attacking, would still have to
contend with the enemy's air and mechanised raids, as the battle
ebbed and flowed along the front and in depth. In such a highly-
fluid situation the operation may develop on both sides to a depth of
150-200 kilometers.121
Should the army's main attack prove successful, its mechanised
forces, having turned the enemy's flank, will break into his rear
areas, followed by infantry units to consolidate the success. As the
defender begins to withdraw, the shock army's motor-mechanised and
cavalry units take up the pursuit by attacking his retreating col-
umns, in order to cut off and surround them. Meanwhile, the shock
army's air arm would harry the retreat from above, attacking both
troops and vital crossings. The pursuit would be pushed as far as
possible until exhaustion sets in. At this point, it was predicted
that the front would temporarily stabilise along positional lines, at
which time preparations for a new operation would begin.
A variation of this scenario posited the failure of the van-
120 Isserson, Osnovy , p. 81; Bazarevskii, pp. 109-11.
Shilovskii, 'Vstrechnaia', p. 2; Isserson, Osnovy , p. 76.
122 Shilovskii, 'Vstrechnaia', p. 2; Isserson, Osnovy, p. 76.
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guard echelon's initial assault during the first two days. In such
an event, it was recommended that the mobile units be withdrawn from
the battle to conserve their strength, with the main burden of the
fighting then shifting to the infantry. Should the latter effort
succeed, the vanguard echelon would then be recommitted into the
battle to exploit rifle corps' success in depth.
Isserson paid special attention to the ambiguous nature of
certain meeting operations, in which elements of the breakthrough
operation are already clearly discernable. Such a situation might
arise, he noted, when the vanguard echelon, having failed in its
attack, is forced by enemy resistance to fall back upon the upcoming
main echelon. In such a case, the vanguard echelon would be with-
drawn and itB place at the front taken by the main echelon. Isserson
called this situation a 'crisis' in the development of the meeting
operation, in which the attacker has already lost the maneuver
advantage afforded by the presence of open flanks, and now faces the
prospect of an impending solid front. However, he maintained that
conditions still existed for successfully concluding the operation,
due to the relative elasticity and undeveloped nature of the enemy's
defences, without resorting to a full-fledged breakthrough.124
This revived meeting operation would get under way with an
attack by the main echelon's infantry units, supported by air strikes
against the defender's front line troops and his rear targets. The
attack would develop slowly at first, achieving a depth of only 20
kilometers during the first two days. Isserson calculated, however,
that by the third day the breach in the enemy front would be suff i-
ciently wide to commit the former vanguard echelon, now styled the
'success development echelon' (eshelon razvitiia uspekha), or ERU,
into the battle, to carry the fighting into the enemy's operational
depth. By the end of the fourth day the main echelon might have
advanced as far as 50-60 kilometers, while the ERtJ would resume its
123 Shilovskii, 'Vstrechnaia', p. 2; Isserson, Osnovy , pp. 81-82.
124 Isserson, Osnovy , pp. 83-84.
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former place in the army's advance by penetrating up to 100 kilome-
ters in pursuit of the enemy along the lines already described.125
However, the meeting operation, for all of the army's attention
to the subject, never achieved the status of the breakthrough opera-
tion, chiefly because Soviet theorists, whatever their declared
preference for maneuver, fully expected that a future conflict would
contain extended periods of positional warfare. This bias was
further strengthened by the type of offensive operations the Red Army
conducted during World War II, which chiefly involved breaking
through fixed positions along a relatively static, although porous
front. This experience, in turn, had a retroactive effect on postwar
Soviet views, in which the meeting operation has been nearly eclipsed
by its better-known relation.
The breakthrough operation against an entrenched defender was
the centrepiece of the Red Army's thinking about the deep operation
during the 1930s. As such, the question attracted the army's best
minds, who responded with a number of complex schemes, both open and
classified, for breaking the positional deadlock and restoring
maneuver to operations.
One of these waa Tukhachevkii, who was now entering upon his
most mature and productive period as a military theorist, in spite of
the enormous demands on his time as overseer of the armed forces'
technical rearmament. A contemporary described Tukhachevskii as the
army's 'most outstanding military man, according to his strategic
range of interests and operational capabilities'. 126 These views
found expression in his New Problems of War, the first part of a
projected three-volume work which the author dedicated to the recent-
ly-deceased Triandafillov. Tukhachevskii, who began working on the
manuscript in 1931, evidently saw the work as a technically more-
sophisticated update of his earlier Future War. Unfortunately, a
revised draft was either lost or destroyed following Tukhachevskii's
125 Ibid, pp. 84-85; 87-88.
126 Isserson, 'Zapiski', p. 65.
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death in 1937, and only the earlier version remains.
Another, lesser-known, figure was Aleksandr Il'ich Egorov, who
during most of this period served as chief of the RKKA Staff, which
in 1935 was renamed the RKKA General Staff. Egorov, as were most of
those who occupied this position during the interwar period, was a
former military specialist. Born in 1885, he rose to the rank of
colonel during World War I, before joining the Red Army in 1918,
where he commanded the Southern and Southwestern fronts and quickly
fell under the influence of his political commissar, Joseph Stalin.
Egorov commanded a number of military districts after the war, before
becoming Chief of Staff in 1931. He has been unflatteringly de-
scribed as a 'figurehead' chief of staff and lacking the 'ability to
initiate much on his own'. 127 Egorov, while he certainly did not
possess Tukhachevskii's brilliance and drive, by virtue of his good
relations with Stalin and Voroshilov, could still push measures which
his brash young counterpart could not. However, his long association
with the Stalinist clique in the army did not save him in the end,
and Egorov fell a victim to the purges at the end of the l930s.
Egorov's chief contribution to the theoretical debate was his
sponsorship of the report 'The RKKA's Tactics and Operational Art at
a New Stage', which provides an interesting glimpse of the army's
early official views on conducting the breakthrough operation. The
report, modeled closely on Triandafillov's 193]. memorandum, echoed
the latter's preoccupation with the strength of modern defence, which
may extend up to 100-120 kilometers in depth and include both the
defenders' tactical zone and his army reserves as well. The only
hope of piercing this formidable barrier lay in the harmonious
employment of the new combat arms, which the report identified as
modern 'strategic' cavalry, motorised and mechanised forces, avia-
tion, airborne troops, and chemical weapons. 128 The resulting mar-
riage of firepower and maneuver would enable the attacker to conduct
127 Martel, p. 24.
128 TsGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18, pp. 141-39.
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an offensive throughout the entire depth of the enemy defence and to
destroy the defender's front-line troops and deep reserves simulta-
neously.
Triandafillov's influence is particularly evident in Tukhachev-
skii's insistence that the offensive be mounted along a sufficiently
broad front to ensure a decisive outcome. He criticized the Germans'
March 1918 decision to launch their attack towards Amiene along a
narrow (80 kilometers) front, which, he contended, left the Allies
free to shift reserves to the threatened area. Tukhachevskii's
attitude is not surprising, as the vast spaces of Eastern Europe made
anything but a broad-front attack pointless. As we have seen,
Brusilov reached the same conclusion in 1916 and enjoyed great
initial success, although he lacked the technical means to exploit
this victory to any great depth. This caused Tukhachevskii to
conclude that in most cases 'The wider the attack front, the greater
will be the operation's success'. 1
	The author also echoed
Triandafillov's preference for an encirclement as the operation's
culmination. This would be achieved either by twin blows along
converging axes, or through a single turning movement to pin the
defender against a natural barrier or neutral frontier.1
Egorov's shock army assault would begin with a heavily-infantry
assault against the enemy's tactical defence zone along the lines
already described. Upon penetrating to a depth of six to 10 kilome-
ters, the army commander would commit his mobile forces to develop
the attack in depth. Motor-mechanised units were expected to advance
as deeply as 80-100 kilometers on the first day after commitment,
with the more vulnerable cavalry covering the advance's flanks to a
depth of 50-60 kilometers. These units would be supported by air-
borne landings in the enemy rear, to disrupt the arrival of the
defender's reserves. The army's mobile formations would meanwhile
129 M.N. Thkhachevskii, Novye Voprosy
 Voiny [New Problems of War]
(Moscow], 1932, TsGASA, fond 33987, opis' 3, delo 1257, pp. 194-96.
° Ibid, pp. 189-92.
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continue their attack, successively defeating the defender's reserves
and destroying his airfields. These units would press on until the
'complete tactical encirclement' of the defender'B forces still
engaged at the front. Upon the defender's withdrawal, the pursuit
phase would begin, with the infantry pressing him from the front,
while motor-mechanised and cavalry forces would harry the retreat
along the flanks, to cut off and encircle his retreating units.131
When Tukhachevskii began writing New Problems of War the Red
Army's mechanisation program was only getting under way and some of
his judgements betray an unreflective enthusiasm for the new combat
arms and their potential. This was particularly evident in his
comments concerning airborne forces, which he blithely assumed could
act independently of the main forces for extended periods of time
before returning to their base. Egorov, on the other hand, suffered
from a lingering and archaic attachment to the cavalry arm, however
'modernised' it might be, although his views elsewhere were progres-
sive enough for the time. In this, as in other areas, the two men's
differences were due as much to temperament as conviction.
Certainly one of the most talented and original, although least
well known, operational theorists of this period or any other was
Georgii Samoilovich Isserson. Born in 1898, he was very much a
product of the Soviet system, although like many others of his
generation he undoubtedly owed much to the writings of his tearist
predecessors. Isserson, following service in the Civil War, was
graduated from the RKXA Military Academy in 1924 and held a variety
of command and staff assignments over the next few years. In 1931
IB8erBon was appointed to head the Frunze Academy's new 'operational
department', and in 1936 he became the first chief of the department
of army operations in the new General Staff Academy, where he was
subsequently awarded the title of professor. One officer who studied
under him called Isserson 'the most capable theoretician in the field
of operational art' following Triandafillov's death, although he felt
131 TSGASA, fond 31983, opis' 2, delo 18, p. 136.
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that Isserson overestimated his own importance. 132
 Following ser-
vice as an army chief of staff during the Finnish War, Isserson was
arrested in July 1941 for criticising the military leaderBhip and
spent the next 14 years in labour camps and internal exile. He was
rehabilitated and returned to Moscow only in 1955, although his
health had been ruined for good. Isserson nonetheless continued his
academic labours in retirement until his death in 1976.133
Isserson was one of the most prolific and erudite authors
writing on tactics and operations during the 19305•1M Among his
most important works on operational art were The Evolution of O pera-
tional Art (1932, 1937), and Fundamentals of the Dee p
 Operation
(1933), the latter of which remains classified to this day.
Isserson's idee fix. was the greatly enhanced role which the
factor of depth had come to play in military affairs at all levels.
According to this view, military strategy had developed from Napole-
onic times and the 'strategy of a single point', through the Moltke
era and the 'epoch of linear strategy', as the increased importance
of fire caused military activities to expand in terms of breadth.
The latter form, with its distinctive flanking maneuver, was evident
at Konnigratz (1866), Metz (1870), Mukden (1905), and during the
opening battles of World War I. However, Isserson argued that the
disappearance of the open flank and the continuous front from the
autumn of 1914 meant that this strategy was no longer viable. This
meant, he wrote, resorting to Marxist terminology, that 'the linear
strategy had arrived at its antithesis', a theoretical dead end from
132 I.Kh. Bagramian, Moi Vospominaniia [My Reminiscences] (Erevan,
1979), pp. 158-59.
133 F. Sverdlov, 'On Videl Budushchuiu Voinu' [He Saw the Future War],
Patriot [The Patriot] (Moscow), 1992, no. 19, p. 11.
134 Isserson's tactical works include 'Kharakter Upravleniia Sovremennym
Boezn' [The Character of Directing the Modern Battle], V&R (1931), no. 5, pp.
56-62; 'Istoricheskie Formy Novykh Form Boia' [The Historical Roots of the New
Forms of Battle], Voennaia Mysi' [Military Thought] (1937), no. 1, pp. 3-27,
and; Lektsii p0 Glubokoi Taktike [Lectures on Deep Tactics] (Moscow, 1933).
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which it could develop no further. 135
 Military art now faced the
task of breaking through a solid and deeply-echeloned front, which
brought to the fore the factor of depth. Its role in the Great War
and the likelihood that similar conditions would obtain in a future
conflict caused Isserson to conclude that 'we are at the dawn of a
new epoch in military art, and must move from a linear strategy to a
deep strategy'.
This overall 'deepening' of war affected all levels of warfare,
as was Bhowrl in the section covering the war's beginning period and
the deep battle. The effect upon operational art was no less dramat-
ic, and Isserson fully expected some form of positional warfare to
recur following the clash of the sides' first strategic echelons in
the war's opening meeting operations.137
This meant that the Red Army faced the prospect of having to
break through a deeply-echeloned front, whose depth Isserson calcu-
lated at between 100 and 120 kilometers. This area, he stated,
consisted of three separate zones of varying depth. The first, or
tactical, zone constituted the main line of resistance and was made
up of two defensive positions. The first of these extended back some
five to six kilometers from the front line, and a second 12 to 15
kilometers behind the forward edge of the first position. Behind
this lay the operational zone, larger and less densely occupied than
the first, embracing the railheads and supply stations to a depth of
50-60 kilometers. Here were concentrated the army's main reserves,
airfields and support troops. A third, or rear, zone completed the
picture. This area served as the link between the front and the
country's strategic rear and included the area between the main rail
distribution stations and the railheads. Also located in this zone
were the front (strategic) reserves and heavy bomber airfields, as
135 Isserson, Evoliutsiia, pp. 19-24, 40.
136 Ibid, p. 62.
137 Ibid, pp. 58-59, 82; Osnovy , p. 91.
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well as the army's, and perhaps the front's, headquarters.
Such imposing depth raised the specter of a return to the
conditions of 1914-18 and the dreary prospect of 'gnawing through'
the enemy's defences. Isserson, to counter this, offered his own
impressive shock army. This would comprise 15 rifle divisions; two
cavalry divisions; three mechanised brigades; a motorised division;
20 tank battalions; eight howitzer regiments; four ground-support air
brigades, and; two light-bomber brigades. This would yield, in raw
figures, a force of 1,472 guns (575 of them heavy), 1,457 tanks (300
medium and the remainder light), 1,045 aircraft, including 378
assault aircraft and 168 light bombers, for a total force of slightly
over 350,000 men. 139
 Experience would later show that Isserson's
shock army was too large and cumbersome to be controlled by a single
army commander. Indeed, such a formidable combination of men and
materiel compared favorably in size to some of the wartime fronts a
decade later.
Isserson, as had Varfolomeev, divided his army into two parts
for conducting the breakthrough operation. By far the largest of
these was the 'attack echelon' (eshelon ataki), or BA, which had the
initial tactical mission of piercing the enemy's forward defensive
zone. The BA would consist of five rifle corps, of which four would
be reinforced with the 20 tank battalions and 12 artillery regiments
to ensure a preponderance of force at the point of decision. Once
the breach was made, the 'breakthrough development echelon' (eshelon
razvitiia proryva), or ERP, would rush into the gap to exploit the
success in depth. Configured for operating in highly-fluid condi-
tions, the ERP's strength lay in its mobility rather than raw strik-
ing power, and accordingly consisted of a mechanised corps, a cavalry
corps, a motorised division, and an airborne detachment.
The breadth of the shock army's attack zone had always been
138 Osnovy , pp. 95-99.
139 Ibid, p. 33.
140 Ibid, pp. 30-31.
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another critical factor in Soviet calculations. Isserson believed
that the army should attack along an overall frontage of 70-80
kilometers. According to this scenario, the four reinforced rifle
corps would make the main breakthrough attack along a front no less
than 30 kilometers in width, which was considered the minimum neces-
sary to allow for the ERP's passage through the gap without interfer-
ence from the defender's artillery along the flanks of the penetra-
tion. The breakthrough zone, under especially favorable conditions,
might be expanded to 45-50 kilometers. In this case, each reinforced
rifle corps would attack along a 10-12 kilometer front, with each
division in the corps' first echelon attacking along a six-kilometer
front, with a density of 18.5 guns, 13.1 aircraft, and 18.2 tanks per
kilometer. The fifth rifle corps would support the main effort with
its own attack along a 15-20 kilometer front.141
The breakthrough operation would begin in the air, one or two
days before the start of the ground attack. This phase would immedi-
ately extend throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational
defence, with the main mass of the army's air strength (fighters and
assault aircraft) directed against the defender's air strength and
his front-line positions along the projected breakthrough zone.
Bomber aviation would seek out targets deeper in the enemy rear, in
order to isolate the battlefield and prevent the arrival of the
defender's reserves to the threatened area. At the same time, the
army's airborne detachment (ADO) would be dropped some 50-60 kilome-
ters behind the front, with the task of disrupting the defender's
command and control system.
The ground attack would commence with the EA's assault against
the defender's tactical zone in a combined ground-air attack along
the lines of the deep battle. The defender's first position would
141 Ibid, pp. 28-29, 32-34, 109-10. Isserson's calculations were
supported by a several of his contemporaries. See Triandafillov, Kharakter,
1st ed., pp. 121, 126; Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, pp. 181-82, and; Vakulich, p.
555.
142 Isserson, Osnovy, pp. 103, 113, 121.
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receive the brunt of the assault, as the second position was rarely
fully-manned and served chiefly as a reserve position for the front-
line troops. Isserson calculated that the fighting for the first
position would continue four or five hours, which he considered
sufficient time to break through to a depth of five to six kilome-
ters. At this point he recommended committing the ERP into the
breach, a decision which he called 'one of the most complex and
responsible' in the entire operation, requiring all the army command-
er's skill. To commit the ERP too early meant involving it in the
battle for the first tactical position, from which it might emerge
too weak to carry out its primary mission of striking in depth. To
delay in committing the echelon would allow the first position's
defenders time to fall back and occupy the second position and be
reinforced by reserves from the defensive depth, which might well
necessitate a repetition of the tactical breakthrough.143
The question of when to commit the ERP was studied intensively
by Isserson's department of army operations during the winter of
1937. The study, entitled 'The Army Offensive Operation in the
Beginning Period of a War' examined in detail this and a number of
other questions, many of which would remain a source of controversy
for many years.1
The study posited three possible scenarios for committing the
ERP into battle. The first involved an attack against a weak defend-
er lacking major reserves. In this case, the ERP would be committed
at the beginning of the attack, or before the complete rupture of the
tactical defence. The second alternative, however, was considered
the most likely and involved an attack against a moderately strong
defender. In this case the ERP would be committed once the tactical
defence had been pierced, preferably by the end of the first day.
The third scenario was considered the most difficult and foresaw an
143 Ibid, pp. 105-06, 113-14.
144 Zakharov, General'nyi, p. 105; V.A. Anfilov, Bessmertnyi Podvig [The
Eternal Feat] (Moscow, 1971), p. 143.
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attack against heavily-fortified defensive positions. In such a
situation the ERP would be committed along with the attack echelon to
strengthen the weight of the blow against the tactical defence zone.
This was considered the least preferable variant, as it would involve
heavy fighting through the tactical defence zone for several days,
resulting in serious losses and a corresponding decline in the
breakthrough development echelon's ability to subsequently exploit
the success in depth.145
The department also examined the possible forms which the ERP's
actions might assume after piercing the tactical defence. The first,
or brief, variant pitted a relatively weak attacker and defender
against each other. In this case, the ERP, having broken through the
tactical zone's second position, would turn immediately inward to
encircle the remaining defenders, leaving only a few mobile units to
carry the advance to a depth of up to 50 kilometers. The second, or
deep, variant involved an attack by a powerful breakthrough echelon
to a depth of as much as 100 kilometers. The ERP, in conjunction
with air strikes and airborne landings in the rear, would engage and
destroy the defender's operational reserves and block the retreat of
those defenders still at the front. The third, or 'combined',
variant posited the actions of two separate armies' breakthrough
development echelons as part of a larger front operation. In this
case, the armies' two ERPs, operating along converging axes, would
drive deep into the defender's rear to encircle large numbers of
enemy forces.
According to Isserson, the ERP's mechanised corps would be
committed into the tactical breach on the first day, followed by the
cavalry corps in the case of a single, large penetration. If more
than one breakthrough zone developed, the two formations might be
committed simultaneously along different sectors. This would be
145 G. Isserson, 'Razvitie Teorii Sovetskogo Operativnogo Iskusstva v
30-e Gody' (The Development of the Theory of Soviet Operational Art in the
'30s], V-IZh (1965), no. 3, p. 53.
146 Ibid, pp. 53-54.
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followed on the operation's second day be the introduction of the
ERP's motorised division.147
The mechanised corps would quickly pass through the defender's
unoccupied second tactical position and into the operational defence
zone to a depth of 50-60 kilometers during the day following the
breakthrough. The cavalry corps will advance along a slightly
different axis to a depth of 30-40 kilometers. Together the two
formations form the wedge of the shock army's projected turning
movement, with the mechanised corps covering the longer, outer flank,
and the cavalry the shorter, inner flank. By the end of the first
day the ERP is to link up with the airborne forces in the enemy rear
while attacking and destroying the defender's operational reserves as
they move up to the battlefield. These activities are supported by
the greater part of the army's air group, which covers the ERP's
advance and assists the attack by targeting the defender's reserves
and communications. At the same time, strategic aviation would
assist in isolating the battlefield by attacking mobilisation, supply
and rail centres in the enemy's interior.'1"8
By the end of the second day following the breakthrough the ERP
will in several places have penetrated throughout the rear zone to a
depth of 100-120 kilometers. Here, the echelon will continue its
attacks against the defender's reserves, while at the same time it
seeks to complete the encirclement of those defenders now isolated
along the original front, in conjunction with the infantry units.
The EA's lead units, meanwhile, would clear the enemy's tactical zone
by the end of the second day, where they will assist the army's
mobile group in 'mopping up' any lingering enemy resistance. Once
this task was completed, the EA could then be brought up by auto
transport over the next few days to the ERP's front.'149
147 Isserson, Osnovy , pp. 114, 117.
11.8 Ibid, pp. 115-16, 118-20, 122.
149 Ibid, pp. 117-18, 123; Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, p. 182; Vakulich, p.
558; I.S. Savinov, 'Operatsii Okruzheniia' (Encirclement Operations],
(1934), July-Aug., p. 23.
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A success of this magnitude, as a result of the breakthrough
operation, inevitably raised the question of the offensive's further
development in depth. This, in turn, meant conducting a series of
consecutive operations, the theoretical elaboration of which had been
substantially completed by the end of the 1920s.
Isserson believed that the necessity for conducting such
operations would quickly become evident, even as the initial break-
through operation was reaching its zenith. This was because the
defender, despite his defeat, would by the operation's fourth or
fifth day have succeeded in bringing up sufficient forces from his
deep reserves to construct the rudiments of a new front. Should
these forces counterattack, a new operation would begin, unfolding
along the lines of the meeting operation, as described earlier. In
such a case, the ERP would automatically become the vanguard echelon,
while the EA would assume the functions of the army's main echelon.
Those units whose arrival is delayed by the need to finish of f those
defenders still at the front, constitute the reserve echelon. Like-
wise, should the enemy's reserves succeed in halting the attacker and
reestablishing a solid front, a new breakthrough operation would have
to be organised.150
Isserson calculated that a series of consecutive operations
launched from the USSR's western frontier against the Polish army
would require a month to reach the line of the middle Vistula, a
distance of some 400 kilometers. This meant an average daily rate of
advance of 15 kilometers, not counting those relatively immobile days
spent preparing new breakthrough operations.151
An uninterrupted advance to such a depth, although it held out
the opportunity for great operational success, inevitably raised the
specter of exhaustion. As we have seen, success depends ultimately
upon the attacker's human and materiel superiority over the defender
at every stage of a series of operations, and particularly at its
150 Isserson, Osnovy , pp. 127-29.
151 Ibid, pp. 130-31.
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culmination point. An operation without this superiority risked
defeat even under the most favorable conditions, as had been the case
in 1914 and 1920. If anything, the problem had grown more acute
since then, as modern armies' materiel needs had increased substan-
tially, even as the means of delivering the necessary supplies had
changed very little. Varfolomeev, for example, calculated a shock
army's daily supply needs at 40-45 trains during an offensive, which
was moderate in comparison with other projections. 152 One author's
gloomy reading of these statistics led him to conclude that supply
problems would compel a future attacker to call a halt in the advance
after only 150-200 kilometers, in order to put his rear services in
order 153
Isserson, however, was considerably more sanguine as to the
prospects of conducting operations to such a great depth, and his
optimism was based primarily on his faith in the efficacy of modern
technology to overcome most of the shock army's supply problems. He
calculated that a series of operations carried to a depth of 400
kilometers would outstrip its rail lines by some 150 kilometers,
given an average daily repair rate of eight kilometers. The remain-
ing distance could be filled by the army's organic transport system
and divisional supply services to a depth of 125 kilometers, leaving
a supply shortfall of 25 kilometers. Isserson maintained that this
distance could easily be made up, either by increasing the rate of
rail repair, or expanding the capabilities of the army's supply
system.154
However, even Isserson was forced to admit that the carrying
capacity of a newly-restored rail line would probably be insufficient
to meet all of the shock army's supply needs during the course of a
152 Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, p. 186. See also F. Trutko, 'Material'noe
Obespechenie Operatsii. Udarnol Armii' (The Materiel Supply of a Shock Army's
Operations], 3L
	
(1932), no. 11-12, p. 74.
153 Appen, 'Problema Narastaniia i Istoshcheniia v Grazhdanskoi Voine,
1918-1920 gg.' [The Problem of Accumulation and Exhaustion in the Civil War,
1918-1920),	 (1932), no. 7, p. 64.
154 Isserson, Osnovy, p. 131.
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month's advance. Rather than halt the advance and allowing the enemy
to regroup and establish a new front, Isserson recommended detaching
the most mobile elements (the mechani ged and cavalry corps and
motorised units) from the main body to form a new vanguard echelon.
This echelon, supported by the bulk of the army's air arm, would then
continue the offensive, without pausing, ahead of the army's slower-
moving rifle units until the operation's successful conclusion.155
From the above, it is evident that the basic theory of conduct-
ing consecutive operations had changed little since the 1920s,
despite the advent of modern weapons. Here, as in so many other
areas, Soviet practice continued to lag behind theory, and it was not
until World War II and the arrival of large amounts of American and
British wheeled and tracked vehicles that the Red Army finally
attained the requisite transport capability to carry out sustained
operations in depth.
However, an attack of this magnitude, even if carried out by a
reinforced shock army, could not hope to achieve a decisive success,
given the expected length of a future Eastern European front. The
fact that such an attack would have to be supported by other armies,
acting in concert, inevitably raised the question of the front level
of command and its place in the theory of operational art.
One of those who devoted a good deal of thought to the subject
was Varfolomeev, whose views on the front and its relationship to its
subordinate armies were solidly in accord with what was by now an
established tradition in Russian-Soviet military thought. His
thinking on the subject is particularly indicative of Mikhnevich's
and Movchin's influence concerning the relationship of 'complex'
(front) and 'simple' (army) operations. 'In planning operations',
Varfolomeev wrote,
the front command establishes the final goal and breaks
them (operations, R.H.J up into a series of intermediate ones.
The achievement of these latter goals is assigned to the armies
(as part of a front) and is regulated by definite tasks. With-
155 Ibid, pp. 132-33.
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in the framework of these tasks, forces and means allotted by
the front, the armies organise and conduct their operations.
As opposed to the front, simultaneously pursuing several goals
and acting along several operational axes, an army pursues one
goal and acts along a single operational axis. The grouping of
army operations in time and space issues from the overall idea
of the front operation and is aimed at achieving intermediate
front goals. The front's influence on the grouping of army
operations is expressed in the distribution of forces and means
between the armies and the regulation of activities in time
(deadlines) and space (axes and lines).156
In certain cases, such as an operation involving the neighbour-
ing forces of two fronts, the high command may assume direct control
over the armies' operations, in order to more effectively coordinate
their actions. In the majority of cases, however, the front command-
er will assign his subordinate armies initial objectives to a depth
of 100 kilometers, or through the enemy's operational defence. upon
achieving this initial task, the army commander will then receive
additional orders as to the operation's subsequent development.
Within the framework of the front commander's instructions, the
several army commanders enjoy considerable freedom of action, in
theory, in allotting forces and missions to subordinate unite, both
for the breakthrough and the subsequent development phases.157
A number of Red Army theorists continued to subsume the front
and the front operation under the rubric of strategy, rather than
operational art, a terminological holdover from the late imperial
era. One of the most influential of these was Isserson, who called
the front a 'formation of a strategic order', and who considered the
army the sole operational unit. 158 Varfolomeev did not address
this question directly, although his writings provide some interest-
ing insights as to the place of front operations in the strategic
sphere.
Varfolomeev believed, as had Triandafillov, that in order to
achieve a decisive success, an operation must be launched along a
156 Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, p. 172.
157 Ibid, pp. 188-89.
158 Isserson, Osnovy , p. 24.
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sufficiently broad front. His solution was to group several shock
armies into what he called a 'shock front' (udarnyi front), calculat-
ing that an offensive of this magnitude would not only absorb a large
number of enemy reserves, but would enable the front to launch deep
attacks along intersecting axes to encircle the defender's forces
still at the front. 159
 The existence of a shock front presupposes
the existence of other, passive, fronts, or those playing an auxilia-
ry role to the main offensive in a theatre of military activities,
much as secondary corps and armies in army and front operations.
This form was successfully employed by the Red Army on a number of
occasions during World War II, as during the Stalingrad counteroffen-
sive of November 1942, when the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts
struck the Axis defenders along both flanks, while the Don Front
pinned the enemy down north of the city. Even more impressive is the
example of the Belorussian strategic operation of 1944, which in-
volved four fronts. Here the First Baltic, First and Third Beloruss-
ian fronts carried out shock missions, with the Second Belorussian
Front consigned to an supproting role.
Other proposals for the organisation and employment of the
front were put forward during these years. Among the most interest-
ing was that drawn up by the staff of the Urals Military District,
which was commanded between 1935 and 1937 by 1.1. Gar'kavyi, a former
tsarist lieutenant.
The staff's report clearly saw the front as a strategic factor,
capable of operating independently in a given theatre of military
activities. The front might consist of several field armies; a
'cavalry-mechanised army'; large airborne units; heavy and light
aviation; tank, engineering, artillery, chemical and transport units,
as well as front reserves up to a rifle corps in strength. In
certain cases, depending upon geographical conditions, the front
might even include such non-traditional units as river flotillas and
even a fleet, if operating along a maritime axis. Such a concentra-
159 Varfolomeev, Udarnaia, pp. 173, 181.
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tion of force, the authors maintained, would enable the front to
conduct a series of consecutive operations to a depth of 300-400
kilometers over a month or more, during which time its mobile forrna-
tions might advance at times as much as 50 kilometers per day.160
It is clear from this description that the staff's notion of
the front's role differed little in organisation, with the exception
of purely technological changes, from that of Leer and Neznamov. In
fact, the authors' idea of the front's spatial responsibilities had
more in common with earlier ideas of a single front occupying an
entire theatre of military activities than with the smaller, strictly
operational force it would become during World War II. In other
respects, particularly as regards the subordination of naval units to
the ground forces commander, the staff's projected front recalls the
breadth of Kuropatkin's responsibilities in 1904-05, as well as
certain aspects of the Red Army's creation of strategic 'theatre'
commands in 1941-42 and 1945. Here, as in other areas, the Soviets
clearly overestimated their capabilities, particularly as concerns
the battlefield control of such an enormous force.
The authors did prove more prescient in forecasting the actions
of certain of the front's subordinate units during an offensive;
foremost the aforementioned cavairy-mechanised army (kouno-iiekhanizi-
rovannaia ariia). The cavairy-mechanised army was, according to the
report, a powerful force which might include as many as two mecha-
nised corps; one or two cavalry corps; two motorised divisions; a
brigade of medium tanks; two to three air brigades; plus additional
artillery, chemical and engineering troops, and was clearly designed
for mobile operations in depth. 161 However, unlike the shock army,
which it resembled in all but name, it was not intended that the
cavalry-mechanised army carry out a breakthrough on its own. Rather,
the army would be held in reserve as the front's mobile group, to be
committed following a breakthrough by one of the regular field
160 TSGASA, fond 37977, opis' 4, delo 258, pp. 123, 125-26.
161 Ibid, pp. 134, 138.
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armies, in much the same way that a mechanised corps would serve the
same purpose for its parent shock army. Once committed, the cavalry-
mechanised army, in conjunction with the front's other armies, or a
similar army from another front, would be able to carry out large-
scale encirciements of the defender's front-line troops.
The idea of the cavairy-mechanised army had its genesis in the
mounted arm's traditional exploitation role, although now on a much
greater and technologically more advanced scale. A more recent
source of inspiration was Budennyi's cavalry army and its dash from
the Kakhovka bridgehead in 1920 as the Southern Front's mobile group.
The cavalry-mechanised army did not appear as such during World War
II, but was transformed into the even more powerful tank armies,
which served as the fronts' mobile group in a number of major opera-
tions. The Red Army did create several smaller formations, known as
'cavairy-mechanised groups' (konno-ekhanizirovannye gruppy), con-
sisting of cavalry, tank and mechanised units, which were used
extensively to exploit front breakthroughs during 1944-45.
Finally, the most forlorn branch of operational art during
these years was, as always, the defensive operation. The subject
received only passing attention from the army's leading theorists,
who generally confined themselves to such generalities as stressing
the heavily anti-tank nature of modern defence and the need to
maintain adequate reserves to repel an attack.1 	 For example, the
army's leading theoretical journal, War and Revolution, published
only a single article dealing with defence at the operational level
during the period in question. In it, the author made the standard
Soviet division of defence into two types, planned and forced, de-
pending upon the decisions of one's own high command and the enemy's
actions. Either form could be employed actively or passively,
although the author considered a passive defence more likely in those
cases in which the army is forced to defend. The author, A. Anisov,
considered the active variant superior, because it gave the defender
TSGASA, fond 37977, opis' 3, delo 368, pp. 1006-08; Varfolomeev,
'Operativnoe', p. 2.
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more time to organise and carry out the necessary measures, while the
latter form suffered from its hurried and ad hoc character, generally
as the result of a previous failure.163
Anisov divided the army's defence into three main zones. The
first was the tactical zone, consisting of two defensive belts. The
first of these extended back some six kilometers from the front line,
and the second was located ten to 12 kilometers back. The tactical
zone, despite its designation, was the backbone of the army's de-
fence, and contained its main forces and most of its anti-tank
weapons. Behind this lay the operational zone, extending some 75
kilometers behind the front. This area contained the army's re-
serves, supply routes, and the greater part of its organic air power.
Behind this was a further rear zone, which contained supply depots,
bomber airfields, deep army and front reserves, as well as, in some
cases, a fortified rear army defensive line. This zone would also
contain the army and, sometimes even, front headquarters.64
The author put forward two proposals for conducting defensive
operations. The first relied on a positional approach and was more
or less static. It would be employed to hold particularly important
areas whose retention was vital. One method was to heavily reinforce
the tactical zone with reserves and attached units, in order to
prevent an enemy breakthrough from the very outset. A more active
approach involved launching a preemptive attack against the enemy's
penetrations, using tank and artillery units already concentrated in
the tactical zone, as well as reserves from the army rear. Anisov
believed that this would either thwart the enemy's offensive prepara-
tions altogether, or at least force him to postpone his attack.
However, should these measures fail and the enemy nonetheless pene-
trates the tactical zone, the army commander is to order a withdrawal
to a new position, while continuing to counterattack, in order to
163	 A. Anisov, 'Armeiskaia Oboronitel'naia Operatsiia' (The Army
Defensive Operation], 3
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slow the enemy's advance.165
The second proposal was less concerned with holding the tacti-
cal zone and more with pinning down enemy forces and winning time for
one's offensive endeavors on other portions of the front. In this
case, as a rule, the front would be lightly held, with some sectors
manned by covering forces only. Much more important is the army
reserve, which contains the bulk of the army's mobile and attached
units. This reserve would be echeloned in depth in the operational
defence zone, from which it could be quickly concentrated and dis-
patched to the front to bolster the tactical defence, by launching
counterattacks to ease enemy pressure. Should the attacker neverthe-
less succeed in breaking through, the reserve units would cover the
retreat to a new position by repeatedly counterattacking the pursuing
forces.
Significantly, none of the works from this period had anything
to say about defensive operations at the front level, whether viewed
through the prism of strategy or operational art. Indeed, strategic
defence, much as its counterpart on the operational level, was
woefully ignored during this period and beyond; a neglect which was
to have near-fatal consequences for the Red Army in 1941-42. Entire
Soviet armies were encircled and destroyed in the Wehrrnacht's 1941
summer and fall offensives, although in many cases this was due to
incompetence at the strategic level. Although the Red Army performed
appreciably better in the defensive fighting of 1942, it nevertheless
surrendered vast territories to the enemy and only recovered when the
German advance faltered for logistical reasons. In fact, it was not
until the Battle of Kursk, in the summer of 1943, that the Soviets
finally succeeded in constructing an operational-strategic defensive
system capable of halting the German army's attack.
The locus of the Red Army's work on the deep operation and
other aspects of operational art during these years was the expanding
165 Ibid, p. 45.
166 Ibid, pp. 47-48.
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network of military-educational establishments which were springing
up around the country. Chief among these until 1936 was the Frunze
Military Academy, which was headed during this period by R.P. Eideman
(1925-32), who had been a junior officer in the tsarist army; Shap-
oshnikov (1932-35), a former colonel and 1910 graduate of the imperi-
al General Staff Academy, and ; A.I. Kork (1935-37), a former captain
and 1914 graduate. Other important institutions included the RXKA
Military Academy of Mechanisation and Motorisation, and the RXKA
Military-Chemical Academy, both established in 1932.
The Frunze Academy, despite periodic campaigns against such
unorthodox thinkers as Svechin and Verkhovskii, continued its efforts
to turn out graduates versed in the ways of modern war. During the
1930s these increasingly took the form of investigating and dissemi-
nating the new theories of the deep battle and operation. The large
numbers of tanks and other weapons then entering the army's arsenal
lent an additional impetus to this search, so that as early as 1930
students were studying the fundamentals of the deep battle on the
basis of the 1929 field manual and were conducting map and field
exercises on the theme.167
However, the academy's increasingly tactical orientation was
insufficient to further the development of operational thought, and
in the summer of 1931. an operational department (operativnyi fakul'-
tet) was established as an adjunct to the academy. The department
offered a one-year course of study to exceptional graduates to
prepare them for staff work at the corps-army-front (military dis-
trict) level, as well as within the RXKA Staff. The course consisted
chiefly of lectures on the developing theory of the deep operation,
as well as more practical exercises, such as war games. Isserson was
appointed the first head of the department, which included among the
faculty the imperial General Staff Academy graduate A.K. Kolenkov-
skii, as well as a number of former tsarist officers such as S.N.
Krasil'nikov and A.N. Lapchinskii. The department, during its brief
167 Kazakov, p. 24; Isserson, 'Razvitie', no. 1, p. 38.
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existence, was able to make a significant contribution to forming the
next generation of high-ranking staff officers. Among its graduates
were the future chiefs of staff A.I. Antonov and M.V. Zakharov.1
However, the department's limited facilities could not keep up
with the army's growing demand for trained operational cadres. The
high command sought to fill this need by establishing, on the basis
of the operational department, a new General Staff Academy, in the
autumn of 1936. D.A. Kuchinskii, a former tsarist officer, was
appointed to head the academy, which included among the faculty such
graduates from itg imperial predecessor as Svechin, Verkhovskii,
Shilovskii, A.I. Gotovtsev, F.P. Shafalovich and others.169
The academy initially consisted of five departments: army
operations, renamed the department of operational art in 1937; the
tactics of higher formations; organisation and mobilisation; military
history; and, foreign languages. The jewel in the academy's crown
was the department of army operations, which embraced the army and
front, the theory of military strategy, independent air operations,
and land-sea operations. The department was headed by Isserson,
whose students spent most of their time studying army and front
operations through lectures and map exercises. Among the exercises
conducted that first year were those on such themes as 'Conducting a
Front Offensive Operation in the Western Theatre of Military Activi-
ties'; 'The Actions of the Breakthrough Development Echelon in a
Front Offensive Operation'; 'Breaking Through a Prepared Defence',
and 'The Commitment of a Mechanised Corps into Battle'.17°
A serious drawback in the academy's course of instruction was
the lack of a concrete course in strategy, which might have served as
the theoretical underpinning for further operational research. This
168 Bulgakova, pp. 26-27; Isserson, 'Razvitie', no. 1, p. 44; V.G.
Kulikov, ed., Akademiia General'no go Shtaba (The General Staff Academy)
(Moscow, 1976), p. 41.
169 Kulikov, p. 40; Bulgakova, p. 27.
170 Kulikov, pp. 45-46; Bulgakova, p. 33; Kazakov, p. 38; Vasilevskii,
p. 92.
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was a particularly damaging omission, as the front operation was
still viewed by many at the time as an instrument of strategy.
However, when Kuchinskii approached Egorov about the possibility of
instituting such a course at the academy, he was rudely cut off by
the marshal and informed that strategic questions were the sole
prerogative of the General Staff.171
Despite these and other shortcomings, the academy was, overall,
successful in developing and spreading the tenets of the deep opera-
tion and raising the theory to a level consistent with, if not above,
the degree of mechanisation achieved in the army by 1936. The
students of the first intake, in this respect, were particularly
distinguished and many of them went on to achieve fame during World
War II and after. These included the wartime chiefs of staff A.M.
Vasilevskii and A.I. Antonov; the front commanders I.Kh. Bagramian,
N.F. Vatutin, L.A. Govorov and P.A. Kurochkin, as well as several
front chiefs of staff, army commanders and other high-ranking of f i-
cers in the central military apparatus.
The Soviets also tested the theoretical concepts in a number of
large-scale maneuvers. One of the largest of these was held in
September 1935 in the Kiev Military District, and involved some
65,000 men, 3,000 vehicles, including 1,040 tanks, 600 aircraft and
300 artillery pieces. The maneuvers began with an attack by the
'blue' army towards Kiev, combined with an airborne landing east of
the city. The attackers succeeded in breaking through the 'red'
army's defences west of Kiev, whereupon they committed a cavalry-
mechanised group into the breach to develop the success. This
movement advanced rapidly until it was finally halted just short of
Kiev. The defenders then launched a counterattack, spearheaded by a
mechanised corps, which was able to turn the attacker's exposed flank
and break into his rear area. The maneuvers were also noteworthy for
the combined parachute-airborne landing of two rifle regiments and
171 Isserson, 'Razvitie', no. 3, pp. 49-50; Bagramian, p. 157.
172 Vasilevskii, p. 93.
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equipment.173
The deep operation was further tested a year later during
maneuvers in the Belorussian Military District. A total of 85,000
troops, 1,136 tanks, 580 guns and 638 aircraft took part in the
exercise, designed to test the army's operational concepts for the
outbreak of a war along the western frontier. Details are sketchy,
although two airborne brigades were dropped during the maneuvers, in
which Isserson and such famous wartime commanders as G.K. Zhukov,
I.S. Konev and R.Ia. Malinovskii took part.174
By 1936-37 the basic precepts of the deep operation were firmly
established in the Red Army, at least at the theoretical level. This
waB, overall, a triumph of Soviet military thinking and indicative of
how far intellectually the army had come in the two decades since the
revolution. Moreover, it was a theory which was very much the
product of Soviet circumstances, chief among which was the country's
momentous industrialisation drive, which transformed the army and
which had no counterpart in the tsarist era. Another was the chang-
ing composition of the theoretical cadres during this period and the
clear dominance of such impeccably Soviet writers as Isserson, whose
talents came to full fruition in the 1930g.
This is not to say that the former military specialists were by
any means excluded from the theory's development. As we have seen,
former officers and graduates of the old General Staff Academy, such
as Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, made important contributions to this
work, while other former officers, such as Tukhachevskii, made
important contributions as well. 175 On the whole, these tended to
be younger men who had graduated from the academy or entered the
tsarist army not long before the revolution and who had adapted
themselves to the new order without much difficulty. In this re-
173 A.M. Degtiarev, ed., Kievskii Krasnoznamennvi [Kiev Red Banner]
(Moscow, 1974), pp. 102-03; A.I. Eremenko, V Nachale Voiny (In the Beginning
of the War] (Moscow, 1965), pp. 8-11.
174 Zakharov, General'nyi, p. 101.
175 Isserson, 'Razvitie', no. 1, p. 42.
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spect, they remained poles apart from Svechin and others like him,
who essentially remained products of the old regime, and whose
influence declined sharply during the decade.
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EPILOGUE
For more than two years the armed forces had managed to escape
much of the horror which Stalin's great purge was visiting on other
areas of society. However, the logic of dictatorship decreed that
this situation could not continue indefinitely, and on 14 June 1937
the country was stunned to learn that a 'treasonous, counterrevo-
lutionary, military fascist organisation' had been uncovered within
the Red Army. The announcement went on to report that a group of
high-ranking officers, led by Marshal Tukhachevskii, had confessed to
charges of treason before a special military tribunal. 'The loath-
some traitors', the announcement continued, had been found guilty and
executed.1
However, this was only the beginning, as the full power of the
Stalinist terror machine was now turned against the armed forces. By
the time the bloodletting subsided somewhat in the autumn of 1938,
more than 40,000 people had been 'purged' from the army. 2 And
K.E. Voroshilov, 'Prikaz Narodnogo Komissara Oborony SSSR' [Order of
the USSR People's Defense Commissar], Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow), 14 June 1937,
p. 1. The other victims were I.P. Uborevich, commander of the Belorussian
Military District; I.E. lakir, commander of the Kiev Military District; A.I.
Kork, head of the Frunze Military Academy; R.P. Eideman, chairman of the
Oso&viakhi civil-military organization; B.M. Fel'dman, chief of the RKKA Main
Administration; V.M. Primakov, deputy commander of the Leningrad Military
District; and, V.K. Putna, most recently military attache in Great Britain.
Ia.B. Gaxnarnik, head of the RXKA Political Directorate, was to have been part
of this group, but he committed suicide before his arrest.
2 D.A. Volkogonov, Triumf i Tra gediia. Politicheskii Portret I.V.
Stalina (Triumph and Tragedy. A Political Portrait of I.V. Stalin), 2nd ed.
(Moscow, 1990), I. 513. This source cites as a source for this figure a
Voroshilov speech at the end of November 1938. Another source supports this
figure and claims that during 1937-38 more than 35,000 officers were
'dismissed' from the ground forces, 3,000 from the navy, and more than 5,000
from the air force. See V.V. Karpov, Marshal Zhukov. E go Soratniki j
Protivniki v Dni Voin y i Mira (Marshal Zhukov. His Comrades-in-Arms and
Enemies in Times of War and Peace] (Moscow, 1992), p. 74. Another source
mentions the figure of 35,000 victims in the officer corps. See W.G.
Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service (New York, 1939), p. 232. Erickson (p.
506) puts the loss at 20-25,000 men out of a pre-purge officer corps of 75-
80,000, while a recent Soviet article puts the total number of officers in the
RKKA at the time at slightly over 106,000 men.	 See O.F. Suvenirov,
'Vsearmeiskaia Tragediia' (An Army-Wide Tragedy), V-IZh (1989), no. 3, p. 39.
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although to be purged was not necessarily synonymous with death, it
can safely be assumed that most of this period's victims were either
shot outright or died subsequently in labour camps.
The purge took an especially heavy toll of the senior and mid-
level commanders, including two more marshals, Egorov and Bliukher.
Among the other victims were all 11 deputy defence commissars and 75
of the Military Council's 80 members. 3
 Of the military district
commanders, all but Budennyi were removed, and some military dis-
tricts, such as the Belorussian, suffered the loss of two commanders.
Among other prominent victims were air force commander Ia.Ia. Alksnis
and, in quick succession, the navy chiefs V.M. Orlov, M.V. Viktorov
and P.A. Smirnov. In fact, the purge hit the navy so hard that M.P.
Frinovskii, a veteran NKVD thug, was temporarily placed in command,
until he too perished.
In all, three of five marshals were executed, leaving only the
military non-entities Voroshilov and Budennyi. Both fleet admirals
were 'repressed' during this time, as were both admirals, all six
vice-admirals, and nine of 15 rear-admirals. Of four army commanders
first class, two were repressed, as were all 12 army commanders
second class. 60 of 67 corps commanders fell in the purge, as did 136
of 199 division commanders and 221 of 397 brigade commanders. The
political organs suffered no less severely. Both army commissars
first class became victims, as did all 15 commissars second class,
and 25 of 28 corps commissars. Of 97 division commisBars, 79 suf-
fered, as did 34 of 36 brigade commissars.4
Stalin's bloodlust even extended to the wives and children of
the purged commanders, many of whom endured long prison sentences and
worse, following their husbands' deaths. In a grisly but not uncom-
mon example, the wives of Tukhachevskii, Uborevich and Gamarnik were
Erickson, p. 505.
' Karpov, p. 73; Suvenirov, p. 41. Both sources cite the late A.I.
Todorskii, whose breakdown of the victims by rank has become standard among
Russian-Soviet historians.
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executed in the prison at Orel in July l94l.
The massive bloodletting seriously disrupted the Red Army's
continuity of development in every realm, particularly in the area of
command cadres. During 1937-38 all but one of the military district
commanders, all of their deputies and military district chiefs of
staff were replaced, as were 88% of the corps commanders and 100% of
their deputies. Of the division and brigade commanders, 99% were
replaced, as were 79% of regimental commanders, 88% of the regimental
chiefs of staff, and 87% of all battalion commanders. 6 By the
beginning of 1940 some 70% of division and regimental commanders had
been at their posts for only a year. 7 The army had been effectively
beheaded and an entire generation of experienced commanders removed,
to be replaced by officers who often lacked the necessary practical
and theoretical training for their jobs. N.G. Kuznetsov, for exam-
ple, became head of the Soviet navy in 1939, at the age of 37. The
wastage was so severe in other areas that several of the new General
Staff Academy's first-year students had their studies interrupted and
were assigned to posts far above their previous stations. 8 Many of
the new commanders' shortcomings quickly became apparent and were to
a great extent responsible for many of the disasters which befell the
Red Army at the beginning of the German invasion in 1941.
The purge indiscriminately cut down military specialists and
red commanders alike. Among the many victims were such former
tsarist officers as A.I. Gekker, V.M. Gittis, V.1. Shorin, N.N. Petin
and others who had joined the army during the Civil War. Equally
unfortunate were those commanders with impeccably proletarian creden-
tials, such as I.P. Belov, P.E. Dybenko, A.I. Sediakin, and G.D. Gai.
N.M. Iakupov, Tragediia Polkovodtsev [The Tragedy of the Commanders]
(Moscow, 1992), p. 304.
6 Karpov, pp. 75-76.
P.N. Pospelov, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovetskoao Soiuza,
1941-1945. Kratkaia Istoriia [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,
1941-1945. A Short History] (Moscow, 1965), p. 40.
8 Zakharov, General'nvi, pp. 52-53; Vasilevskii, pp. 93-94; Sandalov,
pp. 22-23; Kazakov, pp. 40-41.
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Others, such as K.K. Rokossovskii, K.A. Meretskov, and A.V. Gorbatov
were luckier; they were imprisoned and, in some cases, tortured, but
managed to escape execution. They were released and, in spite of
their treatment, went on to enjoy distinguished careers during World
War li. 9 Zhukov himself barely escaped arrest, but survived to rise
from the rank of cavalry division commander to Chief of the General
Staff in less than four years.0
The purge struck the army's intellectual cadres particularly
hard. D.A. Kuchinskii, the first head of the General Staff Academy,
was arrested in 1937 and died the following year. Another prominent
victim was 1.1. Vatsetis, the Red Army's first commander-in-chief,
who was arrested during a lecture break at the Frunze Military
Academy in 1937 and shot a year later. 11 Among the other victims
were many who had done much to enrich Soviet military thinking, such
as Verkhovksii, Movchin and Svechin, the latter of whom outlived his
arch-rival Tukhachevskii by only a year. Varfolomeev was arrested
somewhat later and was executed in prison in October 1941, alongside
such high-ranking commanders as G.M. Shtern and Ia.V. Smushkevich.
The consequences for the development of military theory were
devastating, particularly in the field of operations, where many of
those who were repressed had made their mark. In a typical piece of
Stalinist guilt by association, the execution of Tukhachevskii and
other 'enemies of the people' was sufficient to bring their theories
under suspicion. Isserson, one of the lucky survivors, recalled that
many of the most progressive theorists' writings were denounced and
removed from circulation, while in the General Staff Academy the very
For an interesting account of his arrest, imprisonment, transportation
and release, see A.V. Gorbatov's Gody i Voiny [Years and Wars] (Moscow, 1965),
pp. 126-72. Unfortunately, neither Rokossovskii's nor Meretskov's memoirs,
released during the Brezhnev years, mentions these events.
10 The details of Zhukov's narrow escape became known only in the later,
glasnost'-era editions of his memoirs. See Zhukov, I. 241-44. For another
version, see K.M. Simonov, 'Zametki k Biograf ii G.K. Zhukova' [Notes on a
Biography of G.K. Zhukov), V-IZh (1987), no. 6, p. 54.
A.T. Stuchenko, Zavidnaia Nasha Sud'ba [Our Enviable Fate] (Moscow,
1964), p. 63. This passage and other mentions of the purge were omitted from
the 1968 edition.
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fundamentals of the deep operation were viewed with suspicion.12
Isserson himself continued to lecture furtively on the subject,
although he did not dare to mention the deep operation by name. A
student of Isserson's later recalled that 'great bravery' was re-
quired of the advocates of the deep operation, the teaching of which
remained all but anathema until 1940.13
12 Isserson, 'Razvitie', no. 3, pp. 54-55. The deep operation's return
to favour was signaled by the appearance of Isserson's new book New Forms of
Battle, in 1940.
13 P. Grigorenko, V Podpol'e Mozhno Vstretit' Tol'ko Kr ys (In the
Underground One Meets Only Rats] (New York, 1981), p. 212.
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CONCLUSIONS
Stalin's destruction of the veteran cadres and the transforma-
tion of the armed forceB into the regime's cowed tool, marks a
decisive break with the army' revolutionary past, as bloody and
traumatic as the events leading to its creation in 1918. It is also
the logical vantage point from which to view the evolution of opera-
tional theory during the preceding third of a century, as this
development relates to the dissertation's central thesis--the degree
of continuity in Russian-Soviet operation art. This will be done by
examining the theory's development over the course of the 1904-37
period.
In evaluating the late-tsarist army's views on operations,
certain dominant themes emerge which, taken together, form a recog-
nizable, if nascent, body of operational thought. One of the most
important of these involves the semantic evolution of the operation
and the art of operations and their place in the hierarchy of mili-
tary art. Operations during these years were usually viewed as a
subset and tool of strategy for achieving strategic objectives in a
theatre of military activities. Indeed, important areas of contempo-
rary operational art, such as front operations, were seen as falling
into the strategic realm, a trend which continued well into the
1930s. Nevertheless, important theoretical distinctions had been
made, and these served as the point of departure when the debate
resumed in the 1920g.
Not the least of that decade's accomplishments was the Red
Army's liberation of operational art from the spheres of strategy and
tactics and its recognition as a separate theoretical entity. The
Soviets had inherited the tearist army's terminological confusion as
to the place of operations in the hierarchy of military art, and this
was reflected initially in the army's academic offerings. However,
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by the mid-].920s the situation had begun to change, and the current
ranking of strategy, operational art and tactics caine into being.
This was due primarily to the efforts of Svechin and such younger
former officers as Varfolomeev, whose theoretical influence in the
Red Army was considerable, despite their less than auspicious social
origins.
Easily the most observable line of continuity between the
imperial army and its successor is the persistent notion of the front
(group of armies) level of command, both in theory and practice. The
growth of modern armies and the vast distances anticipated in a war
in Eastern Europe compelled the Russians to adopt this form long
before anyone else. Thus Leer's ruminations on a group of armies
operating in a single theatre of military activities found concrete
expression in the Russian army's 1900 war plan, which envisaged the
creation of two fronts in the western theatre of war. Kuropatkin's
armies in Manchuria constituted a front in everything but name, while
such postwar theorists as Neznamov and Mikhnevich proceeded to refine
the concept and its commander's responsibilities in relation to its
subordinate armies and the high command. Thus was born the Stavka-
front-army system of subordination, which remained a fixture of
Soviet operational organisation for many years.
However, a major point of terminological ambiguity continued to
dog the notion of the front for many years afterwards This confusion
had its origins in the imperial army's designation of the front as a
force capable of performing strategic missions, was reflected in the
army's 1900 and succeeding war plans, in which each front was given
the strategic task of defeating a member of the enemy coalition.
This system was adopted virtually without change during the Civil
War, which saw the Red Army conduct a number of single-front opera-
tions along a theatre of military activities, or two fronts operating
in tandem in a single theatre of war. The idea of the front as a
strategic unit persisted well into the 1930s, which meant that for
many years the army remained the sole operational formation. Howev-
er, by the end of the decade the situation had changed, so that by
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the time the USSR entered World War II the front instance of command
had become firmly entrenched as a key aspect of operational art.
Another, if more tenuous, area of continuity between the two
armies, lay in the area of conducting multiple operations. This
possibility had been raised as early as 1911 by Neznamov, who,
unfortunately, devoted little space to the subject other than empha-
sizing the likely need for them. It fell, instead, to the Red Army,
which had the benefit of the examples of 1914 and 1920 to guide it,
to devise a method for conducting extended operations in depth, and
to determine what, if any, were the inherent limits of such opera-
tions. The result of this work was the theory of consecutive opera-
tions, in which one operation flows from and succeeds another in
pursuit of a larger strategic objective. In this area, as in so many
others, such former officers as Svechin, Varfolomeev, Movchin and
Triandafillov played a major role.
Another of the imperial army's legacies had less to do with a
particular tradition than with the vagaries of conducting operations
along the extended fronts of Eastern Europe. This concerned the
efficacy of launching major offensive efforts along sufficiently-
broad frontages, in pursuit of a decisive result. Most of this
experience was gained at first-hand, notably during Brueilov's 1916
offensive, which owed part of its success to the front commander's
novel expedient of launching several, smaller supporting attacks
along widely-separated sectors of the front in support of a more-
concentrated main effort elsewhere. The method was adopted by the
Red Army out of sheer necessity during the Civil War, given the
extended fronts of that conflict. Postwar theorists developed this
idea further in a number of historical studies which supported the
idea of launching broad-front offensives.
Another, lesser, area of agreement include Neznamov's early
division of the operation into offensive, meeting and defensive
types. This delineation was picked up whole cloth by Red Army
theorists, who grafted it, without substantial change, to the techno-
logically more-proficient army of the 1930s.
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However, despite the evidence of a good deal of theoretical and
practical continuity between the two armies, there are significant
areas of divergence as well, which involve the Red Army's ideological
and technical composition.
The first quality set the Red Army decisively apart from its
imperial predecessor, which was fairly apolitical. The ideological
absolutes and political controls imposed upon the army created an
ethos not disposed to recognize limits, and which could hardly have
failed to have an impact on the nature of its military operations.
Consequently, the political-military belief that the communist
ideology represented the most dynamic historical forces naturally
inclined the army towards offensive operations.
Whatever one may think of the Bolsheviks' political goals,
there is nonetheless a refreshing vitality in the Red Army's conduct
of Civil War operations. This stands in marked contrast to the
Russian army's disgraceful performance in Manchuria and throughout
much of World War I, and is evidence of the tsarist regime's overall
decline as much as of any specifically military shortcomings.
However, the Red Army's laudable preference for offensive operations
was purchased at what later proved to be a stiff price. It is hardly
surprising, given these muscular attitudes, that the army's study of
defensive operations was seriously neglected, which carried over into
all aspects of its post-Civil War strategy, operational art and
tactics.
The other dissonant note is the Red Army's technical makeover
in the ].930s, which also set it apart from its predecessor. The
army, in recasting itself as a modern force, thus broke decisively
with the tsarist tradition of technological inferiority vis a vis the
West. By 1936-37 this process was substantially completed and the
Red Army had become the equal of any of the major European powers,
and its military might easily surpassed that of Nazi Germany, whose
rearmament program was barely under way. This quantitative growth
ushered in equally impressive changes in the armed forces' organisa-
tion, and saw the introduction of such operationally-significant
312
formations as mechanised brigades and corps, which had no counterpart
in the tsarist army.
The Red Army's transformation, from a force not markedly
different in technical prowess from its tsarist predecessor, to a
truly modern army also had profound effects on the development of its
operational theory. This was most evident in what later became known
as the deep operation, which sought to exploit the striking power and
mobility of modern weapons to resolve the problem of breaking through
a solid defensive front.
As the above shows, the task of determining the tsarist mili-
tary legacy's relative weight in the formation of the Soviet theory
of operational art is highly complex. The pre-revolutionary era, for
obvious reasons, presents no problem in this respect, although a
knowledge of the period'B theoretical and practical developments is
crucial to understanding what followed. Much the same is true
concerning the Civil War,in which the contribution of the military
specialists, both professional officers and those holding wartime
commissions, was decisive to the Soviets' victory.
It is in studying the interwar period from 1921 to 1937 that
the problem becomes more complicated, although the specialists'
dominance in many areas is unmistakable. Thus even if one adheres to
the dissertation's narrow definition of this group as consisting
entirely of professional officers alone, the contribution of such men
as Svechin, Shaposhnikov, Varfolomeev and Tukhachevskii, among
others, to the development of Soviet operational thought is impres-
sive. If one takes a broader view and includes among this group such
former wartime officers as Triandafillov and Movchin, then the case
for the former officers' dominance of military theory, particularly
in the first postwar decade, becomes overwhelming, with only a very
few exceptions, such as Frunze, to dispute their monopoly.
However, the older specialists' influence was already waning,
even as the decade was coming to an end. This was due to a variety
of reasons, the most obvious being the overall decline in the number
of specialists in the army in the wake of the large reduction in
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personnel after 1920. Another, more subtle, explanation lies in the
changing technical character of the Red Army itself and the inability
of many specialists, particularly of the older generation, to adapt
to the new mechanisation era. This was becoming evident as early as
1929, and one need only compare the true specialist Kolenkovskii's
The Offensive Oteration of an Army as Part of a Front, with Trianda-
fillov's The Character of Operations of Modern Armies, both of which
appeared in that crucial year, to notice the sea change. Whereas the
former deals with a Red Army not markedly different from its imperial
predecessor, Triandafillov's groundbreaking work already envisaged a
qualitatively new force based on the latest achievements in military
technology. Kolenkovskii's failure was symbolic of a larger shift,
and with the onset of widespread mechanisat ion within the armed
forces the senior military specialists were increasingly relegated to
the sidelines, although a few, such as Shaposhnikov continued to
render command and staff valuable service. For the most part,
however, it fell to such younger specialists as Tukhachevskii,
Varfolomeev and Shilovskii, as well as such wholly Soviet products as
Isserson, to rework the army's operational theory in accordance with
its new capabilities. Thus the appearance of a new, mechanised Red
Army heralded the breakdown of the old imperial-Soviet synthesis, as
personified by the older military specialists, and their replacement
by younger, more self-consciously Soviet, cadres. Likewise, while
Soviet operational theory of the mid-l930s retained many features
which linked it to the past, it was at the same time heavily obliged
to exclusively Soviet circumstances for its birth and development.
As we have seen, this period ended with the destruction of
practically all the old specialist cadres, as well as a good portion
of the non-specialist ranks, and their replacement with officers who,
with a few exceptions, had no institutional connection with the old
army and who were almost entirely unaware of its theoretical heri-
tage. However, neither this precipitate end, nor the relative
decline in the specialists' influence from the late 1920s, should
obscure the influence of their ideas on the development of the Red
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Army's theory of operational art. In fact, the evidence is over-
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